AHC: Maximum wank of Medieval Communalism and WI: How would that affect post-Medieval times?

[Salvador79]

From the late 11th to the 14th century was the heyday of the communalist movement in Medieval Central Europe.
IOTL, it flourished most impressively in the HRE - in what would become Switzerland, Northern Italy, and in the form of the Hanseatic League. But it made inroads all across France and Iberia as well as along the Adriatic, too, for a while. Monarchic attempts at centralisation of power gradually curbed the autonomy of the communes, but in many countries, institutional traditions of local democracy show faint echoes of these medieval polities, even though the differences are, of course, massive.

So, here is a combined AHC and WI. First the AHC:
How far (in space, but also in time) could the Communalist wave have swept and lasted, if we want to find the maximum plausible extent?

And then the WI:
If we assume that the maximum is considerably farther, longer, and deeper than OTL, how would that affect post-Medieval developments?
One thing that comes to mind is, for example, Protestantism: on the one hand, it grew out of independent urban communes like Zürich (Zwingli) or Geneva (Calvin); on the other hand, it was centralising territorial principalities / kingdoms (Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, England) whose adoption enabled it to survive militarily.
But I'm sure there are tons of other implications, too.

 

[Salvador79]

No takers?

Here are three thoughts which occurred to me over the past couple of days:

1.) Key regions for a successful expansion of the communalist movement, which might trigger domino effects outwards, are arguably, in descending order of relevance:
a) Tyrol
b) France
c) Poland
Here is why I think so:
ad a): Tyrol is the link between Northern Italy and Germany-North-of-the-Alps, it had wealthy mining towns which sought greater autonomy, but were ultimately crushed by the Habsburgs. If they prevail, this would not only facilitate the Northwards expansion of proto-capitalist social structures and urban-communalist political role models; it would allow for the Alps to become a defiant stronghold of the communalist model, which it already was in its Western reaches (--> Switzerland). Also, seriously screwing the Habsburgs could prevent them from consolidating into a major dynasty, the major dynasty of Europe, one of the big players in the game of centralising monarchies.
ad b): France was a role model for a centralising monarchy, and while "francvilles" spread in the 12th century, their autonomy was seriously curbed. I have no idea how to prevent French centralisation (while also preventing HRE centralisation at the same time), but with France remaining more of a HRE-like checkerboard of various feudal entities with a loose monarchical structure above it, communalist structures and culture would dominate all of the wealthiest and most-developing parts of Europe.
ad c): The centralisation of the Polish / Polish-Lithuanian kingdom blocked the Eastward expansion of this model (and probably contributed greatly to predetermining that part of the continent to become an exporter of agrarian raw produce with a socio-political structure based on large landowners). Problem is that the communalist model / town autonomy was closely linked to German settlers and their privileges, while Polish royal power was spun as "justice for the Poles". Difficult to see how events like Mayor Albert's Rebellion could have gone differently in this context (without pulling the No Mongols joker).

2.) Forget what I wrote in my OP about Protestantism. With a PoD so early, things would have to look entirely unrecognisable there. As it was, urban communes and peasant republics became strongholds of Early and Radical Reformation, but that was probably already tied to how their power had been crushed and to the crisis and estrangement of a fervently Christian population from a Church of Rome and a Papacy which played to the tune of French kings (Avignonese papacy) and other secular rulers (papal schism) and was riddled with nepotism. If leagues of towns are indeed, by the 13th century, no longer just plucky underdogs but a growing powerhouse, they would probably seek and gain a place closer to the Pope's heart (as they actually often were in Italy, where Popes played urban elites against distant trans-alpine emperors). Staying / becoming the new torch-bearers of strong church power (it actually fits: popes, bishops and abbots are elected heads of oligarchical power structures without hereditary succession, and so were (most) mayors and other heads of communes), urban leagues would probably never become the cradle of Reformation, or rather, reforms would happen within the framework of the Roman church and get imposed on unwilling monarchs.

