AHC: USA fleet ready for Battle of the Atlantic in 1942

[Stardude82]

Or cancel the worst shipbuilding decision made by the USN in the 20th Century (the crime against the laws of God and man that was the Alaska class) and build a fleet of 100.

Would appropriations in late 1940 been soon enough to do much of anything beside convert some trawlers?

 

[Driftless]

An origin for the Alaska's born out of a passionate assessment that probably was incorporated into the Iowas (the big cruiser proponent, Captain A. J. Chantry also designed the Iowas).

From Friedman, Norman; Naval History and Heritage Command. Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War (p. 159):

Another cruiser development almost certainly did not involve the college or gaming. In March 1938, the Secretary of the Navy (presumably meaning the CNO) proposed a new type of large cruiser armed with 10- or 12-inch guns, hence capable of overcoming all existing cruisers. Initial design studies showed that it would displace about 18,000 tons or more (26,000 tons with three triple-gun 12-inch turrets), hence would be well outside the cruiser category as defined by the London Naval Treaty. It would be defined, then, as a capital ship. One question was whether the U.S. Navy would willingly sacrifice battleship tonnage (as provided under the Vinson Acts) to build such ships.​

​

There is no indication that the idea came out of gaming. The General Board cruiser file (420-8) includes a 4 April 1938 paper strongly advocating the new type of cruiser, written by Captain A. J. Chantry, who was then head of Preliminary Design in the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Chantry had been a member of the Naval War College Senior Class of 1936. His 1938 paper is in the form of the college-advocated “Estimate of the Situation,” but it is far less analytical than the paper the college produced in 1931 to guide future cruiser policy. Given its timing, it may have been mainly an attempt to back the Secretary’s request rather than an independent proposal that the United States should build a super-cruiser. Chantry based his estimate of what the Japanese were likely to build on the national character of her people; the aspirations and aims encompassed in her national policy; geographic factors; and in particular, her present and future economic position…. In considering Japanese character it is perhaps sufficient for present purposes to note that her people are zealots, almost fanatical in type, and only removed in moderate degree from the influences of feudalism. Nationalism is highly developed backed by determination of the strongest character. The Japanese believe that they are the children of Heaven and nothing can divert them from their national idealisms. Life is held cheaply in support of their country. They are the most resolute of peoples, the most fearless and determined adversaries of those who seek to oppose them. They are secretive…. It is safe to assume that [Japan] now seeks the hegemony of all China and areas to the north and desires to extend her influence to the East Indies and South Seas as opportunity presents…there is almost no limit to Japanese conceptions of Empire. Coupled with the fanatical determination of her people it makes Japan a “problem child” in the family of nations; one whose every move deserves the most serious attention and consideration of major powers.​

​

Some of Chantry’s tone may be traceable to the recent shock of the Japanese attack on China in 1937, in the course of which the U.S. Yangtze River gunboat Panay had been attacked and sunk, apparently deliberately. The invasion and such incidents were then leading to the beginning of U.S. mobilization, in the form of the second Vinson Act and less public debate on whether to increase production of naval weapons and equipment. Japan was also in the process of rejecting attempts to convince her to abide by the limits stated in the new London Naval Treaty. However, Chantry was going far beyond the usual cool Naval War College analysis. War College papers did not dwell on national characteristics the way Chantry did.​

​

Chantry went on to point to Japanese dependence on imported raw materials; Japan had amassed sufficient supplies to last for the early stages of a war, but would have to rely on imports anyway. None of this can have been unfamiliar. Earlier analyses of likely Japanese naval construction would not even have mentioned it. A list of courses of action open to Japan repeated that Japanese secretiveness would be a major factor in her grand strategy. Japan would counter opponents’ greater strength with “cunning,” meaning that Japan would develop “weapons of attack for which her opponents have no counterpart readily available.” This last was an accurate prediction of Japanese policy, which emphasized the development of individually superior weapons such as the huge Yamato-class battleship, the Zero fighter, and the Type 93 “Long Lance” oxygen-propelled torpedo.​

