AHC: Save the Roman Republic.

[Agricola]

The question is, will those reservists actually resist? The freshly raised Pompeian forces in Italy had a tendency to desert the second they came into contact with Caesar. Why would these be any different?

Exactly!

The cities of Italy were full of veterans during the civil war. At least most of them. And most cities surrendered before the battle could start. Actually a lot of fights between legions in the civil war, did not happen too, because one army surrendered. Mostly because the legionairs enforced the commander to surrender, or they deserted, or even killed their commander.

Legionairs of the civil war were interested in 3 things: Loot & donations, suriving and pension. Almost all legions were fully unpolitical, their loyality was solely defined by these 3 reasons. Some legions changed sides even more than once. And Octavian even managed it to recruit Antonius veterans in South Italy for his army. The keyword was: money! And a lot of legionairies during the civil war were conscripts and not volunteers. The old roman law was still active and was used these times, if needed.

And btw, we had a not so much different situation pre-marian reforms. Don't believe, that the conscripted legions of the mid-republic were much better. There are less cases of legionaries blackmailing their commander, in order to change his strategy, let them plunder, promise donations before they fight, end the war now and dismiss them, and so on. But this is most probably because ancient authors trend to glorify these good old days and reported just a few cases of illoyal legions. Roman legionairies in these times were farmers which went once a year to war, in order to get a bit additional income. If there was no profit expected, they tried to escape from service. The motivation of the mid-republican legionair was most probably, very similar to their late republican colleagues: profit!

Of course the war against Hannibal was a different situation. Every roman risked to loose all his properties. But is'nt that profit-orientation, too? Tiberius Caesar, one of the most experienced roman generals once said, that leading a roman army is like grabbing the wolve on his ears. Today you would perhaps say "riding the bull".

 

[Matteo]

I agree with sly but I disagree with you. Of course legionaries were strongly interested in donations and looting. But, except maybe for the 2 fimbrian legions, this was not their sole motivations. Otherwise you would not understand why Sulla and Caesar were exceptions in the roman republican history.

The legionaries who backed Sulla of Caesar not only poor. The centurions were rather well-off. There were capite censi, but they were not necessarily the poorest.
And most of all, legionaries were roman citizens and patriots. Being in the legion was not only a military business. It also had a political dimension. That's why generals made adresses to their armies. Because their soldiers were also their fellow citizens.

Sulla and Caesar convinced their soldiers that they, the soldiers, were the best of roman citizens. They convinced their soldiers that they, the soldiers, were the ones defending the interests of the republic better than any other. Especially better than all the other that did not fight nor risk their lives, and than those contemptuous other nobles that hated their general. And Sulla and Caesar made thelselves loved by their soldiers and convinced them that together they would restore a good republic.

That's why their soldier citizens followed them in civil wars that seemed almost impossible to win. If Sulla's and Caesar's armies had only been interested in money and their lives, they would have deserted.

 

[Agricola]

Yes, Caeasar was a better in riding the bull. He knew the wolves pretty well and grabbed their ears accordingly. He was very generous (loot & donatives), was very talented and lucky (survive) and kept his promises (pension).

But he also had some issues with his legions. Do not get a victim of republican propaganda (de bello gallico, de bello civile). Read Cassius Dio and others for more. Caesar was also very good in in bluffing. More than once his legions tried to blackmail him for more donations or dismissal. He just answered, that they should go home without any pay, because he does not need them. Which was a bluff.

And when Sulla marched on Rome, a major reason for his soldiers was, that an other commander with an other army was appointed for the war in Asia and should get all this nice loot.

Perhaps I exaggerated a bit above. Some roman commanders were better in riding the bull, than others. Roman armies did not desert that much, if fighting not against romans. But they did. And roman armies were more loyal, if defending their italian homeland (against foreigners) and not operating in foreign countries.

But I have read just lately a monography about the motivation of the legions of the late republic. The author revealed dozens of cases of major and minor revolts of roman legions; most of them during the civil wars from Sulla to Augustus. I don't believe anymore in this brave and loyal roman legionary, who fought for honor and country.

 

[Matteo]

I knew it. What I said is that this was not the only dimension. If you think the only motivation was money and land assignations, you are mistaken.

There were very good reasons for soldiers rebelling or threatening to do so. Quite many of them were aware that they, the citizens, were fighting and ris king their lives for the personal interests of a few nobles who profited much much much much more than them from war.

