AHQ: Partification and position of the NSDAP after German victory in the Second World War

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

German victory in the Second World War has been one of the more common and popular topics in alternative history; however, most, if not all relevant works focus on things like international politics or Hitler's succession. While these issues are in some way the crux of such works, they still leave various questions unanswered, questions that may be of equal importance. One such question is the question of partification (Orlow, "The Nazi Party, 1919 - 1945"), which, in this case, means the assimilation of all aspects of life to the NSDAP.

IOTL, as it is often noted, the National Socialist state was marked, if not dominated, by the incessant infighting between the various agencies. What isn't discussed so often though is the antagonism between Party and State. Between 1933 and 1945, these two sections of the German government fought a bitter war against each other, as the Party, ultimately under the control of the aptly named "Control Faction", shelved the idea of attempting to create a National socialist social system that would include the citizenry inside the Party by means of welfare (Betreuung) and instead focused on gaining control of the government machinery, while the bureaucrats tried to fend off these intrusions and, when possible, push forward with their plans for centralisation of the administration and empowerment of the civil service.

"Partification" was never achieved/completed; while during the later stages of war, when the domestic situation radicalised more and more, Bormann, the Party Chancellor and de facto leader of the "Control Faction" managed to increase the powers of the Party significantly, the NSDAP never reached a position like that of the Communist Party of the USSR; it was far from the clearly recognised hegemonic institution in Germany, with the armed forces being rather independent of it, it lacking complete legislative authority, and not in control of such key aspects of society, as the economy, among other things.

So, assuming that Germany won the war, (I think that, barring extreme deviations from OTL, the framework wouldn't play such a great role here, so everyone can work with their own ideas on that one), how do you think that the NSDAP's status would evolve? Would it manage to become the dominant factor in all aspects of German life or would the precarious balance between it and the other centres of power, such as the army, the civil service and big business? How would partification look like?


(I hope the question is ok, I didn't find anything on it here )

 

[Tresckow]

I don't think Germany would achieve partification like the Soviet Union did with Lenin and Stalin because of national socialism being a much more fluid ideology than Marxist-Leninism. Hitler wavered on positions throughout his entire rule. He called for Lebensraum, then signed a temporary alliance with Moscow. He wanted to Poles to be wiped out, but sent Goering to seek a German-Polish alliance in 1938 in case of a Sudetenland war. Hitler abhored capitalism, but kowtowed to Germany's business elites. Outside of Hitler the definition of national socialism was still vague. Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and Bormann all had different definitions of what being a national socialist meant.

 

[irispaiva]

Hitler wavered on positions throughout his entire rule.

I'd like to add that Hitler, despite hating the United States, praised the system of euthanasia and purging of the "infirm" which was present at the time, which I recall him being quoted as needing to implement it here (NSGermany) ASAP. Funny Mustache Man was a IRL Tsundere.

 

[Tolkiene]

A fellow Orlow reader!

Partification means subordinating state institutions to party ones, not because a person is a party member, but because the positions are in a personal union with party functions, or appointment can only be made by the Parteikanzlei (Party Chancellery). The Wegener Memorandum, so named due to its author Gauleiter Paul Wegener, a protege of Bormann, offers a possible view of what a maximum programme for the Control faction could be. Essentially all spheres of Germany were supposed to be penetrated by the Party. The NSDAP was supposed to be shaped into a fanatical cadre party with exclusive membership and be the ultimate decision-making entity for all of society.

To this end, membership lists were supposed to be purged and criteria for admission tightened. The Hitler Youth was supposed to come under the direct control of the Political Organisation of the Party. Likewise, the propaganda apparatus was supposed to come back into the embrace of the Party (while Goebbels was the propaganda head of the Party, he relied on the state apparatus of the Ministry of Propaganda, not the corresponding Party institution. He also wasn't popular in the Party).

The same applied to paramilitary organisation. The SA was supposed to be turned into a veterans' organisation that was supposed to absorb most of the Party membership. The memorandum doesn't say anything about the SS, which is no surprise since at the time Bormann and Himmler were still allies, but one imagines the Control faction would want to bring the Black Order back under Party control.

Also Bormann wanted to get rid of the Reichsleiter title. As old Gauleiters retire, their replacements would come from the Parteikanzlei's apparatus, though the PK faced the perpetual problem of getting rid of officeholders deemed unsuitable and finding suitable replacements. The PK would want to control judicial and civil service appointments. Indeed, the PK did plan to introduce changes that deempathise the traditional requirements for a position in the civil service. Instead of a degree in law, a high school education or an officer's commission was supposed to be enough. I could also see them attempting to decouple the Party from the judicial system, much like the SS had its own justice system. Presumably it also means empowering the NSFOs, whom the PK envisaged as Nazi commissars in the armed forces, though they fell short of that. Furthermore, Party evaluation would presumably become part of the documentation necessary for an officer‘s promotion.

Is all of this realistic? I don't think so, but fun and interesting to explore!

The Nazi Party was a different beast compared to the CPSU. Nazism had certain dogmas (lebensraum, German hegemony, racism, eugenics, virulent hatred for democracy, Jews, Slavs, communists etc.), but was incredibly fluid beyond that. Hitler was the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy. He quite deliberately let his principals aggrandise themselves and vie for for his favour while he mostly left things in flux. This produced an administrative mess, but left him the ultimate arbiter. The Party itself did not act as a collective, decision-making institution. For one, it lacked the necessary organs for that. It didn't have an equivalent of a Central Committe or Politburo. Granted, these institutions were rubberstamps under Stalin, but they could function, as shown after his death. The Nazis did have the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter conferences, but those were just convened for Hitler to give speeches and indications of what he wanted his minions to do. The Reich Cabinet didn't even meet during the war.

Hitler distrusted bureaucracies, viewing bureaucratisation as something that would rob the Nazi movement of its dynamism and limit his authority as Führer. Hitler did at times talk about creating a Nazi Party 'Senate' - basically a body composed of high-ranking Nazi leaders that would be responsible for selecting a new Führer as well, as in some drafts, advising the incumbent. He compared it to the college of cardinals. That body was never created, but he mentioned it in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939 (when he said it would elect the next Führer if something happened to him, Göring and Hess) as well as monologues during the war (as documented in Hitler's Tabletalk). There's also memoranda on it by Frick and Rosenberg.

There's also the inner circle to consider. The most important standard-bearer for partification there is Bormann. And, of course, he wants the PK to be the ultimate decision-maker. Several Gauleiters are in his camp, but that's due to mutual interest since he lobbies for them and a younger generation has gone through the PK school. They view themselves as responsible to the Führer, not the Secretary to the Führer. Bormann is a canny backroom manager who 'works like a horse', but has no charisma, is widely disliked and barely known in public, so he'd need a stooge to be puppet Führer, which is risky. Of course, there's also the option of a Party apparatchik who shares these goals and is not part of the original inner circle taking the helm.

Göring's power base lies in business, the military and the state. He is the heir apparent, but has no power base in the Party, though he could probably rally a bunch of Gauleiters on account of his role in the 'good old days', status as an Old Fighter, charisma and bribes. But he has no interest in strengthening the Party. Goebbels' base is also in a government ministry and he was for the most part not that powerful. Speer was the exact opposite of the 'apolitical technocrat' he tried to depict himself as, but got on poorly with most Gauleiters, other than Karl Kaufmann and Karl Hanke, because they resented his interventions into the local civil economy (not entirely unreasonably, they feared negative effects on public opinion, plus he was haughty in dealing with them). And Himmler's all about turning the SS into the 'new nobility' of Germany and to this end it formed links with the civil service, big business as well as creating its own army and taking charge of 'settlement' policy.

