Looks like the problems were with engines manufactured in Cincinatti plant
Thx for the link, that makes interesting reading...
I'm afraid that you put too much faith into P-38 programme for early war, even with OTL improvement of the timetable. Allison delivered about 60 V-1710s in the 1st half of 1940, a drop in the bucket for what is needed. Granted, by late 1940 things improved, monthly production went into couple of hundreds, but that is too late for Fance of for the BoB.
Which forgets the demand from the P-38 program: V1710s will
have to be available in greater numbers.
That said, I looked at the first flight date on the P-38, P-39, & P-40 again. I've been getting my years wrong, somehow: P-39 first flew 6 April 1938, P-40 14 October 1938, P-38 27 January 1939 (& not introduced to AAF until July '41, so the claim for "2yr less" that I've seen has to be wrong...
A service intro only 6mo after first flight seems extremely improbable.)
That said, the V1710 was being used by both P-39 & P-40, too, so production would have to increase in any event.
France and UK were signing contracts for anything the USA was producing, or was about to produce, since they have had a major war on. Logistic drain for France or Britain for European war is a pale shade what the USA will expect with a war thousands miles away.
Agreed.
Now that we're talking about engines, the sooner USAAC forgets about 'hi-per' engines the better. Shift any extra funding they have to the R-2800, R-2600 (keeping an eye on the Cincinnati and other plants), V-1710 and Merlin.
Also agreed. If there are issues with production of the V1710, I wonder if the *P-40 might be specified with the R2600, instead? (If so, could be Curtiss loses the competition to Seversky... Or maybe the *YP-42 has the R2600, & gets adopted?)
Request was realistic. When the 1st contract for the Lightning I was signed, there was no P-38 of any sort flying.
This page says the contract was in 3/40, which postdates the XP-38's maiden flight by over a year...
Rate of roll is important, we know that people at eg. Supermarine, Lockheed, Bell etc. were trying to improve their products on that field. Problem the Zero had was it's slow rate of roll as speed went up, while the Fw 190 was praised both by LW and Allied pilots for it's rate of roll, and P-40 was regarded well in that field. Speed was no problem with P-51; P-51 with Merlin or 2-stage V-1710 will be a good climber, and 50 mph faster than Zero. It will get quite a tweaking for the P-38 to improve dive speed, no problem for P51 even as-is.
P-38s will out-accelerate & outclimb P-51s every time, & can outrun A6Ms without half trying. The dive compressibility issues are serious; TTL, there's much less chance of the fix kits being lost when the C-54 carrying them is shot down...
Less blind spots and smaller size contribute to survivability.
Fair point. Against A6Ms, IMO, not a big problem.
Sorry for the completely different turn on the thread I just noticed that there was no discussion on a better British performance.
Don't apologize. The broader the view, the better.
So what have the Sovs got? And how can Hitler completely bugger things up?
('cause you just
know he will.
)
The best way to shorten the Pacific War in my opinion would be if the Royal Navy has a decent Pacific Fleet in late 1941. If this fleet contains a number of submarines operating from Singapore the Japanese Supply line will be quickly crippled facing both American and British threats.
What's the best way to have a Royal Navy fleet East of the Suez? In my opinion it's to double down on the Taranto raid perhaps by saving one of the unlucky fleet carriers (Courageous, Glorious and Ark Royal). Cripple the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean even more than historically. Free up a number of battleships and carriers for operations East of the Suez. Butterflies flap in Crete meaning a larger Royal Navy presence a better air shield and less damage.
This is all excellent thinking, IMO. However...
Japan can't do Pearl Harbour, Philipines and Thailand/Malaya/Burma simultaneously if there is a real fleet in Singapore.
We've been presuming Japan goes ahead on OTL's schedule, so...you'll have to figure out how to add subs & such to Oz after it all starts.
If you can have a British Pacific Fleet in Oz (feel free to nominate a CO:
V/A Stuart Bonham-Carter?), & he's willing to work under Gieger as ComSWPA (thereby freeing Doyle's subs to move to Hawaii under English...
)...
In that vein, what about the Dutch? They had a few subs in DEI, didn't they? What happens to them?
If Taranto is double down on the Italians may be unable to escort convoys meaning greater submarine success meaning that Africa goes better for the allies and is wrapped up ...before the end of 1941
Speculation on that is a bit far afield from the aim, here... (I'll say, if it happened, it would also free U-boats for ops off North America.
)
However...
allowing the long range subs designed for the Pacific to be released for service East of the Suez.
That could not be good for Japan.
Some discussion on another site suggests there's another possibility for shortening the war: the US going all-in in New Guinea instead of continuing up the Solomons and starting the Central Pacific campaign. The guy I was talking to stated that by shuffling all the men, ships, and aircraft there the US would be invading Luzon before 1943 is over, with the lack of fleet train I mentioned before mitigated by the proximity of Australia to base the oilers out of.
That is the most unusual approach I think I've heard.
My problem with it is, it looks like a real slog, under IJAAF air the whole way.
Central Pacific offers long jumps, putting Allied (U.S....) forces much nearer Japan much sooner.
Yes, going through/out of New Guinea means starting sooner... The advantages might outweigh.
OTOH, I'd far sooner bypass the P.I. entirely & go directly from Saipan to Okinawa, masking off the P.I. with CVs, & shortening the war.
IMO, the Central Pacific campaign offers much shorter way to bring in reinforcemets (saves on time and shipping, there is no loading from one ship to another ship), avoids any sizable ground campaign that draws from US Army units, while destroying Japanese Navy in process. With better and more of radars, aircraft, ship-borne AA, workable torpedoes and low-level bombing the Japanese Navy is destoyed much faster than in OTL. New Guinea campaign leves a thorn in the Allied side with the Solomons in Japanese hands, while carriers in relatively confined waters around the NG are not in healthy surrounding.
That, too.
Get the Soviets to somehow attack in June or July 1944 instead of 1945
With Japan at peace & Germany the obviously bigger threat, I don't feature Stalin seeing the need (or gain).
then have the US offer better terms than unconditional surrender after the Marianas fall
That seems very possible, except for Congress... Beyond that, tho, the terms Japan insisted on (keeping an Emperor) were the ones they
got OTL: you need to have PotUS (FDR?) when the surrender discussions come around to
expressly agree to give it to them (which the Atlantic Charter says Japan will get, once defeated), & which Truman OTL wouldn't. Doing it immediately with the fall of Saipan (& the resulting change of gov't in Tokyo) might encourage the "Japanese Valkyrie" to act.
Have Spruance chase down and annihilate the IJN during the battle instead of letting it go.
Maybe. AIUI, the situation was such he couldn't risk it, & if he'd pursued, he'd have left the landings exposed: he'd have given Ozawa (?) what Kurita couldn't (wouldn't) achieve off Luzon...
Between those triple shocks, maybe....
Maybe.
One other thing: bypass Pelelieu!
One scary thing to remember: if this scenario ends without the Bomb being used on Japan, it's very, very possible it ends up being used in Europe in the '50s.