That's why they sometimes disobeyed (no mercy for the losers at Thapsus because the caesarian soldiers were fed-up with the lasting civil war that their general had initially promised to end in a few months) or forced their generals to make peace (the soldiers of Anthony and Octavian after the war of Perusia).

 

[Agricola]

I knew it. What I said is that this was not the only dimension. If you think the only motivation was money and land assignations, you are mistaken.

I don't think that it was the only dimension for every soldier. But the normal soldier was much more unpolitical, than some sources, especially Caesar might let us think. The legionaries tried to enter a legion with a succesful commander (survive), who cared about ongoing supply (food and salary), where they could earn a lot of additional income (loot) and they could be sure, that this commander was mighty enough to keep his promises about dismissal and pension.

Due to the usual rotation of roman high command every year, soldiers did often mistrust their commander and treated him accordingly. The succesful commanders with extraordinary, longterm commands used this for their advantage, whenever they had to fight the normal consular or senatorial legion, if it was not led by such a commander.

Augustus reforms changed a lot. Ongoing supply was better organized than ever before. Salary and pension was clearly regulated by law, which was never the case in the republic. The only problem was a bad legate or a fully incompetent emperor. And in this case, the imperial legionaries still trended to disobey or even force an usurpation.

This worked almost perfectly until Severus Alexander, with just 2 rather short civil wars after Nero and Commodus. And about a dozen smaller usurpations. But now the situation had dramatically changed. The soldiers since Hadrian came often from veteran colonies in the provinces and were not willing to move to the other side of the world and let their homeland without defense. Additionally the old behaviour of the republic, came back: whoever promises higher donativa and easier living was supported to challenge the emperor and usurp. Something we sometimes saw even before during the two civil wars or looking to the praetorian guard.

So Augustus reforms stabilized the military, but his measures could not fully prevent usurpations. How should a senate with a competing senatorial high-command get less usurpations than a single and divine Commander in Chief with emperor cult?

Don't get me wrong. I just ask a question. How should it work? How to herd the wolves in a republic with competing shepherds?

 

[Russian]

...
I think you're somewhat overestimating the movement speed of ancient armies, particularly if every town of note has a force of reservists to act as a ready-made garrison.

Ok, ok, if a victorious general is unexpectedly proclaimed the head of the state on the field of battle in the middle of nowhere near the North See, well... he would definitely need some time first to get his shit together, then to move his Grand Army into Italy. And that would take more than a few weeks, you are right.
But more likely it is planned such way that he beforehand gets his army closer to Italy where an "the legionaries unexpectedly proclaim him the head of the state". And the provisions are ready and the highly mobile troops are already on their way into Italy.
Actually some of the Italian towns will get to know about the rebellion from the mounted rebels who politely ask the town's council if they want to surrender now and be spared or they might wait a little bit for the rebel Grand Army to come and then they would be put to sword.

Of course if the republican reservists give "house for house" fight the rebels will have to fight their way through to Rome months and months.
But they won't. That is my bet in most cases.
Cause the Italians see a victorious brave general who has just saved the Roman world from ferocious Germans (Dacians, whatever). And that is exactly what these nice little fat Italians expect the head of the state do.

But I have read just lately a monography about the motivation of the legions of the late republic. The author revealed dozens of cases of major and minor revolts of roman legions; most of them during the civil wars from Sulla to Augustus. I don't believe anymore in this brave and loyal roman legionary, who fought for honor and country.

Well, a legionnaire might be a true Roman patriot, but he might murder his commanders from time to time.
There is no contradiction here from my point of view.
A good patriotic legionnaire must be well fed and well paid. If he is not... well, some bad greedy commanders or/and politicians might get accidentally killed

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Ok, ok, if a victorious general is unexpectedly proclaimed the head of the state on the field of battle in the middle of nowhere near the North See, well... he would definitely need some time first to get his shit together, then to move his Grand Army into Italy. And that would take more than a few weeks, you are right.
But more likely it is planned such way that he beforehand gets his army closer to Italy where an "the legionaries unexpectedly proclaim him the head of the state". And the provisions are ready and the highly mobile troops are already on their way into Italy.
Actually some of the Italian towns will get to know about the rebellion from the mounted rebels who politely ask the town's council if they want to surrender now and be spared or they might wait a little bit for the rebel Grand Army to come and then they would be put to sword.

Moving armies during this period took a lot of preparation, though, so any general moving significant forces towards Italy wouldn't have been able to keep this secret. Nor, for that matter, would massing enough supplies to feed an army sufficient to conquer Italy.

