AHC: Save the Roman Republic.

[Shiva]

The Roman Empire basically was an attempt to save the Roman Republic, remember that the territory of Rome grew too big for the Republic to manage. Hence the Empire emerged as a more effective manager of everything that Rome had conquered.

But ultimately that failed as well because the Empire also grew too large to manage, at least with the technology that they had. The barbarian invasions, plague, and the social disruption that Christianity unleashed didn't help matters much either.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Given that Pompey hadn't shown much constitutional propriety in his earlier career, I doubt that he's the man to restore the constitution.

Sadly Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus was not a constitutional expert.

Well, he certainly had expertise to draw on among his political allies (e.g. Cicero). That's why I maintain that a reversed Pharsalus would at the very least give the Republic a chance to survive.

Caesar's actions suggest he was moving more towards some kind of permanent monarchy. Give him enough time and he'll accomplish it.

That said, he was also on the path to almost certain assassination.

My thoughts too, which is why I think Pharsalus really was the last chance the Republic had.

 

[HonestAbe]

I think 100 B.C. Is too late. The republic was dead before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, it just hadn't realized it yet. You can always give the republic more time, but you cannot prevent it from becoming an empire without destroying it.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

I think 100 B.C. Is too late. The republic was dead before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, it just hadn't realized it yet. You can always give the republic more time, but you cannot prevent it from becoming an empire without destroying it.

Considering the Republic didn't fall for over half a century after the PoD allows, I'd say you're being rather deterministic here. (Unless our definitions of "republic" and "empire" aren't lining up somehow.)

 

[SlyDessertFox]

Alright, time to get back in here and clear some things up.

What if the optimates / populares factions actually evolved into more formal political alliances (parties?) - could Rome have survived with a "balance of power" between the two groupings with the Army in between

That would likely only assure civil war. The shifting political alliances and backroom deals style of governance actually worked to prevent civil war in my opinion. When allies started lining up firmly in two camps, bad things tended to happen.

Personally I'd go with Sextus Pompey emerging victorious over all others during the Second Triumverate. If he can use heavier ships, or counter Agrippas tactics, combined with taking on and winning against Lepidus, you have a strong Republican who could easily dominate the Mediterranean, and win the Civil War. He just needs to play Octavian and Antony against each other long enough to claim victory.

Assuming he stays a republican, you could see a reformed republic, and considering the chaos of the 2nd Triumverate, there is a very strong argument to do so.

It's a big if, though admittedly it's very possible. You have to give Pompey a reason to stay a republican. OTL he seemed very interested in getting a piece of the pie and working towards that end. His (very stupid I might add, since it gained him practically nothing and gained Octavian a lot) deal with the triumvirate essentially legitimizing his control of SIcily, Sardinia et Corsica, and technically the Peloponessus (though they never actually gave it to him) is highly suggestive of this. As is his remaining in contact with Marc Antony. If he defeats and kills Octavian (which he nearly did) I think it's far more likely he strikes a deal with Antony. Now whether he would use this to build up his own power and work towards some sort of Augustus or Caesar like rule over Rome or as a means to reform the republic a la Sulla is a toss up. I imagine though his father's heavy influence on him might be enough to make him stay true to republicanism and try to go the Sulla route.

1. Caesar was otl on Sullas proscription list, keep him on it.

That solves a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself.

2. A bonus would be if any of the other Boni, like lucullus works in politics a bit after his death, anything that keeps Pompey from tearing down the Sullan reforms to increase his own personal Dignitas.

Contrary to what many seem to think, the republic was actually getting along business as usual from the tearing down of the Sullan reforms until the crisis of 50-49. I can't really explain it here since it's been awhile since I touched Gruen's book, but he makes an extremely well researched and sourced case for that. The reforms really weren't too important in the grand scheme of things.

Caesar being defeated by Pompey might have worked for a while too. The question is whether Pompey after a victory would be satisfied with only First Man of Rome status or not. Was he truly wedded to the Republican cause/Boni of the Senate? Or was he more driven by rivalry with Caesar? If he ultimately went down the dictator route he has a pair of militarily competent enough sons to have a shot at making it heriditary.

There's nothing to suggest he would go down the dictator route. People seem to forget Pompey was for all intents and purposes in military and mostly political retirement by the time the crisis erupted. He didn't even bother anymore to go to his province he was technically commanding personally. He was too enthralled in his personal life by then to be too interested in any more military adventures. He was fine with weilding political power through others (given he was a terrible politician) and really just remaining on the sidelines by that point in time. Remember, his last major military campaign had been against Mithradates more than a decade ago.

