AHC: The Most Decentralized French Crown Possible

[John7755 يوحنا]

With a POD in 1000 CE, create a France that is made significantly more decentralized than otl, yet without becoming a weak kingdom. We could say, that this is a challenge which seeks to see the French monarchy become as decentralized in terms of royal control over lands, yet still successful. Some conditions that I would like fulfilled in addition to any that you can conceive of.

1. The varied vassals of the King of France, should all be made into lands whose rule cannot be revoked by any aside from by Papal interdict. Whether legally binding through allodial holdings or by custom, the King of France has no permission or inclination to revoke or take lands from his vassals under any circumstance.

Example: In the Sassanid empire, the royalty had no legal right to take land from the Noble Houses under any circumstance. These lands though, were not allodial or invaluable domains as in some European lands, but were so sacrosanct in their independence, that they were seen as separate kingdoms, yet united in a sort of ideological framework and agreement of cohesion. A confederacy of consent.

France in this case, must in this challenge, resemble this as closely as possible.

2. All military and government posts are reserved by way of familial inheritance, rather than royal appointments.

Example: In the Sassanid empire, each Noble House often reserved certain governmental posts and or generally roles due to them. The Mihrans inherited by law and custom, the title of margave/marshal and head-general,,, Karens inherited titles related to protector general or chamberlain,,, Ispahbudhan monopolized marriages to the royalty and assumed the highest roles as aides and councilors,,, Surens assumed the role as cupbearers and so forth.

For example in the case of France, this is the sort of schematic that I would to see;

-Cupbearer of the Franks: Archbishop of Rheims
-Marshal of the Franks (1): Duke of Flanders
-Chamberlain of the Franks: Duke of Anjou
-High-Almoner of the Franks: Archbishop of Paris
-Steward of the Franks: Duke of Burgundy
-Marshal of the Franks (2): Duke of Normandy
-Herald of the Franks: Duke of Gascony
-Marshal of the Goths: Duke of Barcelona
-Viceroy-Palatine of the Franks: Duke of Champagne
-Marshal of the Franks (3): Duke of Toulouse
-Aide of the Franks: Royal Appointment

Note, interior and more old states assume roles related to controlling the palace and the legal systems of the kingdom. In other words, proximity to the royal clan, to Paris and to the heartland as it were in France is a source of influence. While lords further at a distance, will receive great titles and roles pertaining to war, control over envoys and foreign discourse and so forth.

As a reiterations, each of these titles must be inherited only by way of holding one of the corresponding titles. The monarch is not permitted to place a person in any position except Aides.

3. Royal or ducal parties are restricted by law or custom from creating new titles or boundaries. In other words, the Duchy of Anjou cannot be divided into three realms or something like this. Furthermore, the king of France cannot create a title within an existing title within the traditional Frankish crownlands.

4. The King of France by way of custom or law, cannot enforce universal taxes, universal measurements or trade customs. The only permitted taxation is at the discretion of the noble lord in his house lands and or the royal in his lands. Further, trade regulation is based on the whim of the liege in that particular land and the royal edict can have no effect in this regard.

Dues however are accepted, wherein the King may receive a set of dues from the noble houses and vice versa.

5. Military custom and criterion:

The French king assumes the role as King of the Franks in wartime, and is required by custom to hold council on all military matters with the three marshals of the realm. Each having roles in the situation. The marshals acting as the ancestral generals and those who keep armies at the ready annually, while the King plays the role of gathering the rest of the noble houses into an army made up of non-margave holdings. War is seen as a conglomerate effort of a council of warlords as opposed to crown against crown, throne against throne, but the nobles take interest in the war as if it is themselves on the throne.

Example: The Sassanid empire operated in this sense. During the reign of Shapur II (309-379 CE), the king among kings was an exceptionally skilled man and the nobles knew this. When they went to war with the Roman Empire, Shapur II would lead the army alongside his hereditary marshals, with whom he convened with as a council, where each of them held supposedly equal votes and roles, with Shapur II assuming the dominant position by only his strength of character.