 

[Agricola]

Revolting armies usually had no access to the imperial logistics. If for example an army of the emperor moves from Moesia to Syria, the procuratores of the provinces the army crosses, are informed in advance and organize supply points and everything else needed. Usually the imperial procuratores payed (lousily) for the goods or offset it with ongoing taxes and munera. So moving armies were a burden, but not devastating. In republican times this was the duty of special legates or the praefectus fabri, but organized much less professional.

An usurping army has to supply itself. This means, that they ask all the cities on their way for supply. If they are not willing to support, they siege and plunder them. So civil war was a huge burden for the cities and their economy, regardless if they surrendered or became plundered. If a city surrendered and the usurper lost the war, the winner often placed a penalty tax on these disloyal cities. So whatever a city does in a civil war, the chances are high, it will be bankrupted afterwards. I am therefore convinced, that civil wars had a major impact on the economy of the late republic or the 3rd century empire.

And of course, such a plundering army is slower than usual. So people will know, that they are coming. An army marches about 20km a day. A courier rides 80-100km a day. With a horse relay system up to 600km/d are possible; in roman times about 250km/d.

 

[DominusNovus]

One thing that was sorely missing from the Constitution of the Roman Republic was a genuine legislature. To be sure, the various popular assemblies did have legislative authority. Also, the various magistracies were not purely executive in nature, but had some legislative authority as well. I would be remiss if I did note that the Romans did not adhere to a strict executive, legislative, and judicial the separation of powers as we now see them. Of course, they did have the idea of political categories of power, namely imperium, potestas, and auctoritas, which could, with some stretching of the imagination be considered vaguely analogous (listed in the same order as the modern separation of powers).

It seems to me that one potential avenue through which a proper legislature could develop would be actually one of the institutions that served to greatly destabilize the Republic: the tribunate. As it was, each tribune had virtually unlimited veto power through the fact that they were considered sacrosanct. If, however, the sacrosanctity of one Tribune could override that of another, we could see a sort of quasi-legislature in which majority rules would apply, with each individual's veto overriding their opponent's until the side with the majority prevails.

Where this system to develop, it is likely that the Plebeian Council would lose its importance as a legislative body, and exist primarily to elect the various tribunes to exercise that effective authority on their behalf in the Tribunal College.

Thoughts?

 

[Matteo]

I can't figure out how your proposition could work because when someone tried to do so, he was accused of being a tyrant.

I am if course refering to Tiberius Gracchus who had his colleague Octavius finally impeached because Octavius did not want to complu with the will of the 9 other tribunes.

That's why I previously mentioned the issue of roman and antic mentalities. The romans, like all other antic cities, did not conceive any separation between the individual as a social being and the individual as a citizen being. This was unconceivable for the ancients. It took until modern ages to conceive such a separation.

For the ancients, the City was the union of citizens with respecting all the social differences. The city was some kind of living body. That's why they did not have our modern idea of transcendant institutions. And for them, magistrates were identified humain beings who gaines personal credit' support and power for the services they gave to citizens. Citizens felt they had a debt of loyalty to the magistrates that made good things for them.

If Cato the elder wrote a history (the origins) where he never named citizens, it was because he was fighting against this social and cultural reality. And it was a lost fight.

And to the opinion of the ancients, having majority systems in the college would ruin the notion of collegiality because one dominant member could turn the college into a tool for monarchic power. That's what Gaius Gracchus, Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and their allies did in 123/122 when they were able to secure the alliance or the neutralité of all the membres of the college. They were able to force their agenda on the Senate and the consuls.

And the majority of the aristocracy saw no other way than firstly to undermine support for Gracchus by demagogic one-upmanship, secondly tricking the election to prevent a 3rd consecutive gracchan tribunate, thirdly a plot to murder Gracchus, Flaccus and the core of their partisans.

even if you took an earlier start, I don't think it could work. In the late 5th and early 4th century, Rome elected a college of consulat tribunes rather than a pair of consuls. But they were an exécutive body like the athénien strategists, not a législature.
You will never find a legislative body other than the assembly of the people in ancient cities. When the roman empire decided it no longer needed to have the comitiae vote, it transfered their voting role to the Senate.

 

[Agricola]

Actually, there was something similar to majority decisions amongst the tribunes. If a tribune put his veto against a decision of a magistrate, he could ignore it. But just, if the majority of the other tribunes assured him, that this veto is unlawful.

