Replacing the Melbourne
Introduction
The RAN maintained for many years from WW2 a fleet based around a single light fleet carrier. The Australian government discussed the idea of removing from service such a carrier, but on several occasions, 1963 and 1967 opted to modernise and extend the life of HMAS Melbourne and maintain a fleet based around a single light carrier. This low cost option would not be available for ever the RAN began to look at options to Replace the Melbourne from as early as the mid 1960’s, and very seriously from 1970 on.
Role of the RAN Carrier Unit
The strategic role of naval aviation was not an area of vigorous debate when the light fleet carriers were initially acquired by the RAN in the 1940’s. In the immediate years after WWII the light fleet carriers were capable of operating 40 high performance combat aircraft and were used by the RN as major fleet units in the Pacific. The RAN must have assumed that its light fleets would perform similar roles in conjunction with British and Possibly US forces in the Pacific, an operational doctrine that eventually saw HMAS Sydney in combat on the west coast of Korea.
But the light fleets would not offer a power projection or major fleet unit capability to the RAN indefinitely.
Vice Admiral Collins to the First Sea Lord
" Although up to date, I have maintained that our carriers should be capable of operating the latest jet fighters, I am now beginning to have my doubts whether this idea is practicable. In the old days we bought Australia and Canberra, two trade protection cruisers, and accepted that they were not fitted with 15 inch guns and armour. Is it not logical for us to provide now two Majestic class cariers and accept that they are not fleet carriers, not even Hermes class? ... their primary role would be trade protection in wich A/S operations play a major part and for which they are well suited... If our carriers were to be employed within the radius of shore based aircraft, the carriers would have to form part of a force with other carriers armed with the appropriate fighters." (1)
As the cold war evolved Australia’s principle maritime forces, the RAN’s light carrier task force, the navies new submarine squadron and the RAAF’s maritime patrol aircraft were designed and structured around escort, reconnaissance, local ASW defence and search and rescue role in the “ANZAM” region, an area encompassing half of the Indian Ocean, the western margin of the South Pacific Ocean and most of South East Asia south of Vietnam. (2)
Two significant events in the 1960’s. heralded a change in the long term strategic role of the ADF, and the RAN. The first event was gradual decline in the significance of the Royal Navy and British Forces generally in Asia. As late as 1964, Australian naval forces were still operating quite closely with RN assets during confrontations with regional nations. With the cancelling of the RN’s carrier program in 1964, and the general withdrawal of British forces “east of Suez” in 1968, the ability of Britain to make a significant contribution to the Maritime Security of Australia was reduced. The second event was the announcement in 1969 of the “Guam Doctrine”, where the US announced it expected its allies in the region to take responsibility for all but global or nuclear military threats. (3)
In the background of these major strategic shifts in Asia came the restructure of the Australian services to what effectively became the integrated ADF. The role of the ADF evolved form the separate service multinational force offshore operations to a poorly defined “defence of Australia” mission. The evolving concept of “ defence of Australia” served to muddy the strategic waters as the RAN prepared for the force structure debate associated with its attempts to replace the Melbourne.
The 1976 defence white paper was the first government policy direction that attempted to grapple with the issue of defence self reliance in maritime policy. The document assed the roles of maritime forces as intelligence, surveillance and patrol, strike as a deterrent and the ability to protect shipping and ports from interference and attack. Budget pressure were relieved in some way by reducing operational stocks and readiness levels, and though assuming a ten-year warning time for major threats to emerge.
Early Options
The contraction of the Royal, and to a lesser extent the US Navy made available various second hand ships for the purpose. A modified Hermes class ship, HMS Centaur became available from 1966. Such a ship was larger and more capable than HMAS Melbourne, but of equivalent age and higher operating costs. Modified Essex class carriers were available from the USN. Highly capable, but very expensive to operate, in both cash and manpower, as well as being the same age or older than the Melbourne. (4) None of these options were pursued with any vigour by the RAN.
Aircraft Carriers worldwide were rapidly growing in size, cost an complexity, reflecting an equivalent increase in the size and cost of high performance combat aircraft. No Navy was producing light carrier type ships in the 1960’s.
