Pay, acting is paid as a Major-General , but wears the uniform of a Lt-Gen. Temporary gets the pay as well for as long as they hold the rank even through that rank is not permeant
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
IIRC Temporary rank was actually gazetted (i.e. published in the London & Edinburgh Gazettes) when an officer was required to take on a role justifying a higher rank, but for some reason the army did not want to make the promotion substantive yet. AIUI they did receive the substantive pay & benefits of the higher rank.
Acting was when an officer stepped into a vacant role, often in emergencies (casualties, promotions or sackings creating the opening) usually very temporarily. These were not rewarded with the money that came with a substantive promotion. Richard Holmes in Tommy commented that if an officer filled an Acting role in the field for 30 days, they were gazetted as Temporary rank.
Think in part this came about in WW1 with the huge number of "temporary gentlemen" required to officer the huge increase in the British Army.
Acting was when an officer stepped into a vacant role, often in emergencies (casualties, promotions or sackings creating the opening) usually very temporarily. These were not rewarded with the money that came with a substantive promotion. Richard Holmes in Tommy commented that if an officer filled an Acting role in the field for 30 days, they were gazetted as Temporary rank.
Think in part this came about in WW1 with the huge number of "temporary gentlemen" required to officer the huge increase in the British Army.
Thanks! So authority remains the same as long as date of seniority remains then?
Acting used to be the same as a Brevet in the UK, which was not the same as the US usage, got the uniform and responsibility but not the pay and privilege, might have changed however, like a lot of things. ( my source is the tales my grandads war buddy told in his old age so might not be reliable )
And some one who has the ear and respect of HMG and the powers that be back in the UK. I wonder if Smuts might be a good choice from a Imperial General staff POV?
The principle behind acting/temporary was that the acting rank was doing the task of their sunstantive junior rank in that they were to be able to take over if the substantive senior was absent, until a permanent incumbent is brought in. Part of the job. Sunray Minor becomes Sunray automatically. Hence no extra pay.
Temporary was filling the actual senior post on a routine basis and no replacement being sought. Handy to try out an officer without having to demote him back to his competent role and he gets the full pay as it is his actual job for the moment. If he proves good then he can be made substantive or promoted elsewhere.
Temporary was filling the actual senior post on a routine basis and no replacement being sought. Handy to try out an officer without having to demote him back to his competent role and he gets the full pay as it is his actual job for the moment. If he proves good then he can be made substantive or promoted elsewhere.
Monthly(Ish) update to the document for those who have been following the fic.
How's Australian production of the Beaufort progressing ITTL? Will Nos. 36 and 100 Squadrons be re-equipped and fully worked up with the type by the end of November 1941 ITTL?
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ITL The Beaufort has been a bit of a problem child due to the cancellation of the Taurus engine. However the Australian government have in their wisdom bought the design modified for a pair of Alvis Pelides engines (over much Angst and obstruction from the cousins at Bristol Aviation).
The Australians are building their own version of the Follond Falcon as a rough field Fighter and have prototype Beafighters flying with the latest mark of the Alvis pelides engine.
Without the complication of the sleeve valve Bristol engines production in Australia is well ahead of OTL. Though not totally self sufficient enough to build aircraft of 100% local components Australia is not so dependant on UK production ITL.
The Australians are building their own version of the Follond Falcon as a rough field Fighter and have prototype Beafighters flying with the latest mark of the Alvis pelides engine.
Without the complication of the sleeve valve Bristol engines production in Australia is well ahead of OTL. Though not totally self sufficient enough to build aircraft of 100% local components Australia is not so dependant on UK production ITL.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
"A couple of years" is rather optimistic for the RNZAF Museum example. The other one in NZ is rather further along.
Vildebeest is massive! by Errol Cavit, on FlickrThey were also used to hunt German raiders off NZ in 1940 - wouldn't fancy their chances trying to bomb them.