3.) Also, because they remained underdogs IOTL, the communal model never entirely degenerated into its very own imperialist reiteration. The seeds are there, if you look at how e.g. town republics in the Old Swiss Confederacy colonised and subjugated neighboring territories, or if you look at how Genoa and Venice colonised. The formation of "leagues of leagues" was indeed already happening IOTL, and it could have gone further if not curbed by both French kings and Holy Roman Emperors, and while it certainly had the potential to become the groundwork for a federalist version of early modern statehood and subsequent modern political entities, it also had the potential to emulate the perennially warring Greek leagues of poleis, or even the most famous once-city-state, Rome.

Also, this is not an all-or-nothing question. There might well have formed such an uber-commune in, say the 14th or 15th century, exerting power and colonising far and wide at its heyday, only to fall apart into warring constituent leagues afterwards, without the prevalence of the communal model as a political system, rather than the territorial monarchy, really having to change from these altered Middle Ages into an altered Age of Modernity.

 

[Salvador79]

@Shevek23 ?

 

[Evil Crusader]

It can certainly go further than OTL, but it runs contrary to the trends of the period that saw almost every place at least nominally trend towards centralisation (with Italy coalescing in regional states and other countries getting even wider unions) and the bigger ones go on to dominate European politics and colonisaion of the whole Early Modern period.
I also think you're massively over-estimating the correlation of communalism with capitalism (and progress); it eventually emerged in places that hadn't had a serious communalist movevemt long since (Belgium and the Netherlands) or ever (England), while areas that persisted into communalism well into the 18th century eventually found themselves poorer and outdated like Genoa or Venice did - or eternal exporters of mercenaries like Switzerland.
Europe probably is poorer and weaker overall due to it, quite possibly to a level that allows the Ottomans to get deeper.

 

[Salvador79]

It can certainly go further than OTL, but it runs contrary to the trends of the period that saw almost every place at least nominally trend towards centralisation

That depends on which time frame you're looking at. The 12th and 13th centuries, when the movement really spread (as compared to the 14th and 15th, when it entrenched itself in places like Switzerland but was indeed on the defense in most other places), were a time of fragmentation in many parts of Europe, and not just because of the communes. Within the HRE, the stem duchies splintered into even smaller units. Iberia increased its fragmentation, too (Portugal...), and while from the look of it - because we know the outcome - France appears to have been on the path towards centralisation since Philipp Augustus, you might as well see it on the verge of breaking apart (Angevin Empire vs. Capetians, the South consolidating its distinctly different identity). The Southern rim of the Mediterranean was fragmenting, too, just like the Muslim Iberian states, the Byzantines gradually fell apart, and so did the Seljuks... the Kievan Rus, if it had ever been a close confederacy, experienced full centrifugality, and that's before the Mongols crushed it.

The one big cultural model that we associate with the Middle Ages that communalism really went against was knighthood.
Princely / royal militaries were predominantly (increasingly heavily armored) knights on (increasingly heavily armored) horses, with some peasant infantry strewn in that would get slashed down first in any battle, just like on the chessboard - with a social structure of a warrior nobility doing mostly that, living off their delineated land's peasant workforce (when they didn't go plundering), and creating their own unique courtly "high culture" around this very time, too, when they didn't fight, with its own types of poetry, music, sports, code of conduct etc.
Communal militaries were predominantly professional infantry (even though they had horses, too) with unprofessional infantry added on top in times of dire need, and in those places where they were strongest (Northern Italy again), they came to follow their own type of commanders (condottieri). In towns, a different brand of culture developed, with its own narrative genres, festivities (carnival!), institutions etc.

So, one essential question here probably is how strong the military advantage of knightly cavalry was around that time, and what communal armies could effectively bring to bear against them beyond numbers before the advent of gunpowder...

(with Italy coalescing in regional states and other countries getting even wider unions)

One question I've been pondering is to what extent the perennial battles between Guelfs and Ghibellins, in which many Northern Italian cities converted from communes to military dictatorships to larger hereditary military dictatorships, are attributable to the inner dynamics of urban leagues like the Lombard League (speaking of the Greek leagues of poleis as an example) and to what extent they were externally induced by the rivalry between Holy Roman Emperors and the Papacy.
To put it differently: If Fred Barbarossa had died in a devastating defeat at Legnano, for example, would the Lombard League have consolidated into some type of Northern Italian "Alte Eidgenossenschaft", or would it have fallen apart into warring factions like it did IOTL?

and the bigger ones go on to dominate European politics and colonisaion of the whole Early Modern period.

Yeah, sure. That's what fascinating me so much about it. The possibility to imagine an entirely different starting part for the transition from Middle Ages to Early Modernity, and thus a different Modernity, too.

Which should not be mistaken for some kind of utopian thought experiment in wishful thinking. There's lots of genuinely ugly aspects to the communal model, too: While we can pinpoint the big systematic expulsions of Jews, for example, to emerging territorial monarchies, there were tons of "spontaneous" pogroms against the local Jewry happening in dozens of quasi-independent towns all over the place, too, to name just one example, and they were often more violent and gruesome than the forced relocations that are better known today.

I also think you're massively over-estimating the correlation of communalism with capitalism (and progress); it eventually emerged in places that hadn't had a serious communalist movevemt long since (Belgium and the Netherlands) or ever (England), while areas that persisted into communalism well into the 18th century eventually found themselves poorer and outdated like Genoa or Venice did - or eternal exporters of mercenaries like Switzerland.

Not necessarily progress, no. I can even well imagine Communalism-wank TLs in which there isn't really any sharply felt transition into Early Modernity around the 15th and 16th centuries at all.
But capitalism, yes. While it was massively helped by some centralised monarchies and their empires later on (and held back by others), it did develop in urban communes, and spread with the legal codes that were copied from one town onto others and the social structures they created. I would go so far as to say that if we went in the other extreme - screwing the communalist movement entirely and right from the start, having only strong monarcho-chivalric states controlling crafts, commerce, and legal courts everywhere throughout the Middle Ages, then it may well have been that capitalism as we know it would never have developed at all in Europe.
The examples you gave also make me wonder whether you differentiate between "capitalism" and "industrialisation". Between Florence and Antwerp - to just take two examples - genuinely capitalist inventions like financial markets were created centuries before industrialisation took off. Also, the Low Countries were both a hotbed of communalism in the Middle Ages AND one of the few urban-dominated confederal republics of Early Modernity, resulting from a war of independence of, basically, a league of cities with some backwater, against the biggest centralised-monarchical dynasty of Europe, so not really a good counter-example, even though it did consolidate into a centralised state. Its religious dimension had, again, I think, a lot to do with how the rift between aristocratic and urban cultures played out IOTL.
England was a relative late comer to the capitalist party, and then overtook everyone through its combination of the slave-based imperial trade triangle and carbo-industrialisation.

Europe probably is poorer and weaker overall due to it, quite possibly to a level that allows the Ottomans to get deeper.

That may be the case (and really depends on how we estimate the advantage of professional heavy cavalry).
Another interesting thing to explore: communalist structures evolving into modernity under the umbrella of a pax Ottomanica... The Ottomans were pretty adaptive in how they dealt with their Christian European subjects at first. Where the limits of that are is another thing I can't fathom yet.

But good food for thought - thank you for your reply!!

 

[Fabius Maximus]

If you want a communalism-wank, how about giving it royal support? IOTL medieval kings often allied with the commons against the nobility, so maybe they could support communalism as a continuation of this. The historical Roman Empire was run along similar lines -- most of the subject city-states more or less ran their own internal affairs, with the Emperor in Rome controlling the military and foreign relations -- so it could also appeal to the Renaissance "Everything was better in ancient Rome" mentality.

 

[Salvador79]

If you want a communalism-wank, how about giving it royal support? IOTL medieval kings often allied with the commons against the nobility, so maybe they could support communalism as a continuation of this. The historical Roman Empire was run along similar lines -- most of the subject city-states more or less ran their own internal affairs, with the Emperor in Rome controlling the military and foreign relations -- so it could also appeal to the Renaissance "Everything was better in ancient Rome" mentality.

Yeah, great idea!
I have thought about how this was done in the HRE anyway, and how it could have been escalated, e.g. if after Barbarossa's death at Legnano, Henry the Lion becomes HREmperor and weakens any Swabian / Southern rivals by declaring countless of their cities as free imperial cities.
I had not thought about this as an outlet for French kings, too - would it have worked, say, to attempt to weaken the dukes of Aquitaine, or Normandy, or Brittany, by targetting them for a francville expansion?

The link to the Renaissance is interesting (thinking about the whole concept of "civitas" here...), although one would have to see whether a PoD several centuries earlier would leave the Renaissance in any shape recognisable to us...

 

[Neoteros]

It can certainly go further than OTL, but it runs contrary to the trends of the period that saw almost every place at least nominally trend towards centralisation (with Italy coalescing in regional states and other countries getting even wider unions) and the bigger ones go on to dominate European politics and colonisaion of the whole Early Modern period.
I also think you're massively over-estimating the correlation of communalism with capitalism (and progress); it eventually emerged in places that hadn't had a serious communalist movevemt long since (Belgium and the Netherlands) or ever (England), while areas that persisted into communalism well into the 18th century eventually found themselves poorer and outdated like Genoa or Venice did - or eternal exporters of mercenaries like Switzerland.
Europe probably is poorer and weaker overall due to it, quite possibly to a level that allows the Ottomans to get deeper.

The reason why Genoa and Venice began to lag behind the likes of France and Spain is the Atlantic Ocean - the Netherlands had a similar system, but were able to prosper as Genoa and Venice did not, due to having access to said ocean. Had Genoa been able to grab an outpost in southern Spain or northern Morocco during their own golden age (perhaps Gibraltar, if only because of the AH irony of a city-state with a significant population of Genoese descent actually being Genoese), and had Venice's plans for an early Suez canal gone ahead (the Mamluks would need to survive however - or, at least, Egypt would need to be under a dynasty friendly to Venice), I think both could've done well enough, even though their days of near-monopoly over trade would be over.

Rome and Sicily had communalist experiments of their own as well; had they endured, I think it would've been for the best, especially for Sicily - had the island avoided centuries of feudalism, it could've become obscenely rich. You'd need the Italian peninsula to be more stable, however, and its states to make common cause against the monarchies north of the Alps; the Lombard League's parliament was beginning to obtain powers remiscent of those of a federal state by the time it was disbanded and, a few centuries later, the Italic League was on the right track, but it got doomed by early deaths and incompetent heirs. It can be done, but you need a clear unifying threat to exist for long enough, the cities and principalities' defensive leagues can gel into something more.

 

[Evil Crusader]

Disagree on fragmentation. Between 1100 and 1300, Iberia saw the violent submission of the taifas into one big realm and the union of Leon and Castile; France went from the lows of the Angevin Empire to a much more centralized state; England actually gained in coherence and absorbed Wales and parts of Ireland; the various monarchies in Scandinavia, Poland and Lithuania grew stronger; even Hungary was on the rise overall, and of course, the power of the Golden Horde would only start melting down towards the half of the 14th century. The only major exception was the Holy Roman Empire, though I feel the lines are slighly blurred because the real failure in there only happened in the 14th century with the Golden Bull of 1356. Regardless, I feel the point is not aligning with the Middle Ages, rather the Early Modern Era; because if we want to 'wank' the model, we want it to be successful against others, not simply favored through screwing everybody else.
For Italy, I still think the Guelf v Ghibellin was potentially salvageable and a means for potential unification; were they to be really backed by their chosen party (the Pope was too busy going universal meddler, the Emperor never quite could get Germany in array to come back), they would work as a strong foundation for control.
I also think the adoption of gunpowder is eventually giving larger polities an insormountable edge on the land fronts - if you field far less troops, it doesn't matter whether they're moderately better, you're just not going to be able to match them in the long term.

The reason why Genoa and Venice began to lag behind the likes of France and Spain is the Atlantic Ocean - the Netherlands had a similar system, but were able to prosper as Genoa and Venice did not, due to having access to said ocean. Had Genoa been able to grab an outpost in southern Spain or northern Morocco during their own golden age (perhaps Gibraltar, if only because of the AH irony of a city-state with a significant population of Genoese descent actually being Genoese), and had Venice's plans for an early Suez canal gone ahead (the Mamluks would need to survive however - or, at least, Egypt would need to be under a dynasty friendly to Venice), I think both could've done well enough, even though their days of near-monopoly over trade would be over.

Rome and Sicily had communalist experiments of their own as well; had they endured, I think it would've been for the best, especially for Sicily - had the island avoided centuries of feudalism, it could've become obscenely rich. You'd need the Italian peninsula to be more stable, however, and its states to make common cause against the monarchies north of the Alps; the Lombard League's parliament was beginning to obtain powers remiscent of those of a federal state by the time it was disbanded and, a few centuries later, the Italic League was on the right track, but it got doomed by early deaths and incompetent heirs. It can be done, but you need a clear unifying threat to exist for long enough, the cities and principalities' defensive leagues can gel into something more.

Even harder disagree. I mean, neither Portugal nor the Netherlands reached 1800 in particularly good shape, and both had marked advantages over Genoa and Venice. They managed to keep one relevant monopoly each (Brazil and the East Indies, respectively), but everywhere else they eventually got muscled out by France and the UK - it's not hard to see Genoa and Venice end up much like them, moderately successful for a while until pushed out. Unless everybody goes commune, of course, then the richest and most populated ones would be the best.
There's a good amount of evidence suggesting the policies of mercantilism did help the eventual industrialisation (what I called 'capitalism' before) by creating large, heavily protected markets striving for higher labor values, something that I feel communalism proved unable to match in the stereotypical image of the many borders a trader had to pass (and get taxed by/change money for) in the Modern Era HRE.

 

[Nuraghe]

Disagree on fragmentation. Between 1100 and 1300, Iberia saw the violent submission of the taifas into one big realm and the union of Leon and Castile; France went from the lows of the Angevin Empire to a much more centralized state; England actually gained in coherence and absorbed Wales and parts of Ireland; the various monarchies in Scandinavia, Poland and Lithuania grew stronger; even Hungary was on the rise overall, and of course, the power of the Golden Horde would only start melting down towards the half of the 14th century. The only major exception was the Holy Roman Empire, though I feel the lines are slighly blurred because the real failure in there only happened in the 14th century with the Golden Bull of 1356. Regardless, I feel the point is not aligning with the Middle Ages, rather the Early Modern Era; because if we want to 'wank' the model, we want it to be successful against others, not simply favored through screwing everybody else.
For Italy, I still think the Guelf v Ghibellin was potentially salvageable and a means for potential unification; were they to be really backed by their chosen party (the Pope was too busy going universal meddler, the Emperor never quite could get Germany in array to come back), they would work as a strong foundation for control.
I also think the adoption of gunpowder is eventually giving larger polities an insormountable edge on the land fronts - if you field far less troops, it doesn't matter whether they're moderately better, you're just not going to be able to match them in the long term.


Even harder disagree. I mean, neither Portugal nor the Netherlands reached 1800 in particularly good shape, and both had marked advantages over Genoa and Venice. They managed to keep one relevant monopoly each (Brazil and the East Indies, respectively), but everywhere else they eventually got muscled out by France and the UK - it's not hard to see Genoa and Venice end up much like them, moderately successful for a while until pushed out. Unless everybody goes commune, of course, then the richest and most populated ones would be the best.
There's a good amount of evidence suggesting the policies of mercantilism did help the eventual industrialisation (what I called 'capitalism' before) by creating large, heavily protected markets striving for higher labor values, something that I feel communalism proved unable to match in the stereotypical image of the many borders a trader had to pass (and get taxed by/change money for) in the Modern Era HRE.

I fully agree, furthermore, during and after the wars between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, there were many attempts to create centralizing and expansive entities, see the Verona of the Scaligeri family, Venice itself, the Visconti Milan ( which was feared by its neighbors already in 11 / 12 th century, given that the first Lombard league was originally created to contain it ), Genoa and Pisa ( which are competing for my Sardinia, with the former having a clear advantage at the moment ), the Tuscan republics, furthermore, many in Italy were those who, hearing the news of a possible formation of the Golden Bull , hoped for it, to see the problem of imperial power in the peninsula resolved ( 1 ) and then remained disappointed by the final result, in fact many eminent writers and politicians ( including a Cola di Rienzo in his early days ) hoped for the inclusion of an Italian representative in it ( which would be able to establish and take advantage of imperial laws and privileges without having to perpetually request the intervention of the Emperor in the peninsula and his permanence in it for long periods, so as not to even have to anger the papacy, especially after the long stay of Ludwig IV in Rome itself, in the political thought of the time it was a good way to allow you to have a representative who exercised the power of the Emperor through delegation but who was also capable of navigating Italian politics without being dependent on the support of German resources, but which also allowed them to have their say on the choice of the future sovereign )



1 ) this last point is taken from the book "
EMPERORS AND IMPERIAL DISCOURSE IN ITALY, C. 1300-1500 " by Anne Huijbers

 

[Salvador79]

Rome and Sicily had communalist experiments of their own as well; had they endured, I think it would've been for the best, especially for Sicily - had the island avoided centuries of feudalism, it could've become obscenely rich.

I know about Rome, but I couldn't find much on Sicily in that respect. Can you point me towards some texts on the matter? Thanks for the suggestions, by the way!

Disagree on fragmentation. [snip]

You have some points there; what I wanted to make clear is that the picture in the 12th and 13th centuries is a lot more mixed and not at all the same as that of the 15th and 16th centuries.

. Regardless, I feel the point is not aligning with the Middle Ages, rather the Early Modern Era; because if we want to 'wank' the model, we want it to be successful against others, not simply favored through screwing everybody else.

That's always a matter of perspective: wanking one equals screwing another. I believe looking at the inherent strengths and weaknesses of both the communal model and its alternatives, and then asking oneself which of its own weaknesses could have been addressed, which strength expanded, is just as valuable as looking at which points of success of its alternatives were coincidental and could easily have been avoided, which of its weaknesses were luckily patched over IOTL but could have played out worse.

You make a good point concerning the role of mercantilism within larger states / empires aiding the development of proto-capitalist societies into industrial capitalist ones - possibly one factor that could work towards slowing down European carbo-industrialisation in a Communalist-wank TL.
On the other hand, I feel it must be clarified that many large contingent empires with centralised statehood absolutely did not show any successful mercantilist policies and did not gravitate towards carbo-industrial capitalism. That's why I pointed towards prior roots of capitalism in commerce between relatively independent European cities.

Also, taking the two issues of "fragmentation" on the one hand and "wank one / screw the other" together, I feel that if we widen the perspective from a Western-Euro-centric one to a more global one, we will always find, at least until the 19th century, when millennia-long but very slow trends of technological shrinking of distances accelerated exponentially and allowed for true and deep centralisation on scales never seen before, centralisation in one part co-occurred with fragmentation in another, because there weren't any underlying factors determining centralisation or fragmentation, it was just the imperial wank of one and the screw of another. From Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, the Rome-screw fragmented Europe, while the Muslim-wank formed a new coherent bloc. And in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modernity, when Western European kingdoms became world-spanning Empires and the Ottomans grew, too, previously huge Central Asian empires fragmented. Just so that we don't get carried away on narratives or frames that suggest a predetermination of history.

 

[Neoteros]

I know about Rome, but I couldn't find much on Sicily in that respect. Can you point me towards some texts on the matter? Thanks for the suggestions, by the way!

It was an experiment, that lasted only a few months, during the Sicilian Vespers; its name, Communitas Siciliae more civitatum Lombardiae et Tusciae, explicitly mentioned the wish to emulate northern Italian communalism. Since it took place back when feudalism wasn't quite as entrenched in Sicily as it would eventually be, I think its survival would've had a positive impact on the local economy and society, and the island could've gone back to being a prosperous breadbasket and center of learning, with no @AndreaConti-penned isekai shenanigans being necessary.

 

[Salvador79]

@Neoteros,
thanks!

Still concerning my last post:
If I left the impression that I think fragmentation = bad, then that's of course not what I meant. (Would make little sense within the OP framework.)
It's not just that there were large kingdoms and empires which helped carbo-industrial capitalism kick off and others who stood in its way.
It's also that not all increases in city states, statelets and leagues of little republics at the detriment of the coherence of larger political entities means that that space is going to be weaker militarily or politically. Examples that come to my mind are mostly from older periods of history, though: Expansion on the Indian subcontinent happened in the (historically uncertain) era of the Mahajanapadas, while later empires came and went without making much headway; even the integration of South-East Asia into the Indosphere happened more often at the hands of merchant leagues and mother cities who planted new colonies than during the few imperial expansions into that area.
The Celticum existed and expanded impressively alongside larger empires to its South until the Roman conquests came, and it was mostly rather decentralised.
As I said, though, it's also a possibility that, with leagues a quasi-universal feature, some behemoth of an uber-league or dominant city (temporarily) comes to dominate all the rest and expand in that form.

 

[Neoteros]

As I said, though, it's also a possibility that, with leagues a quasi-universal feature, some behemoth of an uber-league or dominant city (temporarily) comes to dominate all the rest and expand in that form.

That's more or less what was happening in 12th century Lombardy: with the HRE an ever-present threat, the Lombard League's parliament obtained powers reminiscent of those of a federal state, if only for a short while, up to and including the power to levy taxes on the city-states that made up the league; and while Milan was not as preeminent in the league as it would be later on, as the capital of the Visconti/Sforza duchy, it was still its most important and influential city.

I think Sicily could've been similar, had the Sicilian Vespers been more successful: sure, the various cities of the island would've been more or less autonomous, with the surrounding countryside and several lesser towns as undisputed possessions, but with the Sicilian league's institutions (IRL, they were distributed between Messina and Palermo) gaining more and more powers in order to field forces capable of resisting foreign aggression.

So, while you'd get fragmentation at the local level, in the end it would mostly concern the internal policies of each city-state: the central government wouldn't have as many powers as a modern federal government (most likely, matters of currency and trade would remain in the hands of the individual city-states), but I can see Milan or Palermo flat out prohibiting diplomatic and military endeavours independent from the will of the shared parliament, and perhaps establishing a customs union of some kind.

Of course, the various leagues would have to pick sides: a surviving Lombard League would be, of course, not very likely to side with the HRE in any way, shape or form, while a surviving Commune of Rome would take the side of the HRE, because there's no way it would ever surrender Rome to the Pope - it'd be fun if conciliarism were to get a boost this way, with even the Catholic Church being reformed along communalist lines; whether this butterflies the Reformation away or not, it depends on the behaviour of the members of the Church's various councils: it'd probably be easier for reformers to climb the ranks, but noble and patrician families would still be there, vying for influence and power both civil and religious. Enough corrupt bishops, and movements aimed at reforming or even at breaking away from the establishment would still arise.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

I had not thought about this as an outlet for French kings, too - would it have worked, say, to attempt to weaken the dukes of Aquitaine, or Normandy, or Brittany, by targetting them for a francville expansion?

