Saphroneth
Banned
Wait, why are we talking about the winter of 1862?
Surely it should be the winter of 1861.
Surely it should be the winter of 1861.
AHC Britian and France join the ACW
- Thread starter 606jae
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TFSmith121
Banned
When did the Trent Affair occur?
When did the Trent Affair occur?
November, 1861.
Notes were exchanged back and forth for most of December.
See:
http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1861_timeline/trent_affair.html
No hostilities are even remotely likely before the New Year, 1862.
January-February-March would be winter, 1862.
And again, the report you quoted as somehow being the end all and be all of the defenses of Boston dates from, again, April of 1861.
When did the Trent Affair occur?
November, 1861.
Notes were exchanged back and forth for most of December.
See:
http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1861_timeline/trent_affair.html
No hostilities are even remotely likely before the New Year, 1862.
January-February-March would be winter, 1862.
And again, the report you quoted as somehow being the end all and be all of the defenses of Boston dates from, again, April of 1861.
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frlmerrin
Banned
Big and bold but not that helpful. We have one gun in 1861 and we also know from forts wiki that it was never fully armed but it had acquired some big Rodman's by the end of the OTL ACW. The question is what was available in Q1 of 1862? They didn't appear to have much in the front casemates as they were using them as cells which suggests no additional guns but it is hardly definitive. Can anyone find the relevant Totten report in the ORA?
Evolution now, that, unlike the ACW really changed the world.
Saphroneth
Banned
Page 420 of the same book notes that the forts were not improved until at least 1863.
No, merely a request that you make parts of your post "of substance" by actually arguing your points instead of stating them and then expecting people to take you at your word.
frlmerrin
Banned
So if that is correct then if the British come in Q1 Fort Warren will definitely have 1 gun and could have several more if the Union decide to arm it on the outbreak of hostilities (but not that many as the usual way to move large guns was up and down the coast in a boat and that is difficult in a blockade, moving them by train would be harder and slower). It might even have a few more again in Q2 but not many the Union just don't have that many coast guns.
Smith this is becoming ridiculous.
You use Somerset, whose opinion was based on the same report you are now dismissing, and yet you don't accept the report in question?
Also Barnard's report doesn't addresses coastal fortifications, it points out that an attack against NY would destroy the hearth of the US commerce.
Now if NY is the hearth if the RN blocked that hearth the US commerce would suffer a heavy blow.
Now Barnard's report is used to estimate whose ports must be blocked and the priority given that the paper was named "List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast of the United States . . . with an approximate Estimate of the Number of Vessels required to blockade the several Ports and Rivers" and not "List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast of the United States . . . with an approximate Estimate of the Number of Vessels required to destroy the several Ports."
Captain Washington used Barnard's study to point to Somerset whose ports were of vital importance to the US and the number of ships the Americans expected to be needed to block those ports.
Are you assuming it was due to inability or to priority and can you prove either?
TFSmith121
Banned
So in other words, nothing in Barnard's report discounts the
So in other words, nothing in Barnard's report discounts the following:
"...Somerset eventually declared himself utterly opposed to attacking heavily defended places, probably because Washington had told him that the only hope of success lay in the rather unlikely event of surprising them. ' From the intricacy of the channels and the strength of the forts,' Washington believed, 'it is probable that Boston could not be attacked with any hope of success.' Nor was he much more optimistic about bombarding New York: ' This might have the effect of putting an end to the war, and if so it might be worth the risk. But the risk would be too great if the intention transpired and time were allowed the enemy to make preparations.' The defences of New York had not yet been made impregnable but could readily be improved; a sudden dash, therefore, would be the ' only hope of success.'"
from the following:
then?
Great, glad we got it put in context.
Best,
So in other words, nothing in Barnard's report discounts the following:
"...Somerset eventually declared himself utterly opposed to attacking heavily defended places, probably because Washington had told him that the only hope of success lay in the rather unlikely event of surprising them. ' From the intricacy of the channels and the strength of the forts,' Washington believed, 'it is probable that Boston could not be attacked with any hope of success.' Nor was he much more optimistic about bombarding New York: ' This might have the effect of putting an end to the war, and if so it might be worth the risk. But the risk would be too great if the intention transpired and time were allowed the enemy to make preparations.' The defences of New York had not yet been made impregnable but could readily be improved; a sudden dash, therefore, would be the ' only hope of success.'"
from the following:
British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author: Kenneth Bourne, The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632then?
