AHQ/WI: Alternate Greek Junta

On the 21st of April of 1967, a group of far right anti-communist Colonels launched a coup against the caretaker government that was to lead the country to elections in May. While it was successful, and the king did give his blessings to their government, he was planning a coup of his own, with some royalist generals, and was thwarted by the Colonels, as they had moved faster than him.

Suppose that the Colonels had decided either to not do anything, had been arrested earlier when they had tried that(this wasn't their first attempt, that was back in the 1950s, but they got off scot free because the King didn't want interference in his running of the military, so maybe that could be butterflied away), or, for some other reason, their coup fails, and the King gets to perform one of his own.

How does it go? Is it successful? If yes, what does the resulting government look like? Is the new "Royal Dictatorship" likely to last less, as much, or longer than the Colonels' Dictatorship? What are the priorities of the new government?

In my view, it's likely to be a completely different dictatorship. Many made fun of the Colonels, for their leader was what many considered a provincial buffoon, they seemed disorganized, were highly corrupt, clueless, and were shunned by much of the pre-Coup political establishment, even leading figures of the right, with one or two notable exceptions.

Were the king to perform his own coup, that would doubtlessly change. He was perceived as a weak man, being a tool for his mother, the absolutist Frederica. Even then though, a royal coup would probably mean more high ranking politicians and monarchists behind the new government, and more leading figures embroiled in it. I fear that a return to democratic government would be slower.

That said, it would probably fuel even more resentment, earlier on. What do you think?
 
@VadisDeProfundis (sorry for pinging, but it is a rather interesting thread)

Well, first and foremost, we need to consider the overall situation : for starters, is it the same 1967?

If yes, then there are certain problems. The King had supposedly promised the US ambassador that there would be no intervention before the elections. This is a bit self - defeating however, because, as general Kondylis (the man who restored the monarchy in Greece in 1935) allegedly said, you can organise a coup on any day of the year - except for the day after an election. Thus, it would be unfeasible for a government backed by the King and his generals to survive if the three "Apostasia" governments of 1965-1966 are offering a hint, without hard measures, and I am not very sure whether the generals would be ready -or willing- to crack the whip. Also, a large part of the initial success of the coup of the colonels came from the fact that most people expected the Royalist coup, and that the colonels came out of nowhere for them. We don't know whether a generals' coup would be met with the same apathy or inactivity.

Also, the colonels could certainly have been arrested-in fact, there were many other instances, far more serious perhaps, where they could have been discharged; but there were many more low- and medium - rank officers that were sufficiently hard right - wingers to take their place (the "deep state" was a reality in 1949-1974 Greece). Thus, in my view, you would just see a different set of names toppling the government on a different day of the year, if nothing else changed. I believe that, for a general's junta, some more, not necessarily dramatic, changes are needed.

Part 1: the making of the coup (1951-1967)
The coup of 1951 is not very well known, because news of it were suppressed (for obvious reasons). But there is something interesting: there is a story that Papagos (the man whose bid to become Prime Minister caused the whole story of the 1951 coup) saw Demetrios Ioannides (the infamous later head of the Military Police and the "Invisible Dictator") in the courtyard of the Defence Ministry and that he approached him and asked him to drop his gun and stand down. Now, suppose that Ioannides, alarmed by the shouting civilian (allegedly Papagos was in civilian clothes) shoots at the direction of the voice. The bullet hits Papagos, who is badly, but not mortally wounded.