​

Chantry correctly predicted that the Japanese would build warships individually superior to their foreign counterparts. He parted company with the Naval War College in not considering overall Japanese requirements, hence looking at likely Japanese priorities. Instead, he focused on one part of a possible Pacific War, a war against trade that the United States would prosecute. The question was how the Japanese would defend their own trade. This was very different from the issues typically raised in gaming. The Naval War College certainly agreed that Japan would live or die based on its ability to import what it needed, but that led to a U.S. strategy of blockade. Games explored raiding, not as a means of crippling Japan, but rather as a way to draw off Japanese forces to allow the U.S. fleet greater freedom of action.​

​

Chantry pointed out that a Japanese convoy strategy would fail if the convoy escorts could not deal with individually powerful raiders (presumably cruisers). However, the raiders would be drawn into focal areas (where shipping routes crossed) as they ran down their victims. By placing individually powerful ships in the focal areas, the Japanese would gradually annihilate the raiders. It would not matter if the United States built large numbers of cruisers, as long as they were individually inferior to those the Japanese had. It happened that the focal-area defense had been planned by the Royal Navy during the latter part of the 19th century. It was the alternative to convoys that the British adopted at the time as a means of protecting their trade. It is not clear that Chantry or anyone outside the Admiralty knew this in 1938; the focal-area approach may merely have been the obvious one.​

​

Chantry cited persistent rumors that Japan was already building cruisers somewhat larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the inch guns) as well as very fast light Italian cruisers. He suggested that the Japanese would use their extra tonnage to mount heavier guns—9-, 10-, or 11-inch calibers. In fact, the Japanese cruisers displaced considerably more than 10,000 tons. No one knew that until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese used the extra tonnage to gain conventional advantages like greater speed, but the ships did not mount heavier guns.​

​

Chantry pointed out that having freed themselves of treaty restrictions, the Japanese might choose to build somewhat larger and better-protected ships armed with more 8-inch guns . Alternately, they might jump to a super-cruiser type armed with much more powerful guns. Japanese secrecy made it impossible to know whether super-cruisers were planned. Chantry argued that the possibility could not be dismissed. Any of these ships might indeed be extremely expensive, but the Japanese might well build them anyway. Moreover, the Japanese had a national tendency to spring surprises on their opponents. Chantry argued that the United States should anticipate the possible construction of Japanese or other super-cruisers by building competing ships, the type the General Board was considering. The U.S. Navy needed something superior to either the super 8-inch gun cruiser or the semi-capital ship, since it could not be sure what the Japanese were building.​

​

All of this was a very non–Naval War College argument dressed in Naval War College clothing. Chantry never asked the usual Naval War College questions. What were overall Japanese requirements? What were their priorities likely to be, given likely U.S. action in wartime? There is no evidence that the college was ever asked for its views, or for that matter whether it ever volunteered any. For the moment, enthusiasm for big overarmed cruisers waned, because it seemed more important to use available tonnage for real battleships (the Iowas were being designed). However, the super-cruiser idea returned in 1940, when the Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 dramatically increased available tonnage and all restrictions associated with the London Naval Treaty had died. The big new cruiser program included the six Alaskas, which certainly filled Chantry’s requirements. As for the Japanese, they seem to have decided to build their own super-cruisers only in 1941, and then as part of their main fleet (they were to replace the Kongo-class battlecruisers). These ships were never laid down.​

Interesting piece of history I had not heard of before now.

 

[Driftless]

Accept the offer from civilians to fly air patrols they are just as well armed and equipped as the USAAC aircraft and there are a lot more of them

Add some private yachts/fishing boats - at an earlier date - even unarmed as observers (Ernest Hemingway and drinking buddies dabbled at this). You would also need a central reporting office to coordinate the gathering and disemination of sighting information

 

[Cryhavoc101]

An earlier expansion of the airship fleet, even a small one, would have paid dividends to the events of Drumbeat and the follow on operations of 'the 2nd Happy time'

Having a persistent air patrol over the East Coast convoys (which in any 'improved' POD would have been instigated earlier) would drive down losses and likely have increased U-boat losses and as those few U-boats initially used were the larger Type IX of which Germany had only a handful available - any losses would be telling.

Obviously an earlier blackout combined with convoys travelling further out away from any back ground illumination on the coast would help

A robust east coast convoy command with a dedicated commander with the ability to make decisions and command all the necessary assets (Military and civilian) and be able to react to intel such as that being supplied by the likes of Sir Rodger Winn and his U-boat tracking team in London - OTL this was split between several commanders who were often busy with other jobs and was initially very ineffective.