There's also the armed forces to consider. Contrary to many apologist, lying memoirs, the Wehrmacht became a willing, active participant in the Nazis' genocidal project, but they resented Party meddling in their institutional autonomy. They viewed themselves as one of the centra pillars of the new Germany. Case in point, 'Bloody Ferdinand' Schörner quit his job as head NSFO in the OKH because Bormann annoyed him.

 

[RuneGloves]

I've never understood why one-party states don't abolish the state, and just use their party.

Why does china need a state? The Army is already subordinate to the party. There is no need for a state.

 

[GSD310]

I've never understood why one-party states don't abolish the state, and just use their party.

Why does china need a state? The Army is already subordinate to the party. There is no need for a state.

I’ve always seen the one-party states on the right as seeing themselves to be representing the entire nation and transcending partisan divisions. It’s always been “Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Fuhrer”in Nazi Germany. Nothing about “Ein Partei” there.

For one-party states on the left, like those in communist countries, it seems to be the case that there is a division of labor between the party’s setting the ideological agenda and providing cadres on the one hand and the state’s translating this ideological agenda into policies and representing the nation overseas on the other.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

A fellow Orlow reader!

Partification means subordinating state institutions to party ones, not because a person is a party member, but because the positions are in a personal union with party functions, or appointment can only be made by the Parteikanzlei (Party Chancellery). The Wegener Memorandum, so named due to its author Gauleiter Paul Wegener, a protege of Bormann, offers a possible view of what a maximum programme for the Control faction could be. Essentially all spheres of Germany were supposed to be penetrated by the Party. The NSDAP was supposed to be shaped into a fanatical cadre party with exclusive membership and be the ultimate decision-making entity for all of society.

To this end, membership lists were supposed to be purged and criteria for admission tightened. The Hitler Youth was supposed to come under the direct control of the Political Organisation of the Party. Likewise, the propaganda apparatus was supposed to come back into the embrace of the Party (while Goebbels was the propaganda head of the Party, he relied on the state apparatus of the Ministry of Propaganda, not the corresponding Party institution. He also wasn't popular in the Party).

The same applied to paramilitary organisation. The SA was supposed to be turned into a veterans' organisation that was supposed to absorb most of the Party membership. The memorandum doesn't say anything about the SS, which is no surprise since at the time Bormann and Himmler were still allies, but one imagines the Control faction would want to bring the Black Order back under Party control.

Also Bormann wanted to get rid of the Reichsleiter title. As old Gauleiters retire, their replacements would come from the Parteikanzlei's apparatus, though the PK faced the perpetual problem of getting rid of officeholders deemed unsuitable and finding suitable replacements. The PK would want to control judicial and civil service appointments. Indeed, the PK did plan to introduce changes that deempathise the traditional requirements for a position in the civil service. Instead of a degree in law, a high school education or an officer's commission was supposed to be enough. I could also see them attempting to decouple the Party from the judicial system, much like the SS had its own justice system. Presumably it also means empowering the NSFOs, whom the PK envisaged as Nazi commissars in the armed forces, though they fell short of that. Furthermore, Party evaluation would presumably become part of the documentation necessary for an officer‘s promotion.

Is all of this realistic? I don't think so, but fun and interesting to explore!

The Nazi Party was a different beast compared to the CPSU. Nazism had certain dogmas (lebensraum, German hegemony, racism, eugenics, virulent hatred for democracy, Jews, Slavs, communists etc.), but was incredibly fluid beyond that. Hitler was the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy. He quite deliberately let his principals aggrandise themselves and vie for for his favour, leaving him the ultimate arbiter. The Party itself did not act as a collective, decision-making institution. For one, it lacked the necessary organs for that. It didn't have an equivalent of a Central Committe or Politburo. Granted, these institutions were rubberstamps under Stalin, but they could function, as shown after his death. The Nazis did have the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter conferences, but those were just convened for Hitler to give speeches and indications of what he wanted his minions to do. The Reich Cabinet didn't even meet during the war.

Hitler distrusted bureaucracies, viewing bureaucratisation as something that would rob the Nazi movement of its dynamism and limit his authority as Führer. Hitler did at times talk about creating a Nazi Party 'Senate' - basically a body composed of high-ranking Nazi leaders that would be responsible for selecting a new Führer as well, as in some drafts, advising the incumbent. He compared it to the college of cardinals. That body was never created, but he mentioned it in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939 (when he said it would elect the next Führer if something happened to him, Göring and Hess) as well as monologues during the war (as documented in Hitler's Tabletalk). There's also memoranda on it by Frick and Rosenberg.

There's also the inner circle to consider. The most important standard-bearer for partification there is Bormann. And, of course, he wants the PK to be the ultimate decision-maker. Several Gauleiters are in his camp, but that's due to mutual interest since he lobbies for them and a younger generation has gone through the PK school. They view themselves as responsible to the Führer, not the Secretary to the Führer. Bormann is a canny backroom manager who 'works like a horse', but has no charisma, is widely disliked and barely known in public, so he'd need a stooge to be puppet Führer, which is risky. Of course, there's also the option of a Party apparatchik who shares these goals and is not part of the original inner circle taking the helm.

Göring's power base lies in business, the military and the state. He is the heir apparent, but has no power base in the Party, though he could probably rally a bunch of Gauleiters on account of his role in the 'good old days', status as an Old Fighter, charisma and bribes. But he has no interest in strengthening the Party. Goebbels' base is also in a government ministry and he was for the most part not that powerful. Speer was the exact opposite of the 'apolitical technocrat' he tried to depict himself as, but got on poorly with most Gauleiters, other than Karl Kaufmann and Karl Hanke, because they resented his interventions into the local civil economy (not entirely unreasonably, they feared negative effects on public opinion, plus he was haughty in dealing with them). And Himmler's all about turning the SS into the 'new nobility' of Germany and to this end it formed links with the civil service, big business as well as creating its own army and taking charge of 'settlement' policy.

There's also the armed forces to consider. Contrary to many apologist, lying memoirs, the Wehrmacht became a willing, active participant in the Nazis' genocidal project, but they resented Party meddling in their institutional autonomy. They viewed themselves as one of the centra pillars of the new Germany. Case in point, 'Bloody Ferdinand' Schörner quit his job as head NSFO in the OKH because Bormann annoyed him.

Thanks for the detailed reply.

Yes, Bormann was the main proponent of partification; by my understanding, he wanted to eliminate most of the other RLs (not all, since he was a Reichsleiter and he also was on fairly good (as good as it can be) terms with the Treasury and Schwarz (since both were pushing for centralised control of the Party and they sort of complemented each other, with Bormann pushing for administrative centralisation and Schwarz for financial centralisation).