Also, remember the people on his side and remember that Pompey wanted adoration more than he wanted power. He had the staunchest of staunch republicans on his side, and they commanded troops as well. They also weild immense influence in his camp, given it was their threat to simply take their troops and go somewhere else that prompted Pompey to finally cave in and give battle at Pharsalus. Even if he wanted to, which he certainly didn't, he wouldn't have been able to establish a dictatorship.

Granted, he's not going to reform the republic because he doesn't have the skill, knowledge, or political acumen (to say nothing of the will) to do so, but the republic will still remain. Since he seemed to always want to court Cicero, maybe he could get his advice for enacting some kind of reforms. One thing he does have, especially after saving the republicans asses, is the political power to push what Cicero suggests through if he wants to.

Given that Pompey hadn't shown much constitutional propriety in his earlier career, I doubt that he's the man to restore the constitution.

See above. Extra judicial commands were not new in the republic anyway, especially in times of crisis-which the couple years immediately following Sulla's death most certainly were. After that, the republic (and Pompey for the most part-the first triumvirate did not dominate roman politics as people think, judging by the fact they consistently failed to get their men elected during most of the period), continued mostly business as usual.

Well, he certainly had expertise to draw on among his political allies (e.g. Cicero). That's why I maintain that a reversed Pharsalus would at the very least give the Republic a chance to survive.



My thoughts too, which is why I think Pharsalus really was the last chance the Republic had.

It's not the last chance. That really came after a couple decades of entrenched Augustan rule. It's the last best chance though.

I think 100 B.C. Is too late. The republic was dead before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, it just hadn't realized it yet. You can always give the republic more time, but you cannot prevent it from becoming an empire without destroying it.

Again, this is from hindsight and is thoroughly debunked by Gruen. I really need to purchase this book so I can start actually drawing some direct quotes from it and the like.

 

[scholar]

Your challenge if you choose to accept it is, with a pod no earlier then 100 B.C is to save the Roman Republic and prevent it from becoming an empire.

Bonus if you can prevent civil wars and no one gets decleared dictator for life.

You know, the whole concept of Rome becoming an Empire is a loaded one. For instance, some people place the death of the Republic with Sulla, others with the ascension of Augustus, and a few place it after or at his death. The current system of government was doomed though, some decentralization was in order as far as governing the provinces was concerned, and some centralization of authority was needed to command it.

I am a much bigger fan of the Roman Revival under the Ostrogoths which actually saw the Ostrogoth Kings and their Nobility working with and supporting the Senate as an official governing body inside of the lands under Ostrogothic Control outside of things like Martial affairs.

 

[Maur]

The Cimbri and the Teutones decisively defeat the Romans headed by Gaius Marius. Italy is properly devastated by them. The Roman provinces rebel, combined with invasions from abroad. The Roman Italian allies side with the Cimbri and the Teutones against Rome to save themselves from the Germanic/Celtic wrath and plunder.
In the end the Cimbri and the Teutones settle in the South Italy, the Northern Italy gaines independence.

Rome keeps only the Central Italy, it is poor, proud...
and republican

Well... that actually works

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

You know, the whole concept of Rome becoming an Empire is a loaded one. For instance, some people place the death of the Republic with Sulla, others with the ascension of Augustus, and a few place it after or at his death. The current system of government was doomed though, some decentralization was in order as far as governing the provinces was concerned, and some centralization of authority was needed to command it.

I think the op would be satisfied with a stronger executive power in Rome, so long as it answered to republican norms and constraints, and wasn't just in the hands of the army or a single rich family.

 

[Matteo]

This is precisely what the most enlightened romans wanted but never could achieve.

Why did they not succeed ?

Because it was an absolutely theoritical conception that just could not succeed given the way of thinking, the cultural and social realities of the romans.

Remember what Caesar himself said himself about the optimates always talking about the republic, the republic, the republic, the republic. He said "the republic is just a word with no reality nor constistency."

The republic had always been so.

Ronald Syme has brillantly demonstrated what had always been the arcana imperii, the real secret of power : the domination of a small group of aristocrats for a short time, then another group, then another.

Though Gruen is right about the avoidability of the civil war that started in 49, the fact is that Sulla had set an example that could not be forgotten.

Sulla did this, and before him the optimates killed the Gracchi brothers because they thought in a way that led to an authoritarian power.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Remember what Caesar himself said himself about the optimates always talking about the republic, the republic, the republic, the republic. He said "the republic is just a word with no reality nor constistency."