 

[CalBear]

Would appropriations in late 1940 been soon enough to do much of anything beside convert some trawlers?

It took 18 months, at the usual pre-war construction pace found in a USN yard, where many of the workers were actually WPA, and construction standards were on the level of luxury auto makers, to take the first ship of the class from keel to operational (as a comparison, it took 19 months to build the first Fletcher Class, once the war started that fell to under a year). Put a sense of urgency into the system (which the WI sort of requires) and you would have yards pumping Erie and/or Treasury Class hull in around 11 months. with a big project, including some West Coast private shipyards it would be possible to have at least 25 ships in worked up condition by the time the war started.

The key is getting somebody to decide it was important (for that matter the navy could simply head out to Bremerton, San Diego and Suisun Bay and start taking a hundred or so Clemson class DD out of mothballs, swap out the low angle 4" guns and replace them to 3"/50, add a couple 40mm twin mounts (or the far less capable, but also much more available quad 1.1" mounts) in place of half the torpedo tubes, a couple K-guns and have an easy 50-60 reservist manned 35 knot destroyers ready before the war starts. Not an ideal solution, the old four pipers were very useful as fast transports and fast minelayers but they were very capable ships, if quite wet forward.

Same goes for aircraft. Rather than my much beloved PBB, just make Consolidated's FY 1941 extra special and give them a high priority order for additional PBYs and/or have the Naval Air Factory set aside one of the Kingfisher lines and start pumping out PBN Nomads aka the Catalina V (a PBY variant with a redesigned hull, larger fuel tanks and a remarkable 50% greater range/endurance. The PBY lacked the extremely heavy bomb load and the "why yes I can fly from New York to the Thames and back with stopping for fuel" range of the PBB, but it was a very fine aircraft, was already in production, and could be cranked out fairly quickly

What is needed is for Stark to put things in motion so King has the available forces to institute convoys (really hard to blame King for failing to something he didn't have the ships to accomplish). Money was there as of July 1940. Just need to spend some of it.

 

[Popcorn]

Build a bunch of destroyers and escort carriers with an established pipeline for training pilots. Have a plan to establish convoys at a moment’s notice and actually implement the plan.

 

[CalBear]

An origin for the Alaska's born out of a passionate assessment that probably was incorporated into the Iowas (the big cruiser proponent, Captain A. J. Chantry also designed the Iowas).

From Friedman, Norman; Naval History and Heritage Command. Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War (p. 159):

Another cruiser development almost certainly did not involve the college or gaming. In March 1938, the Secretary of the Navy (presumably meaning the CNO) proposed a new type of large cruiser armed with 10- or 12-inch guns, hence capable of overcoming all existing cruisers. Initial design studies showed that it would displace about 18,000 tons or more (26,000 tons with three triple-gun 12-inch turrets), hence would be well outside the cruiser category as defined by the London Naval Treaty. It would be defined, then, as a capital ship. One question was whether the U.S. Navy would willingly sacrifice battleship tonnage (as provided under the Vinson Acts) to build such ships.​

​

There is no indication that the idea came out of gaming. The General Board cruiser file (420-8) includes a 4 April 1938 paper strongly advocating the new type of cruiser, written by Captain A. J. Chantry, who was then head of Preliminary Design in the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Chantry had been a member of the Naval War College Senior Class of 1936. His 1938 paper is in the form of the college-advocated “Estimate of the Situation,” but it is far less analytical than the paper the college produced in 1931 to guide future cruiser policy. Given its timing, it may have been mainly an attempt to back the Secretary’s request rather than an independent proposal that the United States should build a super-cruiser. Chantry based his estimate of what the Japanese were likely to build on the national character of her people; the aspirations and aims encompassed in her national policy; geographic factors; and in particular, her present and future economic position…. In considering Japanese character it is perhaps sufficient for present purposes to note that her people are zealots, almost fanatical in type, and only removed in moderate degree from the influences of feudalism. Nationalism is highly developed backed by determination of the strongest character. The Japanese believe that they are the children of Heaven and nothing can divert them from their national idealisms. Life is held cheaply in support of their country. They are the most resolute of peoples, the most fearless and determined adversaries of those who seek to oppose them. They are secretive…. It is safe to assume that [Japan] now seeks the hegemony of all China and areas to the north and desires to extend her influence to the East Indies and South Seas as opportunity presents…there is almost no limit to Japanese conceptions of Empire. Coupled with the fanatical determination of her people it makes Japan a “problem child” in the family of nations; one whose every move deserves the most serious attention and consideration of major powers.​