The USN Iwo Jima class amphibious helicopter carriers were introduced into service from the mid 1960’s. Here was a modern aircraft carrying vessel of an affordable size and type that the RAN might look at. However these ships were not at the time able to operate fixed wing aircraft like Trackers or Skyhawks. There was however considerable professional interest within the RAN about these vessels.
The First Serious Attempts
The integration of the three services after the Tange model in the early 1970’s lead to the formation of a new interservice force structure panel, the Central Studies Establishment (CSE). The panel looked first not at the replacement of the Melbourne but for a replacement for the HMAS Sydney, then serving as a large amphibious vessel in the last years of the conservative government. (5) In 1972 a study entitled Landing Platform Helicopter Study (6) began to look at the idea of replacing HMAS Sydney, presumably with something like an Iwo Jima class helicopter carrying amphibious ship.
Fairly soon the ground shifted immeasurably with the election of the Whitlam Government with a very strong domestic and social policy agenda. Conscription was axed, as was the fourth Mirage squadron, 10 of 20 SeaKing ASW helicopters ordered in 1971 and HMAS Sydney was to be paid off immediately without replacement.
The Landing Platform Helicopter Study evolved into a far larger and wide ranging study, Naval Air Power/ Tactical Air Weapons System Study. NAP/TAWS. This study was designed to demonstrate the relative merits of land and sea based air power and which direction naval air power may go in the ADF’s future. The TAWS portion of the study evolved as well into the first of several studies into the future of the RAAF’s tactical fighter fleet.
NAP/TAWS was structured as a team of civilian scientists assisted by an officer from each of the services. In time additional officers were added. The RAN and the RAAF took a very different approach to the study. The RAAF assigned its “best and brightest” officers and were particularly influential in framing the initial premises of the study. The RAN took the study not very seriously at all, to the RAN the value of a carrier at sea was simply academic, there was no case to argue. The RAN assigned second rate officers to NAP/TAWS or left RAN billets on the study unfilled.
NAP/TAWS ran for 3 years and produced a ten volume report in 1975. The study concluded that aircraft carriers were not effective or necessary in modern warfare. The study claimed that the only unique capability provided was dipping sonar equipped helicopters, which in an case could be operated from frigates and fleet auxiliaries. The study concluded that the RAN should be re-equipped concentrating on submarines and small patrol craft, and that surplus funds should be channelled towards land based airpower.(7)
Next Moves
The RAN was particularly unimpressed by NAP/TAWS and mounted a serious campaign to squash the report and its conclusions , in which they were partially successful. The RAN’s case was helped significantly by the appointment of a clever and shrewd chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Anthony Synnot in December 1976. Synnot realised that the key to a successful carrier project was political rather than technical and becoming emeshed in a technical/analytical struggle with the RAAF would not lead to an early carrier decision. In January 1977 he changed the Navies tack, and confronted the “platform” centric ADF and RAAF force structure position, creating the boldly titled “Aircraft Carrier Project” in January 1977. Synnot succeeded in persuading the Fraser government to fund carrier studies from 1977. 1M $Au was allocated for design studies from June 1977. (7)(8)
Invitation to Register Interest-1977
In 1977 the government(1) invited companies around the world to submit proposals on a no obligation will be entered into basis. By February 1978 sixteen companies from five nations had registered interest.
In August 1979, The Minister for Defence, Mr Killen announced that three preferred options had been identified. They included;
1 Bazan, Spain – a varient of the US Sea Control Ship.
2 Intalcantieri, Italy, the Garibaldi class.
3 Litton-Ingalls, Pascagoula, USA. A modified LPH Iwo Jima class.
A Ministerial Statement in September 1980 announced the governments formal commitment to replacing the Melbourne. (9)
“The Government has decided to replace HMAS Melbourne with a purpose designed ship to be equiped with helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, but with the potential for operating also short take off and vertical landing aircraft. The government will not make a decision on the actual acquisition of STOVL aircraft until 1983. I should emphasise that at this stage there is no commitment to aquire STOVL aircraft. The period between now and 1983 will provide valuable time for the government to asses the advantages, availability, suitability and cost of STOVL aircraft in the light of further development of this particular type of aircraft. Further definition of the carrier details will now be undertaken and be completed in the next financial year.” (8)
Leaving VSTOL aircraft out of the picture was a mixed decision. The RN had gone down that route, they justified the Invincible class ships as command and ASW assets, with a nominal ASW airgroup of 10 Sea Kings, and a capacity for more when the ships were approved in 1972. VSTOL aircraft were postponed until 1974-75 and the tactic avoided significant RAF hostility before the Invincible class ships “main gate” decision.
