I guess you could work off of a basis that the Nazis still take over Germany- but even if you don’t, a communist Germany + Russia likely end up in a WW2esque conflict in the 30s/40s with the WAllies anyway.
AHC: optimize Soviet performance in WW2
- Thread starter Krasno
- Start date
I guess you could work off of a basis that the Nazis still take over Germany- but even if you don’t, a communist Germany + Russia likely end up in a WW2esque conflict in the 30s/40s with the WAllies anyway.
A lot of suggestions focus on the early war, as is proper - but I'm interested in the late war performance as well. A few things to note:
The needlessly heavy casualties in late 1944 and early 1945 were often driven by a failure to adapt to the German's layering of anti-tank defenses and to modify ratio of infantry to tanks, particularly motorized infantry. The formations were just too tank heavy, without enough support vehicles or motorized infantry to defend breakthrough points and spearheads, and so armored losses were a real problem. I think the assault on Estonia was a mistake given that it could have been flanked by the Bagration salient created, and a lot of manpower was tied up in that and the Finnish endeavor that could have been better used elsewhere as reserves. More forces in southern Ukraine in early 1944 may have allowed for the complete destruction of 1st PZ Army, for example.
In terms of commanders, demote Yeryomenko to army level command, he continually blundered his armored forces into PAKfront ambushes even when he had overwhelming superiority of resources, and was also blatantly lying to STAVKA on advance timetables. Frankly, after Bryansk-Vyazama he was lucky not to have been imprisoned, as Lopurkhovsky's work has shown, but his late war performance was not worlds better.
I think taking Berlin earlier actually would have been possible. The Germans had relatively weak defenses in the area given Hitler's fixation on southeastern Europe and Seelowe Heights showed that these defenses would not stand up to a strategic offensive that could have been launched months earlier, frankly.
The needlessly heavy casualties in late 1944 and early 1945 were often driven by a failure to adapt to the German's layering of anti-tank defenses and to modify ratio of infantry to tanks, particularly motorized infantry. The formations were just too tank heavy, without enough support vehicles or motorized infantry to defend breakthrough points and spearheads, and so armored losses were a real problem. I think the assault on Estonia was a mistake given that it could have been flanked by the Bagration salient created, and a lot of manpower was tied up in that and the Finnish endeavor that could have been better used elsewhere as reserves. More forces in southern Ukraine in early 1944 may have allowed for the complete destruction of 1st PZ Army, for example.
In terms of commanders, demote Yeryomenko to army level command, he continually blundered his armored forces into PAKfront ambushes even when he had overwhelming superiority of resources, and was also blatantly lying to STAVKA on advance timetables. Frankly, after Bryansk-Vyazama he was lucky not to have been imprisoned, as Lopurkhovsky's work has shown, but his late war performance was not worlds better.
I think taking Berlin earlier actually would have been possible. The Germans had relatively weak defenses in the area given Hitler's fixation on southeastern Europe and Seelowe Heights showed that these defenses would not stand up to a strategic offensive that could have been launched months earlier, frankly.
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As a side note.....
As you noted, there was a decline in performance of the Red Army in late 1944 and early 1945. This decline over the broad average in finesse probably continued all the way to the fall of Berlin. By late 1944 / early 1945, Stalin knew that WWII was won and was anticipating a post war confrontation with the West. So....
- About 20,000 promising officers were transferred to rear area training and instructional positions to preserve their lives / skills and to prepare the Soviet military for the post war world. This large scale transfer included commanders and staff officers of all levels, as well as aircrew, technical specialists etc. Needless to say, not all the officers remaining at the front were of the same level of ability.
- Anticipating victory, the Soviets also transferred, or released from the Red Army about 50,000 men with academic aptitudes or industrial skills that would be needed in the the post war world. These releases tended to reduce the number of "multi taskers", spontaneous learners, and "easy to train" types available to the Red Army.
Then, in addition to the talent releases ......