Great, glad we got it put in context.
Best,
why? Are you assuming that the Americans would not take seriously the real threat of war vs historical OTL ugly diplomatic incident and just sit on their hands waiting for the RN to steam in? What basis are you assuming this? We know that the Union had surplus artillery and plenty of artillerymen to man them and plenty of infantry to back up the defenses.
Just as likely is that Fort Warren ends up looking like Fort Fisher with a sizeable infantry force supporting it\
my general problem with the posts you and saph make are that you assume that the Americans, who on both sides during the Civil War plus during the War of 1812 and Mexican War and Spanish American War typically showing great energy and skill in hurriedly organizing and deploying troops and artillery units would not do so because the British are coming. If anything history would seem to show that the opposite is the case. You assume the US Navy would be helpless, although both previous wars show that one thing is certain, the US Navy will be handled with aggression and considerable skill, and you assume that any problems can be ignored or you hand wave them away or simply make assertions or in the case of Saph, give us a wall of information on ships or regiments which don't really contribute to the discussion.
TFSmith121
Banned
Actually, it notes that Gov. Andrew complained about
Actually, it notes that Gov. Andrew complained about the lack of federal spending on harbor defenses, particularly in Boston, and argued the Lincoln Administration should spend more on such projects in Boston, and station a large warship there.
Context!
Best,
Actually, it notes that Gov. Andrew complained about the lack of federal spending on harbor defenses, particularly in Boston, and argued the Lincoln Administration should spend more on such projects in Boston, and station a large warship there.
Context!
Best,
frlmerrin
Banned
I really need to answer your question on why I think that the information in the ORA recently linked by TFSmith121 reveals a chronic shortage of guns to defend the Union coast. Unfortunately it requires quite a bit of work on my part so I have put it off to the weekend. Once I have done that it will be clear why I am taking the position I do. And so goodnight, it is late here.
TFSmith121
Banned
True enough...
True enough...
As has been stated, there were plenty of guns available to thicken up the shoreside defenses in the important US ports; given the weakness of the rebels, they were never needed, but that doesn't mean they didn't exist, as per the reality is that any political situation that was deteriorating toward war would, in fact, result in an effort by the US to strengthen the coastal defenses in the major Atlantic embayments and harbors, including:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cg...=root;size=100
The table is split between field, siege, and (separately) sea coast guns and mortars, and include those on hand when the war began in April, 1861, those purchased between April, 1861 and June, 1862, weapons issued from the arsenals, and those remaining in store and so available to be used in (say) new units for the field armies and/or reinforced fortifications.
The numbers are very interesting.
In April, 1861, there were 231 field guns, 544 siege guns, and 1,508 sea coast guns and mortars on hand; an additional 1,608 field guns, 211 siege guns, and 302 sea coast guns and mortars were procured by June, 1862, and no less than 1,373 field guns, 553 siege guns, and 1,296 sea coast guns and mortars were issued - meaning supplied to units in the field and manning fortified posts. That left no less than 466 field guns, 202 siege guns, and 604 sea coast guns and mortars in store for future use.
In other words, after putting 3,132 guns into service with active forces, there were still another 1,272 in store - including no less than 806 heavy guns (siege artillery and seacoast guns and mortars). Or, in other words, enough artillery to equip 212 additional batteries of six guns each, including 77 batteries of field artillery, 33 of siege artillery, and 100 batteries of sea coast guns and mortars.
To put that another way, if a standard divisional artillery is estimated at three batteries of six guns each, or 18 total, that's enough field artillery for 25 infantry divisions. The siege artillery batteries would be enough for (as an example) 11 additonal separate battalions of three batteries each, while the 100 batteries of coast artillery pieces would be enough to equip eight additional full regiments (12 companies/batteries each) of heavy artillery for fortress duty.
And in case anyone thinks that's the end of it, a year later, in June of 1863, the number of guns in store had actually increased in all three categories.
Best,
True enough...