Now the future colonels are in deep trouble, since Papagos was a highly respected former general and the leader of the Right. A large part of the "respectable" Right is horrified when they learn what happened - "one of them" had been shot by a lowly army officer. Papagos, once having sufficiently recovered, pushes for the punishment of the seditious officers. Politicians, members of the court, businessmen press the King and the generals to look into the affair and find those responsible. The Americans, worried at the prospect of trouble in Greece just two years after the end of the Civil War and with the war in Korea still raging on, also want decisive action to prevent anything like that from happening again (after all, they wanted Papagos to become Prime Minister exactly because they considered his predecessor, Nikolaos Plasteras (another former general) too lax on communism). King Paul and his generals, who didn't want to weaken their grip on the army by purging its more radical elements but were also worried about this event and under pressure from so many different quarters, agree to launch an official investigation. In the end, Demetrios Ioannides and those that accompanied him in his operation to capture the Defence Ministry are court-martialled and sentenced to death for sedition. The rest of the officers, including Papadopoulos, are black-marked.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, not much changes compared to OTL: Papagos still becomes Prime Minister and is even more popular because of his stance in the whole affair and his personal plight. He will likely push for some ore controls on the military in the 1952 constitution, influenced by his experiences and he will probably try to undermine the remnants of IDEA (the dominant military faction since the days of the government-in-exile in the Second World War) inside the army, in order to prevent something similar from happening in the future; but apart from that, not much is different. Karamanlis is also very likely to succeed him as Prime Minister, since he had the support of the Palace and most likely, the Americans. But there are some differences: the government and the military leadership, fearful of a possible repetition of the events of 1951 and a split in the Right, monitor the military far more closely. After a few years, Georgios Papadopoulos, who could still have got his post in the Intelligence Agency (because he was supported - if not picked- by its director, general Natsinas) - but wouldn't probably be able to develop his ties to the CIA due to the suspicions surrounding his potential involvement in the 1951 incident, starts his rumblings about the "need to save Greece" and his other activities. The intelligence report reaches the Prime Minister's office; but this time, Papadopoulos isn't able to turn the whole affair around and end up retaining his position and getting the Chief of Stuff dismissed on the charge of corruption. Instead, he is swiftly discharged from the military , alongside many of his acquaintances in it, as the government wants to be more secure. Although this isn't the end of conspiratorial movements inside the army, the various potentate dictators are disorganised, divided and lacking any extensive connections with the various CIA agents in the country, while the Greek government and the Americans have a keen interest in keeping a tight leash on all these elements.

Enter the 1960s. Elections are bound to happen in 1960-1961 (unless something changes that). The populace is not very happy with the authoritarianism of the Karamanlis government, the scandals of that period and its handling of the matter of Cyprus. At the same time, the more limited (compared to OTL) crackdowns on the Left during the 1950s (due to the diversion of resources and the partial shift of priorities from these activities to keeping an eye on the military) and the bad taste 1951 left in the mouths of many in the moderate Right are projected to give the Centre Union * and the Left (United Democratic Left - EDA) an even larger percentage of the vote than OTL. Karamanlis, worried about this prospect, employs in turn an even more brutal form of the OTL Pericles Plan. The Hellenic Radical Union (ERE), his party, wins the elections, amidst widespread rumours of voter suppression and outright fraud. Georgios Papandreou, the leader of the Centre Union decides not to acknowledge the election results and launches a campaign to bring down the government. In the end, in 1963, Karamanlis is embarrassed by the assassination of some leftist politicians (for example Ilias Iliou and Christos Lambrakis) from far-right lone wolves (we could expect the likes of Gotzamanis - people who fled alongside the Germans in 1944, would have ITTTL a siege mentality due to the greater influence of the left and the suppression of the radical members of the military, that would push them to act even without the tolerance of the police/gendarmerie). Furthermore, he is very unpopular due to his seemingly servile behaviour vis-a-vis the Palace (we have no reason to assume that Frederica wouldn't be as hell-bound as OTL to running the country herself and getting her way with things like the dowry of princess Sophia or the funding of her charities-financial activities), his inability to hold the moderate Right with him and the distrust of the hard-right voters, while the Palace is on the verge of withdrawing its support. Thus, he is forced to resign. In the coming elections, Papandreou wins in a landslide and forms a government.

