The British were not particularly impressed with the Monitor's first appearance in battle: 'We could have done the work of the Monitor and Merrimac together ', was The Times' comment.3
But while the American turret ships were not ocean-going vessels and the British ironclads were stronger ships, the British would still have met with some difficulties. Their ironclads had too deep a draught to use Bermuda or to operate in the shallow waters of the North American coast. The monitors might therefore have played havoc with any attempt by the older wooden frigates to maintain a close blockade.
The emphasis on Milne's squadron and particularly on its offensive qualities owed, of course, a good deal to the sense of frustration about Canada, but it was, too, based on a confident contempt for the stability of the American economy and morale, both already severly strained by the civil war.
Indeed for part at least of this belief they had support from Americans themselves, in particular one expert quoted by the Admiralty hydrographer, Captain Washington, in a paper entitled ' List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast of the United States . . . with an approximate Estimate of the Number of Vessels required to blockade the several Ports and Rivers '.1
It may be said of New York . .. that if an enemy succeeded in obtaining command of it, even temporarily, or, what would be nearly the same in its consequences, if he succeeded with his fleet in forcing the entrance to the harbour, and in bringing his guns to bear on the city, such a disaster would result in our buying him off upon any terms he might think it expedient to exact. Attacks upon other great seaport towns, such as Boston or Philadelphia, might indeed be attended with results highly disastrous, but they would tell comparatively little upon the issues of the war. The difference is that between striking a limb and striking the heart, for New York is the true heart of our commerce,-the centre of our maritime resources; to strike her would be to paralyse all the limbs.
Somerset eventually declared himself utterly opposed to attacking heavily defended places,2 probably because Washington had told him that the only hope of success lay in the rather unlikely event of surprising them. ' From the intricacy of the channels and the strength of the forts,' Washington believed, 'it is probable that Boston could not be attacked with any hope of success.' Nor was he much more optimistic about bombarding New York: ' This might have the effect of putting an end to the war, and if so it might be worth the risk.
But therisk would be too great if the intention transpired and time were allowed the enemy to make preparations.