If they get that back to flying condition it would be worth traveling half way around the world to see.
Is their an extant Blackburn Shark. I have this fantastic image in my mind of a Wildebeest, Shark , and Swordfish all on the flightline.
ITL I promise the PAM will ensure that at Least RAF units have slightly better aircraft. As to the RNZAS and the RAAF hopefully some production from the Australian aircraft factories will trickle down. Only time will tell.
Is their an extant Blackburn Shark. I have this fantastic image in my mind of a Wildebeest, Shark , and Swordfish all on the flightline.
ITL I promise the PAM will ensure that at Least RAF units have slightly better aircraft. As to the RNZAS and the RAAF hopefully some production from the Australian aircraft factories will trickle down. Only time will tell.
12 35 Consolidating gains and pushing on
12 35 Consolidating gains and pushing on
Despite the Iraq distraction, at the end of April as the war in the Mediterranean continued, at the moment the Allies and the Axis were like two boxers trading blows, some more effective than others. Whilst the loss of Greece was a grievous blow to the Allies it was far from a knockout. O’Connor’s forces were jabbing at the Axis defences in the foothills of Tripolania and in East Africa the Allies were cementing their control on the newly conquered Italian colonies.
In Crete, the forces there were on guard and bracing themselves for the next Axis blow. There was in early May distinct indications that the Luftwaffe forces in the form of Fleigerkorps VIII and Fleigerkorps XI were rebuilding after the exertions of the Balkan and Greece campaigns, traffic analysis confirmed the concentration of Ju52 transports in the Peloponnese and Fighters on the southern airfields as close to Crete as possible. The High Command in Cairo were convinced that an invasion of the Island by both air and sea was immanent. With the chaos caused by the evacuation of the mainland the Greek forces, those troops currently on Crete were not really capable of resisting a competent assault. It would be up to the RN and the RAF to ensure that no significant body of Axis forces were able to land on the island whilst the military forces were rebuilt and organized. The one saving grace from the allied point of view was the presence on the island not only of the five squadrons of the PAC but also the Polish Brigade.
Since their arrival on the island some weeks ago the Polish troops had been training hard and preparing positions, principally to defend the airfield occupied by the PAC. Training cadres had been supplied to as many Greek formations as were willing to take them. Amongst those formations being trained were the four National Guard Battalions formed from over three thousand men of the classes of nineteen fifteen to nineteen twenty, their numbers swelled by volunteers. It was for this levy that the earlier request for capture Italian arms had been made of the British, before the fall of Greece the British had delivered one hundred heavy machine guns, four hundred light machine guns and twelve thousand rifles and copious amounts of ammunition from the stocks captured from various north and east African Italian garrisons and field formations.
Despite having a good proportion of veterans of the Greko-Turkish war fought between nineteen and nineteen twenty two these national Guard Battalions would only be viable as garrison troops and having local knowledge would prove invaluable in defence.
With the arrival on the island of the RAF squadrons evacuated from Greece the airfields on Crete were now almost at capacity and some squadrons were transferred to the mainland to rebuild after their losses in the recent campaign. Whilst the pilots and ground staff were shipped out their aircraft were left behind to provide replacements and reserves for the squadrons on the island.
