AHC: significantly reduce rivalry between IJA and IJN

In threads discussing Imperial Japan's WW2 performance, the infamous level of enmity between its army and navy is often mentioned. The two had separate aircraft designs, and even separate atomic bomb programmes. What PoD-s could help in reducing this rivalry to a manageable level, improving the overall performance in WW2?
 
The rot began very early, as early as around the time of the Meiji Restoration. During that time, the newly formed service branches drew their leaders and membership from rival clans. Thus the seeds of factionalism were sown and things only worsened with subsequent budgetary disagreements and differences in strategic outlook during the 1920s and beyond.

In order to prevent the rivalry, you need things to be run by men who are all friends, or at least who are professionally on the same page, right from the very beginning.
 
In order to prevent the rivalry, you need things to be run by men who are all friends, or at least who are professionally on the same page, right from the very beginning.
I’m just wondering if even with this factor, and with all things being as OTL, you’ll end up with some form of rivalry when it comes time to decide whether to go north or south (hokushin-ron vs. nanshin-ron). Two different options with two different consequences and I wonder if with the stakes involved for the Empire, differences of opinion and the taking of sides as to what the best option is will be unavoidable.
 
I’m just wondering if even with this factor, and with all things being as OTL, you’ll end up with some form of rivalry when it comes time to decide whether to go north or south (hokushin-ron vs. nanshin-ron). Two different options with two different consequences and I wonder if with the stakes involved for the Empire, differences of opinion and the taking of sides as to what the best option is will be unavoidable.
I mean sure, but the OP isn't asking for no rivalry, merely a manageable level of rivalry. One could compare to the United States, where the Army and Navy were hardly best buds (and the Air Force, even if technically part of the Army, wasn't exactly in a committed relationship), but they were nevertheless able to manage this to achieve their goals. Partly this was because the United States had the resources to "do everything" to some extent, but you could definitely improve the IJA/IJN relationship without needing them to be completely on the same page about everything.

Alternatively, of course, you could have one or the other side (probably the Navy for obvious reasons) essentially "win" completely so that the other side simply doesn't have the political power to sustain any serious rivalry anyway. This would be something like the Navy would be completely driving the strategic picture and the Army would be reduced mostly to occupation and gendarmerie troops, as well as reinforcements for the Japanese marines in more difficult cases. The Army would presumably be trying to escape this, but might find it difficult.
 
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Would it be realistic to somehow get Japan to have an independent Air Force branch, so that the Army and Navy have less things to fight over?
 
In threads discussing Imperial Japan's WW2 performance, the infamous level of enmity between its army and navy is often mentioned. The two had separate aircraft designs, and even separate atomic bomb programmes. What PoD-s could help in reducing this rivalry to a manageable level, improving the overall performance in WW2?
You need to go back to the constitution of 1867 imo.

Basically it set up a situation where the Army of the Navy could collapse the government at will.

This set up a situation where the Army and the Navy thought of themselves as supreme powers rather than someone that needed to make deals and arrangements.
 

Typho

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Alternatively, of course, you could have one or the other side (probably the Navy for obvious reasons) essentially "win" completely so that the other side simply doesn't have the political power to sustain any serious rivalry anyway. This would be something like the Navy would be completely driving the strategic picture and the Army would be reduced mostly to occupation and gendarmerie troops, as well as reinforcements for the Japanese marines in more difficult cases. The Army would presumably be trying to escape this, but might find it difficult.
The IJA was doing coups against the government and internal factions. If the IJN won, wouldn't that lead to endless coups from the advantageous land based Army?
 
The IJA was doing coups against the government and internal factions. If the IJN won, wouldn't that lead to endless coups from the advantageous land based Army?
You would, presumably, arrange matters so that the IJA simply doesn't have the power to carry out coups (or doesn't want to). For example, they might not have any heavy units in the Home Islands and security for Tokyo is provided by marines; there's no obvious leverage for them to carry out a coup then, since they lack any forces that could possibly overpower the defenses, so they're basically powerless to force a change in policy.

You need to go back to the constitution of 1867 imo.

Basically it set up a situation where the Army of the Navy could collapse the government at will.

This set up a situation where the Army and the Navy thought of themselves as supreme powers rather than someone that needed to make deals and arrangements.
This is probably a good PoD. IIRC it required that the Navy and Army minister being an admiral and a general, respectively? I don't think it's a great leap to have the choice instead be free--this doesn't mean that they can't be generals or admirals, but it does mean that if the Army decides not to play ball the government can simply appoint a civilian and carry on. I think this arrangement was a little unusual even for the time...
 
Would it be realistic to somehow get Japan to have an independent Air Force branch, so that the Army and Navy have less things to fight over?

Or to have a Navy, a Naval expeditionary/rapid reaction force and a naval Air Force. 6 Divisions of ‘marines’ under naval control/transport and support. No ‘army’. The Navy is the largest heavy engineering concern in the empire, I’m sure it could support the marines needs.
 
Or to have a Navy, a Naval expeditionary/rapid reaction force and a naval Air Force. 6 Divisions of ‘marines’ under naval control/transport and support. No ‘army’. The Navy is the largest heavy engineering concern in the empire, I’m sure it could support the marines needs.
Is there any example of a significantly sized power having a unitary armed forces with just one chain of command? Where for instance the general equivalent might have a few squadrons of ships and regiments of marines OR might have a division of marines OR might have a substantial air group.

The reason I ask is long experience has shown me that the more fiefdom boundaries a request has to cross, the slower and less reliable that it is. Frankly I think this is at least 50% of the reason of the effectiveness of aircraft carriers---their air arm is organic to them and the captain can just order a strike and it gets done.
 
Is there any example of a significantly sized power having a unitary armed forces with just one chain of command? Where for instance the general equivalent might have a few squadrons of ships and regiments of marines OR might have a division of marines OR might have a substantial air group.

The reason I ask is long experience has shown me that the more fiefdom boundaries a request has to cross, the slower and less reliable that it is. Frankly I think this is at least 50% of the reason of the effectiveness of aircraft carriers---their air arm is organic to them and the captain can just order a strike and it gets done.
Canada has gone the furthest down this path - no one has followed. Canada has wound most of them back.

Much of the appeal of conscript armies is that you dragoon a whole lot of young men and indoctrinate them to serve the state, 'the school of the nation'. Japan followed Prussia's model. It is a strong part of a nation's culture but this organisation's culture is hard to overcome or change, even in volunteer armies.
 
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