While extremely anti-centralized, this system went great lengths in creating a sort of noble which certain of their heritage, prowess, privilege and lineage, felt truly part of any royal endeavor. Sassanid monarchs relied upon the notion that the throne of the kingdom was held by many at once, and hence the nobles who felt themselves in a sense partners in the crown of the Aryans, would wage war with all their might for the Sassanid king, as if it was their own crown. No centralized authority was thus needed.

Your challenge is to meet as close to this as possible with France.

6. The King of France is confirmed by both the Papacy and the nobility as part of the coronation process. Simple enough. Let us say, that the King of the Franks begins with a sceptre through inheritance of father, is donned a sword by the nobles and crowned by the Papacy or a high cleric.

7. The King of France must be extremely expansionist despite its status of decentralism. This is done for two reasons:

-The King gains his prestige via successful campaigns.
-Loot is distributed among the nobles and royal estates, increasing revenue.
-Gives the King the opportunity to turn his vassals into weapons, as opposed to leisurely elites.

Have France for instance involved more greatly in the ensuing wars in Iberia and actively seeking to subjugate both Islamic and Catholic states in Iberia.

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I would love to see some answers and read any other suggestions.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

Bump

 

[The Professor]

First off the bat we should prevent a hereditary crown of France. Either Holy Roman or Bohemian style should suffice so there's some blood connection but less dynastic lockdown on the title.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

First off the bat we should prevent a hereditary crown of France. Either Holy Roman or Bohemian style should suffice so there's some blood connection but less dynastic lockdown on the title.

Why do you argue that this is a requirement?

 

[The Professor]

Why do you argue that this is a requirement?

French nobility generally operated under forms of primogeniture which leads to consolidation of lands and titles. Separating the Crown out from that will decrease centralisation under the Crown.

 

[funnyhat]

POD at Bouvines, with Philippe II (no longer "Auguste") defeated?

 

[alexmilman]

First off the bat we should prevent a hereditary crown of France. Either Holy Roman or Bohemian style should suffice so there's some blood connection but less dynastic lockdown on the title.

I thought about something like that but, IIRC, in the HRE an emperor had somewhat greater rights regarding vassals’ territories. See, for example, what Barbarossa did to Henry the Lion.

How about something closer to the Rurikid Rus in its Kievan form? Confederation of the princedoms ruled by the members of the same (very big) dynasty with few levels of a hierarchy which could not be changed (at least in theory). Holder of the highest title is the most senior member of the princely family and after his death the highest throne is passed to the next in the seniority with a reshuffling of the thrones based on seniority of the family members and the thrones. The same principle applies to the vacant lower level thrones (senior family member of the level lower or equal to the vacant throne). Looting part is exactly as described in the OP and the same goes for the local taxes and laws. There are no confederation-wise titles like in the HRE or Sassanid empire but there is no need to have them. The princes have to come to the call of their immediate superior with their own band in expectation of getting share of the future loot. The office holders do exist but only within a household of specific princedom. The subordinate princes may become members of the council of their superior prince (boyars).

Existence of the multi-level hierarchy makes accumulation of the excessive personal power even on a highest level quite difficult because resources directly controlled by an individual prince are limited: big part of his princedom are the subordinate princedoms with “a limited liability” so his personal army is quite small. OTOH, if he has a reputation, he can raise a much greater force (small bands of his subordinates and allies) for a campaign that promises loot. Take, for example, an assembly of the Princes of the Southern Rus which led to the Kalyan’s campaign. They were expecting a nice profit by looting the herds which the Mongols looted from the Polovtsy (“expropriation of expropriators”) and while in this specific case it ended not as expected, there were earlier, more successful campaigns of the same type.

Introduce similar system in France and you may get a reasonably successful (for a while) decentralized state which is capable of the aggressive foreign wars and quite stable internally because, while the princes can fight each other, this fighting is mostly about the loot and relatively minor adjustments (especially when seniority is not quite clear) because nobody is interested in rocking the boat and, actually, would not be allowed to by other princes who are waiting for their turn to be promoted. Plus, this system of the regular movements does not allow any specific prince to become too deeply rooted in his princedom and develop a loyal support base in it.