Usually this happens in advance. So the majority of tribunes declare, that they will defend the magistrates action against any veto. There are a some examples for this approach. The story around Grachus is a rather extreme case, which shows the flaws of the roman constitution.

Nevertheless, I am afraid, that a representative democracy with elected tribunes acting as a kind of "House of commons" as a 2nd chamber beside the senate as a "House of Lords" boggles the romans mind.

Another problem would be, that the senate itself was no legislative body. De iure it was just an advisory board. But the senators themselves saw the senate as the highest executive body of the roman republic, steering and supporting the magistrate in every case which goes beyond usual daily business. Sometimes even executing tasks itself via executive senate-commitees (e.g. decemviri). Of course as the highest executive, they approved every bill before it was forwarded to the comitia (theoretically). So the roman senate would perhaps accept a different organisation for the tribunes, which were sitting already in the curia anyways, but they would fight against any solution, where the senate is just a legislative body.

It is even harder to divide executive and jurisdiction. From a roman point of view executive work and iurisdiction was the same thing and undividable by nature. Therefore every roman magistrate acted as a judge in his area of responsibility. The praetores and propraetores more than others, but thats it. There was also no clear distinction between law and administrative order / decision (lex vs edictum). So up to a certain extent every roman magistrate was able to create new laws by himself from our modern point of view. It is still unclear to me, where the romans drew the line.

It is easy to rescue the roman republic with modern concepts. But this approach is doomed to fail, because the romans would not understand and accept such changes. The challenge is, to rescue the roman republic with ancient concepts compatible to the roman mindset. Perhaps a very slow step-by-step approach in the direction of some modern concepts could work. But therefore you need centuries of slow development. Like IRL the constitution of the roman empire changed a lot in 500 years.

 

[DominusNovus]

Nevertheless, I am afraid, that a representative democracy with elected tribunes acting as a kind of "House of commons" as a 2nd chamber beside the senate as a "House of Lords" boggles the romans mind.

Another problem would be, that the senate itself was no legislative body. De iure it was just an advisory board. But the senators themselves saw the senate as the highest executive body of the roman republic, steering and supporting the magistrate in every case which goes beyond usual daily business. Sometimes even executing tasks itself via executive senate-commitees (e.g. decemviri). Of course as the highest executive, they approved every bill before it was forwarded to the comitia (theoretically). So the roman senate would perhaps accept a different organisation for the tribunes, which were sitting already in the curia anyways, but they would fight against any solution, where the senate is just a legislative body.

What does that have to do with my proposal?

 

[Derek Pullem]

One thing that was sorely missing from the Constitution of the Roman Republic was a genuine legislature. To be sure, the various popular assemblies did have legislative authority. Also, the various magistracies were not purely executive in nature, but had some legislative authority as well. I would be remiss if I did note that the Romans did not adhere to a strict executive, legislative, and judicial the separation of powers as we now see them. Of course, they did have the idea of political categories of power, namely imperium, potestas, and auctoritas, which could, with some stretching of the imagination be considered vaguely analogous (listed in the same order as the modern separation of powers).

It seems to me that one potential avenue through which a proper legislature could develop would be actually one of the institutions that served to greatly destabilize the Republic: the tribunate. As it was, each tribune had virtually unlimited veto power through the fact that they were considered sacrosanct. If, however, the sacrosanctity of one Tribune could override that of another, we could see a sort of quasi-legislature in which majority rules would apply, with each individual's veto overriding their opponent's until the side with the majority prevails.

Where this system to develop, it is likely that the Plebeian Council would lose its importance as a legislative body, and exist primarily to elect the various tribunes to exercise that effective authority on their behalf in the Tribunal College.

Thoughts?

You want to make the Tribunal College into a forerunner of the Supreme Court?

 

[DominusNovus]

You want to make the Tribunal College into a forerunner of the Supreme Court?

Anything's possible. I'm just trying to moderate the potential abuses of the Plebeian Tribunes, where any one of them can totally derail the government and hold it hostage to his personal whims. After all, consider that the Emperors held the bulk of their legal authority from having tribunician powers.

 

[Matteo]

This is a countersense.

Tribunes did not veto laws of consular bills or other tribune's bills. They did it for political purposes. And they did it only if they had powerful supporters. Because they kbew that without powerful enough supporters, they would be prosecuted and condemned just after their term.

The nature of the tribunes deeply changed after the licinian-sextian laws of 366. It became one of the checks and balances that the leasing aristocrats in the Senate could use to control magistrates (be they consuls of other tribunes) or to force temporarily dominant coalitions to accept compromises.