So, a potential Partification under Bormann (not as Führer, but as the main driving force) would look like this perhaps?

a) a new constitution is adopted, a "Nazi constitution" in that it confirms the central role of the NSDAP in government and society and perhaps it enshrines the Enabling Act and many other changes brought about by the "Führer Decrees"

b) The state continues to exist: it's not like the Departments of the Partei Kanzlei would become ministerial departments. But the Party controls it mainly because the NSDAP is recognised as the party of government in the constitution (and perhaps a clause in said constitution states that only Party members an be ministers; or perhaps, to be more diplomatic, Reichstag members - which is a nice way to say Party members, since all other parties have been outlawed, although I don't know if indepdendents had been barred from running for that body) and, from what you said, every applicant for a civil service job would get through ideological screening as well. I also thought that the sons/children of "Party members that made (exceptional) sacrifices for the cause" (or with Party member parents who died early) might be allowed to enter the civil service fast track (as a form of "welfare"), which would allow Partification to creep in the bureaucracy from there as well.

c) the army takes a new oath, not just to the Führer, but to the constitution as well, which means that they also have to respect and protect the party's preeminence. The Party controls appointments after a certain level perhaps by making "commitment" play a role as well (I guess they would come up with something vague enough that most would agree at first to have it and then no one could agree on what it would mean).

d) Businesses are tricky. Perhaps the Party would leverage its position in government, since a lot of the larger German firms were either backed by state money(Reichswerke AG or Kontinentale Öl AG come to mind) or were rather dependent on government contracts and business (such as IG Farben) to push for more Party members to sit at their boards. I guess an economic downturn, such as the one depicted in TNO, would be in many ways a godsent to the Party, since they could use bailout and aid as bargaining chips for struggling companies and in the ones they would de facto nationalise, they could push for all-Party structures.

And there are some questions still:

a) would the Partei Kanzlei gain any de jure position? By that I mean, could they get an official role in the legislative process or would they stay at lobbying ministers to get legislation they would want. If the latter happened, it would be easier, if the scenario I outlined above happened, since the ministers, as Party members and most likely higher officials in it before getting a department, would most likely be subject to Party regulations and under the influence of that body and Bormann in particular; but it would still leave much wanted, especially if a Führer opposed to the PK was in charge.

I guess the PK could get a sort of official role by becoming a sort of "legal adviser" to the government; by that I mean that the PK would review every law to see if it was in accordance with the National Socialist principles etc (which, since the NSDAP lacked a very comprehensive guide on "what it means to be a Nazi", if I understood your comment correctly, would again lead to much back-and-forth between the mnistries and the Party) and they would get to send it back if they deemed inappropriate, and only a Führer decree could override this form of veto

b) what would the relation between the PK and the Führer be? Because I guess that at some point, there might be friction between the two: a Führer like Speer for example would probably want to curtail Party power; a more radical Führer would probably be against the increasing entrenchment of the Party's position and the bureaucratisation, which he would view as stripping the Party of vitality and the ability for swift/dramatic action etc. Since I guess that Bormann or his successor would be preparing for those eventualities as Hitler's health would start to decline more during the 1950s, they would probably want various forms of guarantees against the Führer. Since every potential Führer would be jealously guarding his power and privileges, this could probably happen only if a figure under the Party's control were to become Führer. So they would probably try to secure that by making the selection process of the next Führer more/exclusively controlled by the Party.

Assuming that Hitler died in the late 1940s -early 1950s and he was succeeded by Göring (still not disgraced and legally the successor) and Hess was removed from the line following his flight, the Party would be at least secure from a Speer-like character and by that point, Göring would probably be more interested in self-indulgence, so, as long as his power wasn't directly threatened and he got to exercise it occasionally. However, the Party would still have to grapple with Göring's vast clientele and Bormann in particular would have to deal with the Führer trying to make personal appointments from the Party (which would be within his powers and within the constitution), both as a way to reward friends and secure his personal interests. Also, as Göring's health would become increasingly poorer, thinking about the future would be quite an important thing in the Party; while Bormann would be able to eliminate other factions and perhaps limit Göring's inroads and isolate his supporters and clients, there would still be problems: would Göring appoint a successor of his own, like Hitler did? Or would he make any arrangements about the succession at all? Both are perilous for the goals of the PK: in the first one, the Party continues not to be able to control one of most important events in German political life, and it also reaffirms the power of a Führer to potentially shut the PK off the government process for a long time, if he is able to choose someone that opposes the PK as his successor.

The latter is more complicated: if Hitler hadn't enshrined a mechanism to choose a successor (oversight or an unwillingness to limit his autonomy in a key aspect - choosing his successor if Göring had died as well) in the new constitution and if Göring hadn't agreed to the idea as well (after all, it had been Hitler who had talked about it in his own succession arrangements, so people could probably argue that the Senate was intended for that occasion only and Göring was not obliged to do anything towards that direction), there would be a brief, but important vacuum after Göring's death. Given the absence of a senate and a designated successor, perhaps the law would be similar to the pre-1933 provisions and therefore, the President of the Supreme Court would become acting Head of State (which is another headache, if the offices of Chancellor and President had been abolished and fused in the position of the Führer, which is possible - would they revert to the pre-1933 distinction or would they have to devise a new division of powers?). Assuming that the former happened, since it would be the more expeditious option, the division would probably be that the President of the Supreme Court would become acting Head of State, but without certain powers perhaps, until the Party would elect the new leader of the NSDAP, who, according to the constitution, would become Führer of the German Reich with full powers.

While this seems ok, it has a big problem, namely that the Party has to find a way to elect the new Führer in the first place, which could very well lead to factionalism exploding out of proportion as many would think that in that environment of uncertainty, many could have a chance to succeed and the PK itself would have to contain the rivalries between its members and subordinates. So that could lead to a protracted period where there is no Führer, which could perhaps start a) making the population start losing faith in the Party b) allow people to push back at partification, citing this as proof of the Party's ineffectiveness to discharge the most important function of government (to actually get one).

The people at the PK would probably have thoughts of that sort, so I guess that, at some point, they would begin to orient themselves towards limiting the powers of the Führer. Starting from taking the appointment of the successor away from the discretion of the Führer, they would probably try to find ways to further limit his powers and make the position of the Party/the Partei Kanzlei more official.

 

[Ombra]

Following with great interest, might write a fuller reply when I have more time, but personally, I feel all directions listed as plausible depending on the specifics of how the war ended and who holds the keys to the kingdom after Hitler's death. Consider the monumental differences if for instance the Eastern Front is a disaster for the Soviets in 1941 and Todt never dies on his plane, vs what it would look like if Germany somehow came through to the other side after the vast expansion of the SS economic empire in alliance with the Speer ministry and related weakening of the Gauleiters. Different groups would have different levels of momentum.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Following with great interest, might write a fuller reply when I have more time, but personally, I feel all directions listed as plausible depending on the specifics of how the war ended and who holds the keys to the kingdom after Hitler's death. Consider the monumental differences if for instance the Eastern Front is a disaster for the Soviets in 1941 and Todt never dies on his plane, vs what it would look like if Germany somehow came through to the other side after the vast expansion of the SS economic empire in alliance with the Speer ministry and related weakening of the Gauleiters. Different groups would have different levels of momentum.

Ah, yes, indeed. I wanted not to delve too much into the world of explaining how victory happened, because I thought that would derail the situation somewhat and I didn't want to limit the spectre of the conversation. People can work on different hypotheses and come up with different scenarios. But yes, the Germans declared war on the Soviets, the East was conquered, the Reichkommissariats were formed (I think these are the important things from wartime that would affect the Party).