The RAN was in a very different position. Funding in the late 1970’s was very tight, with inflation touching double figures, domestic spending ballooning due to Whitlam era social initiatives and growing unemployment. The entire ADF was in a parlous state. Much of its equipment had been purchased in the 1960’s and was becoming due for replacement. Some major procurements had proceeded in the 1970’s, Leopard 1 tanks, FFG7 frigates, but a funding shortfall faced almost all new programs. From 1977-80 the ADF proposed to replace the 100 or so RAAF Mirages with only 50 FA-18 Hornets.
As far as a potential RAN airgroup went, the RAN were in poor shape. The 10 SeaKings delivered in 1975 were attritioning very quickly, and the ASW fit and radar specified in 1972 was not particularly modern. The future Melbourne replacement looked like featuring an airgroup of 5-6 semi obsolescent ASW helicopters for at least the first five years of its life. Further ASW helicopters and VSTOL aircraft were expensive, as expensive on a unit basis as the proposed new RAAF fighter force. At least 12 new VSTOL fighters and another 5-10 ASW helicopters were required to exploit the capabilities of the new ship, and these represented a major funding challenge to the cash strapped ADF budget and other service programs. (9)
Symptomatic of the ADF funding crisis at this time - The need for a helicopter for the FFG7 class ships was postponed, the ships were to enter service without their principle weapon system. The helicopters could not be afforded until 1985-90, ten years after the ships were ordered. (9)
The Ships
The Ships(10)(11)
RAN Baseline LPH RAN B_L SCS HMS Invincible
Length oa 648.6ft(198m) 640ft(195m) 675ft(206m)
Length fd 636ft(194m) 576ft(175.6m) 589.9ft(182.6m)
Beam WL 94ft(28.7m) 80ft(24m) 90.2ft(27.5m)
Beam FD 126ft(38.4m) 95ft(28.9m) 104.6ft(31.9m)
Displacement FL 21,407t 15,380t 19,860t
Draft 28.4ft(8.7m) 29.7ft(9.04m) 28.8ft(8m)
Speed 24kt 24kt 28kt
Range 7000nm 4800nm 4000nm
Prop. 2 by LM2500 2 by LM2500 4 by Olympus.
SHP 40,000 2 CRP prop. 45,000 1 CRP prop. 112,000, 2 fixed prop.
Aircraft? 22-26(22 Hang – 4dp) 16 (Hang?) 22 (16 Hang)
Ski Ramp 12deg 12deg. 7 deg.
Lifts 2 deck edge 2 (1 deck edge) 2
Command Sys NCDS NCDS ADAWS 6
Air Search An/SPS-49 An/SPS-49 Type 1022
Surface Search AN/SPS-67 AN/SPS-67 Type 992
Navigation AN/SPS-67 AN/SPS-67 Type 1006
Carrier Appro AN/SPN-35A AN/SPN-35A Type 1006
Iff Yes Yes Yes
TACAN ASN/URN-25 ASN/URN-25 No
Armament SM-1(if fit) SM-1(if fit) Sea Dart
CIWS 2 2 No
Accomadation 1184(120,172,884) 850(102,156,592) 1005(131,265,609).
Costs
A number of FY82 $Au costs are presented in pp113-125 of “A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy”(12). The costs are for the Invincible, associated aircraft and systems and for competing defence programs from that time.
Modified US Built LPH as above. Roughly $Au 1000M.
2nd Hand Invincible $Au 477.8m. Including ship purchase $Au285m. Project costs $Au 193m including $Au 43.9m for an initial refit and spares in the UK, $Au 5m for Australian modifications and $Au 20m on training travel and equipment.
New Invincible in 1983, roughly $Au 1000M, but not fully costed.
2nd hand Invincible operating costs $Au 32.1m per annum (same as Melbourne, and $Au 6m more than the projected operating cost of the modified LPH.
