Alliance System sans Dreadnoughts

[Riain]

Well actually since they built numerous capital ships for foreign powers then there is strong evidence that yes the British could build more than 3.5 capital ships a year, especially as that was an average and there were some years when the British built notably more ships and some years when they slacked off.

Anyway I asked if you were arguing that is was morally wrong for the British to make alliances in the face of a German Fleet that was created entirely to put pressure on the British and you answer boils down to:Yes.

Fine I now know your position.

Just to restates mine for the record. It is that Britain was never entirely as clear in its collective political mind to oppose Germany as some later historians suppose. There was some marked debate on not simply the scale of intervention in Belgium but its objectives. I therefore argue that while it might not be a sure fire solution actually Germany would have been better off with a fleet of battleships and cruisers not aimed at the British in the North Sea but sufficient to defend German interests in the Baltic and its coasts and possibly contest the French in Germany's oversea Empire. This might not stop the British weighing in against them but if it prevented the Entente Cordial being quite so cosy that might well have slowed if not out right limited British intervention which has to be in Germany's interests. There is even the possibility that it might have prevented any kind of Anglo-French rapprochement at all which would have been extremely beneficial to Germany's interests.

I have counted a couple of the ships Britain built for foreign powers given they were taken on by the RN, which leaves only a couple maybe 3 or 4 not counted which is hardly an indication of great slack in the British shipbuilding industry and great restraint by British politicians in the face of intolerable provocation.

I don't think it is morally wrong for Britain to concentrate in the North Sea or to make an Entente with France and Russia. My problem is with the argument often stated on this board that Germany building a 'bigger' fleet from 1899 'provoked' Britain and since Germany didn't need a fleet and Britain did Germany was morally wrong to 'provoke' Britain. Germany was perfectly within its rights to expand its navy in the face of the 1893 Franco-Russian alliance and the massive preponderance of the RN, just as it was within its rights to expand the Army in 1913 when France went to a 3 year conscription term and Russia began making offensive mobilisation plans. I don't buy the 'Germany is the guilty party' line, that's all, there is enough blame to go around for every ignorant dickhead of the era.

 

[RodentRevolution]

I have counted a couple of the ships Britain built for foreign powers given they were taken on by the RN, which leaves only a couple maybe 3 or 4 not counted which is hardly an indication of great slack in the British shipbuilding industry and great restraint by British politicians in the face of intolerable provocation.

I don't think it is morally wrong for Britain to concentrate in the North Sea or to make an Entente with France and Russia. My problem is with the argument often stated on this board that Germany building a 'bigger' fleet from 1899 'provoked' Britain and since Germany didn't need a fleet and Britain did Germany was morally wrong to 'provoke' Britain. Germany was perfectly within its rights to expand its navy in the face of the 1893 Franco-Russian alliance and the massive preponderance of the RN, just as it was within its rights to expand the Army in 1913 when France went to a 3 year conscription term and Russia began making offensive mobilisation plans. I don't buy the 'Germany is the guilty party' line, that's all, there is enough blame to go around for every ignorant dickhead of the era.

The only thing the German ruling classes were guilty of was in regards their navy was stupidity. When your most likely enemies are a couple of land powers building a fleet to contest the oceans with a power you would really like to stay neutral only works if you can build a big enough fleet to truly intimidate them.

However the Germans found themselves in the worst of possible outcome zones from their policy. What they did not do was force the British to up their game in terms of naval procurement, that is the point about the 3.5 capital ships a year when Britain at maximum effort could probably turn out 5 a year, the British kept building at the same rate as before. What happened though was that the Royal Navy was forced to redeploy to focus on the German threat. This in turn forced a re-appraisal of relations with France and Russia, as Britain did not want to risk distractions away from the home area.
Yet having achieved nothing save to force a potential neutral closer to the camp of the enemy the Germans then found they could not afford to continue with their naval building programme. So they are stuck with a naval building program that has not come close to threatening severe losses on the RN line of battle in an all up confrontation but has pushed the British into a military accord with France and by extension Russia but above all made the British, being all self-centred, absolutely convinced that they are the target of all Germany's conquest fantasies.