- Soviet replacements in late 1944 / 45 were often Balts and Ukrainians- a good many less than fully enthusiastic about being in the Soviet Army. Replacements also included a certain number of "comb outs" from deeper in the Soviet Union who also tended to have disproportionate morale / discipline problems.
Commanders of veteran Soviet units feared that their units would be "contaminated" by accepting replacements with a higher percentage of serious morale / discipline problems. So, STAVKA decided not to bring veteran units up to strength with dubious replacements.
Rather, such replacements would be placed in newly created units with little to no pre-existing combat skills. Veteran units remained at the front, but they were functioning at a reduced capacity since many had not been brought back up to strength.
The end result is less finesse and more "banzai" from Soviet units as 1944 turned into 1945......
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Regarding the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, one under-discussed consequence is the USSR's state of quasi-mobilization on the economy. Increased defense expenditures and conscription into the Red Army led to extreme hidden inflation '38-41 in the non-defense sector, much of the costs of which were born by civilian consumption. Consumer goods and food became increasingly scarce and expensive, especially with the poor 1940 harvest. As demand for labor exploded, indiscipline in the workplace increased enormously as workers hopped from job to job hoping to find better access to resources and pay. Despite desperate calls from regional Party leaders for rationing, with rationing systems spontaneously appearing in almost every city, Stalin firmly opposed these necessary measures and cracked down on informal attempts to set up rationing.
The insistence on maintaining a formally civilian economy even as the country's defense burden increased enormously had especially bad consequences during the Winter War. Leningrad experiences frequent power outages and work stoppages due to strains on the transportation and energy network, resulting in workers missing entire shifts worth of pay. Slow-walking the country into mobilization undermined civilian and military morale in '38-41. You had all the downsides of increased defense expenditures on the economy without the mobilizational/patriotic benefits associated with a state of war.
The insistence on maintaining a formally civilian economy even as the country's defense burden increased enormously had especially bad consequences during the Winter War. Leningrad experiences frequent power outages and work stoppages due to strains on the transportation and energy network, resulting in workers missing entire shifts worth of pay. Slow-walking the country into mobilization undermined civilian and military morale in '38-41. You had all the downsides of increased defense expenditures on the economy without the mobilizational/patriotic benefits associated with a state of war.
Know the enemy and know yourself in a hundred battles you will never be in peril
While OTL Soviet-German military cooperation between 1922 and 1933 is often forgotten, it had a decisive impact on the origins and outbreak of World War II.
The Treaty of Rapallo (1922) marked the formal normalization of relations after the hostility of World War I. Both nations, ostracized by the West, found common ground in their desire to revise the post-war order. Soviet Union hosted hundreds of German soldiers, engineers and scientists at secret military bases.
The Kama Tank school (Panzerschule Kama) was a secret training school for tank commanders operated by the German Reichswehr near Kazan, Soviet Union. It operated from 1929 to 1933. The school was established in order to allow the German military to circumvent the restrictions on tank research spelled out in the Treaty of Versailles. Apart from Kama, for the same reason Germany also operated the Lipetsk fighter-pilot school (1926–33) and a gas warfare facility, Gas-Testgelände Tomka (1928–31).
More important for the future were the intellectual exchanges that occurred there. The Germans borrowed Soviet concepts such as paratroopers and the dive bomber from the Red Air Force. The Red Air Force, in turn, learned tactical and operational lessons from German instructors, copied German designs, and (when unsatisfied with technical cooperation) stole design blueprints from their German partners.
This relationship ended nine months after Hitler assumed power in 1933 and, at his orders, the secret facilities closed one by one… the alliance was only renewed in 1939 with the better known Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Now what would have happened if this Faustian bargain wasn’t interrupted before Barbarossa?
The year is 1940. A specter of dread hangs over the world as the unthinkable unfolds: a fortified, Nazi-influenced Soviet Union stands shoulder to shoulder with its former ideological adversary.
Through its signature by Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the revised Treaty of Rapallo, initially a mere opportunist pact, had morphed in 1924 into a secretive full-blown military and economic alliance, forever altering the course of history.