​

Some of Chantry’s tone may be traceable to the recent shock of the Japanese attack on China in 1937, in the course of which the U.S. Yangtze River gunboat Panay had been attacked and sunk, apparently deliberately. The invasion and such incidents were then leading to the beginning of U.S. mobilization, in the form of the second Vinson Act and less public debate on whether to increase production of naval weapons and equipment. Japan was also in the process of rejecting attempts to convince her to abide by the limits stated in the new London Naval Treaty. However, Chantry was going far beyond the usual cool Naval War College analysis. War College papers did not dwell on national characteristics the way Chantry did.​

​

Chantry went on to point to Japanese dependence on imported raw materials; Japan had amassed sufficient supplies to last for the early stages of a war, but would have to rely on imports anyway. None of this can have been unfamiliar. Earlier analyses of likely Japanese naval construction would not even have mentioned it. A list of courses of action open to Japan repeated that Japanese secretiveness would be a major factor in her grand strategy. Japan would counter opponents’ greater strength with “cunning,” meaning that Japan would develop “weapons of attack for which her opponents have no counterpart readily available.” This last was an accurate prediction of Japanese policy, which emphasized the development of individually superior weapons such as the huge Yamato-class battleship, the Zero fighter, and the Type 93 “Long Lance” oxygen-propelled torpedo.​

​

Chantry correctly predicted that the Japanese would build warships individually superior to their foreign counterparts. He parted company with the Naval War College in not considering overall Japanese requirements, hence looking at likely Japanese priorities. Instead, he focused on one part of a possible Pacific War, a war against trade that the United States would prosecute. The question was how the Japanese would defend their own trade. This was very different from the issues typically raised in gaming. The Naval War College certainly agreed that Japan would live or die based on its ability to import what it needed, but that led to a U.S. strategy of blockade. Games explored raiding, not as a means of crippling Japan, but rather as a way to draw off Japanese forces to allow the U.S. fleet greater freedom of action.​

​

Chantry pointed out that a Japanese convoy strategy would fail if the convoy escorts could not deal with individually powerful raiders (presumably cruisers). However, the raiders would be drawn into focal areas (where shipping routes crossed) as they ran down their victims. By placing individually powerful ships in the focal areas, the Japanese would gradually annihilate the raiders. It would not matter if the United States built large numbers of cruisers, as long as they were individually inferior to those the Japanese had. It happened that the focal-area defense had been planned by the Royal Navy during the latter part of the 19th century. It was the alternative to convoys that the British adopted at the time as a means of protecting their trade. It is not clear that Chantry or anyone outside the Admiralty knew this in 1938; the focal-area approach may merely have been the obvious one.​

​

Chantry cited persistent rumors that Japan was already building cruisers somewhat larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the inch guns) as well as very fast light Italian cruisers. He suggested that the Japanese would use their extra tonnage to mount heavier guns—9-, 10-, or 11-inch calibers. In fact, the Japanese cruisers displaced considerably more than 10,000 tons. No one knew that until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese used the extra tonnage to gain conventional advantages like greater speed, but the ships did not mount heavier guns.​

​

Chantry pointed out that having freed themselves of treaty restrictions, the Japanese might choose to build somewhat larger and better-protected ships armed with more 8-inch guns . Alternately, they might jump to a super-cruiser type armed with much more powerful guns. Japanese secrecy made it impossible to know whether super-cruisers were planned. Chantry argued that the possibility could not be dismissed. Any of these ships might indeed be extremely expensive, but the Japanese might well build them anyway. Moreover, the Japanese had a national tendency to spring surprises on their opponents. Chantry argued that the United States should anticipate the possible construction of Japanese or other super-cruisers by building competing ships, the type the General Board was considering. The U.S. Navy needed something superior to either the super 8-inch gun cruiser or the semi-capital ship, since it could not be sure what the Japanese were building.​