Still the good news is that peace only has to last till sometime around 1916-1918 for the British draw ahead enough again to realise the German threat is distinctly marginal by 1914 the British programs would have resulted in some 36 battleships and 10 battlecruisers but you could expect more to be added in the 1915 spending proposals so the actual numbers for that year would likely be higher and thus Germany would be seen as not requiring any longer a sufficient concentration of force to compromise Imperial Defence. Shame war broke out in 1914.

It is not a moral issue, it is an issue of brains and German leadership of the period clearly did not have a sufficiency.

 

[Riain]

It is not a moral issue, it is an issue of brains and German leadership of the period clearly did not have a sufficiency.

Germany did have a pretty bad political system, Britain's was better but then again Russia's was worse.

Germany did manage to keep considerable British resources invested in capital ship building, the Admiral Class BCs were the result of a scare over the idea the Germans were building some fancy BCs when they weren't. It is often stated on this board that Germany building capital ships meant less uboats or army equipment, so given the engine of the war was the Western Front how many British army units didn't get created by the GF having to be double the size of the HSF to maintain a superiority of numbers on every day of the war?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tirpitz_Plan

You don't even need to read too much, the article is pretty much a summary of the succinct points.

Tirpitz, probably (in my opinion) in a desire to maximise his importance in the Reich, laid out his plan to build a navy to challenge Britain. Inherent in that plan was the "risk theory" that the German fleet might be 'Copenhagenised' by the British. Hardly the plan of a man who had no intention of aggression towards Britain. In the end, he (Tirpitz) failed to realise the British would expand their fleet to meet the risk. Starting from a trailing position, Germany (once Britain picked up their production) could never catch up.
The Entente Cordiale and the Anglo-Russian Convention allowed Britain to meet that threat with no distractions.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Germany did have a pretty bad political system, Britain's was better but then again Russia's was worse.

Germany did manage to keep considerable British resources invested in capital ship building, the Admiral Class BCs were the result of a scare over the idea the Germans were building some fancy BCs when they weren't. It is often stated on this board that Germany building capital ships meant less uboats or army equipment, so given the engine of the war was the Western Front how many British army units didn't get created by the GF having to be double the size of the HSF to maintain a superiority of numbers on every day of the war?

About minus 60 divisions. That is the HSF effectively added some sixty plus divisions to the forces available to France from her allies.

There most likely would not have been a British Expeditionary Force engaged on the German Western Front...the much smaller British Expeditionary Force would be solely charged with securing the Belgian Neutral Zone around the ports of that nation at least one possible outcome without a Risk HSF

 

[Riain]

About minus 60 divisions. That is the HSF effectively added some sixty plus divisions to the forces available to France from her allies.

There most likely would not have been a British Expeditionary Force engaged on the German Western Front...the much smaller British Expeditionary Force would be solely charged with securing the Belgian Neutral Zone around the ports of that nation at least one possible outcome without a Risk HSF

So if Germany had a navy the size of France or Russia the commercial competition and other issues that drove the British into an Entente with France and Russia wouldn't have happened? I love the big calls, but that is a whopper that I'd shy away from making.

 

[RodentRevolution]

So if Germany had a navy the size of France or Russia the commercial competition and other issues that drove the British into an Entente with France and Russia wouldn't have happened? I love the big calls, but that is a whopper that I'd shy away from making.

Can I say with absolute certainty? No but I would point out that even with the larger risk HSF and the rest of the above on top of an actual invasion of Belgium the British Government still actually hesitated...now this suggests to me that it might not have taken all that much to decide the British Government to undertake a more limited response right down to doing absolutely nothing and being the most neutral of neutrals.

Even if the British did not then Germany would have been no worse off at sea, save that yes she might have been able to afford slightly more u-boats and she might also have been better off on land with extra capacity to support her land forces or internal economy. The British would likely have had a RN of roughly if not exactly the same size anyway in line with her traditional practices so unlikely to see an even bigger BEF.