 

[Ombra]

Ah, yes, indeed. I wanted not to delve too much into the world of explaining how victory happened, because I thought that would derail the situation somewhat and I didn't want to limit the spectre of the conversation. People can work on different hypotheses and come up with different scenarios. But yes, the Germans declared war on the Soviets, the East was conquered, the Reichkommissariats were formed (I think these are the important things from wartime that would affect the Party).

In that case, I feel we really need to throw in the variable of what the SS is doing. In any long war/execution of Generalplan Ost the SS would grow to a considerable role. While this might not be enough to take control of the state on its own, it can definitely be one of the deciding factors in the struggle for succession and partification depending on who they side with.

In the scenario provided, after all, eastern colonisation and security services are happening under their auspices. Their strong relationship with the armaments ministry have put them in a strong position economically and industrially, which is likely to be near-monopolistic in the Reichskommissariate. While Goering will probably be keeping the RW close to his chest, the continued economic expansion of the SS might actually incentivise the party to try and corral what businesses they can/infiltrate them with party members before Himmler, Speer, and Heydrich can get their grubby fingers on them.

But the economy is only a part of this equation. The SS at this point have their own army and are of course by and large the German domestic security services. Any crisis such as the one you describe post-death of Goering would, imho, never ever result in a prolonged power vacuum for precisely this reason. The competitive and cannibalistic nature of the Third Reich means that such a vacuum would immediately be filled by whoever is ready. Purely through usage of the apparatus of security and repression, the SS can manufacture the right scandal at the right time, detain the right person, or enact the right operation to ensure the victory of one faction/candidate over the other. It might be overreach to push one of their own, maybe. But I don't believe they would stand by and watch as the party gets paralysed by institutional indecision and uncertainty.

I have tackled this problem in my own narrative setting (warning if you've read Alice In Wartheland and This Fire We Kindled: very mild spoilers ahead on Nazi politics). In that timeline, which is an ASB setting where Germany has gained considerable eastern European territories but the Soviet Union is still extant, I've had Heydrich gain the reins of power following precisely a similar power vacuum (death of Goering, no clear succession mechanism, attempt by the party to seize the state, SS intervention to make it fail). Heydrich's Fuehrership is very much intended as a one-off, a product of very specific contingencies. In the later 20th and early 21st century, the trend will be towards what I call "indirect partification". Effectively my idea is that the watershed of the Heydrich experience will create a situation where the heavyweights of the Nazi state (the SS, the armaments ministry and industry/state-owned companies, and the Wehrmacht) tacitly decide to never select a Fuehrer from among themselves to avoid upsetting the apple cart, and keep turning to "inoffensive" party members to act as "compromise Fuehrers". This will have unintended consequences down the line, where the main events of the story will do much to upset the status quo in the Third Reich - but more broadly speaking clever party functionnaires can make use of the opportunity of acting as an apparently inoffensive, compromise mediator figure between various Nazi interests to gradually penetrate the civil service and the economy.

Summa summarum, I believe the immediate postwar to be, ironically, the worst possible time for partification to happen. Too many competitors who have had the distinction of "serving at Hitler's side" are arrayed to try and seize power, and riding the height of victory disease and near-limitless economic control/political clout. The real opportunity for the party comes much later, when the long and steadily applied pressures of the Cold War, the Nazi economic dysfunction, and the deterioration of the dreams of empire in the East, all start to corrode the more grandiose aspects of the regime. At that point the transition that Germany needs is one imho very favourable to partification. Now that the big overarching goals (win the war, colonise the east) are more or less acknowledged as done, the Nazi state needs "a reason to exist" and a reorientation to a more long-term life, as opposed to a short-term dash towards an objective. This is where the need for administrative and economic control, the exhaustion and corrosion of the main power brokers, and the impelling demand for a new ontology, can give the party an opportunity to step in and turn the Third Reich into a "managerial state".

 

[Tolkiene]

Thank you for your thoughtful, detailed response. You're quite correct that most Nazi victory scenarios focus more on the leading personalities of the potential heirs, and less so on the processes involved. I think one reason is that you get all manners of secondary literature, both scholarly and less so, on the inner circle and even there it varies. But second echelon figures are less explored and when it happens, it's more likely to be the SS than the Party.

Language barriers may also play a role. For example, there's a very good German language biography of Gauleiter Erich Koch by Ralf Meindl, but to my knowledge it hasn't been translated into English. Orlow's history of the NSDAP is incredibly comprehensive, but that alone is daunting and it's not the most accessible work. So I welcome the chance to discuss this stuff!

d) Businesses are tricky. Perhaps the Party would leverage its position in government, since a lot of the larger German firms were either backed by state money(Reichswerke AG or Kontinentale Öl AG come to mind) or were rather dependent on government contracts and business (such as IG Farben) to push for more Party members to sit at their boards. I guess an economic downturn, such as the one depicted in TNO, would be in many ways a godsent to the Party, since they could use bailout and aid as bargaining chips for struggling companies and in the ones they would de facto nationalise, they could push for all-Party structures.

Yes. Big business profited handsomely from the Nazis if it played ball. Look no further than IG Farben's factory complex Auschwitz-Monowitz. If something similar to the scenario outlined by you occurs, I could see hardliners pushing for the establishment of mandatory Party cells in companies. So businessowners retain control over most regular business decisions, but the Party wants a seat at the table when it comes to large-scale investment decisions.

I guess the PK could get a sort of official role by becoming a sort of "legal adviser" to the government; by that I mean that the PK would review every law to see if it was in accordance with the National Socialist principles etc (which, since the NSDAP lacked a very comprehensive guide on "what it means to be a Nazi", if I understood your comment correctly, would again lead to much back-and-forth between the mnistries and the Party) and they would get to send it back if they deemed inappropriate, and only a Führer decree could override this form of veto

Yes, what I meant. Already in OTL the Staff of the Deputy Führer secured the right to vet laws and civil service appointments for their conformity to Nazi beliefs. They used the Law to secure the Unity of Party and State (Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat) as a basis for this. This is, of course, quite open to interpretation, since beyond a few dogmas Nazism was a fluid ideology. But it's something they'd want to expand on. The PK would want to be the source of orthodoxy, conduit of the Führer's will and chief personnel office. All in all, the PK managing to acquire the authority to block laws deemed not 'national socialist' enough would be a quite devious way to secure control, while also chipping away at the autority of whoever happens to be Führer.

I think the Reichsorganisationsleitung would sooner or later be dispensed with. Ley was an unstable drunkard. Back in the 30s some forces in the Party pushed for him to be kicked upstairs by being appointed minister of labour, while being forced to give up leadership of the DAF. If he mismanages labour policy after the war and there's some sort of economic crisis, Bormann might have a pretext to get rid of another Reichsleiter title.

Naturally, there is the issue that the Gauleiters and the PK might not necessarily have the same vision in regards to partification. A Gauleiter will be happy to extend his power over state authorities and say gain control over revenue collection in his bailiwick, but that does not automatically mean he wants to take orders from the PK in Berlin. This applies in particular to the 'Old Fighters' who got their positions during the 'Kampfzeit' and look down on a 'jumped up' Secretary. Granted, these guys would eventually die off or retire and be replaced by younger figures (an example for the second generation of up and coming Party bosses moulded by the PK would be Paul Wegener and Hartmann Lauterbacher), but they'd definitely still be a big deal in the 50s.