As has been stated, there were plenty of guns available to thicken up the shoreside defenses in the important US ports; given the weakness of the rebels, they were never needed, but that doesn't mean they didn't exist, as per the reality is that any political situation that was deteriorating toward war would, in fact, result in an effort by the US to strengthen the coastal defenses in the major Atlantic embayments and harbors, including:
- naval forces on the water,
- additional artillery and fortifications and troops ashore, and
- obstacles - mines, blockships, chains, cables, rafts, booms, dams, weirs, breakwaters, etc. - in the water.
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cg...=root;size=100
The table is split between field, siege, and (separately) sea coast guns and mortars, and include those on hand when the war began in April, 1861, those purchased between April, 1861 and June, 1862, weapons issued from the arsenals, and those remaining in store and so available to be used in (say) new units for the field armies and/or reinforced fortifications.
The numbers are very interesting.
In April, 1861, there were 231 field guns, 544 siege guns, and 1,508 sea coast guns and mortars on hand; an additional 1,608 field guns, 211 siege guns, and 302 sea coast guns and mortars were procured by June, 1862, and no less than 1,373 field guns, 553 siege guns, and 1,296 sea coast guns and mortars were issued - meaning supplied to units in the field and manning fortified posts. That left no less than 466 field guns, 202 siege guns, and 604 sea coast guns and mortars in store for future use.
In other words, after putting 3,132 guns into service with active forces, there were still another 1,272 in store - including no less than 806 heavy guns (siege artillery and seacoast guns and mortars). Or, in other words, enough artillery to equip 212 additional batteries of six guns each, including 77 batteries of field artillery, 33 of siege artillery, and 100 batteries of sea coast guns and mortars.
To put that another way, if a standard divisional artillery is estimated at three batteries of six guns each, or 18 total, that's enough field artillery for 25 infantry divisions. The siege artillery batteries would be enough for (as an example) 11 additonal separate battalions of three batteries each, while the 100 batteries of coast artillery pieces would be enough to equip eight additional full regiments (12 companies/batteries each) of heavy artillery for fortress duty.
And in case anyone thinks that's the end of it, a year later, in June of 1863, the number of guns in store had actually increased in all three categories.
Best,
Keep tell you folks to play the ball, not the man.
As demonstrated by your own post #330 you are once again ignoring that basic rule.
You were warned in November, on the occasion of your 5th kick and 9th action overall that you were on your last chance.
Real shame you didn't listen.
ok guys, TWO people (one on each side no less) have been kicked or banned in this thread...
can we take it easy please and be respectful of one another?
can we take it easy please and be respectful of one another?
Warned y'all about this a couple hundred posts back.
Really unfortunate that some folks chose to ignore good advice.
Hopefully everyone else will play nice.
Saphroneth
Banned
Idealized targets for a British/French naval attack on the Union eastern coast
This is an attempt to evaluate the relative impact, on shipbuilding and on commerce, of British/French attacks on Union coastal ports. Between them, in Mar 1 1862 the British and French could concentrate
5 Devastation class
1 Gloire class
1 Couronne class
4 Aetna class (incl 1 Lengthened Aetna 1 turret ship)
3 Thunderbolt class
1 Warrior class
1 Defence class
(rather pleasingly about equal between the two)
With several more to follow before the end of the year, and a couple which may be available with war speeding construction (like the second Gloire). These are additional to the dozens of steam ships of the line that the two allied nations can dispose between them.
As against this the Union has
USS Monitor
with the additional problem that if the Monitor is delayed a few days on the way to Hampton Roads, then the Virginia will most likely destroy the Federal squadron there or at the least drive them from the area.
The Endicott Report gives eleven locations requiring defence on the Union east coast.
1. Kennebec River, ME
2. Portland, ME
3. Portsmouth, NH
4. Boston, MA
5. New Bedford, MA
6. Narragansett Bay, RI
7. Eastern entrance to Long Island Sound.
8. New York, NY
9. Delaware River
10. Baltimore, MD
11. Washington, DC
So, working down the list:
1) Kennebec River
The shipbuilding centre of Bath is on this river. It's a relatively minor target, though.
2) Portland
Another relatively minor target.
3) Portsmouth
Somewhat more important, due to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The capture, raid or destruction of this port could prevent the construction or completion of the Agamenticus (montor), the New Hampshire (a sail ship of the line used as a store ship) and some sloops and gunboats.