Georgios Papandreou encounters the same, or similar problems as OTL: the dispute with Turkey over Cyprus, the American pressure to mend this rift on the southern wing of NATO, domestic opposition from various groups to his reforms and dissent in his own party, largely caused by the meteoric rise of his son, Andreas Papandreou, who is considered to espouse radical ideas. However, with less threat from the military, he is actually able to push forward some of his policies, while the Palace is reluctant, for the same reason, to push things further. Thus, a sort of "cold peace" persists, while both sides build up their forces and the Palace begins to develop a new network of loyalists inside the military. However, the Prime Minister, feeling less pressured by the possibility of a coup, is able to continue his term.

Then comes the death of Paul in 1965. Papandreou believes that the new king, Constantine II, is more easy to work with, due to his youth. However, the young king is heavily under the influence of his mother, who in turn believes that she is in charge of the country and advises her son to adopt a confrontational stance. The first major clash between the king and the Prime Minister comes when the military leadership purges some officers suspected of being members of some "rather leftist" (in reality democratic - centre -left at most) officer clubs and organisations, which were allowed to grow considerably (in secret always), as the government's attention had turned to the right wing groups. Although Papandreou has no sympathy for the left, he senses this as an attempt to rebuild the reactionary networks that used to control the army and thus turn the military into an instrument to threaten the government; thus, he decides to fight the king over this issue, by assuming the Defence Ministry himself (as per OTL). The matter quickly becomes a hot topic, as there are allegations of certain senior government figures having relations to these leftist groups and that they planned a coup. The king demands that Papandreou step down immediately as Defence Minister and restore his former cabinet member that had this position to his post (this also happened OTL, but was not as outrageous as it sounds at the time, since the convention was that the King would nominate the Defence and Interior Ministers, to control the military and the Police and Papandreou himself had named a royalist as his defence minister). Papandreou refuses to obey the command, while daily demonstrations cause upheaval across the country. In the end however, Papandreou is toppled by an internal coup, as a number of his party's members of parliament side with the opposition (after much Palace and CIA prodding) in a contentious vote of no-confidence (the vote of the United Democratic Left, the leftist party, which supported the, government in the vote, were counted as "negative ones", due to the ideological orientation of their party) thus bringing down the government. The following days are characterised by anarchy, as the parliament is bickering over the no-confidence vote and the people demonstrate, enraged by the duplicity of the "rebel" parliamentarians.

The King, meanwhile, rushes to capitalise on this development, by naming his own government of members of the previous government that switched sides, expecting that the ERE would support it. This backfires however, as the Right is divided between those who want to support the new government and those who believe that such a move would be their political tombstone. Thus this first attempt fails. After another short-lived royalist government, which manages to win support from most of the ERE, but not enough to have a majority, the king agrees to form a final government that will organise elections in December 1966, on condition that any future government will have a defence minister appointed by the king , the elections will be based the law of proportional representation (which is disadvantageous to the Centre Union) and that the trials of the "leftist" officers will proceed. The major parties agree on these terms and back this third government. However, there is deep distrust between the King and the Papandreous, which is expected to create trouble again in the future.

Georgios and Andreas Papandreou seem to be polling high, something that worries many conservatives. The King is particularly anxious, as the Papandreous, particularly Andreas, campaign on the promise of far-reaching constitutional reforms that will limit the scope of the powers of the monarchy as they existed in the 1952 Constitution and will further increase civilian oversight of the military and democratize the country's institutions. However, he refrains - for the moment - from taking any action, as the ERE is also gaining strength, thanks to the leadership of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who is one of the few leaders of the party who are able to regain the moderate voters who begin to get uncomfortable with Andreas Papandreou's "socialist agitation". This shift is decisive, for it, combined with the electoral law, leads to a hung parliament on December 14, 1966. The country experiences unrest after this election, while the Centre Union continues to push for constitutional amendments inside a rather divided parliament. The instability inside the country alarms the military leadership and the Americans, who fear that the left may take advantage of the situation to present itself as an credible alternative to the two large parties. Thus, when the proposal of "a limited dictatorship" (a short period of martial law) under the supervision of the King and his generals, is presented, they are receptive to it as a way to restore stability and end the deadlock in government. The result is that, on January 23, 1967, a royal decree about the declaration of martial law across the country is announced.