Göring strikes me as someone who'd leave many things in flux regarding succession. He never appointed a single deputy for his many offices. He had Milch as State Secretary in the Ministry of Aviation, but also often undermined him to keep him from getting too influential. Worth noting that Göring and Bormann ended up having a very bad relationship, especially after Bormann became Secretary to the Führer in 1943. That caused Göring to briefly throw in with Goebbels, Speer and other bigwigs who wanted to cut the 'Committee of Three' down to size, though nothing came of that. Thing is, Bormann's power is primarily derived from his access to Hitler. Ironically, in the long run one of the younger figures groomed by him might be a better agent of partification than Bormann himself due to not having stepped on so many toes, and possibly having a bit more charm.

The Senate being established as a body is an interesting option. Sources vary when it comes to size and composition, though one imagines the leading Party bigwigs would be on it, making it a formalisation of the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter conferences. It seems it was a matter of debate whether field marshals should be on it. One interesting option would be for the chairman of the senate acting as interim leader of the Reich after a Führer dies until a new one is chosen. Another would be decoupling the office of Reich chancellor from that of the Führer for day-to-day management and temporary stewardship in the case of a vacancy, though that would get in the way of the PK's ambitions.

But the economy is only a part of this equation. The SS at this point have their own army and are of course by and large the German domestic security services. Any crisis such as the one you describe post-death of Goering would, imho, never ever result in a prolonged power vacuum for precisely this reason. The competitive and cannibalistic nature of the Third Reich means that such a vacuum would immediately be filled by whoever is ready. Purely through usage of the apparatus of security and repression, the SS can manufacture the right scandal at the right time, detain the right person, or enact the right operation to ensure the victory of one faction/candidate over the other. It might be overreach to push one of their own, maybe. But I don't believe they would stand by and watch as the party gets paralysed by institutional indecision and uncertainty.

Moreover, the SS was also active infiltrating the civil service, granting honorary SS ranks to prominent figures in Party and the State (granted, this did not necessarily mean that said individuals became supporters of the SS. After all, Bormann was an honorary SS general), and forging links with big business (see the Circle of Friends of the Reichsführer-SS). Now contrary to popular belief, the Nazis weren't in the habit of murdering their own en masse (I'm not saying this to downplay their evil, far from it. If anything it makes Nazi Germany even more evil since it did not have to force compliance and participation in its vile acts through threats of purging). The Night of the Long Knives, while bloody, was fairly limited in scale and the number of people killed is actually dwarfed by those who were simply forced to retire in the aftermath of the bloodletting. And no one was killed during the Blomberg-Fritsch Crisis.

The only other bloody purge within Nazi Germany's power structure occured after a bunch of officers had literally tried to blow up the Führer. But backroom intrigue, blackmail, manufactured scandals, some limited bloody purging? Definitely on the table. The SS regards itself as Germany's new vanguard elite, so it would not remain passive, though that could also produce backlash if it makes an overt play for power. Doubly so if it has gone too far with its military ambitions. Not that the SS is a monolith marching in lockstep behind whoever is Reichsführer-SS. In the last stages of the war, Müller seems to have thrown in his lot with Bormann, Wolff cut his own deal with the Western Allies and Kaltenbrunner was able to bypass Himmler and get direct access to Hitler due to his good relations with the Secretary. But it cannot be discounted as a power player.

Also lol we just made Bormann interesting! He isn't a milquetoast statuos quo pen-pusher and Brezhnev expy. He is actually a 'reformist' who wants to make radical changes to the way the Third Reich is run...just not the way 'reformist' is commonly understood, since it is usually equated with being a Krushchev, Deng or Gorbachev figure (which shows the limitations of that sort of parallelism).

Effectively my idea is that the watershed of the Heydrich experience will create a situation where the heavyweights of the Nazi state (the SS, the armaments ministry and industry/state-owned companies, and the Wehrmacht) tacitly decide to never select a Fuehrer from among themselves to avoid upsetting the apple cart, and keep turning to "inoffensive" party members to act as "compromise Fuehrers".

Indirect partification as a result of the Party apparatus playing 'honest broker' is an interesting option. Göring, compared to other contenders, has the advantage of being very big tent because he can appeal to all manners of interest groups, despite his many character flaws. And said 'eccentricities' are likely to keep him from changing the status quo too much. Plus he has actual popularity with the German people. But Himmler and Heydrich want an SS state, Bormann total partification, and Speer's power is based on an alliance between war industry and SS and most Gauleiters dislike him. In such a situation, a 'younger, up and coming' Party apparatchik whose personality is reasonably appealing and who hasn't annoyed anyone too much might get picked. You may wind up with a Party oligarchy.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

In that case, I feel we really need to throw in the variable of what the SS is doing. In any long war/execution of Generalplan Ost the SS would grow to a considerable role. While this might not be enough to take control of the state on its own, it can definitely be one of the deciding factors in the struggle for succession and partification depending on who they side with.

In the scenario provided, after all, eastern colonisation and security services are happening under their auspices. Their strong relationship with the armaments ministry have put them in a strong position economically and industrially, which is likely to be near-monopolistic in the Reichskommissariate. While Goering will probably be keeping the RW close to his chest, the continued economic expansion of the SS might actually incentivise the party to try and corral what businesses they can/infiltrate them with party members before Himmler, Speer, and Heydrich can get their grubby fingers on them.

But the economy is only a part of this equation. The SS at this point have their own army and are of course by and large the German domestic security services. Any crisis such as the one you describe post-death of Goering would, imho, never ever result in a prolonged power vacuum for precisely this reason. The competitive and cannibalistic nature of the Third Reich means that such a vacuum would immediately be filled by whoever is ready. Purely through usage of the apparatus of security and repression, the SS can manufacture the right scandal at the right time, detain the right person, or enact the right operation to ensure the victory of one faction/candidate over the other. It might be overreach to push one of their own, maybe. But I don't believe they would stand by and watch as the party gets paralysed by institutional indecision and uncertainty.

I have tackled this problem in my own narrative setting (warning if you've read Alice In Wartheland and This Fire We Kindled: very mild spoilers ahead on Nazi politics). In that timeline, which is an ASB setting where Germany has gained considerable eastern European territories but the Soviet Union is still extant, I've had Heydrich gain the reins of power following precisely a similar power vacuum (death of Goering, no clear succession mechanism, attempt by the party to seize the state, SS intervention to make it fail). Heydrich's Fuehrership is very much intended as a one-off, a product of very specific contingencies. In the later 20th and early 21st century, the trend will be towards what I call "indirect partification". Effectively my idea is that the watershed of the Heydrich experience will create a situation where the heavyweights of the Nazi state (the SS, the armaments ministry and industry/state-owned companies, and the Wehrmacht) tacitly decide to never select a Fuehrer from among themselves to avoid upsetting the apple cart, and keep turning to "inoffensive" party members to act as "compromise Fuehrers". This will have unintended consequences down the line, where the main events of the story will do much to upset the status quo in the Third Reich - but more broadly speaking clever party functionnaires can make use of the opportunity of acting as an apparently inoffensive, compromise mediator figure between various Nazi interests to gradually penetrate the civil service and the economy.