Poland became the first brutal testament to this unholy union. German Panzers and Soviet T-28s carved the nation in two, their combined might leaving the Western powers reeling. This swift victory emboldened both regimes. The spoils of war fueled their war machines, German engineers collaborating with their Soviet counterparts to refine tank designs and develop cutting-edge weaponry.
Under the watchful eyes of German advisors, the Red Army underwent a radical transformation. Blitzkrieg tactics were integrated into Soviet doctrine, emphasizing rapid armored assaults and combined arms maneuvers. German training methods instilled a new level of discipline and coordination within the once-chaotic Red Army ranks.
The economic alliance proved mutually beneficial. Germany, hungry for resources, gained access to Soviet oil, chromium, and vast agricultural lands. In return, the USSR received advanced German industrial technology and expertise, accelerating its own domestic production of tanks, aircraft, and critical war materiel.
Yet, beneath the surface, cracks began to appear in the alliance's facade. Hitler's insatiable expansionist ambitions could clash with Stalin's desire for a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The Balkans are also a point of contention, with the Soviets wary of German influence in the region.
However, a crucial element had shifted: logistics and communication. The vast resources at the Soviet Union's disposal were now being managed with improved efficiency. German expertise helped streamline transportation networks, communication channels were bolstered, and the once-chaotic flow of troops and supplies became more coordinated. This newfound logistical prowess further strengthened the Soviet war machine.
Furthermore, a hidden ace lay in the Soviet arsenal: secret anti-tank weaponry and rumored advanced tanks. While collaborating with the Germans,Soviet engineers meticulously studied captured Panzer technology, secretly developing their own devastating countermeasures. These advancements remained hidden, a potential trump card held close to the chest.
As 1940 draws to a close, the world teeters on the precipice of further conflict. The Nazi-Soviet alliance, a marriage of convenience forged in blood and steel, has fundamentally reshaped the global landscape. Yet, the seeds of discord are sown, the ideological chasm between the two regimes a constant undercurrent of tension. Will this uneasy partnership hold, or will the inevitable clash between these titans rewrite the future once more?
Only time will tell if the world will witness a truly global war unlike any ever seen before, a conflict where the battle lines are drawn not just across continents, but across ideologies themselves.
Could it be possible?
Basic sources :
1. https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/s...ilitary-pact-and-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/
2. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:16401/FULLTEXT01.pdf
3.
While OTL Soviet-German military cooperation between 1922 and 1933 is often forgotten, it had a decisive impact on the origins and outbreak of World War II.
The Treaty of Rapallo (1922) marked the formal normalization of relations after the hostility of World War I. Both nations, ostracized by the West, found common ground in their desire to revise the post-war order. Soviet Union hosted hundreds of German soldiers, engineers and scientists at secret military bases.
The Kama Tank school (Panzerschule Kama) was a secret training school for tank commanders operated by the German Reichswehr near Kazan, Soviet Union. It operated from 1929 to 1933. The school was established in order to allow the German military to circumvent the restrictions on tank research spelled out in the Treaty of Versailles. Apart from Kama, for the same reason Germany also operated the Lipetsk fighter-pilot school (1926–33) and a gas warfare facility, Gas-Testgelände Tomka (1928–31).
More important for the future were the intellectual exchanges that occurred there. The Germans borrowed Soviet concepts such as paratroopers and the dive bomber from the Red Air Force. The Red Air Force, in turn, learned tactical and operational lessons from German instructors, copied German designs, and (when unsatisfied with technical cooperation) stole design blueprints from their German partners.
This relationship ended nine months after Hitler assumed power in 1933 and, at his orders, the secret facilities closed one by one… the alliance was only renewed in 1939 with the better known Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Now what would have happened if this Faustian bargain wasn’t interrupted before Barbarossa?
The year is 1940. A specter of dread hangs over the world as the unthinkable unfolds: a fortified, Nazi-influenced Soviet Union stands shoulder to shoulder with its former ideological adversary.