* It is very possible that a party of the centre would be formed ITTL as well, as it was to the best interests of the Americans (who were instrumental to the formation of the OTL one): the lack of a strong centrist party allowed for polarisation, that benefitted the Right but also the Left. The presence of one, on the other hand, weakened the Right and the Left, reduced tensions and made the isolation of the latter more easy and durable. ITTL, there is even more motivation to weaken both. As for the Papandreous, I think they were the only ones capable of leading such a disparate coalition of different groups as a single political organisation.
 
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To me, it seems more palatable, with the King;s backing. It could be very similar to Carol in Romania, as the benevolent temporary overlord against both communists and right wing extremists. Should the Orthodox church promote the building program, as ceaserpapsism it will take off
 
Part 2: the generals in action

It is January 1967. We've got the King and his generals on top a dictatorship that has been imposed as martial law by royal decree, in order "to combat unrest and restore law and order" in the country. The people, although somewhat surprised by this turn of events, are also tired of the continuous political instability, and more than a few in the more conservative quarters of society are somewhat happy, as this development will likely stem the growth of the Left as a political force.

The King would most certainly proceed to create a new government, consisting of royalists. There are several candidates for the post of Prime Minister: Panagiotis Pipinelis, the Defence Minister who (both ITL and OTL) caused a crisis by refusing to resign from his post could be a possible candidate, as he would be seen as dependable and having adequate royalist and nationalist credentials. Konstantinos Kollias, the right-wing Supreme court judge who OTL became the first Prime Minister of the junta, or another friendly, conservative, high ranking court official, could also be a suitable candidate (it is also important to note that Kollias was chosen at the insistence of the king, who argued that a military officer as Prime Minister would harm the country's international image and he most likely thought that a senior court official, a man of the laws, could offer a veneer of legitimacy). Other options could be a friendly and somewhat neutral academician (Athens and the Academy were the strongholds of the more conservative members of the academia and intellectuals) and a senior civil servant (former or current), since the civil service was fairly "secure" because any appointment there had to be ideologically acceptable as well (ie. no leftists).

As far as the ministerial posts are concerned, we can look at the composition of the Kollias and the Papadopoulos cabinets of OTL to draw people for the jobs in the government, as most people in these were persons that weren't related with the major parties and I think that both the Centre Union and ERE would oppose this extra-parliamentary solution (the latter potentially not as absolutely as the former) and thus, many would be hesitant to participate in the new government. However, without the disdain that most of the members of the two large parties initially had for the regime of the colonels, whom they viewed as seditious officers acting illegally and adventurous upstarts (Centre Union and moderate ERE) or idiots/dangerous upstarts who threatened the integrity and the long-term survival of the Right in Greece (many in ERE), this junta is going to be a lot more respectable, at least in the eyes of the Right, something that could sooth things between the military leadership and some more conservative politicians. This, combined with the fact that the generals were more connected with the political establishment and their goals are not "revolutionary", as those of the April 21, 1967 coup were (at least in theory), means that there will be a greater chance with an actual continuity of government, with few disturbances (the colonels literally purged the civil service and other institutions, removing thousands of people, in an effort to consolidate their hold on power-with the expected results. The generals, who have more support and influence in the existing system, don't need such drastic measures). A number of officials with questionable political beliefs would most certainly be fired and the control of one's political beliefs will become more rigorous, but apart from that, there wouldn't be any further actions in that direction.