2 Phalanx CIWS at $Au 12-15m.
20 Sea Harrier FRS1 $Au 280-310m. (Flyaway + Support)
20 AV-8B $Au 900m. (Flyaway +Support) $US31m flyaway per aircraft.
12 AV-8B (A Govt est) $Au 350-400m.
2 SeaKing (RAN Standard) $Au12.7m flyaway.
22 Lamps III total project $Au 1024m. (Per unit $US 32m). For FFG7 class.
10 P3C Orion $Au280m.
3 Hunt class Minehunters $Au 200m.
Army Project Raven (Comms) $Au 120m.
New Ship Selection
The Garibaldi class proposal was dropped during 1980/81. In January and February 1981 design studies contracts were placed with Ingals (LPH) and Gibbs and Cox (SCS). A Joint RAN/USN project office (PMS 308) was opened in March 1981, the overall cost of the design studies and US project office being $Au 8 million. PMS308 developed Top Level Specifications for the LPH and SCS based on RAN agreed Ship Characteristics.
The initial design studies were completed in July 1981. In August 1981 the Defense Force Development Committee agreed with the baseline characteristics and agreed that construction of the vessel in Australia was not viable.
Final Administrative approvals proceeded during 1981. The Force Structure Committee examined the need for a carrier during August and September. The “Aircraft Carrier Project Evaluation Board Report” was presented to the DSDC. 5 Cabinet submission prepared during November 81. Carrier acquisition formally supported by the Chief of Defence Force Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of General Staff (Army). A Carrier was formally opposed by the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the Chief of Air Staff. (8)
Wild Card – Second Hand Invincible
The Royal Navies severe post war contraction reached its lowest point in June 1981 when the British Government announced that only two Invincible class ships were to be maintained in service – at the same time as the second and third ships were being built! Accordingly the Royal Navy made an offer to sell the first ship HMS Invincible to the RAN.
The UK Ministry of Defence approached Australia and sent a team to brief Australia on the characteristics of the Invincible and the details of any deal in September 1981. The offer was at first coolly received, the Invincible class itself was poorly suited to the RAN’s requirements and hand been ruled out of the New Carrier program very early in the evaluation.
The Invincible class ships themselves were fine units, and probably superior platforms to either of the final ships selected. However the major problem with the ships was the completely unique (for the RAN) ship systems and weapons on board the Invincible. The RAN by that time had standardised on US systems like the Naval Tactical Data System, the LM2500 gas turbine and an entire range of subsidiary system. Entering the Invincible class ships into the RAN would require the establishment of a complete and separate logistical, training and support infrastructure that would be expensive and difficult.
On its side the Invincible class ship 2nd hand was much cheaper, with a total project cost, $Au475 roughly half the other options, and the ship would be available for service in the early months of 1984. The low capital cost and quick availability of the ship was telling and in September the Minister announced that a second hand Invincible would be included in the carrier evaluation. Discussions with several UK companies were ongoing covering the refit and support required for Invincible. On the 25th of February 1982 the minister announced that the Invincible was to be acquired by the RAN. (8)
Ministerial Statement Mr D.J. Killen 25 February 1982 (extracts)
“the Government has decided that Australia is to purchase the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible”
“the total project costs, including provision for spares, test and training, necessary modifications and other support, but excluding missiles is estimated at $Au 478M at August 1981 prices. “
“The carrier will provide the Government with additional military options, particularly in areas further from our shores and remote from our military airfields”
“There is no single scenario or contingency for which this ship is acquired. In fact our defence as a whole is not structured to meet one particular threat. There is a wide variety of circumstances which could occur during the lifetime of the ship”
“The acquisition of the Invincible should not be seen merely as a replacement for the Melbourne. The Invincible is a very Modern ship with a wide range of capabilities quite beyond those which are available to us now, Firstly the ship is particularly suited to operating and maintaining large numbers of anti submarine helicopters. Investigations have shown that that to counter submarine threats a combination of weapons platforms is necessary. The combination includes land based aircraft, ASW helicopters and warships.” Secondly there is a need for a ship capable of planing, commanding and co ordinating operations by a large group of ships and aircraft” “Thirdly the ship has a capacity to carry for a short time a Royal Marine commando – the equivalent of an Australian battalion group. This should be a very useful adjunct to our amphibious ship; HMAS Tobruk.”” Further the ship is capable of operating short take off and vertical landing aircraft of the Harrier type, although at present it is intended only, I repeat only to embark ASW helicopters. The decision of whether to aquire this type of aircraft will be made at a later date”
“A limit of cost of $50m is to be allowed for RAN modifications. These will include adding 450tonnes of fuel to increase the ships range to meet our basic requirements”
“ It is often asked: is one carrier enough? In the present circumstances the answer is yes. Our Defense force must be properly balanced; one carrier is adequate for lower level contingencies and, like the rest of our capabilities would provide a sound basis for expansion. In a diverse maritime threat, for instance, shore based air would be used where they could prove most effective and our one carrier could be used further afield where its special capabilities were needed. Our defence force must be a coherent whole. I entirely reject the concepts sometimes espoused of all submarines or all patrol boats. Each weapons systems has its advantages and each has its limitations.” (8)
Following this announcement a carrier project office was opened in Bath in May 1982 and PM308, the US project office for carrier replacement was closed down. On the 30th of June HMAS Melbourne was decommissioned, the Skyhawk and Tracker squadrons were disbanded on the second of July 1982.