Through April and the first two weeks of May some twenty five thousand tons of supplies were shipped to the island by ships large and small. Whist the Islands larger harbours (none could really qualify as a port) on the northern coast received the bulk of these supplies significant quantities were also delivered to the south coast often over the beach. All these shipping movements had to be provided with air cover and this gave the crews of the AMES units plenty of practice and sortie numbers to test and hone the fighter direction system under combat conditions. Communications were a major problem, with a virtually non-existent telephone system let alone dedicated telex lines, alerts had to be done by radio from the AMES/GCI sites directly to the airfields. Here having GCI at the AMES sites was essential as each unit was acting as it’s own sector control. The obverse of this was the difficulty of not having a central operations room to coordinate the response of AMES/GCI sites. Another problem was that the slightly longer range thirteen point five meter wavelength mobile chain home type AMES stations did not have their own fighter direction capability. In order to link the majority of the airfields on the northern side of the Island dedicated Military phone lines had been laid. Though working, these lines were vulnerable and liable to be cut in the case of a serious attack. Despite the obvious operational limitations imposed by the infrastructure this had permitted the establishment of operations centres at, Ritimo, Heraklion(Candia), Canea and by the Poles at Pediada-Kastelli
As a final back up the AMES/GCI station up the mountains behind Spakia on the Islands south coast had its own Control room attached to help provide and organize cover for the convoys to and from Alexandria. Whilst not fully comprehensive, Tedder was satisfied that Crete now had the most complete early warning and fighter control system it was possible to arrange in the time available. Tedder as well as the Ground Commanders were convinced that the Germens with their Italian allies would mount an invasion against the island sooner rather than later.
All that was needed now was a competent AOC for the island capable of controlling and commanding it’s air defence. Tender had informed the AM himself that it was not a task that should fall on him but on an officer who had prior experience of commanding a Fighter Group during the previous summers battles . At the time of this request, Tedder had already been made aware that Air Marshal Longmore was being recalled to London for ‘Discussions’ and that he would at least temporally be AOC Middle East.
Unknown to Tedder at the time The AM and Sir Hugh Dowding had already enquired of Sir Keith Parks as AOC Fighter Command for his recommendation as to which of his Group Commanders should and could be sent as AOC Crete. Sir Hugh was a little surprised when Sir Keith had replied that he could not recommend any one of his Group Commanders for the task of defending Crete and requested a meeting at the Air Ministry to explain why and to propose an alternative AOC for Crete and Malta.
At the meeting Sir Keith explained that with the importance of the defence of Crete and the impact it’s loss would have both politically and militarily in the Mediterranean theatre Sir Keith had come to the conclusion that an officer of higher command rank and experience would be required and suggested that the obvious choice was himself. Especially as now that Longmore was being recalled the officer appointed should be of sufficient rank and experience to at least deputize for Air Marshal Tedder if not actually replace him as AOC Middle East if such a situation should somehow arise.
He could recommend several officers who could replace him as AOC Fighter Command in the current circumstances and they would always have immediate access to Sir Hugh's advice and experience, whereas the AOC responsible for the defence of Malta and Crete, now that both islands were in all practical terms in a state of siege, would have to rely on his own resources and abilities in a changing and challenging environment. After some consideration both the AM and Sir Hugh had agreed to recommend the new appointment to the Prime Minister.
Prior to departing for Malta, before travelling on to Crete, Air Marshal Sir Keith Parks had made one request (some would claim it later as being a condition) that at least two wings of Spitfire Mark III’s be dispatched to Malta immediately and a flow of replacements maintained. He had pointed out that as the AOC Fighter Command he was uniquely qualified to confirm that the viability of Fighter Command would not be adversely by the dispatch of a couple of wings of Spitfires. He had pointed out that the Germans had diverted far greater numbers of aircraft including ME 109’s away from France and Belgium and that there was every indication that these transfers were continuing. Sir Keith was quite adamant that he was not going to send pilots against the enemy whilst flying inferior aircraft. Although at the time he did not actually know it, Sir Keith was definitely preaching to the converted, as the knowing glances passing between the AM and the CAS might have indicated Spitfires would be arriving in Malta despite any reservations still held by some in the Government.
Sir Hugh himself had observed to Churchill that sending Spitfires to the Middle east would be a good investment as every enemy aircraft shot down there was one less that could be sent against Britain. Also the fewer pilots lost in the Mediterranean theatre the fewer replacements that would need to be sent from Britain. After some tense discussion within the War Cabinet not only was Sir Keith Park confirmed in the post of AOC RAF Malta and Crete but also the provision of Spitfires to both Malta and Crete was approved with a Churchillian memo marked ‘Action this Day’ somewhat belatedly arriving on Sir Hugh Dowding’s desk at the AM. The new AOC of Fighter Command would be Air Marshal Sholto Douglas who Sir Hugh and Sir Peter knew would need a firm guiding hand if he was to adhere to the policies already being perused by Fighter Command.