Regarding the Left, the new government would most certainly order a violent crackdown, similar to the one of the colonel's regime. Thousands of trade union leaders, politicians, intellectuals and others suspected of harbouring leftist ideas would be arrested and incarcerated. Many of them would be exiled in the camps that had been set up for this purpose during the civil war or the Metaxas dictatorship. The government would begin a witch hunt for those who managed to escape. However, I think that the generals' dictatorship would be more careful to international reaction. Therefore, torture of prisoners would possibly be somewhat more limited than OTL; perhaps some staged inspections would be offered to international observers, to confirm the "humane treatment of those imprisoned"; and the release of some prominent figures would happen after international pressure more quickly than IOTL.

The Church would have a much better or similarly bad relationship with this junta, in my view, than with the OTL one, although the former seems more likely. The nature of the new government is fairly different from the one of the colonels, who wanted to subject the church to their control and use it as another means of influencing public opinion and the generals would be disinterested in or unwilling to press on with such a plan. There would be some behind-the-scenes prodding and the government would support certain metropolitans in elections. They would also develop close ties with various religious organisations (who could play the role of the government agents inside the Church) and they would most certainly push for a friendly person to occupy the archbishopric throne in Athens if Chrysostomos II dies on their watch, but apart from that, there would be no further intervention.

In the education sector, if the reforms of the OTL 1963-65 took place, the new government would roll them back. This means that there would be some extensive lay-offs that would affect the teachers and the professors (the more progressive ones) and a stricter control of the beliefs and ideas of the educational personnel. The archaic, official language (the Katharevousa) would be restored as the sole language of education, while the revisions of the school books that took place during that period would also be canceled, thus bringing back the books of the 1950s. The Pedagogical Institute, if created, would be dissolved, because of its fairly progressive (at the time) proposals for the public education and because it was stuffed and headed by scientists, education experts and academics that had drawn the ire of the conservative and a change in the curriculum that would emphasise nationalist ideas and above all, anticommunism would most certainly take place. I am not very sure whether the general's junta would keep the distribution of free schoolbooks , which the colonels continued after it had been instituted by the Papandreou government OTL, or begin it on their own initiative, or whether they would take the same measures in favour of the students (mostly improvement of the material conditions). On the one hand, they wouldn't need to try to get the public's support through policies like these, at least not as much as the colonels. On the other hand, promoting education for the youth of the nation is always good for PR and if they could ensure the neutrality of the students for the next few years through the offer of material benefits and gain some goodwill from many parents for the opportunity they offer to their children, while also showing a reformist face to the people, they could get some more support for the Right after the military government was over.

Lastly, in the economy, there would be few differences from OTL. Certainly, things would be a little more stable, as the government would be viewed as more dependable. I think that some deals with prominent businessmen (like Tom Pappas) would be signed, in an effort to secure the support of this group and display an image of growth in the economy to the public. There would probably be a continuation of measures benefitting the farmers (a large conservative constituency), such as debt relief, higher pensions and subsidies. However, there wouldn't be as much state interventionism in the economy as during the colonels' regime, due to the different approach that each side would have. The generals' junta would probably continue projects such as the electrification of the rural areas. At the same time, there is a small chance that, under more technocratic direction and management and somewhat less corruption (at least many less "sea loans" that were never recovered and more money into actual, productive industries), local industry could become more competitive and profitable, thus strengthening the economic base of the country, while somewhat more amenable relations with western Europe might help prevent the economic restrictions many EEC countries imposed IOTL. All these could prove positive in the long term.

Thus, most of 1967 passes with this new government trying to stabilise things and eliminate the perceived communist threat, which are its focuses. By mid 1968, things seem good enough again: the left is disorganised and fragmented, the government deadlock has been overcome (although in a rather unorthodox way) and stability seems to have returned. Now, there are two options: 1) the generals stand down soon or 2) the generals remain.