So since we can only ever make margin calls on probabilities then yes I would argue that Germany would have most likely faced a very different and much more beatable alliance had she not followed the siren calls of Tirptiz and the Navy League.

 

[LordKalvert]

Hum I am going to have to assume that in a spirit of exacting fairness you have decided to submit a piece of evidence that weights against your contention....I had not even got to end of the first paragraph of your source and:



So it seems that there is an indication that from very early on at least someone in Britain were concerned by the German Fleet. Then we have this paragraph:




Whilst in the final paragraph Germany and German is mentioned no less than eight (8) times making it rather clear. Further throughout we see that in regards Germany it is her naval ambitions and the manner in which she is going about them that vexes the author.

Now we do not actually know how influential in Britain's ruling circles the author was but as you can see it was German Naval policy that flagged it up as a threat to at least that individual.

Hum I am going to have to assume that in a spirit of exacting fairness you have decided to submit a piece of evidence that weights against your contention....I had not even got to end of the first paragraph of your source and:



So it seems that there is an indication that from very early on at least someone in Britain were concerned by the German Fleet. Then we have this paragraph:




Whilst in the final paragraph Germany and German is mentioned no less than eight (8) times making it rather clear. Further throughout we see that in regards Germany it is her naval ambitions and the manner in which she is going about them that vexes the author.

Now we do not actually know how influential in Britain's ruling circles the author was but as you can see it was German Naval policy that flagged it up as a threat to at least that individual.

What the piece shows is that the German fleet is only a small part of what is driving the British foreign policy at the time- the need for reconciliation with France and Russia is seen in much broader terms. In no way does it contradict anything I said.

The German fleet is more nuisance than threat to Great Britain. If she was really concerned about her naval position, doubling the fleet of Germany is something she could do without any of the diplomatic moves.

None of the crisis after the Entente have Germany threatening British interests at all- Morocco? the Balkans?

No what Britain's aim is is to channel France and Russia away from British interests and towards Germany. Just the way the game is played

 

[King Augeas]

I'm reading Robert Massie's Dreadnought at the moment and the impression that I'm taking from it is that Britain was looking for a European ally and Germany thought that she was the only option, causing her to overplay her hand. When negotiations failed, France, having realised how weak and isolated she was at Fashoda, seized the opportunity to repair relations. Britain was happy to gain a continental friend; Germany, astonished and fearing encirclement, responded by trying to force the new Entente apart, which only drove Britain and France closer together.

The causes of German overconfidence seem to have been many-fold. One of these is the fleet construction but at this point it doesn't seem to have been decisive - more relevant at this point was the feeling of isolation in Britain and the desire for a European friend. Later, of course, the fleet construction and German diplomacy just cement the Entente.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

What the piece shows is that the German fleet is only a small part of what is driving the British foreign policy at the time- the need for reconciliation with France and Russia is seen in much broader terms. In no way does it contradict anything I said.

It contradicts everything you've said. The reason Britain is reconciling with Russia and France (I'm not sure you can call it a reconciliation when there's never been a conciliation in the first place) is because of Germany. The reason Britain is hostile to Germany is because of the German fleet - unless you think 2,500 Schutztruppen in G.E.A. is terrifying London?

I'm reading Robert Massie's Dreadnought at the moment and the impression that I'm taking from it is that Britain was looking for a European ally and Germany thought that she was the only option, causing her to overplay her hand. When negotiations failed, France, having realised how weak and isolated she was at Fashoda, seized the opportunity to repair relations. Britain was happy to gain a continental friend; Germany, astonished and fearing encirclement, responded by trying to force the new Entente apart, which only drove Britain and France closer together.

The causes of German overconfidence seem to have been many-fold. One of these is the fleet construction but at this point it doesn't seem to have been decisive - more relevant at this point was the feeling of isolation in Britain and the desire for a European friend. Later, of course, the fleet construction and German diplomacy just cement the Entente.

