Most important convoys were too far north for Dakar to be of any use. And it could be easily taken by the British.
Provided you can get those 40 million people to cooperate. What good is this industry (already employed to the maximum capacity possible OTL anyway) if there are no resources to feed it with?
Without doubt. As long as the Axis can actually ship supplies to Dakar.
It doesn't put them in a worse position. Even if "only" more French people collaborate with the Axis than actually did it is still an improvement.
This is an extract from Extract from The Air Forces of the World, by William Green and John Fricker
By June 17, 1940, when Marshal Pétain sought terms of surrender from the Germans, Paris had been occupied and Guerdian's armoured forces had thrust forward as far as Dijon and Saône. The Armée de l' Air was still fighting, and on June 23rd, when the French Government capitulated, had more operational aircraft than at the start of the German offensive. During June 18th-20th the D.520 fighters of GCI/3, II/3, III/3, III/6 and II/7, and the Hawk 75As of GCIII/2, I/4, II/4, I/5 and II/5 had been ordered to North Africa, but the remainder of the Armée de l' Air elements based in France at the time of the capitulation awaited disbandment in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.
On July 3rd the Royal Navy launched an attack on the French Fleet at Mers el Kébir to prevent its possible use by the Axis powers. In the hope that the Mers el Kébir clash would develop into a Franco-British war, the German Government rescinded its demand for the disbandment of all Armée de l' Air elements, and agreed to the retention of some units for the protection of France's North African possessions.
The forces retained, subsequently referred to as the Vichy Air Force, included 6 Groupes de Chasse, with Bloch M.B.151s, 152s and 155s; two Escardrilles de Chasse de Nuit, with Potez 631s; four Groupes de Bombardement with LeO451s; two Groupes de Bombardement d' Assault with Breguet 693s; three Groupes du Reconnaissance with Potez 63-11s, and one Groupe de Transport with Farman 222s and Amiot 143s. All these units were divided into the 1° and 2° Régions Aériennes. Fighter pilots were allowed to fly four hours each month, and bomber and reconnaissance pilots six hours. The German Armistice Commission also permitted production of the Dewoitine D.520 fighter to continue at Toluse, this type later re-equipping several Vichy Groupes de Chasse.
In North Africa, which was designated Commandment Superior de l' Air en Afrique du Nord, were based four Groupes de Chase with D.520s and two with Hawk 75As; five Groupes de Bombardement with LeO451s and four with DB-7s; two Groupes de Reconnaissance with M.B.174s and 175s, two with Potez 63-11s. and one with Martin 167s; and one Groupe de Transport flying Potez 54s and 65s. In French West Africa the Vichy Air Force had one Hawk 75A-equipped Groupe de Chase; three Groupes de Bombardement flying Martin 167s, and one Groupe de Reconnaissance flying Potez 63-11s. In Madagascar were stationed a mixed squadron of Potez 25s and 63-11s, and in Syria and the Lebanon were one M.S.406 Groupe, one Martin 167 Groupe de Bombardement, one Potez 63-11 Groupe, and six squadrons with obsolete Bloch M.B.200s, Potez 25s and 29s. A number of the units were not at their full establishments but, nevertheless, the Vichy Air Force was quite a sizeable component with between 700 and 800 combat aircraft.
I don't know how easy it would be to move some of it to the Eastern Front.
The logistics challenges for the German AF were different from the field armies. In the first months of the war in the east a extra 500 aircraft particularly tactical bombers may have made a greater difference that a couple of motorized corps. there still could be a morale or volunteer problem, but the consequences would be different than with infantry.
does it seem more plausible Vichy air force kept in the colonies (away from Europe) to guard against further British (and under my scenario Italian) attacks?
does it seem more plausible Vichy air force kept in the colonies (away from Europe) to guard against further British (and under my scenario Italian) attacks?
Sure. There are several other ways to look at this. Does Germany want a minor ally or a large one? We have to remember when the cease fire came in June France possesed in Metropolitan France & NW Africa appox 3,000 operational aircraft & perhaps another thousand damaged or stored.
If Germany restricts the French AF as in OTL then your question is a good one. Alternatley if this French ally is expected to contribute a large AF the both Africa and the east can have coverage.
Ultimate danger for Germany is Laval, or whoever, cant hold the military together. Petain was having trouble with his nuetral policy. He tried ensuring all the key commanders were loyal but there were simply not enough who saw Frances future outside the Allied camp.
A pro Axis or Facist French government will be hard pressed to find a large number of like minded military leaders or men for the ranks that it can truly trust. This question runs against the large material resources that might be salvaged after the defeat in June 1940.
Originally Posted by Imladrik
French Submarine were not made for the atlantic, they were made for the mediterannean. Only a few of them were oceanic submarines. The French Navy had no reason to build huge numbers of oceanic submarines because their planned enemies were the Kriegsmarine (easily dealt with with the help of the british) and the Regia Marina (which was restricted to the Mediterranean.
Which means the Germans don't have to transfer U-boats to the Mediterranean and therefore concentrate them on the Atlantic.
thanks. very interesting points about (potential) French air power, all the focus is usually on the fleet.
they DID have a myriad of aircraft manufacturing projects together.
my speculation was, with Germany allowed bases in Tunisia, Dakar, Syria, et al, the French air force would be occupied but as you have pointed out their capacity was far greater.