Despite the Iraq distraction, at the end of April as the war in the Mediterranean continued, at the moment the Allies and the Axis were like two boxers trading blows, some more effective than others. Whilst the loss of Greece was a grievous blow to the Allies it was far from a knockout. O’Connor’s forces were jabbing at the Axis defences in the foothills of Tripolania and in East Africa the Allies were cementing their control on the newly conquered Italian colonies.
In Crete, the forces there were on guard and bracing themselves for the next Axis blow. There was in early May distinct indications that the Luftwaffe forces in the form of Fleigerkorps VIII and Fleigerkorps XI were rebuilding after the exertions of the Balkan and Greece campaigns, traffic analysis confirmed the concentration of Ju52 transports in the Peloponnese and Fighters on the southern airfields as close to Crete as possible. The High Command in Cairo were convinced that an invasion of the Island by both air and sea was immanent. With the chaos caused by the evacuation of the mainland the Greek forces, those troops currently on Crete were not really capable of resisting a competent assault. It would be up to the RN and the RAF to ensure that no significant body of Axis forces were able to land on the island whilst the military forces were rebuilt and organized. The one saving grace from the allied point of view was the presence on the island not only of the five squadrons of the PAC but also the Polish Brigade.
Since their arrival on the island some weeks ago the Polish troops had been training hard and preparing positions, principally to defend the airfield occupied by the PAC. Training cadres had been supplied to as many Greek formations as were willing to take them. Amongst those formations being trained were the four National Guard Battalions formed from over three thousand men of the classes of nineteen fifteen to nineteen twenty, their numbers swelled by volunteers. It was for this levy that the earlier request for capture Italian arms had been made of the British, before the fall of Greece the British had delivered one hundred heavy machine guns, four hundred light machine guns and twelve thousand rifles and copious amounts of ammunition from the stocks captured from various north and east African Italian garrisons and field formations.
Despite having a good proportion of veterans of the Greko-Turkish war fought between nineteen and nineteen twenty two these national Guard Battalions would only be viable as garrison troops and having local knowledge would prove invaluable in defence.
With the arrival on the island of the RAF squadrons evacuated from Greece the airfields on Crete were now almost at capacity and some squadrons were transferred to the mainland to rebuild after their losses in the recent campaign. Whilst the pilots and ground staff were shipped out their aircraft were left behind to provide replacements and reserves for the squadrons on the island.
Through April and the first two weeks of May some twenty five thousand tons of supplies were shipped to the island by ships large and small. Whist the Islands larger harbours (none could really qualify as a port) on the northern coast received the bulk of these supplies significant quantities were also delivered to the south coast often over the beach. All these shipping movements had to be provided with air cover and this gave the crews of the AMES units plenty of practice and sortie numbers to test and hone the fighter direction system under combat conditions. Communications were a major problem, with a virtually non-existent telephone system let alone dedicated telex lines, alerts had to be done by radio from the AMES/GCI sites directly to the airfields. Here having GCI at the AMES sites was essential as each unit was acting as it’s own sector control. The obverse of this was the difficulty of not having a central operations room to coordinate the response of AMES/GCI sites. Another problem was that the slightly longer range thirteen point five meter wavelength mobile chain home type AMES stations did not have their own fighter direction capability. In order to link the majority of the airfields on the northern side of the Island dedicated Military phone lines had been laid. Though working, these lines were vulnerable and liable to be cut in the case of a serious attack. Despite the obvious operational limitations imposed by the infrastructure this had permitted the establishment of operations centres at, Ritimo, Heraklion(Candia), Canea and by the Poles at Pediada-Kastelli
As a final back up the AMES/GCI station up the mountains behind Spakia on the Islands south coast had its own Control room attached to help provide and organize cover for the convoys to and from Alexandria. Whilst not fully comprehensive, Tedder was satisfied that Crete now had the most complete early warning and fighter control system it was possible to arrange in the time available. Tedder as well as the Ground Commanders were convinced that the Germens with their Italian allies would mount an invasion against the island sooner rather than later.