It really is an excellent book, full of insights and useful information for potential PODs.

 

[Riain]

It contradicts everything you've said. The reason Britain is reconciling with Russia and France (I'm not sure you can call it a reconciliation when there's never been a conciliation in the first place) is because of Germany. The reason Britain is hostile to Germany is because of the German fleet - unless you think 2,500 Schutztruppen in G.E.A. is terrifying London?




It really is an excellent book, full of insights and useful information for potential PODs.

German was competing with Britain commercially because she had industrialised later and had more efficient industrial plant and practices, this competition was a problem for Britain an would occur if Germany built 1.1 capital ships per year that was her pre Naval Law building tempo or 2.5 capital ships per year of 1899-1905 and 1907-1917.

Similarly, while Germany kept her army small she was getting richer, more developed and more populous by the year and thus more capable of expanding in the style of 1864-70. This hegemonic potential was a problem for Britain and would occur if Germany built 1.1 capital ships per year that was her pre Naval Law building tempo or 2.5 capital ships per year of 1899-1905 and 1907-1917.

The expanded German fleet was merely one of a number of problems Britain had with Germany, its perhaps the most visible and certainly the coolest, but in the halls of power in Britain the other factors were given sufficient weight.

 

[RodentRevolution]

German was competing with Britain commercially because she had industrialised later and had more efficient industrial plant and practices, this competition was a problem for Britain an would occur if Germany built 1.1 capital ships per year that was her pre Naval Law building tempo or 2.5 capital ships per year of 1899-1905 and 1907-1917.

Similarly, while Germany kept her army small she was getting richer, more developed and more populous by the year and thus more capable of expanding in the style of 1864-70. This hegemonic potential was a problem for Britain and would occur if Germany built 1.1 capital ships per year that was her pre Naval Law building tempo or 2.5 capital ships per year of 1899-1905 and 1907-1917.

The expanded German fleet was merely one of a number of problems Britain had with Germany, its perhaps the most visible and certainly the coolest, but in the halls of power in Britain the other factors were given sufficient weight.

Except that the same could be said of the USA and we do not see the British forming alliances to contain the Americans. In the case of both nations where it was a case of industrial development that was a question that was not a threat to the British ruling and monied classes but an investment opportunity. For example the growth of the German merchant marine led to more orders from Germany to British shipbuilders, you might also want to ask who owned the gas companies lighting European cities towards the end of the 19th century?

Yes weight may have been given but to a Government with a history of lassez faire economics you really needed a direct threat of consequence to impact foreign policy.

 

[Riain]

Except that the same could be said of the USA and we do not see the British forming alliances to contain the Americans. In the case of both nations where it was a case of industrial development that was a question that was not a threat to the British ruling and monies classes but an investment opportunity. For example the growth of the German merchant marine led to more orders from Germany to British shipbuilders, you might also want to ask who owned the gas companies lighting European cities towards the end of the 19th century?

Yes weight may have been given but to a Government with a history of lassez faire economics you really needed a direct threat of consequence to impact foreign policy.

The American thing perfectly illustrates my point, without a number of factors going against them Britain won't form an alliance. Indeed they didn't form a alliance IOTL despite commercial, naval and continental hegemonic threats emanating from Germany. If Germany continued to build 1.1 capital ships per year as they did 1890-1899 they'd still build enough to put Britain into the Entente camp in the wishy washy way it happened IOTL.

On an unrelated note I'm currently obsessed with the growth of the US military in the pre WW1 timeframe, fascinating topic.

 

[RodentRevolution]

The thing is without the Germans building more than around half British numbers they fail to become a threat. Take 1.1 as your value. The British might then expect to divert 1.5 out of their 3.5 newly ordered battleships per year to counter Germany's fleet even as it grows. Now take a look at what everybody else was building. A case in point was the US who by 1918 had I believe some 16 dreadnought and superdreadnought rate battleships in the water, the total rest of the world number with the HSF scuttled was 44 capital ships (this includes battlecruisers as well as battleships) and the British count was 42. Now I suspect the rest of the world total to be slightly higher without a certain war but so too would the British one be. This strongly suggests that the British could reasonably expect to mount a credible defence and contain Germany.