Through its signature by Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the revised Treaty of Rapallo, initially a mere opportunist pact, had morphed in 1924 into a secretive full-blown military and economic alliance, forever altering the course of history.
Poland became the first brutal testament to this unholy union. German Panzers and Soviet T-28s carved the nation in two, their combined might leaving the Western powers reeling. This swift victory emboldened both regimes. The spoils of war fueled their war machines, German engineers collaborating with their Soviet counterparts to refine tank designs and develop cutting-edge weaponry.
Under the watchful eyes of German advisors, the Red Army underwent a radical transformation. Blitzkrieg tactics were integrated into Soviet doctrine, emphasizing rapid armored assaults and combined arms maneuvers. German training methods instilled a new level of discipline and coordination within the once-chaotic Red Army ranks.
The economic alliance proved mutually beneficial. Germany, hungry for resources, gained access to Soviet oil, chromium, and vast agricultural lands. In return, the USSR received advanced German industrial technology and expertise, accelerating its own domestic production of tanks, aircraft, and critical war materiel.
Yet, beneath the surface, cracks began to appear in the alliance's facade. Hitler's insatiable expansionist ambitions could clash with Stalin's desire for a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The Balkans are also a point of contention, with the Soviets wary of German influence in the region.
However, a crucial element had shifted: logistics and communication. The vast resources at the Soviet Union's disposal were now being managed with improved efficiency. German expertise helped streamline transportation networks, communication channels were bolstered, and the once-chaotic flow of troops and supplies became more coordinated. This newfound logistical prowess further strengthened the Soviet war machine.
Furthermore, a hidden ace lay in the Soviet arsenal: secret anti-tank weaponry and rumored advanced tanks. While collaborating with the Germans,Soviet engineers meticulously studied captured Panzer technology, secretly developing their own devastating countermeasures. These advancements remained hidden, a potential trump card held close to the chest.
As 1940 draws to a close, the world teeters on the precipice of further conflict. The Nazi-Soviet alliance, a marriage of convenience forged in blood and steel, has fundamentally reshaped the global landscape. Yet, the seeds of discord are sown, the ideological chasm between the two regimes a constant undercurrent of tension. Will this uneasy partnership hold, or will the inevitable clash between these titans rewrite the future once more?
Only time will tell if the world will witness a truly global war unlike any ever seen before, a conflict where the battle lines are drawn not just across continents, but across ideologies themselves.
Could it be possible?
Basic sources :
1. https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/s...ilitary-pact-and-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/
2. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:16401/FULLTEXT01.pdf
3.
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Interesting. When would you say the Red Army peaked during the war then, in terms of its performance/competence and quality of equipment? What about the Red Air Force?
The alliance might hold for a while if Italy joined the WAllies out of anticommunism (plus generous compensations offered by the panicked UK and France, who feared Italy joining the Hitler-Stalin Axis)
After the Fall of France, German conquest appetites would turn against Italy. While weaker on paper than France, Italy fully assisted by the Commonwealth would likely hold, as its terrain heavily favours defenders. It might become WWI 2.0.
Soviets might likewise get bogged down in Turkey and Iran, facing Commonwealth armies with massive recruitment in India
There's also a possibility that Japan joins UK and France, as a strong faction in the military wanted to "Go North". Especially in return for recognition of Manchukuo and technology / industrial equipment.
China (under Chiang) would likely sit the conflict out, while retaking Xinjiang from Soviet puppets and crushing Mao. And once the Soviets seem in trouble, China might join the war too (hoping to get Mongolia back + Western industrial equipment).
So, if the Soviets and Germans get bogged down in enough problems elsewhere, they might stay together
Turkey, maybe, as the Turkish Army is something of an unknown quantity. But getting bogged down in Iran? No, not happening. If the Soviets are in the war in 1940 or and attacking Iran, spare British Middle Eastern strength amounts to a few brigade, not mythical "large armies". Given how the Iranians themselves crumbled OTL against hastily mobilized Soviet reserve formations, an improved and largely undistracted USSR would handily crush them.