​

All of this was a very non–Naval War College argument dressed in Naval War College clothing. Chantry never asked the usual Naval War College questions. What were overall Japanese requirements? What were their priorities likely to be, given likely U.S. action in wartime? There is no evidence that the college was ever asked for its views, or for that matter whether it ever volunteered any. For the moment, enthusiasm for big overarmed cruisers waned, because it seemed more important to use available tonnage for real battleships (the Iowas were being designed). However, the super-cruiser idea returned in 1940, when the Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 dramatically increased available tonnage and all restrictions associated with the London Naval Treaty had died. The big new cruiser program included the six Alaskas, which certainly filled Chantry’s requirements. As for the Japanese, they seem to have decided to build their own super-cruisers only in 1941, and then as part of their main fleet (they were to replace the Kongo-class battlecruisers). These ships were never laid down.​

Now I have an actual NAME to blame for the damned Cruiser, Big.

How the hell does the SAME officer command a group that came up with the Iowa class and the comedy of errors that were the Alaskas? Remarkable.

Also - pretty much everyone knew the IJN was full of shit regarding their cruiser tonnage. A Royal Navy officer remarked that if one of the classes (the Takao class?) was really 10,000 tons much of the structure had to be made out of balsa wood.

 

[alfredtuomi]

Institute a blackout in coastal cities and require ships to sail in convoy would have made a big difference even without a single additional warship.

Precisely what I was thinking.unfortunately it requires a certain admiral who we all know but don't really love to actually listen and act upon someone else's advice.

 

[Driftless]

On the blackout: agreed that it should have happened much sooner, but the political will and ability to "sell" the blackout idea to local governments took too long. The blackout was not popular with many business owners especially. Even with ships being sunk in sight of port or burning offshore, some of the response was "The Navy needs to do a better job. Don't be taking evening sales out of my pocket!"

 

[CalBear]

On the blackout: agreed that it should have happened much sooner, but the political will and ability to "sell" the blackout idea to local governments took too long. The blackout was not popular with many business owners especially. Even with ships being sunk in sight of port or burning offshore, some of the response was "The Navy needs to do a better job. Don't be taking evening sales out of my pocket!"

This is one of those issues that the Navy, King in particular, gets unfairly pilloried for on a regular basis. FDR (or maybe the Generals commanding the Military Districts, although they are really unlikely to go after this Political Hot Potato) were the only ones who had the authority to enforce Martial Law.

Easier to blame King, who, to be fair, was prickly enough to be in a really good place to draw fire.

 

[James Ricker]

The results would be heavier German U-Boat losses earlier in the war with a lot of Saved Allied tonnage
Those U-boats would take down their crews with them which would take out their commanders and future Commanders
That would be a loss that would hinder the kriegsmarine for the rest of the war
The extra tonnage would allow the more supplies to cross the Atlantic it might not speed up the invasion of Europe but it would be better supplied
A few hundred thousand more gallons of fuel at the right moment could have had Allied troops in the Ruhr Valley in 1944

 

[Stardude82]

The key is getting somebody to decide it was important (for that matter the navy could simply head out to Bremerton, San Diego and Suisun Bay and start taking a hundred or so Clemson class DD out of mothballs.

This is a part of the picture I'm fuzzy about. I was under the impression that between the purges in the 1920s and Bases-for-Destroyers, there really weren't many ocean going small ships left in stock. If there's any resources on the Red Lead Fleet from 1939 onwards, I'd be interested in them.

Edit: Unless there is some way to prevent force reductions in the 20s and 30s, it seemed they were out of hulls by the start of the war.

Flush-deck destroyer interwar history

 

[David Floyd]

Agreed that King wasn't responsible for the lack of blackouts but he was surely responsible for the anti convoy mentality and policy.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

King was not at the root of the lack of convoys along the east coast, US industry was. The shipping industry, the port industry, railroads, and manufacturing. The Britss spent months easing into a convoy system because of the gross inefficiencies in the convoy system. The Brits did not flip to a convoy system overnight precisely because of the severe disruption to industry. Klein in his 800 page primer on US industrial mobilization 1939-1943 touches briefly on this. His rather cold estimation is the loss of cargo & related disruption to US industry, mostly on the east coast was so small in terms of gross activity its lost in the noise of common error in industrial data. Conversely Klien estimates a abrupt switch to convoys would cause a near termination of deliveries in the first weeks, & over six months to recover sea delivery to over 50%. Klein based this on British experience & later US experience. So, if Klien is correct the cold calculation is the disruption from cargo losses to sinking was significantly less than a hasty half assed conversion to convoys.

