It would require a serious doctrinal shift for one thing. The soviets concentrated heavily on ASW with the adoption of the bastion concept. I think Gorshikov wanted carriers but was denied because they were too expensive to design. If the Soviets had managed to get the Graf Zepplin home instead of her sinking then who knows, using her as at least a starting off point would be something.
Actually I have something from an alternate navy the soviets made. I did not make this, got it from another forum, can't remember what one though.
If you want I can send you the whole thing.
[FONT="]This naval policy study was undertaken by Admiral Gorshkov in 1960 to advocate a new strategy for a new Soviet Navy. Gorshkov managed to get close to Khrushchev by advocating a new ‘mobile missile navy’. Gorshkov warned in the future ICBM bases could be knocked out by American missiles. By 1965 the Soviets had recognised than nuclear warheads on submarines and ships could be anywhere in the world and could strike any target on earth from any direction. The 1960 Naval Plan had several aims (these are not listed in any order of importance); [/FONT][FONT="]
1) To create the most powerful navy in the world. Not by sheer numbers but by having the best equipped warships armed with powerful missile systems. The West would not catch up with SSMs until the late 1960s.
2) To operate across the globe to support Communist friends and deny free passage to Western shipping. Bases were created between 1967 and 1982 in Syria, Egypt, Cuba, Vietnam, Cape Verde, Angola, India and Iran to give global coverage with a massive merchant fleet supplying ships mid ocean and abroad. Nuclear powered carrier groups would be created to hunt down Western Carrier Groups. The main purpose was to operate from bases in Africa and the Middle East to close off all trade routes through the Red Sea and the Cape to effectively cut the world in half and cut off the West’s oil supplies.
3) To destroy any NATO vessels operating east of the Greenland, Iceland, Scotland line and to cut off all reinforcement from America.
4) To offer nuclear deterrent to NATO with large SSBN forces operating across the globe.
6) To hunt and destroy Western SSBNs outside territorial waters and far from home if so required.
7) From 1973 to create and protect Arctic ‘bastions’ for Soviet SSBNs to operate without fear of destruction.
[/FONT][FONT="]
[/FONT][FONT="]Reinforcement of sea denial by powerful air forces able to operate across the globe, in peacetime to track SSBNs and surface groups. [/FONT][FONT="]
This document would form the basis for all Naval procurement and operations until 1991.
Khrushchev blocked any carrier construction but sanctioned a powerful submarine fleet and by the end of his reign the Red Navy had politically manoeuvred him into ordering a powerful surface fleet, especially after the emergence of two RN carrier groups armed with supersonic strike aircraft and escorted by excellent cruisers and the newer Nimitz Class supercarriers . This plan upset the VVS the most losing its strategic role and new bombers. While it gained the Naval Air force fighters it lost all the Tu-22M Backfire production to the Navy (but got the better Tu-160 Blackjack) and some 60 Su-24 Fencer. The Army lost some funds but sharing SAM technology helped the Navy and the Army (who gained in some radar technology and overseas prestige), and relations did not sour too badly.
[/FONT]