A lot less cause for getting involved. Wars cost money and the British already felt something of the fear of being an empire in decline. Stay out but loom just enough to make sure no one tries to actually take another player off the board.

So I am really not seeing a for sure and certain driver to alliance or even entente without a German Naval Bill or two. Rather I expect the British might be content to watch and wait for longer.

 

[TRH]

So I am really not seeing a for sure and certain driver to alliance or even entente without a German Naval Bill or two. Rather I expect the British might be content to watch and wait for longer.

The naval business I don't understand as well, but I do know that the British had come to see their state of non-alignment as dangerous, so they wanted an alliance to hitch their wagon to. The French one just happened to be more attractive for a number of reasons. But from the 1890's or so onwards, I don't think they wanted Splendid Isolation any longer.

 

[LordKalvert]

The naval business I don't understand as well, but I do know that the British had come to see their state of non-alignment as dangerous, so they wanted an alliance to hitch their wagon to. The French one just happened to be more attractive for a number of reasons. But from the 1890's or so onwards, I don't think they wanted Splendid Isolation any longer.

Diplomacy rarely moves on a single track and there are multiple reasons for everything.

Anglo-German relations had been excellent until near the end of the Roseberry administration when there is a sharp division. The main driving point is the Germans feel that the British are no longer showing enough support for German allies- Austria and the Ottomans in the Balkans and the Italians in Ethiopia. The Germans are furious with the British for stirring up the Armenian issue which threatened the Sultan and Austria's interests in the Balkans. The close relations that Britain was developing with Russia and France at the time was seen as a serious threat.

One of the main reasons for joining Russia in the Triple Intervention was to drive a wedge in Anglo-Russian relations.

The Germans also think the British should have given more support to the Italians in Ethiopia. The collapse of the Crispi regime is a severe blow to the Germans

This is the backdrop to the Kruger Telegram. The Germans are trying to show the British that Britain needs Germany and her allies. It doesn't work

The British make several approaches to the Germans or rather Chamberlain does. These approaches are attempts to limit Russian expansion in the Far East. Expansion that the Kaiser was encouraging to get the Russians off his back and maybe a share of the spoils

It's only when the Yangtze agreement is reached that the British realize that Germany will no longer be a obstacle to Russia

If you read Grey's memorandum carefully, he talks about "no longer opposing Russia's natural expansion in the Balkans". Now that's a powerful phrase. It shows that Britain's intent is to drive Russia towards the Balkans and bring about a rupture in Russo-German relations.

In other words, what Britain truly fears is a Russo-German accord. By pushing Russia away from the Far East, where Britain's interests are rather minimal, and towards the Balkans, Britain hopes to prevent a Russo-German alliance and end their naval building. We should remember that the navy ranks in 1901, are Britain-France-Russia-Germany (?) or the US. Russia is also outbuilding France at the time. Can the British really be that afraid of the 4th biggest navy? Does that make any sense at all?

Even in the period 1910-1914 the Germans are spending only an average of 11,000,000 pounds a year on fleet construction. The British naval budget is over 40 million pounds. A 25% increase in the naval budget would hardly break the British budget and would be far cheaper than risking the Empire

Finally, the settlement with France. Basically, its Morocco for Egypt. The French entente is bought at the expense of German treaty rights in Morocco.

All of this makes clear- British policy is to settle with France and Russia and drive them into conflict with Germany as a means of preventing a European triplice. If Germany is not going to stand in France and Russia's way, than France and Russia should be pushed into Germany's way

Even without a German fleet, British interests are to push the French and especially the Russians onto Austro-German interests

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Even in the period 1910-1914 the Germans are spending only an average of 11,000,000 pounds a year on fleet construction. The British naval budget is over 40 million pounds. A 25% increase in the naval budget would hardly break the British budget and would be far cheaper than risking the Empire

Finally, the settlement with France. Basically, its Morocco for Egypt. The French entente is bought at the expense of German treaty rights in Morocco.