In other words, tribunes were one of the foundations of the oligarchic nature of the roman republic.

 

[DominusNovus]

This is a countersense.

Real quickly, could you rephrase that? Some of your word choices are inadvertently obtuse, and I'm not quite getting your meaning.

 

[Matteo]

I realize I did not end my second sentence. I meant tribunes did it veto for personal purposes but for political purposes. And only when they had enough political support to do so.

 

[DominusNovus]

I realize I did not end my second sentence. I meant tribunes did it veto for personal purposes but for political purposes. And only when they had enough political support to do so.

I'm getting the impression we're talking at cross purposes here. I don't really see how that is a problem with the scenario I suggested, unless you're saying that the issue I identified (abuse of veto by Tribunes) was not as problematic as I portrayed it.

 

[Agricola]

I'm getting the impression we're talking at cross purposes here. I don't really see how that is a problem with the scenario I suggested, unless you're saying that the issue I identified (abuse of veto by Tribunes) was not as problematic as I portrayed it.

I still don't get, how you like to develop a proper legislature via the tribunes. Perhaps you could explain that a bit more. I agree, that the tribunes are an issue. They are just not the only one. Perhaps even not a major one.

I once had a similar idea about a restoration of the republic during the early principate:

Tiberius stripped the comitia of their legislative power and made the senate the legislative. The tribunes were still elected by the comitia plebis and they joined the sessions of the senate. And they still had their veto. I also mentioned above, that a single veto of a tribune could be prohibited by the majority of his colleagues in some cases.

So theoretically, we are not that far away from a 2-chamber-parliament at this point of time.

- the senate (1st chamber) is not elected. They are nominated by the censors (theoretically).
- the tribunes are a kind of elected representatives of the people and could become the core of the 2nd chamber.
- they could develop a clear system of majority decision, because they had already something similar.
- they had the right to introduce a bill. I am not sure, if they still had it after Tiberius changes. And if, just in the comitia plebis not in the senate, afaik.
- of course further measures are needed, e.g. tribunes should not be able to become magistrates or senators. IIRC Sulla alrady failed with this idea, due to the heavy resistance of the aristocracy, because almost all tribunes were young aristocrats.

Of course de facto the senate was heavily steered by the princeps during the reign of Tiberius and far away from beeing a parliament. And I don't know of any tribune who ever vetoed against one of his bills.

My point is, that the roman republic shows incipient stages of a representative democracy, if we are looking to the tribunes. Also the idea, to give the senate the full legislative power is not against the roman mindset, because it happened. And to develop a 2nd chamber via the tribunes is also not fully unimaginable, because the tribunes were already supervising the senate. But this is just a core, from where we could develop a very roman and strange way of new legislature.

As mentioned above, the much harder task is to strip the executive power of the senate. And to strip the executive power from the comitia, too. Just if they should do more than electing tribunes after a reform.

 

[DominusNovus]

A proper legislature would certainly take quite a while to evolve from the scenario I propose. As a rough outline:

- The idea of the tribunes being able to countermand each others vetoes is formalized, likely due to dissatisfaction with the operation of the Tribunate. Obviously, this would immediately evolve into a majority vote being required among the tribunes to exercise the veto. At this point, the assembled tribunes function more as an 'anti-legislature,' capable of only blocking legislation, rather than actually moving it along.
- As with the 'proper' magistracies, tribunes did have the authority to propose legislation, but, of course, all legislation had to pass through an assembly. However, given that it would be likely that any legislation that a tribune would propose to the council would already have been vetted by his tribunal colleagues, a sort of pro-active voting within the Tribunate could naturally evolve over the years; so long as a majority of the Tribunes did *not* veto the proposal, it could proceed to the Plebeian Council.
- After some time, perhaps due to gradual emigration of Plebeian citizens outside of the boundaries of the city proper (rendering them unable to easily be present to vote in the Council), the plebeians could be satisfied with simply rubber-stamping whatever the tribunes have decided to propose as legislation. This would be more palatable if the number of tribunes is relatively high (much higher than the historical body was). Once it becomes custom to accept the decision of the majority of the tribunes, then it could formalized into practice, with the actual Plebeian Council not needed to vote on the legislation itself, only being required for the election of the Tribunes to act on their behalf.

Now, mind you, I'm not talking a quick fix here, like re-ordering the Comitia Centuriata could be considered to be. I'm talking about a process that might take a century (or, at the very least, multiple generations) to work itself out. But I think that this could be a very fruitful course of action.