4) Boston
One of the really big targets. Contains the Atlantic Iron Works, the Boston Navy Yard and some smaller shipbuilders. Boston Navy Yard contains one of the five remaining drydocks in US possession and also built the monitor Monadnock, while the Nantucket was built in Atlantic Iron Works. Canonicus, Nahant and the never-launched Quinsigamond were also built in Boston.
5) New Bedford
Has a textile mill, but doesn't look as important in 1862 as it would become by the time of the Endicott Report. This could conceivably be skipped unless I've missed something.
6) Narragansett Bay
Providence is an important manufacturing centre, and Newport holds the campus of the US Naval Academy at this time (with Annapolis being in Virginia and all). An important target if the war is expected to be long - largely because of the disruption from forcing a second relocation.
7 and 8) Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.
(Combined as 7 and 8 are in many ways different entrances to the same place.)
The biggest target selection on the list. In addition to building the Monitor, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey built a huge selection of the other Monitors and ironclads - Passiac (1862) Montauk (1862) Weehawken (1862) Catskill (1862) Camanche (1862) Mahopac (1864) Manhattan (1863) Tecumseh (1863) Onondaga (1863) Miantonomoh (1863) Roanoke Reconstruction (1863) Dictator (1863) Puritan (1863) Kalamazoo (never launched) Dunderberg (1865) Keokuk (1862) Spuyten Devil (1864) Galena (1862). n.b. Dates given are for launch not commission.
A British-French fleet forcing the forts and getting into both Long Island Sound and New York would be able to essentially cripple the US Navy's ironclad program. This makes it the prime target, especially as much of the remaining USN support structure is here, irrespective of how a blockade would ruin the US trade economy.
9) Delaware River
Not only does this river lead directly to the powder mills (hence a major target), but cities on the Delaware river build most of the as-yet-unmentioned east coast monitors. Patapsco (1862) Sangamon (1862) Lehigh (1863) Saugus (1864) Tonawanda (1864) Shackamaxon (never launched) New Ironsides (1862). It's also a major economic area, with Philadelphia the star city.
10) Baltimore
Baltimore is a major manufacturing centre, but also currently under direct Federal administration and occupation. It's not, however, as important in shipbuilding as many of the other places mentioned.
11) Washington DC
The US capital. Self explanatory, and the majority of the British+French ironclads (5 Devastation 4 Aetna 3 Thunderbolt) can make it upriver.
So - the most important targets are...
New York and environs - essentially building the majority of the US ironclad fleet. A raid can set the USN back months... in addition to how it's also the most important US city in economic terms.
Delaware River - another important economic hub, the home of the powder mills, and additionally building several other ironclads.
Washington DC - the US capital, and capture of the capital usually means defeat.
Boston - not only is it comically vulnerable, but it's building most of what's left of the monitor fleet once the first two listed targets are taken out. I'd say attack this first as practice!
It also goes without saying that the British plus French turn out to be able to station one ironclad and three steam battleships at every blockade location, with some spare, as well as a good couple of steam frigates... right from the start of the war with no extra building.
To fight this off the US has one ironclad and some frigates, and if it wants to build ships with armour as resistant as the British/French ironclads (4" thickness single plate instead of the much inferior layered system) then the experience of New Ironsides shows that plate fabrication will take close to a year.
So - I think we can be fairly confident that attacking these four locations would suffice to effectively neuter the USN and indeed the US.
Next I'll look at an idealized distribution of resources, probably including an estimate of a "warship budget".
This is an attempt to evaluate the relative impact, on shipbuilding and on commerce, of British/French attacks on Union coastal ports. Between them, in Mar 1 1862 the British and French could concentrate
5 Devastation class
1 Gloire class
1 Couronne class
4 Aetna class (incl 1 Lengthened Aetna 1 turret ship)
3 Thunderbolt class
1 Warrior class
1 Defence class
(rather pleasingly about equal between the two)
With several more to follow before the end of the year, and a couple which may be available with war speeding construction (like the second Gloire). These are additional to the dozens of steam ships of the line that the two allied nations can dispose between them.
As against this the Union has
USS Monitor
with the additional problem that if the Monitor is delayed a few days on the way to Hampton Roads, then the Virginia will most likely destroy the Federal squadron there or at the least drive them from the area.