Summa summarum, I believe the immediate postwar to be, ironically, the worst possible time for partification to happen. Too many competitors who have had the distinction of "serving at Hitler's side" are arrayed to try and seize power, and riding the height of victory disease and near-limitless economic control/political clout. The real opportunity for the party comes much later, when the long and steadily applied pressures of the Cold War, the Nazi economic dysfunction, and the deterioration of the dreams of empire in the East, all start to corrode the more grandiose aspects of the regime. At that point the transition that Germany needs is one imho very favourable to partification. Now that the big overarching goals (win the war, colonise the east) are more or less acknowledged as done, the Nazi state needs "a reason to exist" and a reorientation to a more long-term life, as opposed to a short-term dash towards an objective. This is where the need for administrative and economic control, the exhaustion and corrosion of the main power brokers, and the impelling demand for a new ontology, can give the party an opportunity to step in and turn the Third Reich into a "managerial state".

Thanks for the reply.

About indirect partification, it's an interesting concept. So, the major power centres are the SS and the army, the businesses, the civil service, all loosely interconnected through the SS, who have all decided to elect Führers from the NSDAP, but the position of the Führer has started to resemble that of the Holy Roman Emperors in the 15th and 16th centuries, with the former playing the role of the princes.

Also, I agree with what you said about the ability of the SS to act that way, although I think that it wouldn't be impossible to have a protracted crisis (the following is to large part a sort of thought experiment of mine).

a) For one, the Waffen-SS would probably still fall under the army's jurisdiction, for it wold allow Himmler to expand their influence and reach more effectively, without alerting the army that much, and the Army would still be maintain the monopoly of military force, at least in theory. So, if Himmler for example attempted to use the W-SS, he might be in for a nasty surprise, since the OKW could perhaps tell him a big "No no", while the acting President could perhaps be convinced to intervene.

b) Also, about the police, it doesn't necessarily mean that it would be under whomever happened to be RF-SS. I mean, if Himmler had died before the events of the succession and his positions (RF-SS and CdP) hadn't been fused, then there could be a reshuffle that would take the position of CdP (and Interior Minister) away from Himmler's successor in the SS and give it/them to a person outside it. While there would be a lot of overlap between the Police and the SS, via Himmler's policy of handing over honorary ranks and commissions, there would also be a possibility to sever these links with time, which would limit Heydrich's room of maneuver substantially, especially since he would be unanle to press charges, imprison etc. He would still have a powerful tool in the remainder of the RSHA, but he would have to be able to secure the cooperation of the new Police leadership, which could be not a given.

If the new Interior Minister was a Party member bureaucrat from the ministry, you could probably get at least a level of commitment in achieving this goal. While this wouldn't neutralise such measures as protective custody etc, I think that it would be more difficult for them to be used in this case. So, with a bit of miscalculation from most sides, you could probably get a somewhat protracted fight for the succession.

Lastly, about the ripe time for partification, I agree as well: the time would probably be in the early 1960s, which in many ways would start resembling 1938: signs of crisis inside the regime, the economy overheating with all the spending during the 1950s, a sense that the policies in place would be approaching a dead end. Since this time the solution would probably not be to found outside (since Germany has no need to expand, it already controls an enormous economic and resource base and the world would have definitely entered the nuclear age by then), there would be more support to search for it inside Germany and replace the old status quo with a new one. Partification would then constitute an attractive alternative for the younger base of the party, since it would give the promise of change, of doing away with old and cautious bureaucrats and allowing the "expert ideologue" to be in charge and implement his vision, while almost 15 years of Party education controlled by the PK would have laid the groundwork as well.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Thank you for your thoughtful, detailed response. You're quite correct that most Nazi victory scenarios focus more on the leading personalities of the potential heirs, and less so on the processes involved. I think one reason is that you get all manners of secondary literature, both scholarly and less so, on the inner circle and even there it varies. But second echelon figures are less explored and when it happens, it's more likely to be the SS than the Party.

Language barriers may also play a role. For example, there's a very good German language biography of Gauleiter Erich Koch by Ralf Meindl, but to my knowledge it hasn't been translated into English. Orlow's history of the NSDAP is incredibly comprehensive, but that alone is daunting and it's not the most accessible work. So I welcome the chance to discuss this stuff!



Yes. Big business profited handsomely from the Nazis if it played ball. Look no further than IG Farben's factory complex Auschwitz-Monowitz. If something similar to the scenario outlined by you occurs, I could see hardliners pushing for the establishment of mandatory Party cells in companies. So businessowners retain control over most regular business decisions, but the Party wants a seat at the table when it comes to large-scale investment decisions.



Yes, what I meant. Already in OTL the Staff of the Deputy Führer secured the right to vet laws and civil service appointments for their conformity to Nazi beliefs. They used the Law to secure the Unity of Party and State (Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat) as a basis for this. This is, of course, quite open to interpretation, since beyond a few dogmas Nazism was a fluid ideology. But it's something they'd want to expand on. The PK would want to be the source of orthodoxy, conduit of the Führer's will and chief personnel office. All in all, the PK managig to acquire the authority to block laws deemed not 'national socialist' enough would be a quite devious way to secure control, while also chipping away at the autority of whoever happens to be Führer.

I think the Reichsorganisationsleitung would sooner or later be dispensed with. Ley was an unstable drunkard. Back in the 30s some forces in the Party pushed for him to be kicked upstairs by being appointed minister of labour, while being forced to give up leadership of the DAF. If he mismanages labour policy after the war and there's some sort of economic crisis, Bormann might have a pretext to get rid of another Reichsleiter title.

Naturally, there is the issue that the Gauleiters and the PK might not necessarily have the same vision in regards to partification. A Gauleiter will be happy to extend his power over state authorities and say gain control over revenue collection in his bailiwick, but that does not automatically mean he wants to take orders from the PK in Berlin. This applies in particular to the 'Old Fighters' who got their positions during the 'Kampfzeit' and look down on a 'jumped up' Secretary. Granted, these guys would eventually die off or retire and be replaced by younger figures (an example for the second generation of up and coming Party bosses moulded by the PK would be Paul Wegener and Hartmann Lauterbacher), but they'd definitely still be a big deal in the 50s.

Göring strikes me as someone who'd leave many things in flux regarding succession. He never appointed a single deputy for his many offices. He had Milch as State Secretary in the Ministry of Aviation, but also often undermined him to keep him from getting too influential. Worth noting that Göring and Bormann ended up having a very bad relationship, especially after Bormann became Secretary to the Führer in 1943. That caused Göring to briefly throw in with Goebbels, Speer and other bigwigs who wanted to cut the 'Committee of Three' down to size, though nothing came of that. Thing is, Bormann's power is primarily derived from his access to Hitler. Ironically, in the long run one of the younger figures groomed by him might be a better agent of partification than Bormann himself due to not having stepped on so many toes, and possibly having a bit more charm.

The Senate being established as a body is an interesting option. Sources vary when it comes to size and composition, though one imagines the leading Party bigwigs would be on it, making it a formalisation of the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter conferences. It seems it was a matter of debate whether field marshals should be on it. One interesting option would be for the chairman of the senate acting as interim leader of the Reich after a Führer dies until a new one is chosen. Another would be decoupling the office of Reich chancellor from that of the Führer for day-to-day management and temporary stewardship in the case of a vacancy, though that would get in the way of the PK's ambitions.