Sure. French Kings IOTL used a similar tactic with court cases to undermine the Dukes of Aquitaine (alias the Kings of England), so I don't see why they couldn't use grants of free city status to the same ends.

The link to the Renaissance is interesting (thinking about the whole concept of "civitas" here...), although one would have to see whether a PoD several centuries earlier would leave the Renaissance in any shape recognisable to us...

The Renaissance started in 14th-century Italy, when communalism was still an ongoing force (albeit one approaching the end of its heyday), so depending on the POD we could still have the Renaissance occur on schedule.

 

[Neoteros]

The Renaissance started in 14th-century Italy, when communalism was still an ongoing force (albeit one approaching the end of its heyday), so depending on the POD we could still have the Renaissance occur on schedule.

The seeds of the Renaissance were sown during the era of communalism so, I think it could've emerged on schedule anyway. That said, most of the Renaissance princes belonged to families that got where they were by accumulating influence and wealth during the city-state era, and in most cases they preserved the pre-existing councils and senates even as they lost any kind of real power (sounds very familiar, doesn't it?) so, in order to preserve the already limited democracy of the communalist era, you'd need to reform it in such a way that power can't be easily monopolized - the collegial nature of most of the communalist institutions was supposed to be a safeguard against that, but that... didn't quite work as expected.

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

Ok here’s my pitch- the majority of Italian communes emerged from territories ruled by bishops, and in the kingdom of Germany even prince bishops as exalted as the electors of cologne and triers lost control of the cities their sees were based in and had to consent to communal self rule.

It seems to me that prince bishops were much less able to assert their dominance against communalist movements than their secular counterparts- so if you want more places with civic autonomy, start off with an expanded imperial church system.

This could be achieved by a surviving Otto III managing to fully dominate the papacy, or really any end to the investiture controversy which allows the emperor significant input into the investiture of bishops- otl the imperial church only really stopped growing after the demise of the hohenstaufens and the following lack of imperial attempts to challenge papal prerogatives.

Otl a third of a the kingdom of Germany was governed by prince bishoprics- had the church been a more pliable tool for the emperors from the 10th century onwards, I could easily see that rising to a majority, or even something more like three quarters by the 1300s, with the rest being divided by crown lands and secular fiefs. That in turn makes it much more likely for cities to become free cities and throw off episcopal control.

A stronger imperial church system could lead to similar developments in Poland, Hungary or France- if the monarch can pick the bishop he’s likely to grant him land rather than a hereditary vassal, and that might strengthen royal power vis a vis the nobility while also making it more likely that prince bishops rule the agricultural hinterlands while their actual residential cities secure self governance.

 

[Salvador79]

Thank you for your input and awesome ideas!
The statement about church Lands as ground for communes looks valid and convincing. The Duchy of Swabia is probably the only major worldly principality that fell apart into communes, too.

Sicily gives awesome depth, but probably needs outside /Prior PoDs which may easily butterfly the vespers.

I've been pondering about one single PoD that could have massive consequences towards weakening Central Monarchy and replacing it as a role model with more devolved and communalist polities. Otto3 I did not quite fathom in this regard, probably still too small.

I am currently reflecting about Hastings 1066. No Norman conquest of England not only means a less autocratic English monarchy and better chances for English cities to Join the Hanseatic League, hell, more urbanity earlier in the first place given no Harrying of the North.
It also means no Angevin Empire, No perennial Anglo-French wars in which France centralised. I need to flesh out what this means for HRE-Italian and HRE-Slavic interaction potential.

I have no time for a TL but might do some timetables if this works plausibly, and suggest where this could affect modernity.