I recall reading an account of one of the allied people who invaded Iran expecting to meet up with a ragtag mob of Soviet troops, but instead was very much surprised to find them parade-standard in appearance, superbly disciplined and very well trained and equipped.
It sounds like these were among the best soviet units, although I strongly suspect this was to put on a show for the western allies (which worked for the person I was reading about) rather than because the Iranian opposition required it.
Stalin goes against paranoid dictator type and listens to what the excellent Soviet spy network is telling him. With the information that the spy rings in Berlin, Tokyo, London and Washington were giving him plus warnings from official British sources Stalin had all the information he needed.
The Soviets and now, Russians evidently consider that their finest military accomplishment of the war was the counter blow that followed after they stopped the Germans at Kursk in July 1943:
- Non stop Red Army blitzkrieg takes them all the way from the Kursk area, through the Donbass, then on to Kiev, then..... into Romania, and almost to Hungary.
The Red Army's advance featured rapier like mechanized columns the entire way, sans the numbers driven, battering ram tactics of the later campaigns in East Prussia and against Berlin. It also featured bewildered Germans fleeing on foot and collapsing from mal nutrition and thirst.
But.... the campaign never received much attention in the west.
Early on, optimisation - in the sense of getting the best out of what you have - could be ensuring that somehow or other the working tanks had ammo, fuel and crews. T26 isn't a great choice for 1941, but against 38t, Panzer 2, 37mm armed Panzer3 it isn't a bad match up. And there weren't too many of the 50mm Panzer 3s or Panzer 4s, so another few hundred functional T26s would have helpe, at least in the long run.
You mean the WAllies who constantly tried to prevent conflict and were ultimately forced into conflict because Nazi Germany never followed its word?
If Germany is communist it would be much less expansionist than Nazi Germany and both France and Britain want to avoid war.
I wasn't primarily thinking about Iranian or Turkish armies, but about Commonwealth armies (with mass recruitement in India, which would work quite well as even Indian nationalists would be nervous about Soviets invading the neighbouring country...) deployed alongside them. And later, as months pass, of course there will be newly recruited (and British/US-equipied) Iranian and Turkish divisions joining the front too, of course.
And even if Iran is wholly conquered, then the Soviets still have to fight Commonwealth forces at the Raj-Iran border, as well as in neighboring Iraq, so the same problem is still there.
There's also the need for Soviets to deploy the VVS southwards, as the threat of British bombings in Caucasus (especially the oil fields of Baku, Batumi and Grozny, which provided around 80% of Soviet oil) and Central Asia would be a severe one. And it will become worse and worse as the range and performance of Allied bombers increase, and the USA start mass-producing fighters and bombers too.
This and an earlier expansion of the Red Army would pay massive dividends.
The Purges didn't just impact the armed forces but also every aspect of Russian society including for example those people intrinsically vital to the development of aircraft design and production (during a period a great strides in the area of aeronautical improvements) turned into lumberjacks in the far east or even worse fertiliser for some through the looking glass bullshit political science.
This left the Russian air forces equipped with far worse aircraft than their peers - and that is even before we get to the awful way in which the airforce was initially utilised during Barbarossa resulting in a massively disproportionate loss rate vs the Luftwaffe of about 9:1 in combat.
Total losses to all causes during Barbarossa was 21,000 odd aircraft - about half that in combat - the Germans suffered 2,800 odd aircraft to all causes.
This allowed the much smaller Luftwaffe to dominate the skies - reduce that ratio even marginally is going to cause the Germans huge issues and by reducing losses to the Russian airforce allows it to improve faster (more experienced pilots and aircrew surviving) along with its increased impact on the war.
Which, as I noted, did not exist. Historical recruitment hit its limit and even then most of the volunteers wound up on policing duty because India was restive as fuck. Indian nationalists actually looked to the Soviet Union as a hope for independence, taking its anti-colonial rhetoric at face value. There’s a reason that during the Cold War though they were non-aligned, India was a Soviet-leaning non-aligned. For obvious reasons, this made the British disinclined to embark on further mass recruitment schemes.
The idea that Britain could raise massive armies out of India in 1940-41 is a fantasy that takes no account of either the material shortages that Britain was facing nor the political realities of the Raj's actual political state as a imperialized, colonial subject.
Even ignoring that Iran (and maybe Turkey. The Brits at the time thought they would crumble rather quickly to the Germans if attacked, but we don't know for sure since they never entered the war so the abilities of the Turkish Army in 1940/41 remains an unknown quantity) would rapidly be overrun, with what equipment? Between the Fall of France and mid-1941, Britain was just struggling to arm it's own forces, never mind having surplus to arm other armies. Having to back-up the Italians like you mentioned would be a further draw on those resources.
The Raj-Iran border could be held by both sides with a minimum of forces, as it’s largely an impassable wasteland lacking the infrastructure to sustain large armies within and over it. The biggest meaningful war activity would be the Soviets using it as a smuggling to support the above-mentioned Indian nationalists. And yeah, the run southward through Iran in 1940 would force a pause at the Iran-Iraq border, but by '41 those logistics would have caught up and Britain would still have precious little land forces relative to the scale of what the Soviets could deploy. When Iraq broke out into a - rather weak all things told - rebellion in April 1941, it took until June for the British to assemble a force that could respond to put it down.
This was not a time where Britain was rolling in the resources to stop major overland thrusts. Hell, just being able to enjoy support from the VVS would probably result in the Iraqi rebellion (which the Soviets would not hesitate to back up) succeeding - the British credit their total control of the air as being what allowed the garrison at Habbaniya to survive which obviously would not be possible if the VVS is operating in the area - letting the Soviets just walk into Iraq. If British forces that historically went to North Africa are now tied down in a meatgrinder in Italy like you suggested, the Soviets could very well then use Iraq (and Eastern Turkey, if they've taken it) as a base to strike towards the Suez.
With Britain losing the Middle East and India becoming increasingly restive from Soviet supported rebellions, Britain would be in a even more precarious position by mid-'41 than it was OTL.
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Doubt it.
The nazis loved the idea of a final grand race war to the east against the Slavs. They wanted a permanent state of war to keep the Aryan race strong
The immediate strategic aim of invading the USSR was of securing the resources to win the war in the West. If that does not seem possible, Hitler may shelve his plans for later. He wanted to conquer the Soviet Union, it being his life goal after all, but if he knew he could not knock them out, he might conclude that he has to have a peace with Britain first, or else be squashed in a two-front war.
The permanent state of war wouldn't be a problem right now, as war against Britain (and possibly Free France and/or Italy) will provide it.
The final grand race war would probably be planned for "later" indefinitely, until it's quietly shelved.
Well, that was true IOTL.
But would it still be true in this ATL ? For starters, Britain will get much more desperate, facing both Germany and Soviet Union together, and really need as much troops as possible, and ready to make unprecedented concessions to get it. Of course, London wouldn't want to do that. But if the other option is to simply accept that the Germans and Soviets take over the entire Europe + Middle and Near East ?
On the other side, Indian nationalists might have had (for many of them) sympathies for Soviet Union, or the Soviet model. But they would be quite unhappy, or outright worried, with the Soviets conquering Iran (because it would make them look like just another set of colonial conquerors, and more importantly because it would put them right next to India itself).
Also, you're right that historical Britain (by itself) wouldn't have the material resources to equip (and expand, with mass colonial recruitment) an army big enough to match Germans and Soviets, let alone equip other armies (such as Italians, Free French, Turks or Iranians).
But in the event of a German-Soviet offensive alliance to take over Eurasia, the USA would likely start the lend-lease (with mass production) much sooner. Because, quite frankly, the threat to US interests would be far bigger and more pressing.