All of this makes clear- British policy is to settle with France and Russia and drive them into conflict with Germany as a means of preventing a European triplice. If Germany is not going to stand in France and Russia's way, than France and Russia should be pushed into Germany's way

Even without a German fleet, British interests are to push the French and especially the Russians onto Austro-German interests

In 1910 construction of battleships were Dreadnoughts. It was considered that Dreadnoughts made all other capital ships obsolete. Therefore the totals had been 'reset' and the totals were much closer - the German Dreadnoughts with their design, range and deployment were considered the threat to the Empire. From a British perspective, Morrocco for Egypt makes sense - it removes the French claim to Egypt, securing the all-important short sea route to India - in exchange for respecting French claims in a country with minimal British interests. The Anglo-Russian Convention is the same principal for Iran, Tibet and Afghanistan - relations, while never placing serious financial strain on Britain, were normalised.

Also by 1904 (signing of the Entente Cordiale) an European Triplice isn't a credible possibility. Without Germany completely changing her foreign policy (and returning Alsace-Lorraine one would assume?) there is no way there is going to be a reproachment between Germany and France.

Germany was seen as the aggressive, growing, power that was the threat to European stability. Probably mainly down to the bombast of the Kaiser. Germany was a threat to Russia and France directly and to many other powers indirectly through the risk of European War. Whilst she built a fleet that challenged the British, concentrated so close to the British Isles, she also threatened Britain as well. British policy was to ensure calm on the continent by supporting the weaker side of any alliance block, therefore levelling the playing field. For Britain to support Germany would have tipped the balance decisively in Germany's favour.

 

[LordKalvert]

In 1910 construction of battleships were Dreadnoughts. It was considered that Dreadnoughts made all other capital ships obsolete. Therefore the totals had been 'reset' and the totals were much closer - the German Dreadnoughts with their design, range and deployment were considered the threat to the Empire. From a British perspective, Morrocco for Egypt makes sense - it removes the French claim to Egypt, securing the all-important short sea route to India - in exchange for respecting French claims in a country with minimal British interests. The Anglo-Russian Convention is the same principal for Iran, Tibet and Afghanistan - relations, while never placing serious financial strain on Britain, were normalised.

Also by 1904 (signing of the Entente Cordiale) an European Triplice isn't a credible possibility. Without Germany completely changing her foreign policy (and returning Alsace-Lorraine one would assume?) there is no way there is going to be a reproachment between Germany and France.

Germany was seen as the aggressive, growing, power that was the threat to European stability. Probably mainly down to the bombast of the Kaiser. Germany was a threat to Russia and France directly and to many other powers indirectly through the risk of European War. Whilst she built a fleet that challenged the British, concentrated so close to the British Isles, she also threatened Britain as well. British policy was to ensure calm on the continent by supporting the weaker side of any alliance block, therefore levelling the playing field. For Britain to support Germany would have tipped the balance decisively in Germany's favour.

The German fleet is more nuisance than threat and in fact by 1914 Russian naval construction had once again surpassed Germany's.

Of course, the French entente prevents a European triplice (which was its point) unless the Russians and the Germans come to an agreement and France gets dragged into it. That is what Germany tries at Bjorko. If the Russians win the Japanese war, that is real. Britain desperately wants to avoid that

Germany is actually, the weaker party when the Entente is conceived. Its only the Japanese War that throws the balance of power towards Germany. In 1903, both the French and Russian navies are bigger than Germany's, the dreadnought not thought of and the land balance is massively in favor of the Franco-Russians. Germany's diplomatic position isn't as bad (Italy and Romania are more faithful and Serbia of little importance) but otherwise: The Germans had just learned of the French 75 recoil mechanism and had no counter, few heavy artillery pieces, no trench mortars, no grenades and are still wearing Prussian blue. The Russian army had not been broken by the Japanese War.