In case 2, things would most likely develop like they did OTL (roughly) up to 1973. There would be a period of increased oppression that would reach its apex in 1969-70. After that period, the generals would start discussing the possibility of a transition to a more democratic government; at the same time they would draft some rather authoritarian amendments to add to the constitution (enshrining the position of the army as a guarantor of the "order and the law" as a backchannel to avoid the need for martial law, creating a constitutional court to examine cases where the constitution was disputed (which would be stuffed by sufficiently supportive people) and others), which would solidify the new status quo.
There could be some more vocal opposition to the revolution in Libya in 1969 (if it happens at that time) and the government would capitalise on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (if the Prague Spring still happens) to show the "failure and the brutality of communist dictatorship". There wouldn't probably be a rapprochement with the East Bloc countries (it was actually the junta that was the first Greek government that developed ties with the East bloc countries, in an effort to break the economic restrictions imposed by western European countries and also as a way for the USA to gain access to these countries). Perhaps there would be an opening to the regimes of Spain and Portugal, since both countries had similarities with Greece at the time. Furthermore, I think that Athens would adopt a more cautious policy regarding Cyprus and try, for example, to push Makarios on the patriarchal throne if Athenagoras died, in order to install a more pro-western figure as president of Cyprus, instead of the OTL confrontational stance (and the divide between Papadopoulos and Ioannides loyalists on the island in late 1973 and in 1974). Regarding Turkey, Greece would be able to adopt a more firm stance, thanks to greater internal stability and this, combined with the aforementioned restrained policy of the latter in Cyprus could actually help avert the invasion of 1974 (a plus).

The point where this becomes interesting is when do the generals stand down: if we suppose that the Yom Kippur war and the oil embargo (or their analogues) happen at the same time as in OTL, then if the generals remain in power past October 1973, things will most likely end up the same on the domestic front: strained relations with the Americans because of the neutrality and the refusal to allow the use of the bases, which would most likely happen ITTL as well, worsening economic conditions that increase public discontent and an attempt at controlled liberalisation that will lead to disturbances and a new crackdown that will backfire however, as the American patrons realise that the continuation of the general's regime is unproductive and they begin to support the idea of full democratisation, under their supervision, of course. The monarchy would most likely be ended by referendum after the restoration of a democratic government, in order to remove "a source of instability, intrigue and outside intervention in politics".

If however, they resign before that point, then we could see a sort of "Francoist" Greece: the army has retreated from the government on its own terms and has got an almost official role in it. Many supporters of the generals and the conservative factions control government posts, sit on the boards of companies, have amassed personal wealth and are able to exert considerable influence in many ways and maintain the status quo. The monarchy could be given some credit for the liberalisation and thus gain some more time. Democracy would be restored, but this would be accompanied by several limitations, checks and controls that would aim at preventing problems from arising again. After some time, there could be further liberalisation, as well as an improvement of economic conditions and continued governmental and political stability, even if the latter are also largely due to the fear that the army could intervene again; if all proceeded well, then there would be a strong chance that by the early 1980s, Greece would be ready to enter the European Economic Community (alongside Spain and Portugal).

Case 1 is more different than OTL: in it, the generals begin a slow removal of restrictions . In the end, martial law is lifted in late 1968, after the amendments mentioned previously are voted in the constitution by a popular referendum. The generals have withdrawn to the backround, monitoring the political situation. The army, because it has withdrawn on its terms, retains its vast, unofficial influence, while the rule that the military can intervene when it considers it necessary is still acceptable. The two main old political parties and much of the old political system have also survived. All this means that there is still potential for instability and army intervention, and that the coup was just a temporary break. All this could mean that after a certain period of time, after which the left would have managed to regain some of its power and the system would be once again in disarray, the army would once again called to intervene. In this scenario, it is rather unlikely that Greece would be able to enter the EEC, and it would be plagued by political and economic instability.
 
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Perhaps a Turkey style military's as umpire in the background. If it can lead to the survival of the monarchy and the white cross flag it would please some.
 
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