Of course, this is a somewhat idealized schema: the princedoms had been regularly divided to accommodate growing number of the princes and there were even scenarios under which a princedom becoming a hereditary property at the cost of its ruling family being excluded from the right to the highest throne. Still, the system survived even the Mongolian invasion and ceased to exist only with the raise of Moscow which was a byproduct of the Mongolian rule. So we can expect that with something similar France could exist for quite a few centuries.

 

[Drunkrobot]

Existence of the multi-level hierarchy makes accumulation of the excessive personal power even on a highest level quite difficult because resources directly controlled by an individual prince are limited: big part of his princedom are the subordinate princedoms with “a limited liability” so his personal army is quite small. OTOH, if he has a reputation, he can raise a much greater force (small bands of his subordinates and allies) for a campaign that promises loot. Take, for example, an assembly of the Princes of the Southern Rus which led to the Kalyan’s campaign. They were expecting a nice profit by looting the herds which the Mongols looted from the Polovtsy (“expropriation of expropriators”) and while in this specific case it ended not as expected, there were earlier, more successful campaigns of the same type.

So, perhaps have responsibility over the kingdom's treasury somewhat decentralised rather than it becoming understood to be the "personal property" of the King, with a permanent list of positions which grant the holder of that position an income paid out by that treasury, some spots on the list being linked to important vassals, and others being grantable and revocable for the King, like his retinue and castellans? I copy from The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000 by Christ Wickham:

But the core reason for the survival of Arab rule as not only a political but also a cultural hegemony was not luck. Rather, it was the result of the decision (traditionally, and plausibly, ascribed to 'Umar I in 640-42) to settle the Arab armies, not as a landowning aristocracy as in the Germanic West, but as paid garrisons in newly founded cities (amsar), Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Mosul on the edge of the Iraq-Syria borderlands known as the Jazira, Fustat (the future Cairo) in Egypt, and others. The tax revenues of the provinces went to these garrisons above all, who thus were well rewarded for their separation from the socio-political life of the conquered population; being on the local diwan, the register for those entitled to army pay, was a coveted privilege, defended against newcomers as much as possible... ...This decision had several consequences. One was fiscal: the tax system of the Roman - and also Sassanian - empire never broke down, as it did in the West, for it always had an essential political purpose, the payment of a ruling army.

Having this permanent 'fund' which pays out on a regularised basis to the whole ruling coalition and replenished by taxes and war booty could ease the weakening effects of feudalism and help get the major vassals 'bought in' to the wellbeing of the regime, while depending less on the genetic lottery of the monarchy always producing an at least passable sovereign every time. Another factor for stability is how it democratises the rewards granted by the throne - the monarch having an inner circle of favourites will be more tolerable for the people outside of it if the main difference is that the favourites are merely getting a higher income than they themselves are getting, rather than having the question of whether those large estates will be in the possession of your family for generations to come or will instead be rewarded to someone else hanging over anybody that a pretender might use to try and start a coup. By widening the ruling coalition, and this spreading out the private rewards of being a member of that coalition, each member will be more incentivised to work for the good of the whole i.e. keeping government stable and productive, avoiding unnecessary and unwise war, and finding victory in desirable war.

 

[alexmilman]

So, perhaps have responsibility over the kingdom's treasury somewhat decentralised rather than it becoming understood to be the "personal property" of the King, with a permanent list of positions which grant the holder of that position an income paid out by that treasury, some spots on the list being linked to important vassals, and others being grantable and revocable for the King, like his retinue and castellans? I copy from The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000 by Christ Wickham:
.