The Endicott Report gives eleven locations requiring defence on the Union east coast.
1. Kennebec River, ME
2. Portland, ME
3. Portsmouth, NH
4. Boston, MA
5. New Bedford, MA
6. Narragansett Bay, RI
7. Eastern entrance to Long Island Sound.
8. New York, NY
9. Delaware River
10. Baltimore, MD
11. Washington, DC
So, working down the list:
1) Kennebec River
The shipbuilding centre of Bath is on this river. It's a relatively minor target, though.
2) Portland
Another relatively minor target.
3) Portsmouth
Somewhat more important, due to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The capture, raid or destruction of this port could prevent the construction or completion of the Agamenticus (montor), the New Hampshire (a sail ship of the line used as a store ship) and some sloops and gunboats.
4) Boston
One of the really big targets. Contains the Atlantic Iron Works, the Boston Navy Yard and some smaller shipbuilders. Boston Navy Yard contains one of the five remaining drydocks in US possession and also built the monitor Monadnock, while the Nantucket was built in Atlantic Iron Works. Canonicus, Nahant and the never-launched Quinsigamond were also built in Boston.
5) New Bedford
Has a textile mill, but doesn't look as important in 1862 as it would become by the time of the Endicott Report. This could conceivably be skipped unless I've missed something.
6) Narragansett Bay
Providence is an important manufacturing centre, and Newport holds the campus of the US Naval Academy at this time (with Annapolis being in Virginia and all). An important target if the war is expected to be long - largely because of the disruption from forcing a second relocation.
7 and 8) Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.
(Combined as 7 and 8 are in many ways different entrances to the same place.)
The biggest target selection on the list. In addition to building the Monitor, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey built a huge selection of the other Monitors and ironclads - Passiac (1862) Montauk (1862) Weehawken (1862) Catskill (1862) Camanche (1862) Mahopac (1864) Manhattan (1863) Tecumseh (1863) Onondaga (1863) Miantonomoh (1863) Roanoke Reconstruction (1863) Dictator (1863) Puritan (1863) Kalamazoo (never launched) Dunderberg (1865) Keokuk (1862) Spuyten Devil (1864) Galena (1862). n.b. Dates given are for launch not commission.
A British-French fleet forcing the forts and getting into both Long Island Sound and New York would be able to essentially cripple the US Navy's ironclad program. This makes it the prime target, especially as much of the remaining USN support structure is here, irrespective of how a blockade would ruin the US trade economy.
9) Delaware River
Not only does this river lead directly to the powder mills (hence a major target), but cities on the Delaware river build most of the as-yet-unmentioned east coast monitors. Patapsco (1862) Sangamon (1862) Lehigh (1863) Saugus (1864) Tonawanda (1864) Shackamaxon (never launched) New Ironsides (1862). It's also a major economic area, with Philadelphia the star city.
10) Baltimore
Baltimore is a major manufacturing centre, but also currently under direct Federal administration and occupation. It's not, however, as important in shipbuilding as many of the other places mentioned.
11) Washington DC
The US capital. Self explanatory, and the majority of the British+French ironclads (5 Devastation 4 Aetna 3 Thunderbolt) can make it upriver.
So - the most important targets are...
New York and environs - essentially building the majority of the US ironclad fleet. A raid can set the USN back months... in addition to how it's also the most important US city in economic terms.
Delaware River - another important economic hub, the home of the powder mills, and additionally building several other ironclads.
Washington DC - the US capital, and capture of the capital usually means defeat.
Boston - not only is it comically vulnerable, but it's building most of what's left of the monitor fleet once the first two listed targets are taken out. I'd say attack this first as practice!
It also goes without saying that the British plus French turn out to be able to station one ironclad and three steam battleships at every blockade location, with some spare, as well as a good couple of steam frigates... right from the start of the war with no extra building.
To fight this off the US has one ironclad and some frigates, and if it wants to build ships with armour as resistant as the British/French ironclads (4" thickness single plate instead of the much inferior layered system) then the experience of New Ironsides shows that plate fabrication will take close to a year.
So - I think we can be fairly confident that attacking these four locations would suffice to effectively neuter the USN and indeed the US.
Next I'll look at an idealized distribution of resources, probably including an estimate of a "warship budget".