This of course does not address the January 1942 problem of sinkings rivaling new launches. Which was a critical issue then.

 

[TonyA]

An origin for the Alaska's born out of a passionate assessment that probably was incorporated into the Iowas (the big cruiser proponent, Captain A. J. Chantry also designed the Iowas).

From Friedman, Norman; Naval History and Heritage Command. Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War (p. 159):

Another cruiser development almost certainly did not involve the college or gaming. In March 1938, the Secretary of the Navy (presumably meaning the CNO) proposed a new type of large cruiser armed with 10- or 12-inch guns, hence capable of overcoming all existing cruisers. Initial design studies showed that it would displace about 18,000 tons or more (26,000 tons with three triple-gun 12-inch turrets), hence would be well outside the cruiser category as defined by the London Naval Treaty. It would be defined, then, as a capital ship. One question was whether the U.S. Navy would willingly sacrifice battleship tonnage (as provided under the Vinson Acts) to build such ships.​

​

There is no indication that the idea came out of gaming. The General Board cruiser file (420-8) includes a 4 April 1938 paper strongly advocating the new type of cruiser, written by Captain A. J. Chantry, who was then head of Preliminary Design in the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Chantry had been a member of the Naval War College Senior Class of 1936. His 1938 paper is in the form of the college-advocated “Estimate of the Situation,” but it is far less analytical than the paper the college produced in 1931 to guide future cruiser policy. Given its timing, it may have been mainly an attempt to back the Secretary’s request rather than an independent proposal that the United States should build a super-cruiser. Chantry based his estimate of what the Japanese were likely to build on the national character of her people; the aspirations and aims encompassed in her national policy; geographic factors; and in particular, her present and future economic position…. In considering Japanese character it is perhaps sufficient for present purposes to note that her people are zealots, almost fanatical in type, and only removed in moderate degree from the influences of feudalism. Nationalism is highly developed backed by determination of the strongest character. The Japanese believe that they are the children of Heaven and nothing can divert them from their national idealisms. Life is held cheaply in support of their country. They are the most resolute of peoples, the most fearless and determined adversaries of those who seek to oppose them. They are secretive…. It is safe to assume that [Japan] now seeks the hegemony of all China and areas to the north and desires to extend her influence to the East Indies and South Seas as opportunity presents…there is almost no limit to Japanese conceptions of Empire. Coupled with the fanatical determination of her people it makes Japan a “problem child” in the family of nations; one whose every move deserves the most serious attention and consideration of major powers.​

​

Some of Chantry’s tone may be traceable to the recent shock of the Japanese attack on China in 1937, in the course of which the U.S. Yangtze River gunboat Panay had been attacked and sunk, apparently deliberately. The invasion and such incidents were then leading to the beginning of U.S. mobilization, in the form of the second Vinson Act and less public debate on whether to increase production of naval weapons and equipment. Japan was also in the process of rejecting attempts to convince her to abide by the limits stated in the new London Naval Treaty. However, Chantry was going far beyond the usual cool Naval War College analysis. War College papers did not dwell on national characteristics the way Chantry did.​

​

Chantry went on to point to Japanese dependence on imported raw materials; Japan had amassed sufficient supplies to last for the early stages of a war, but would have to rely on imports anyway. None of this can have been unfamiliar. Earlier analyses of likely Japanese naval construction would not even have mentioned it. A list of courses of action open to Japan repeated that Japanese secretiveness would be a major factor in her grand strategy. Japan would counter opponents’ greater strength with “cunning,” meaning that Japan would develop “weapons of attack for which her opponents have no counterpart readily available.” This last was an accurate prediction of Japanese policy, which emphasized the development of individually superior weapons such as the huge Yamato-class battleship, the Zero fighter, and the Type 93 “Long Lance” oxygen-propelled torpedo.​

