Egypt would likely have been something of a mess no matter what the outcome of the 2011 uprising. Still, it wasn't fated to end as ignominiously as it did. Morsi's election wasn't inevitable, nor was his ouster. (For that matter, I'd be remiss not to point out that the final chapter on the post-Mubarak period hasn't been written yet — it's very possible there will be another uprising or a transition back towards a more democratic system in the next few years.)
There are several PoD's. One would be for the Mubarak's to be a little more accommodating of US, European, and Egyptian diplomats' efforts to negotiate a phased transition. That would have avoided the constitutional vacuum that left the army fully in charge, which prolonged the transition and allowed the military to grow even more powerful than it was under Mubarak (who, by the end, was more a civilian dictator than anything else.)
The POD I'd like to focus on though was the Egyptian presidential election in 2012. Morsi only narrowly prevailed over Ahmed Shafik, and even in the first round, the top-four candidates — Morsi, Shafik, Hamdeen Sabbahi, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh — were separated by fairly small margins.
Of these, a Shafik victory might have represented a softer Sisi presidency. Absent the June 30 (2013) uprising, he'd have been unable to crackdown on the MB like Sisi has, however, and against him, the revolutionary alliance of Islamists and secular activists would have endured in opposition. Hamdeen Sabbahi was a big supporter of the June 30 protests and has allied himself relatively closely with the military establishment, so his policies may have ultimately been similar despite having more support from the revolutionaries.
The most promising option is probably an Aboul Fotouh victory. Aboul Fotouh, or AMAF as he was sometimes called, was arguably the most small-d democratic of the options. OTL, he supported Mubarak's ouster, supported protests against Morsi, but opposed the coup. As a moderate Islamist, he had the best potential to keep the revolutionary camps united. As in OTL, the MB-dominated parliament is likely dismissed by the courts, and AMAF may opt to appoint his own constitutional convention delegates representing a broader spectrum than the MB-dominated body that Morsi used to push through a document in late 2012.
The best PoD for an AMAF victory would be if the initial alliance between him and Sabbahi hadn't broken down. In that case, Sabbahi would have run as his VP, and AMAF would have had strong odds of emerging as one of the contenders in the runoff. Against either Shafik or Morsi he would have been favored.
As president, AMAF would have been best-placed to mediate between different sides and put in place a consensus constitution similar to Tunisia's. And he'd have been significantly less threatening to Egypt's moderate majority. OTOH, he'd lack a strong political base. Liberals are a minority faction in Egypt, and he'd face a determined opposition of both the MB (who hated him for leaving the movement) and the Deep State establishment.
As a result, I imagine AMAF governing uneasily, with weak control over parliament, a still powerful army, and significant discontent. But it seems unlikely to me he'd bring about as much opposition as Morsi managed, and he'd likely have treaded far more carefully than Morsi did. Morsi and the MB went into deep conflict with the establishment and the army by the end of his term, which sealed his fate.
AMAF may therefore have succeeded in at least holding onto office and allowing electoral norms and civil liberties to consolidate. He may have left Egypt a significantly more liberal constitution than either the MB-written 2012 document or the new army-backed 2013 one. This may have been the case even if his tenure was chaotic and he ultimately went on to lose his bid for another term.
There are several PoD's. One would be for the Mubarak's to be a little more accommodating of US, European, and Egyptian diplomats' efforts to negotiate a phased transition. That would have avoided the constitutional vacuum that left the army fully in charge, which prolonged the transition and allowed the military to grow even more powerful than it was under Mubarak (who, by the end, was more a civilian dictator than anything else.)
The POD I'd like to focus on though was the Egyptian presidential election in 2012. Morsi only narrowly prevailed over Ahmed Shafik, and even in the first round, the top-four candidates — Morsi, Shafik, Hamdeen Sabbahi, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh — were separated by fairly small margins.
Of these, a Shafik victory might have represented a softer Sisi presidency. Absent the June 30 (2013) uprising, he'd have been unable to crackdown on the MB like Sisi has, however, and against him, the revolutionary alliance of Islamists and secular activists would have endured in opposition. Hamdeen Sabbahi was a big supporter of the June 30 protests and has allied himself relatively closely with the military establishment, so his policies may have ultimately been similar despite having more support from the revolutionaries.
The most promising option is probably an Aboul Fotouh victory. Aboul Fotouh, or AMAF as he was sometimes called, was arguably the most small-d democratic of the options. OTL, he supported Mubarak's ouster, supported protests against Morsi, but opposed the coup. As a moderate Islamist, he had the best potential to keep the revolutionary camps united. As in OTL, the MB-dominated parliament is likely dismissed by the courts, and AMAF may opt to appoint his own constitutional convention delegates representing a broader spectrum than the MB-dominated body that Morsi used to push through a document in late 2012.
The best PoD for an AMAF victory would be if the initial alliance between him and Sabbahi hadn't broken down. In that case, Sabbahi would have run as his VP, and AMAF would have had strong odds of emerging as one of the contenders in the runoff. Against either Shafik or Morsi he would have been favored.
As president, AMAF would have been best-placed to mediate between different sides and put in place a consensus constitution similar to Tunisia's. And he'd have been significantly less threatening to Egypt's moderate majority. OTOH, he'd lack a strong political base. Liberals are a minority faction in Egypt, and he'd face a determined opposition of both the MB (who hated him for leaving the movement) and the Deep State establishment.
As a result, I imagine AMAF governing uneasily, with weak control over parliament, a still powerful army, and significant discontent. But it seems unlikely to me he'd bring about as much opposition as Morsi managed, and he'd likely have treaded far more carefully than Morsi did. Morsi and the MB went into deep conflict with the establishment and the army by the end of his term, which sealed his fate.
AMAF may therefore have succeeded in at least holding onto office and allowing electoral norms and civil liberties to consolidate. He may have left Egypt a significantly more liberal constitution than either the MB-written 2012 document or the new army-backed 2013 one. This may have been the case even if his tenure was chaotic and he ultimately went on to lose his bid for another term.
Last edited:
