Who said ships in reserve don't count?
ships in reserve don't count?
Who said ships in reserve don't count?
What they do cost, however, is manpower, equipment, shipyard space, and
time.
And the issue is, as your list (source?) points out, is what the British have on hand in the winter of 1861-62, are
Black Prince, Warrior, Resistance, Defense (all still completing, working up, or refitting after trials in the winter of 1862), the four 2,000 ton ships built in the 1850s (only one of which is actually in commission for overseas service), and the four 1,500 ton ships built in the 1850s,
during the war with Russia, which are all in reserve. So even to get those 12 in commission, operational, and across the North Atlantic (in winter) is not going to be a quick process, much less allow for any of the "sudden descent" IMPERIAL STORM tropes.
And the point in all this is the British, in any potential conflict with the US in 1862-??, are going to try and wage offensive war on multiple fronts, maritime and continental, and at distances that have yet to be attempted in the steam era, against a peer competitor with far more resources in theater than the British/BNA/rebels have or can deploy and sustain.
Again, the Russo-Turkish and South African conflicts do not compare, both in terms of the "enemy's" industrialization and demographic advantage in theater, much less the reality the Russians chose not to, and the South Africans could not, wage war at sea.
So here's the issue - given the realities of the British experience in the conflicts with the Russians and South Africans, and the realities of the resources of the US in the 1860s, and the utter uselessness of the French ships against the Prussians in 1870-71, and the pointlessness of the Italian and Austrian fleets in 1866 - where the Austrians, after all, won the ONLY naval action worth the name and still
lost the war - who cares how many freaking ships the British have or don't have?
Based on the historical record, the Royal Navy could prevent an invasion of the British Isles, and it could maintain sea control in the eastern Atlantic and adjacent sea areas; it could not substitute for an army in a continental-scale land war, and never did. The British always tried to glean allies to provide
their armies in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, and absent said allies, Britain could not defeat a significant enemy ashore. In a conflict without allies, Britain could not maintain its naval forces and create an army of significance, as per every major war it fought against a peer competitor in the modern era.
The RN wasn't a magic wand in
either world war, the Anglo-French conflicts of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, much less any of the conflicts the British actually fought against Western enemies in the 1850s or 1880s. And as
Palmerston said, it wouldn't make a
damn bit of difference if the British had tried to intervene against the Prussians and Austrians in 1864 over freaking Denmark, which is a little closer to Portsmouth, England, than Portsmouth, England is to Portsmouth, Maine. Troops on the ground made the difference in that war, as they generally did in all wars between peer competitors.
So it's not going to win an war at one blow with the Americans in the 1860s, either. Sorry.
Ironclad warships in 1862, or 1865, or 1914, were not the equivalent of the atom bomb in 1945. Again, sorry.
One more time, here's Mr. Temple in 1864:
"...I am sure every Englishman who has a heart in his breast and a feeling of justice in his mind, sympathizes with those unfortunate Danes (cheers), and wishes that this country could have been able to draw the sword successfully in their defence (continued cheers); but I am satisfied that those who reflect on the season of the year when that war broke out, on the means which this country could have applied for deciding in one sense that issue, I am satisfied that those who make these reflections will think that we acted wisely in not embarking in that dispute. (Cheers.) To have sent a fleet in midwinter to the Baltic every sailor would tell you was an impossibility, but if it could have gone it would have been attended by no effectual result. Ships sailing on the sea cannot stop armies on land, and to have attempted to stop the progress of an army by sending a fleet to the Baltic would have been attempting to do that which it was not possible to accomplish. (Hear, hear.) If England could have sent an army, and although we all know how admirable that army is on the peace establishment, we must acknowledge that we have no means of sending out a force at all equal to cope with the 300,000 or 400,000 men whom the 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 of Germany could have pitted against us, and that such an attempt would only have insured a disgraceful discomfiture—not to the army, indeed, but to the Government which sent out an inferior force and expected it to cope successfully with a force so vastly superior. (Cheers.) ... we did not think that the Danish cause would be considered as sufficiently British, and as sufficiently bearing on the interests and the security and the honour of England, as to make it justifiable to ask the country to make those exertions which such a war would render necessary."
Replace "Danes" with "Canadians" and "the Baltic" with "the Gulf of the Saint Lawrence" and "Germany" with "United States" and the numbers as appropriately, and it reads as follows:
"...I am sure every Englishman who has a heart in his breast and a feeling of justice in his mind, sympathizes with those unfortunate Canadians (cheers), and wishes that this country could have been able to draw the sword successfully in their defence (continued cheers); but I am satisfied that those who reflect on the season of the year when that war broke out, on the means which this country could have applied for deciding in one sense that issue, I am satisfied that those who make these reflections will think that we acted wisely in not embarking in that dispute. (Cheers.) To have sent a fleet in midwinter to the Saint Lawrence every sailor would tell you was an impossibility, but if it could have gone it would have been attended by no effectual result. Ships sailing on the sea cannot stop armies on land, and to have attempted to stop the progress of an army by sending a fleet to the Saint Lawrence would have been attempting to do that which it was not possible to accomplish. (Hear, hear.) If England could have sent an army, and although we all know how admirable that army is on the peace establishment, we must acknowledge that we have no means of sending out a force at all equal to cope with the 200,000 or 300,000 men whom the 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 of the United States could have pitted against us, and that such an attempt would only have insured a disgraceful discomfiture—not to the army, indeed, but to the Government which sent out an inferior force and expected it to cope successfully with a force so vastly superior. (Cheers.) ... we did not think that the Canadian cause would be considered as sufficiently British, and as sufficiently bearing on the interests and the security and the honour of England, as to make it justifiable to ask the country to make those exertions which such a war would render necessary."
Best,