Moreover, the SS was also active infiltrating the civil service, granting honorary SS ranks to prominent figures in Party and the State (granted, this did not necessarily mean that said individuals became supporters of the SS. After all, Bormann was an honorary SS general), and forging links with big business (see the Circle of Friends of the Reichsführer-SS). Now contrary to popular belief, the Nazis weren't in the habit of murdering their own en masse (I'm not saying this to downplay their evil, far from it. If anything it makes Nazi Germany even more evil since it did not have to force compliance and participation in its vile acts through threats of purging). The Night of the Long Knives, while bloody, was fairly limited in scale and the number of people killed is actually dwarfed by those who were simply forced to retire in the aftermath of the bloodletting. And no one was killed during the Blomberg-Fritsch Crisis.

The only other bloody purge within Nazi Germany's power structure occured after a bunch of officers had literally tried to blow up the Führer. But backroom intrigue, blackmail, manufactured scandals, some limited bloody purging? Definitely on the table. The SS regards itself as Germany's new vanguard elite, so it would not remain passive, though that could also produce backlash if it makes an overt play for power. Doubly so if it has gone too far with its military ambitions. Not that the SS is a monolith marching in lockstep behind whoever is Reichsführer-SS. In the last stages of the war, Müller seems to have thrown in his lot with Bormann, Wolff cut his own deal with the Western Allies and Kaltenbrunner was able to bypass Himmler and get direct access to Hitler due to his good relations with the Secretary. But it cannot be discounted as a power player.

Also lol we just made Bormann interesting! He isn't a milquetoast statuos quo pen-pusher and Brezhnev expy. He is actually a 'reformist' who wants to make radical changes to the way the Third Reich is run...just not the way 'reformist' is commonly understood, since it is usually equated with being a Krushchev, Deng or Gorbachev figure (which shows the limitations of that sort of parallelism).



Indirect partification as a result of the Party apparatus playing 'honest broker' is an interesting option. Göring, compared to other contenders, has the advantage of being very big tent because he can appeal to all manners of interest groups, despite his many character flaws. And said 'eccentricities' are likely to keep him from changing the status quo too much. Plus he has actual popularity with the German people. But Himmler and Heydrich want an SS state, Bormann total partification, and Speer's power is based on an alliance between war industry and SS and most Gauleiters dislike him. In such a situation, a 'younger, up and coming' Party apparatchik whose personality is reasonably appealing and who hasn't annoyed anyone too much might get picked. You may wind up with a Party oligarchy.

Very interesting points, thanks for bringing them up.

About the implementation of the partification, indeed the PK and the Gaus would be at odds, since the Gauleiters would most likely aspire to become "little Führers" in their Gaus and push partification (much) further than what the Party Chancellery would be prepared for or willing to get (ie subsume almost all state administration in their Gau organs and be able to discharge the functions of admnistration and government without much fuss from Berlin or Munich). So, the PK would probably be unwilling to go all the way for that reason as well (to have a counterbalance for the Gauleiters and something that would make them to continue need support from Berlin), as well as for practical reasons (placing all the administration under the Gauleiter would allow for corruption to bloom, which would a) deprive the Treasury of funds b) allow the Gauleiters to build their own local clientele and power bases on a level surpassing everything before. The ideal for the Party Chancellery would most likely be for the Party in general to be in a hegemonic position and the Gauleiters not to be questioned or obstructed when carrying out PK policy and in general, that State positions be occupied by Party members, not to integrate the Party and the State in a single entity.

The detachment of the Chancellorship from the office of Führer would be an interesting possibility as well. In theory, I think it could allow the Party to defuse perhaps tensions in the case of succession by promising the lesser candidate the chancellorship and, more generally, to limit the power of the Führer somewhat, while it would deepen the partification of the government apparatus. Of course, the chancellorship could be a threat, as you said, if someone hostile to the PK occupied it.

 

[Tresckow]

Very interesting points, thanks for bringing them up.

About the implementation of the partification, indeed the PK and the Gaus would be at odds, since the Gauleiters would most likely aspire to become "little Führers" in their Gaus and push partification (much) further than what the Party Chancellery would be prepared for or willing to get (ie subsume almost all state administration in their Gau organs and be able to discharge the functions of admnistration and government without much fuss from Berlin or Munich). So, the PK would probably be unwilling to go all the way for that reason as well (to have a counterbalance for the Gauleiters and something that would make them to continue need support from Berlin), as well as for practical reasons (placing all the administration under the Gauleiter would allow for corruption to bloom, which would a) deprive the Treasury of funds b) allow the Gauleiters to build their own local clientele and power bases on a level surpassing everything before. The ideal for the Party Chancellery would most likely be for the Party in general to be in a hegemonic position and the Gauleiters not to be questioned or obstructed when carrying out PK policy and in general, that State positions be occupied by Party members, not to integrate the Party and the State in a single entity.

The detachment of the Chancellorship from the office of Führer would be an interesting possibility as well. In theory, I think it could allow the Party to defuse perhaps tensions in the case of succession by promising the lesser candidate the chancellorship and, more generally, to limit the power of the Führer somewhat, while it would deepen the partification of the government apparatus. Of course, the chancellorship could be a threat, as you said, if someone hostile to the PK occupied it.

On the office of Fuhrer, I always felt like it'd be abolished once Hitler died and the roles of President and Chancellor would separate. Goering as Reichspresident and Bormann as Chancellor would provide some interesting power dynamics for the party...

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

On the office of Fuhrer, I always felt like it'd be abolished once Hitler died and the roles of President and Chancellor would separate. Goering as Reichspresident and Bormann as Chancellor would provide some interesting power dynamics for the party...

Well, Bormann wouldn't get the chancellorship, he wasn't a known entity outside Party circles and he had more than a few enemies inside and even more outside it.

 

[Tresckow]

Well, Bormann wouldn't get the chancellorship, he wasn't a known entity outside Party circles and he had more than a few enemies inside and even more outside it.

Yeah but assuming Hess' power continues to wane or he still goes off to England like OTL, Bormann will probably be second-in-line after Goering. I say Bormann over Himmler because there is no way the army would let Himmler hold an office that high.

 

[Ombra]

Also, I agree with what you said about the ability of the SS to act that way, although I think that it wouldn't be impossible to have a protracted crisis (the following is to large part a sort of thought experiment of mine).

Yes, you have quite convinced me.

Lastly, about the ripe time for partification, I agree as well: the time would probably be in the early 1960s, which in many ways would start resembling 1938: signs of crisis inside the regime, the economy overheating with all the spending during the 1950s, a sense that the policies in place would be approaching a dead end. Since this time the solution would probably not be to found outside (since Germany has no need to expand, it already controls an enormous economic and resource base and the world would have definitely entered the nuclear age by then), there would be more support to search for it inside Germany and replace the old status quo with a new one. Partification would then constitute an attractive alternative for the younger base of the party, since it would give the promise of change, of doing away with old and cautious bureaucrats and allowing the "expert ideologue" to be in charge and implement his vision, while almost 15 years of Party education controlled by the PK would have laid the groundwork as well.

All of the above, and moreover, I feel like the Nazi regime itself, by empowering the "technocrats of rationalisation" was essentially going to usher that transformation itself. By this I don't mean that partification is guaranteed to happen, not at all, but that once the old power brokers who had personal experience with Hitler and his erratic decision-making are gone, and the need for a new ontology expresses itself, a lot of these young, educated SS officers, economists, agronomists, as well as civil service bureaucrats etc, are going to ask themselves, well, why the hell not? Why shouldn't we rationalise the state just like we did X? (Insert whatever policy field you feel like). I feel like the younger base in particular would really see no reason why the state as a whole has to run differently than the office for the four year plan/the Zentrale Planung, or what have you.