What I wrote has very little to do with what you are saying. I repeat:

1. The kingdom is a confederation of the princedoms hierarchically arranged and ruled by the members of the same dynasty.
2. The princedoms are passed based upon the seniority principle within the dynasty. In the simplest case, throne is passed to the senior surviving brother, not to the eldest son. To accommodate the growing numbers of the dynasty members the new princedoms could be created but the princedoms on a top level of a hierarchy remains formally the same even if the territory held directly by their princes may change.
3. There is no common treasury or confederation-wide positions, just the princedoms with their own establishments.
4. Upon receiving a specific throne prince is getting income from his subjects and “princely” properties within this princedom.
5. Prince has his retinue (military band and household officials) which is moving with him from one princedom to another getting temporary sources of income (salaries and land grants which they hold until it is time to move) but each princedom has its permanent aristocracy which holds lands on a hereditary principle; strength of this group of people varies from one princedom to another.
6. Evolution. Eventually, the country-wide rotation is being replaced by a different model: one branch of a dynasty holds the top seat (Great Princedom) with the same seniority-based inheritance but only within this branch and there are “2nd level” great princedoms formally subordinated to the #1, each ruled by its own branch of a family. Both #1 and #2 levels have subordinate princedoms serving directly to them. As a result, shifting and travel happens on a much lesser scale than in the original model both for the princes and their retinue (which is getting permanent lands of their own).

King in that schema is just a current ruler of the #1 princedom.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

What I wrote has very little to do with what you are saying. I repeat:

1. The kingdom is a confederation of the princedoms hierarchically arranged and ruled by the members of the same dynasty.
2. The princedoms are passed based upon the seniority principle within the dynasty. In the simplest case, throne is passed to the senior surviving brother, not to the eldest son. To accommodate the growing numbers of the dynasty members the new princedoms could be created but the princedoms on a top level of a hierarchy remains formally the same even if the territory held directly by their princes may change.
3. There is no common treasury or confederation-wide positions, just the princedoms with their own establishments.
4. Upon receiving a specific throne prince is getting income from his subjects and “princely” properties within this princedom.
5. Prince has his retinue (military band and household officials) which is moving with him from one princedom to another getting temporary sources of income (salaries and land grants which they hold until it is time to move) but each princedom has its permanent aristocracy which holds lands on a hereditary principle; strength of this group of people varies from one princedom to another.
6. Evolution. Eventually, the country-wide rotation is being replaced by a different model: one branch of a dynasty holds the top seat (Great Princedom) with the same seniority-based inheritance but only within this branch and there are “2nd level” great princedoms formally subordinated to the #1, each ruled by its own branch of a family. Both #1 and #2 levels have subordinate princedoms serving directly to them. As a result, shifting and travel happens on a much lesser scale than in the original model both for the princes and their retinue (which is getting permanent lands of their own).

King in that schema is just a current ruler of the #1 princedom.

I like your suggestion, however, I would prefer for the sake of preference and this timeline, that the nobles inhabit different families entirely and their only relatedness can come from consistent marriage.

 

[alexmilman]

I like your suggestion, however, I would prefer for the sake of preference and this timeline, that the nobles inhabit different families entirely and their only relatedness can come from consistent marriage.

This could to a certain degree fit into the “evolved” schema (#6): on that stage the common dynasty of the 1st and 2nd princely level did not matter, dynasty of the lower levels already did not matter at all and as far as the nobility was involved, it did not belong to the ruling dynasty from the very beginning. If you go one step further in that direction (but not all the way to the completed Muscovite state) you have the follow hierarchy:

1. The top ruler (#1)
2. His personal Council - members of the noble families who traditionally served #1 but mostly do not belong to the ruling dynasty. They may have specific titles, hereditary or not, and are actively involved in governing the country.
3. Hereditary princes of the lower ranks who preserved some of their lands, have jurisdiction within their territories and have to provide a military service when called. They do not participate in the government. The fact that they may belong to the extended ruling dynasty is of no importance. With a LOT of luck they may raise to the 2nd level but this is rather an exception than a rule.
4. Nobility. Directly subordinated to one of the top 3 levels. Never would become members of the 3rd level but at least in theory could get into the 2nd (for example, by marriage). Being predominantly military class, actively participate in all military affairs and are rewarded by the land grants and some other forms of a compensation (each of them has to raise his own band unless he is a member of a household band of his superior).