However in the Background to all this the Falklands war had broken out and HMS Invincible played a prominent role in the British victory. On the 13th of July the Australian Minister for Defence announced that the UK government would retain the Invincible in UK service.
Post Invincible
In 1982 a Parliamentary committee reported on the carrier issue, including a new Member by the name of Kim Beazly. The committee found that whilst a carrier like Invincible was a useful ASW asset, Submarine warfare was an unlikely contingency, and even if it did occur, it could be handles by P-3 Orion aircraft from shore bases. The considered that the Invincible was not a “Cost Effective” asset, not surprising given the planned airgroup! The committees conclusion was not binding on the government, but it was a good measure of the opinions in political circles at that time on the issue. (10)
The carrier project was back where it started, but two years behind schedule now. The RN offered this time The Hermes and some FA-1 Harriers. This was turned down by the Australian government, that had had its fill of old, and high maintenance ships with the Melbourne and the Supply. The carrier program was re started, but could not get around the fact that insufficient money was available. (9)
Back to the Drawing Board
Carrier studies recommenced in July, and option included ;
A purpose designed ships $Au 750m-1100m.
A similar ship to merchant standards $Au 400-500m with delivery in 1987.
A converted container ship $Au 100-150M with delivery by 1986.
In a statement to the house in August 1982 the Minister claimed that the original requirements for a carrier remained, and outlined the option above, and threw in the unlikely option of a 35000-40000 ton CTOL carrier or a recommissioning of the Melbourne.
However the ground had shifted and the DFD briefed the Minister in December, with the RAN dissenting, that a carrier procurement should not proceed. A carrier decision was postponed till after the March 2003 election, which was one by the ALP, who had maintained a strong anti carrier stance for the preceding six years. (8)
References
(1) Woodman, S., 1997. “ Defending The Moat: Maritime Strategy and Self Reliance.” in “In Search of a Maritime Strategy” p 116.
(2) Grey, J., 1997. “ The Royal Australian Navy In The Era of Forward Defence, 1955-75.” in “In Search of a Maritime Strategy” pp 100-113.
(3) Frame, T.R., 1992. “Pacific Partners” p 118.
(4) Frame, T.R., 1992. “Pacific Partners” p 101.
(5) Boutilier, J.A. 1991 “Get Big or Get out: The Canadian and Australian Decisions to Abandon Aircraft Carriers. Reflections on the RAN, Kangaroo Press pp 397.
(6) Evans, D 1990 “ A Fatal Rivalry” MacMillan Australia. Pp102
(7) Quoted from "Carriers for the Commonwealth", James Goldrick,1991. (Reflections on the RAN)
(8) ????, 199?, “Australian Carrier Decisions” pp 165-174.
(9) Brown, G and Woolner, D., 1982 “A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy” Strategic Studies and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.
(10) Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, 1982 “An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defense Force”.
(11) Brown, G and Woolner, D., 1982 “A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy” Strategic Studies and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. P62
(12 ) Brown, G and Woolner, D., 1982 “A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy” Strategic Studies and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. P113-125.
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