Goering as Reichspresident and Bormann as Chancellor would provide some interesting power dynamics for the party...

Goering would, imho, never willingly share power with Bormann. Not in a million years.

There is an opportunity for the office to be split later on, possibly as part of the brokering of a consensus between the various potentates of the Reich, maybe as part of the scenario discussed above, with the Party mediating between various interests. But I still feel it likelier that the singular office would be retained, even if the candidate selected ends up being an inoffensive party member most of the time (until some clever young apparatchik gets in there with a bold plan...). Nazism is very fluid of course, but you don't just toss out the Fuehrerprinzip like that, not in a country that's actually won the war in some capacity.

By the way, Tanaka, this is all very interesting. Do you have a timeline in the works perhaps? We could use a few more works that treat this subject matter with the nuance it deserves. I for one would be eager to read it. And if you ever happen to check out my own stories on Cold War Nazi Germany, I'd be very eager to know your thoughts.

 

[Tolkiene]

When Hitler appointed Göring as his successor, he said he'd succeed him in all offices of State, Party and Wehrmacht. In other words, he'd be Führer. And in the monologues recorded in Hitler's Tabletalk, he also says Führer will continue to be the title of the supreme leader of Germany. It's the same monologue where he says that a Nazi Senate should be set up to act as a college of cardinals and elect future Führers. He split the office when he named Dönitz president and Goebbels chancellor, but that was when there was nothing left to inherit anyway. Plus it was super unlikely that Goebbels would make it out of Berlin even if he'd wanted to escape. In public, there'll be a Führer to act as the 'embodiment of the German people's national will chosen by providence', even if he's just a figurehead controlled by the oligarchs. Frankly, a scenario where some Nazi 'princes' have to balance retaining the energy of the Nazi movement and the mystique of the Führership with the very practical requirements of actually running a dysfunctional, continental empire (never mind the Führer's efforts to gain true control, possibly through a Nazi Cultural Revolution type deal) could be interesting.

It's also pertinent to note that while Bormann took over Hess' old office (now renamed the Parteikanzlei) and was far cannier and more powerful, he didn't get the Deputy Führer title. Nor was he ever in the line of succession, whereas Hess was in theory, even though no one expected a Führer Hess. There were good reasons for this. Bormann had no charisma, could not give a speech to save his...and he knew it. So did Hitler. The ordinary German literally didn't know who Bormann was. Göring hated him, and no one in the inner circle liked him. Which is why, as I think I mentioned, I believe one of the younger Party apparatchiks groomed by Bormann in the PK is in the long run a better choice to drive the agenda.

About the implementation of the partification, indeed the PK and the Gaus would be at odds, since the Gauleiters would most likely aspire to become "little Führers" in their Gaus and push partification (much) further than what the Party Chancellery would be prepared for or willing to get (ie subsume almost all state administration in their Gau organs and be able to discharge the functions of admnistration and government without much fuss from Berlin or Munich). So, the PK would probably be unwilling to go all the way for that reason as well (to have a counterbalance for the Gauleiters and something that would make them to continue need support from Berlin), as well as for practical reasons (placing all the administration under the Gauleiter would allow for corruption to bloom, which would a) deprive the Treasury of funds b) allow the Gauleiters to build their own local clientele and power bases on a level surpassing everything before. The ideal for the Party Chancellery would most likely be for the Party in general to be in a hegemonic position and the Gauleiters not to be questioned or obstructed when carrying out PK policy and in general, that State positions be occupied by Party members, not to integrate the Party and the State in a single entity.

Agreed. Even in OTL a lot of the actual management of a Gau was vested in the Gau staff offices, which the PK sought to pack with its people. And further down you have the Kreisleiters running things on a district level. This could produce an interesting source of conflict, when the Gauleiters seek to extend their authority to become little Führers in fact and name, while the PK must balance securing hegemonic control for the Party and thus keeping its clientele happy with preventing the local Hoheitsträger from becoming autonmous barons and thus destabilising the state.

All in all, I think this scenario is promising.

a lot of these young, educated SS officers, economists, agronomists, as well as civil service bureaucrats etc, are going to ask themselves, well, why the hell not? Why shouldn't we rationalise the state just like we did X? (Insert whatever policy field you feel like).

In many ways, it's the hour of second or third echelon Nazi functionaries who don't have the same prominence as the Old Fighters, but know the nuts and bolts of the system and are still dedicated Nazis. Guys like, to name some examples, Wilhelm Stuckart, Gustav Adolf Scheel, Werner Best, Otto Ohlendorf, Paul Wegener, Herbert Backe, Gerhard Klopfer, Hans Kehrl et al. Obviously not all of them since it's not like all these guys have the same vision, but broadly people of that type.

 

[Kaiser of Brazil]

Well currently I can’t give a very long reply but let me throw my hat in.

I do not believe “Petrification”, as in the way that happened in China or the USSR, would be possible. The German Ideology and system is far different from the more bureaucratic-minded Marxism-Leninism. I would argue that the central theme of Nazism, perhaps on par to anti-semitism and German nationalism, is the Führer himself. The Leadership principle was enshrined in the NSDAP from the moment Hitler took over from Drexler, the Cult of Personality in Nazism was not the same under Mao and Stalin. In China, Mao was seen as the Helmsman, the one leading the nation, the father of communist China who inherited thousands of years of Chinese traditions. In the Soviet Union, Stalin was Lenin’s chosen heir, the Grand Marshal that led the workers to victory with his brilliant mind. Even other examples always show the leader as the infallible father of the Nation, the one to lead them to victory. In Brazil, Vargas was called “Father of the Poor”, in Argentina, Peron is such a central figure that political parties claim his legacy to this day.

In the Reich, the Führer IS the nation. The Führerprinzip is perfectly shown by the grand speeches, the state propaganda, and the way people like Hess praised Hitler. “Hitler is Germany, Germany is Hitler”, his word alone was worth more than any law. “The Führer commands and we obey”, every aspect of his life was idolized and imitated. Men like Mao and Stalin inherited their systems, they didn’t create the Party, but in Germany, Hitler essentially created it. As long as he is alive, and even after death, every word of his’ is a law, one that must be followed unquestionably as if he is a prophet, the incarnation of the German Aryan spirit.

Hitler said in his life that there would be a succession to his title. He created the title of Führer and unless he himself dismantled it, then it could never be destroyed unless a future leader dared to strike the main Pilar of the NSDAP: Hitler’s Will. If Hitler declared one day that Jews were Aryans then the NSDAP would have no choice but to follow. He switched the Japanese from “Asiatic Horde” to “Honorary Aryans” and the Party followed with no question. As such, if Hitler created the title and set up a succession, then that is exactly what they were supposed to do. The idea of following the leader with no question was one of the main pillars of Nazism, and the idea of partification would have to overcome the Führer, and it was something practically impossible to do without going against the words of the creator of the party. The only way I could see it happening was if the PK was influential enough to put a puppet Führer in charge and keep the real power in the shadows. Publicly, the Führer would always have to be kept as an unshakable pillar, the physical manifestation of Germany itself.

 

[Captain Homicide]

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What are the chances in the event of a standard AANW/Fatherland style Nazi victory that Hitler replaces Göring with Himmler as his heir due to the SS’ part in the Holocaust, Generalplan Ost and the brutal reshaping of Europe into the New Order?