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Saphroneth
Banned
First, Boston.
This is so easy (there are no defences) that I'm going to go ahead and use this post to put together a list of hypothetical ships to use.
By the US Naval Institute Press:
With a total of 90 screw liners and more than thirty screw frigates, assigning 20 liners and 10 frigates seems possible - but we'll see if we need them... it might well be that the NA&WI station of OTL is sufficient.
First - Boston. As we know, until 1863 at least the Boston harbour defences consisted of one sea facing cannon - one condemned cannon.
One ironclad, one ship of the line, a frigate and a few sloops and gunboats is more than sufficient. (The frigate would probably be sufficient.) This means we can write off that naval yard, and the British and potentially French navies get target practice.
(This would IMO take about a day - two if the attackers fear a trap. These ships are then available elsewhere, except for a single ship of force and some gunboats to enforce blockade.)
This is so easy (there are no defences) that I'm going to go ahead and use this post to put together a list of hypothetical ships to use.
By the US Naval Institute Press:
With a total of 90 screw liners and more than thirty screw frigates, assigning 20 liners and 10 frigates seems possible - but we'll see if we need them... it might well be that the NA&WI station of OTL is sufficient.
First - Boston. As we know, until 1863 at least the Boston harbour defences consisted of one sea facing cannon - one condemned cannon.
One ironclad, one ship of the line, a frigate and a few sloops and gunboats is more than sufficient. (The frigate would probably be sufficient.) This means we can write off that naval yard, and the British and potentially French navies get target practice.
(This would IMO take about a day - two if the attackers fear a trap. These ships are then available elsewhere, except for a single ship of force and some gunboats to enforce blockade.)
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Saphroneth
Banned
New York
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...onepage&q="fort wood" "water battery"&f=false
New York is a tricky target, being the best defended (and with good reason); however, it's still not up to much.
I'll draw here from Kinburn, in which ten Allie ships of the line and three ironclad floating batteries - plus gunboats - sufficed to neutralize a system of Russian forts armed with medium pounder guns in the course of a single morning with only two dead and 25 wounded. The Russian fort system contained 71 guns capable of engaging, 24 lber and below.
Tier 1 - the narrows.
Here the British approach is to bombard the forts from the south to reduce them, rather than running them. The Terror (NA&WI station already) and any other ironclad force anchors within ~400 yards of the selected fort and engages, with the ships of the line anchoring a little further out (depends on the depth - at Kinburn they anchored 1,200 yards out due to shoals.)
At this range the 11" Dahlgren gun can't penetrate her armour, let alone what's actually there...
Fort Hamilton (east bank)
Fort Hamilton has three casemate guns (32 lbers) and three redoubt guns (24 lbers) able to fire south.
Her three foot masonry is not likely to hold up to prolonged bombardment from 32-lbers, 8" shell guns and 68-lbers - just a few ships of the OTL station (Donegal, St George, Liffey, Mersey, Ariadne) could bring to bear between them a broadside of
Donegal
16 8" shell guns
34 32-lbers
1 68-lber
St George
1 68-lber
57 32-lber
2 18-lber
Liffey
15 8" shell guns
10 32-lber
1 68-lber
Mersey
6 8" shell guns
14 10" shell guns
Ariadne
12 10" shell guns
2 68-lber
Total from this subsection of the NA&WI station
5 68-lber (+ the guns on the Terror)
26 10" shell guns
37 8" shell guns
101 32-lber
2 18-lber
Fort Tomkins
Incomplete.
Fort Richmond
20 south facing gun emplacements, as well as 20 facing into the narrows and 20 north. 46 8" guns total in January, so assume all are present.
Since they're all shell guns, the Terror may be required here as she's essentially proof against shell (as per Kinburn with a less advanced design of floating battery).
Battery Hudson and Battery Morton
Two barbette earthworks, with 40 32-lbers facing south.
Fort Lafayette
Strong, wooden supports (flammable!) and with 20 32-lbers and up to six 24-lbers.
The main difference in armament between these forts and Kinburn is that the Kinburn forts mounted up to 24-lbers and these mount up to 32-lbers, plus some 8" guns. The total south facing firepower of the forts is
63 32 lber
9 24 lber
20 8" guns
This is roughly comparable (a little superior) to one broadside of the Donegal. The fraction examined of the NA&WI station can deliver three times as many shell guns and one and a half times as many 32-lbers as the south-facing fort guns - as well as 5 unarmoured 68-lbers and 7 armoured 68-bers able to engage from very close range.
Or, if they're feeling cheeky, they could just skip all that and sail gunboats through the Kills river system.
Tier 2 - the islands
At least two of these are abandoned, and most of the rest don't have many guns that can engage south. Mostly 32 lbers, again, and fewer of them, with only a few shell guns.
They're also too far out to actually prevent shelling of the city, as was noted at the time.
So New York takes a substantial commitment of resources - maybe five or six of the ships of force actually present in NA&WI at the time. Deploying the lot would give, roughly, one ship for every two guns in the narrows defences.
New York's defences, while relatively strong, are untenable against Milne's OTL NA&WI station.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...onepage&q="fort wood" "water battery"&f=false
New York is a tricky target, being the best defended (and with good reason); however, it's still not up to much.
I'll draw here from Kinburn, in which ten Allie ships of the line and three ironclad floating batteries - plus gunboats - sufficed to neutralize a system of Russian forts armed with medium pounder guns in the course of a single morning with only two dead and 25 wounded. The Russian fort system contained 71 guns capable of engaging, 24 lber and below.
Tier 1 - the narrows.
Here the British approach is to bombard the forts from the south to reduce them, rather than running them. The Terror (NA&WI station already) and any other ironclad force anchors within ~400 yards of the selected fort and engages, with the ships of the line anchoring a little further out (depends on the depth - at Kinburn they anchored 1,200 yards out due to shoals.)
At this range the 11" Dahlgren gun can't penetrate her armour, let alone what's actually there...
Fort Hamilton (east bank)
Fort Hamilton has three casemate guns (32 lbers) and three redoubt guns (24 lbers) able to fire south.
Her three foot masonry is not likely to hold up to prolonged bombardment from 32-lbers, 8" shell guns and 68-lbers - just a few ships of the OTL station (Donegal, St George, Liffey, Mersey, Ariadne) could bring to bear between them a broadside of
Donegal
16 8" shell guns
34 32-lbers
1 68-lber
St George
1 68-lber
57 32-lber
2 18-lber
Liffey
15 8" shell guns
10 32-lber
1 68-lber
Mersey
6 8" shell guns
14 10" shell guns
Ariadne
12 10" shell guns
2 68-lber
Total from this subsection of the NA&WI station
5 68-lber (+ the guns on the Terror)
26 10" shell guns
37 8" shell guns
101 32-lber
2 18-lber
Fort Tomkins
Incomplete.
Fort Richmond
20 south facing gun emplacements, as well as 20 facing into the narrows and 20 north. 46 8" guns total in January, so assume all are present.
Since they're all shell guns, the Terror may be required here as she's essentially proof against shell (as per Kinburn with a less advanced design of floating battery).
Battery Hudson and Battery Morton
Two barbette earthworks, with 40 32-lbers facing south.
Fort Lafayette
Strong, wooden supports (flammable!) and with 20 32-lbers and up to six 24-lbers.
The main difference in armament between these forts and Kinburn is that the Kinburn forts mounted up to 24-lbers and these mount up to 32-lbers, plus some 8" guns. The total south facing firepower of the forts is
63 32 lber
9 24 lber
20 8" guns
This is roughly comparable (a little superior) to one broadside of the Donegal. The fraction examined of the NA&WI station can deliver three times as many shell guns and one and a half times as many 32-lbers as the south-facing fort guns - as well as 5 unarmoured 68-lbers and 7 armoured 68-bers able to engage from very close range.
Or, if they're feeling cheeky, they could just skip all that and sail gunboats through the Kills river system.
Tier 2 - the islands
At least two of these are abandoned, and most of the rest don't have many guns that can engage south. Mostly 32 lbers, again, and fewer of them, with only a few shell guns.
They're also too far out to actually prevent shelling of the city, as was noted at the time.
So New York takes a substantial commitment of resources - maybe five or six of the ships of force actually present in NA&WI at the time. Deploying the lot would give, roughly, one ship for every two guns in the narrows defences.
New York's defences, while relatively strong, are untenable against Milne's OTL NA&WI station.