Well considering he gets most of the credit for destroying said republic, I'd take his confusion here with a grain of salt. That said, it might help to define "republic", preferably in a way other than "the aristocracy continue to wield final power".

 

[SlyDessertFox]

The OP does say the POD can be as far back as 100 BC, so Sulla's march on Rome need not happen.

 

[DominusNovus]

the territory of Rome grew too big for the Republic to manage.

We always say this, but what was it about the Republic specifically that made it unsuited for administering a large territory?

the social disruption that Christianity unleashed didn't help matters much either.

What social disruption? You had a minority that was being oppressed. They then came into power, and the government utilized their support for a variety of purposes. Other than a brief interlude on behalf of Justinian, there really wasn't much disruption. Roman history before the Edict of Milan and after both look fairly similar in their overall trends.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

I don't necessarily think the republic grew too big. I do think however it grew too big too fast to adjust accordingly. Which is how you have the crisis from the Gracchi-Sulla. However, that does not make it doomed. As I believe Gruen points out there were attempts at reform even after Sulla that we're actually getting somewhere. Before, during, and after Sulla. The principate was only one such system that could have came out of it, there are plenty of more Republican models that could have resulted as well.

 

[DominusNovus]

Here's a question: Could Rome remain, more or less, institutionally a city-state republic, and still maintain its empire?

 

[GdwnsnHo]

Here's a question: Could Rome remain, more or less, institutionally a city-state republic, and still maintain its empire?

First instinct - trololol, nope.

Second thought - Depends what you consider a city-state republic. A republic based in one central city? Not a chance, as no-one who had money or power would travel far enough from the seat of power and decision to have decent governance of the republics territories.

However, a republic OF city states? I.e. each state is governed as seen fit, be it Tyrant, Democrat, Theocrat, Plutocrat, etc but has a representative at a Senate of the Cities? I imagine most wouldn't say it was a City-State republic, but I could see that working.

I'd find it interesting at least to have a mixture of Athens-Style democracies voting alongside Egyptian Nomarchs, and the representatives of Nomadic Tribes (mmm, Bedouin Representatives...).

Now if they allowed former Kingdoms (ala Pontus) to send more, who would likely vote on orders, then you'd prevent them being marginalised for having the temerity to hold territory.

But I digress....

 

[Matteo]

I don't necessarily think the republic grew too big. I do think however it grew too big too fast to adjust accordingly. Which is how you have the crisis from the Gracchi-Sulla. However, that does not make it doomed. As I believe Gruen points out there were attempts at reform even after Sulla that we're actually getting somewhere. Before, during, and after Sulla. The principate was only one such system that could have came out of it, there are plenty of more Republican models that could have resulted as well.

I only partly agree with you, Sly.

The problem with the roman republic was an intrinsic contradiction. 95% wanted to prevent evolution or at least wanted to cool things down as much as possible while all italian and provincial elites wanted a strong evolution. They had to be forced in order to accept necessary evolutions : that's what the social war made clear.

The roman aristocracy that dominated the republic had become the problem.

I agree with you when you say there were reformers. But let us precise what are real reformers : certainly not the brilliant but sterile theoreticians like Cicero.

The real potential reformers were and always had been outsiders. And the problem is that, as in the roman mentality individuals who made strong decisions and reforms always took personal credit for it and that this strongly in reason their personal power, the strong man was always seen as a potentiel tyrant.

For example (and this is a point on which I disagree with one of your previous posts), Most of the roman aristocracy opposed Pompey as long as he seemed to embody reform (Pompey's stand in favour of pushing his italian clients on the roman political stage and in favour of the provinces). They stopped opposing Pompey only when both Pompey stopped trying to grab extraordinary powers and allied with them to being the fall of the one who appeared to be the real reformer : Caesar.

I must add that Pompey held all powers and even extraordinary powers along all the 50's, contrary to what you mentioned. He held the
corn dole imperium from 57 on. He was consul in 55 then held imperium on while Spain until his death. He cumulatif his spanish imperium with a third and extraordinary consulship in 52 (he was sole consul for half of the year. The conclusion is he did all but retire. And his administration of Spain through legates was a model for Augustus's system of government : staying close to Rome to exert pressure on the City.

There were very deep and very strong forces pushing towards a monarchical power. Such an empire strongly needed some kind of monarch if it wanted to stop the awful mess it had become. The risk for Rome was losing the empire if it did not adopt a strong and organized government that was contrary to republican ideals.