finally, the British are convinced that the Austrian Empire was a goner destined to dissolve upon Franz Ferdinand's death

If anything it is German weakness that is driving the policy at hand rather than a real fear of the German navy. The Germans are well aware of their weakness in artillery

The period of German strength from 1905- (without a war) about 1917 is unusual and not the normal state of affairs. The Germans seeing this gap disappearing is driving the advocates of war

 

[King Augeas]

All of this makes clear- British policy is to settle with France and Russia and drive them into conflict with Germany as a means of preventing a European triplice.

Chamberlain's attempts for a German alliance can hardly be understood in terms of a strategy to settle with France and Russia. Britain wanted a friend in Europe to prevent her own isolation more than she specifically wanted conflict with Germany, or indeed any power - it's just that if you settle with France you antagonise Germany, and vice versa. I think the driving factor is perceived British weakness, rather than German weakness.

The German fleet comes into it as a harbinger of long-term German intentions - saying that it's more nuisance than threat may be true, but geography dictates that it's more of a threat than the Russian fleet and its design characteristics and the popularity of Mahan in the IGN make clear its strategic purpose - and therefore also the expectations of future strength. That doesn't mean that it couldn't be dealt with diplomatically had Britain and Germany made a deal, but once Chamberlain's hopes of a deal were dashed and Germany moved on to the opposing side, its continued construction served to confirm British suspicions of German hostility.

 

[LordKalvert]

Chamberlain's attempts for a German alliance can hardly be understood in terms of a strategy to settle with France and Russia. Britain wanted a friend in Europe to prevent her own isolation more than she specifically wanted conflict with Germany, or indeed any power - it's just that if you settle with France you antagonise Germany, and vice versa. I think the driving factor is perceived British weakness, rather than German weakness.

The German fleet comes into it as a harbinger of long-term German intentions - saying that it's more nuisance than threat may be true, but geography dictates that it's more of a threat than the Russian fleet and its design characteristics and the popularity of Mahan in the IGN make its strategic purpose clear. That doesn't mean that it couldn't be dealt with diplomatically had Britain and Germany made a deal, but once Chamberlain's hopes of a deal were dashed and Germany moved on to the opposing side, its continued construction served to confirm British suspicions of German hostility.

Chamberlain's policy is being rejected by the foreign policy establishment for a lot of reasons. The biggest is that the Germans don't want to play the role Chamberlain assigns them as defender of British interests against Russia. Chamberlain first approaches the Germans after the Russians take Port Arthur and the Germans take Kaichow. For some reason, Chamberlain thinks the Germans would want an alliance with Britain to prevent Russian expansion in China- something that Germany is actively encouraging

He again approaches Germany after the Boxer Rebellion. This results first in the Yangtze agreement to protect the open door as far as each was able. The British are hoping to bring pressure on the Russians but the Germans use the agreement to push for the British to open up the Yangtze trade.

This is the final straw for Grey and the foreign policy establishment but Chamberlain persists. The on again/off again talks continue until Lord Salisbury Salisbury totally rejects the idea of an alliance. His reasoning being
1) Neither the German nor the British government could really commit themselves to war. Only the mood of Parliament at the time of crisis could determine the course

2) That the German and Austrian borders were more likely to be attacked than the French seek to invade Britain

3) It would limit Britain's freedom of movement during a crisis

Yes, geography does mean that the German fleet is a greater threat than the Russian fleet but by itself, the British really would have no need for help It would only have cost Britain about 5 million pounds to double German construction. That would seem a lot easier than creating a host of near alliances

The great fear need not even be talked about it is so obvious: A Russo-German combination as at Bjorko. If this takes root, than France is forced to join because she needs the Russian Army. Italy is already a member of the Triple Alliance and even if these two stay out of it, the Russo-German fleet is something to fear. Nor can any British blockade be of much use against the Russo-Germans At all costs, this must be avoided