All that was needed now was a competent AOC for the island capable of controlling and commanding it’s air defence. Tender had informed the AM himself that it was not a task that should fall on him but on an officer who had prior experience of commanding a Fighter Group during the previous summers battles . At the time of this request, Tedder had already been made aware that Air Marshal Longmore was being recalled to London for ‘Discussions’ and that he would at least temporally be AOC Middle East.
Unknown to Tedder at the time The AM and Sir Hugh Dowding had already enquired of Sir Keith Parks as AOC Fighter Command for his recommendation as to which of his Group Commanders should and could be sent as AOC Crete. Sir Hugh was a little surprised when Sir Keith had replied that he could not recommend any one of his Group Commanders for the task of defending Crete and requested a meeting at the Air Ministry to explain why and to propose an alternative AOC for Crete and Malta.
At the meeting Sir Keith explained that with the importance of the defence of Crete and the impact it’s loss would have both politically and militarily in the Mediterranean theatre Sir Keith had come to the conclusion that an officer of higher command rank and experience would be required and suggested that the obvious choice was himself. Especially as now that Longmore was being recalled the officer appointed should be of sufficient rank and experience to at least deputize for Air Marshal Tedder if not actually replace him as AOC Middle East if such a situation should somehow arise.
He could recommend several officers who could replace him as AOC Fighter Command in the current circumstances and they would always have immediate access to Sir Hugh's advice and experience, whereas the AOC responsible for the defence of Malta and Crete, now that both islands were in all practical terms in a state of siege, would have to rely on his own resources and abilities in a changing and challenging environment. After some consideration both the AM and Sir Hugh had agreed to recommend the new appointment to the Prime Minister.
Prior to departing for Malta, before travelling on to Crete, Air Marshal Sir Keith Parks had made one request (some would claim it later as being a condition) that at least two wings of Spitfire Mark III’s be dispatched to Malta immediately and a flow of replacements maintained. He had pointed out that as the AOC Fighter Command he was uniquely qualified to confirm that the viability of Fighter Command would not be adversely by the dispatch of a couple of wings of Spitfires. He had pointed out that the Germans had diverted far greater numbers of aircraft including ME 109’s away from France and Belgium and that there was every indication that these transfers were continuing. Sir Keith was quite adamant that he was not going to send pilots against the enemy whilst flying inferior aircraft. Although at the time he did not actually know it, Sir Keith was definitely preaching to the converted, as the knowing glances passing between the AM and the CAS might have indicated Spitfires would be arriving in Malta despite any reservations still held by some in the Government.
Sir Hugh himself had observed to Churchill that sending Spitfires to the Middle east would be a good investment as every enemy aircraft shot down there was one less that could be sent against Britain. Also the fewer pilots lost in the Mediterranean theatre the fewer replacements that would need to be sent from Britain. After some tense discussion within the War Cabinet not only was Sir Keith Park confirmed in the post of AOC RAF Malta and Crete but also the provision of Spitfires to both Malta and Crete was approved with a Churchillian memo marked ‘Action this Day’ somewhat belatedly arriving on Sir Hugh Dowding’s desk at the AM. The new AOC of Fighter Command would be Air Marshal Sholto Douglas who Sir Hugh and Sir Peter knew would need a firm guiding hand if he was to adhere to the policies already being perused by Fighter Command.
Polish Air Component. A semi autonomous Polish air group formed under the administration and logistics of the RAF.