Chapter 12.20 Preparing the ground in Tripolania
General O’Conner had a problem, even with the decision not to strip his command of its experienced divisions they were currently strung out on a very long logistics trail stretching all the way back to the Nile Delta and thence from there via vulnerable sea line of communications back to the UK and the empire. How soon they could resupplied and recommence offensive operations against the Italians was a prime concern. The news from the intelligence services that not only were elements of a German Fleigerkorps arriving in Libya but there was evidence of one or more German armoured division being shipped over to Tripolitania as well was a cause of real concern.
In discussions with Wavell, General O’Conner had tried to resolve the tactical and strategic conundrum that this news of Italian and German reinforcement presented , one option was to keep forces in place and built them up in anticipation of an attack by a combined Italian and German army with the intention of holding the line and then pushing the Axis back towards Tripoli. This would then turn the campaign into a war of attrition and logistics. Another option was to push forward now before the Italians could fully recover from their earlier defeats and the Germans could establish a powerful Corps in Africa. There were some who were advising a mid way house, that was to build up the Desert Army in it’s current defensive positions but to send powerful forces forward to aggressively patrol and disrupt the Axis preparations.
All concerned understood that almost everything depended upon the success or otherwise of the RAF and the Navy in destroying or at least preventing the arrival of supplies to Tripoli. In Tripoli, the Italians possessed the largest port west of Alexandria on the north African shore with its facilities to handle up to six large freighters at a time. Despite the continuous air attacks on Malta the RN was keeping a powerful force of destroyers based there supplemented by Cruisers whenever required or judged necessary to interdict the flow of supplies from Italy. Likewise during his recent visit Sir Hugh had seen for himself the critical role that offensive actions by the RAF based on Malta would have not only in tracking the Axis convoys but also in attacking them. Both directly and indirectly by mining the port areas on a regular basis.
With the decision not to send Army units to Greece sufficient shipping had been freed up for another major convoy to be run eastwards to Malta. Shipping was also being used to supply the RAF in Greece, where possible this was being shipped using Greek owned vessels. Other ships, principally vessels of two thousand tons or less were being used to take supplies to Crete and along the coast of Africa as far as Benghazi.
The problem for Wavell and the British was that a lot of the equipment such as tanks and trucks was just worn-out. Whilst great efforts had been made to repair and refit what the army already had and with motor transport in particular to organise a proper system for the use and maintenance of the large stock of captured Italian lorries. The Royal Army Service Corp, ran not only the motor transport but also the railway system and even had their own flotilla of coasters and other vessels for moving supplies. This integration was very significant in their success in the western desert. The cooperation with the RAF was also a fundamental part of the campaign as having two supply systems fighting to use the same resources could have been a major source of delay and confusion. Under Longmore’s Command the RAF logistics and the RASC worked closely together.
One major problem being the shortage of transport aircraft. This problem had been highlighted to the CAS on his recent flying visit to the area. Unlike most rear echelon troops the RASC were fully armed and combat trained as they were expected to provide their own security and defence when and where necessary. It was to an extent on the experience and the interaction with the RASC that the forward based RAF personnel started to be armed and trained for airfield defence. Shortly after the fall of France the first of the RAF Defence Squadrons had been formed and now in the western desert these came of age.
The original two RAF Armoured Car Squadrons had more than proved their worth in Operation Compass and now several squadrons, bearing squadron numbers between seven hundred and one onwards into the eight hundreds were operational. Equipping these squadrons and providing arms for the RAF base personnel had been solved to an extent by issuing them captured Italian arms and equipment. The one thing the RAF did not get from captured Italian stocks were anti aircraft guns, The Italin guns were to largely remain where they were to defend the former Italian infrastructure now being put to use by the British and Commonwealth forces. The decision had been made that the RAF would use AA ordinance from their own stocks. Therefore base workshops had been making mounts for K-guns, aircraft browning machine guns and Hispano cannons to supplement the few forty millimetre Bofors that had found their way to the RAF.
The gathering of intelligence and the sharing of the same was to be of prime importance in the campaign to be fought in Tripolitania. Whilst the work of the air reconnaissance aircraft was well known the work of the Y service stations was just as important. The interception and interpretation of radio signals was of vital importance. Techniques learnt by RAF personnel at Bletchley Park were to be a force multiplier for the allies. Principle amongst these innovations was the closely guarded secret of traffic analysis. Whilst breaking codes was important much could be learnt of the your enemies dispositions and movements simply by understand who was talking to whom, how often, for how long and occasionally actually knowing about what. The flip side of this was of course signals security and in their working with the RAF during operation Compass and generally, the lack of signals security on the Army radio networks had become a point of some contention between the two services. This friction had got to such a point early in the New Year that Wavell had asked the Navy to investigate. The results of this enquiry were quick and sobering. Naval listening teams at various locations had submitted their interceptions of both Army and RAF signals for a period of one week. These intercepts had then been interpreted by an Naval intelligence team who had no prior information of what was being intercepted just that it was ‘enemy signals’ traffic. Just using intercept time, locations, bearings and other data provided not only did this team give an appreciation of the size and location of the units involved but often were able to identify their purpose and function. Whilst the RAF and Army bases were fairly easy to locate the Army units in the field were a little more difficult to locate, however far more detail of the army units size and purpose was deduced and their movements logged than the High Command had anticipated. In fact the Naval intelligence team were able to provide an order of battle for the British forces, that whilst only partial in places was accurate enough to cause real concern. Suddenly signals security had become a very hot topic. An adjunct to this was that it became clear that the RAF were using false signals to disguise their bases, this was being done mainly by the Q units who were setting up decoy airfields and supply dumps to divert attention from the real RAF facilities. By creating signal traffic from these site their validity as targets to the enemy was enhanced. This signals deception concept would now be taken up and expanded by the Army in the field.
Continuous mining of the waters around Tripoli and the bombing of the port was slowing the flow of supplies to the Axis but had not choked it off. Bombers would sortie from Malta and from the Benim airfields around Benghazi. As often as possible the two Polish squadrons of Wellingtons now based on Crete would also be sent, however this was becoming less frequent as the need to slowdown the enemy build up on the Greek frontiers became acute. By early March there were indications that German units were assembling in the area to the west of Buerat , in Tripolitania. General O’Conner had a hard time persuading Wavell that it was wise to maintain out west so far beyond El Agheila, the plan was form a series of hard points inland from Sirte from which aggressive patrolling could be done but the main line of resistance would be back towards El Aghelia until O’conner’s forces were ready to strike out for Tripoli. The distance involved had to be appreciated travelling by road, to Sirte was a gruelling trek of almost two hundred miles to El Aghelia and the same distance again to Bengahzi.
Longmore had ordered a series of landing fields to be built along the coast, with fuel and stores for both the forward basing and quick movement of aircraft. To south of the coastal plain O’Conner had instructed the LRDG under the command of Ralph Bagnold to make far reaching patrols to watch for any move to outflank the Commonwealth forces. Here the previous rudimentary system of air supply was refined to keep the patrols out in ’The Blue’ for extended periods. The most important weapon carried by the LRDG was their radio.
Elsewhere a parallel race to strike a decisive blow was being run, in East Africa the forces from both the Sudan and Kenya were now advancing into Italian Somalia and after having been checked for a time were now making progress aided by the squadrons of SAAF Hurricanes and Tomahawks. Such was the situation at the beginning of March.