The system needed to be more open to all provincial elites. And to put order into a system of government with so many diverse elites, you need a strong leader who has a long enough time to rule.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

Except while the Gracchi (for example) were the loudest and the most vocal, they weren't anywhere close to the only reformers of their time (and their counterparts in subsequent generations). The bona did not reject to the idea of reform-they rejected when someone looked like they were going about it in a way that could be construed as them out for personal glory or too much power-which is why the Gracchi were opposed at every turn, yet the reforms they advocated (most of them anyway) were quietly put into action after they were removed. You can even see reform happening in between Sulla and Caesar's civil war, and not necessarily because of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey (I should also point out, not to you but in general, that out of those 3, Crassus was the only person who could actually get his way in the Senate-Pompey and Caesar consistently failed, especially during the triumvirate, to get any of their guys in power).

While Pompey technically had power during the 50s, he was consistently beaten in the senate. The triumvirate usually failed to get their henchmen elected, and failed most of the time to get their way without some form of compromise. It wasn't really domination as much as it was the bona managing to consistently thwart them.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

First instinct - trololol, nope.

Second thought - Depends what you consider a city-state republic. A republic based in one central city? Not a chance, as no-one who had money or power would travel far enough from the seat of power and decision to have decent governance of the republics territories.

However, a republic OF city states? I.e. each state is governed as seen fit, be it Tyrant, Democrat, Theocrat, Plutocrat, etc but has a representative at a Senate of the Cities? I imagine most wouldn't say it was a City-State republic, but I could see that working.

I'd find it interesting at least to have a mixture of Athens-Style democracies voting alongside Egyptian Nomarchs, and the representatives of Nomadic Tribes (mmm, Bedouin Representatives...).

Now if they allowed former Kingdoms (ala Pontus) to send more, who would likely vote on orders, then you'd prevent them being marginalised for having the temerity to hold territory.

But I digress....

Well why not something a little in between? Something like they did OTL at first, except applied more widely: Operate through client states. This was done to a large extent in the east but slowly phased out, and was done in North Africa and up to a point in Spain and Gallia Narbonensis. Basically, something like keeping Makedon divided into its 4 republics, maintaining indirect control of Greece (though, say, direct control of Epirus), maintaining client rule in Pergamon, continuing to work though clients in Spain etc.

 

[DominusNovus]

Well why not something a little in between? Something like they did OTL at first, except applied more widely: Operate through client states. This was done to a large extent in the east but slowly phased out, and was done in North Africa and up to a point in Spain and Gallia Narbonensis. Basically, something like keeping Makedon divided into its 4 republics, maintaining indirect control of Greece (though, say, direct control of Epirus), maintaining client rule in Pergamon, continuing to work though clients in Spain etc.

My concern about client states is that their leadership can too easily become clients of individual ambitious Romans; hardly a stabilizing force.

 

[Matteo]

Except while the Gracchi (for example) were the loudest and the most vocal, they weren't anywhere close to the only reformers of their time (and their counterparts in subsequent generations). The bona did not reject to the idea of reform-they rejected when someone looked like they were going about it in a way that could be construed as them out for personal glory or too much power-which is why the Gracchi were opposed at every turn, yet the reforms they advocated (most of them anyway) were quietly put into action after they were removed. You can even see reform happening in between Sulla and Caesar's civil war, and not necessarily because of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey (I should also point out, not to you but in general, that out of those 3, Crassus was the only person who could actually get his way in the Senate-Pompey and Caesar consistently failed, especially during the triumvirate, to get any of their guys in power).

While Pompey technically had power during the 50s, he was consistently beaten in the senate. The triumvirate usually failed to get their henchmen elected, and failed most of the time to get their way without some form of compromise. It wasn't really domination as much as it was the bona managing to consistently thwart them.

The reforms were put into action after Tiberius Gracchus's death because his party (his stepfather Appius Claudius Pulcher, Publius Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus and his real brother Mucius Scaevola, Marcus Perperna who was an ally of the Claudii, ... Etc) remained " in power", having the support of the majority of the People in the People's assembly.

Try mentioning one reformer who did not gain personal power : you won't find. Those who pretended such a thing in fact did nothing : Livius Drusus the elder for example.

Pompey and Caesar did not care much about being beaten in the Senate : they had their way in the assemblies of the people. it did not matter much for them to have their men in the consulship because their provincial imperia gave them so much power that they could exert decisive influence on the roman political stage if they coordinated themselves.