​

Chantry correctly predicted that the Japanese would build warships individually superior to their foreign counterparts. He parted company with the Naval War College in not considering overall Japanese requirements, hence looking at likely Japanese priorities. Instead, he focused on one part of a possible Pacific War, a war against trade that the United States would prosecute. The question was how the Japanese would defend their own trade. This was very different from the issues typically raised in gaming. The Naval War College certainly agreed that Japan would live or die based on its ability to import what it needed, but that led to a U.S. strategy of blockade. Games explored raiding, not as a means of crippling Japan, but rather as a way to draw off Japanese forces to allow the U.S. fleet greater freedom of action.​

​

Chantry pointed out that a Japanese convoy strategy would fail if the convoy escorts could not deal with individually powerful raiders (presumably cruisers). However, the raiders would be drawn into focal areas (where shipping routes crossed) as they ran down their victims. By placing individually powerful ships in the focal areas, the Japanese would gradually annihilate the raiders. It would not matter if the United States built large numbers of cruisers, as long as they were individually inferior to those the Japanese had. It happened that the focal-area defense had been planned by the Royal Navy during the latter part of the 19th century. It was the alternative to convoys that the British adopted at the time as a means of protecting their trade. It is not clear that Chantry or anyone outside the Admiralty knew this in 1938; the focal-area approach may merely have been the obvious one.​

​

Chantry cited persistent rumors that Japan was already building cruisers somewhat larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the inch guns) as well as very fast light Italian cruisers. He suggested that the Japanese would use their extra tonnage to mount heavier guns—9-, 10-, or 11-inch calibers. In fact, the Japanese cruisers displaced considerably more than 10,000 tons. No one knew that until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese used the extra tonnage to gain conventional advantages like greater speed, but the ships did not mount heavier guns.​

​

Chantry pointed out that having freed themselves of treaty restrictions, the Japanese might choose to build somewhat larger and better-protected ships armed with more 8-inch guns . Alternately, they might jump to a super-cruiser type armed with much more powerful guns. Japanese secrecy made it impossible to know whether super-cruisers were planned. Chantry argued that the possibility could not be dismissed. Any of these ships might indeed be extremely expensive, but the Japanese might well build them anyway. Moreover, the Japanese had a national tendency to spring surprises on their opponents. Chantry argued that the United States should anticipate the possible construction of Japanese or other super-cruisers by building competing ships, the type the General Board was considering. The U.S. Navy needed something superior to either the super 8-inch gun cruiser or the semi-capital ship, since it could not be sure what the Japanese were building.​

​

All of this was a very non–Naval War College argument dressed in Naval War College clothing. Chantry never asked the usual Naval War College questions. What were overall Japanese requirements? What were their priorities likely to be, given likely U.S. action in wartime? There is no evidence that the college was ever asked for its views, or for that matter whether it ever volunteered any. For the moment, enthusiasm for big overarmed cruisers waned, because it seemed more important to use available tonnage for real battleships (the Iowas were being designed). However, the super-cruiser idea returned in 1940, when the Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 dramatically increased available tonnage and all restrictions associated with the London Naval Treaty had died. The big new cruiser program included the six Alaskas, which certainly filled Chantry’s requirements. As for the Japanese, they seem to have decided to build their own super-cruisers only in 1941, and then as part of their main fleet (they were to replace the Kongo-class battlecruisers). These ships were never laid down.​

As others, hadn't seen or heard of this before. And, even if it was used for (as a certain mod would say) evil purposes, it is one of the most incredible descriptions of the Japanese character and mindset of that era I have ever seen. The man's words are chilling in the hindsight of
Banzai charges, suicidal aircraft and small boat operations, political assassinations and the disdain for the lives of POW's and subjugated peoples. This even though my duty assignment in Japan was one of my favorites and I really enjoyed, and value, the Japanese people I have met and know...strange feelings...

 

[Stardude82]

Another source of hulls:

Eagle-class patrol craft - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

These were written off mostly during the 1930s. Not great ships, but keeping these in mothballs until through the 1940s would have been interesting.

 

[marathag]

However flying on only two early model Wright R-3350 engines in the middle of the Atlantic might have been risky

It seems the early R-3350s, as also used with the Consolidated Corrigidor Prototype, also slain on the altar of B-29, was reliable.
It also didn't have twin turbos and a poor cowling design like the B-29 hadthat amplified the R-3350s cooling shortcomings

 

[kent]

when the folks in charge refuse to listen to the ideas from England it didn't matter how ready the fleet was.