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

This could to a certain degree fit into the “evolved” schema (#6): on that stage the common dynasty of the 1st and 2nd princely level did not matter, dynasty of the lower levels already did not matter at all and as far as the nobility was involved, it did not belong to the ruling dynasty from the very beginning. If you go one step further in that direction (but not all the way to the completed Muscovite state) you have the follow hierarchy:

1. The top ruler (#1)
2. His personal Council - members of the noble families who traditionally served #1 but mostly do not belong to the ruling dynasty. They may have specific titles, hereditary or not, and are actively involved in governing the country.
3. Hereditary princes of the lower ranks who preserved some of their lands, have jurisdiction within their territories and have to provide a military service when called. They do not participate in the government. The fact that they may belong to the extended ruling dynasty is of no importance. With a LOT of luck they may raise to the 2nd level but this is rather an exception than a rule.
4. Nobility. Directly subordinated to one of the top 3 levels. Never would become members of the 3rd level but at least in theory could get into the 2nd (for example, by marriage). Being predominantly military class, actively participate in all military affairs and are rewarded by the land grants and some other forms of a compensation (each of them has to raise his own band unless he is a member of a household band of his superior).

3. when you say 'have to' why is it a have to? If it is a custom, then this would be accepted. If it is legally binding, then I would ask it be rectified.

4. Sounds good, but a land grant is somewhat implied central authority. For there is the assumption that the head monarch has the right to distribute the lands as they see fit. Further, the nobles might no require their own lands, as they rule their own domains and fiefs as if they are independent and not legally beneath anyone.

 

[A Most Sovereign Lady]

Casually remember that kings are the strongest among generally speaking equally weak fricks. On a more serious suggestion keep some version of the Frankish tradition of diving up lands and titles to heirs, this keeps any one lord from becoming too powerful with out weakening the entire realm all that much in practice.

 

[alexmilman]

3. when you say 'have to' why is it a have to? If it is a custom, then this would be accepted. If it is legally binding, then I would ask it be rectified.

4. Sounds good, but a land grant is somewhat implied central authority. For there is the assumption that the head monarch has the right to distribute the lands as they see fit. Further, the nobles might no require their own lands, as they rule their own domains and fiefs as if they are independent and not legally beneath anyone.

Good questions and I wish I have the adequate answers.

#3. At least in the specific case of Rus legality and custom were practically synonyms. AFAIK, subordinate was “kissing the cross” to confirm his oath of allegiance and this fact was documented (this is how we know about it). Then, there was a practical side: (a) if and when the sovereign was considerably stronger than his subject then disobedience could have the negative consequences (but there were cases of an open rebellion or some other situations when subordinate was neglecting his duties) and (b) loyal service could be rewarded by the land grants, gifts or even promoting into #2 category or receiving some official position which did not qualify for #2 but was honorable and could be used by his descendants as a base for the further promotion (for example, within the rigid military command hierarchy filled based on the “hereditary merit” principle). The lands granted would belong to a category distinctively different from the hereditary lands: while the hereditary lands could not be taken back (only confiscated in the case of a treason, etc.), the granted lands were held strictly on condition of a loyal service and could be taken away.

#4. Land grant for the lower category could come both from the immediate superior or from the top ruler. The last case was applicable only to the nobles directly subordinated to the high ruler. Eventually, in the case of Russian state, the #3 category lost most of its power and practically all service was to the top ruler (the #2 and #3 categories could have their own noble followers but they were a minority) and the grants were coming from the top. In your schema there is no need to go that far because this would mean that the state is already highly centralized. To clarify terminology, the “nobles” in this context are the lowest level of the feudal ladder, not the semi-independent rulers. They may have their small hereditary holdings but that’s it. They are clearly and definitely “under” somebody.