Could you do much prep of the tank on the ground before putting it up into orbit?
Like a door or Better insulation since you know you are going to be using it for a station.
A Sound of Thunder: The Rise of the Soviet Superbooster
- Thread starter nixonshead
- Start date
Like a door or Better insulation since you know you are going to be using it for a station.
You could, and you would, but there's only so much you can do to prepare it for being a space station without compromising it being a tank.
"Boldly Going: A History of an American Space Station" eventually works out the ET for a space station designed using the Orbiter "Enterprise" as a core.
As noted it was studied but there's no getting around it would take a lot of astronaut manual labor to set it up and there's only so much you can do to outfit or prepare the interior for the work without compromising it's use as a tank. OTL Congress actually mandated that NASA plan for the delivery of tanks to orbit should anyone show the capability to operate and/or fit out the tank on orbit but as there weren't any real options for showing such capability NASA never had to deliver. (Which itself probably would have been a nightmare to try and actually do in the first place)
TTL there might be more work on the idea and maybe some industrial/private interest, (after all there was more than a little interest in buying a private orbiter OTL) but frankly I'm having a hard time seeing it happening over just having Shuttle or Shuttle-C delivered orbital modules.
Randy
Obviously this is up to the author and I suspect that as this is a tl focused on the N1 and Soviet Space program that is what most of the writing is going to be focused on. But one of the potential tangents of having Shuttle C at the start of the 80's along with a Skylab II that has a limited service life is a Shuttle C derived Space Station launched at the end of the decade, basically a better Space Station Enterprise with the Shuttle C payload fairing as a proper drylab and the ET as a wet lab expansion space.
I suspect we'll see a good bit of Shuttle C launched dry-lab components but I also suspect we'll see the same issues with wet-labs that have happened OTL. The main issue is we've got no good "workable" space suits suited (pardon the pun) for working long periods in space. It's just never been a priority for anyone to design or develop and without that your EVA (or even IVA say inside an ET) is going to be limited due to fatigue and danger.
Done right, say like the "HabiTank" lunar base concept it has a good chance of giving "pressurized space" for a pretty quick and relatively cheap effort. The ET however is HUGE spaces and really difficult to justify the large amount of labor and cost it would need. It really only makes "sense" if you figure somehow you're going to have thousands of people on-orbit over a decent amount of time. Otherwise dry-habs are likely going to cost out better.
(KInd of puts it into the catagory of "problems I wish our space program had"
)Randy
While the original design for the external tank did involve it being placed into orbit alongside the space shuttle with the ET having a separate de-orbit motor in the nose, this was dropped fairly early into the firm definition of the program, and none of the 135 ETs that were used in the program were ever placed into orbit.
As for the payload cost, the external tank is already being taken over 95% of the way to orbit, and if you do not have to target the MECO precisely to dispose of the ET you can make a more efficient launch, further locking in that the ET does not reduce the payload the shuttle could deliver at a one-to-one ratio.
For some reason I thought that the ascent profile for the first couple of missions put the ET into an orbit with an endoatmospheric perigee, rather than leaving it on a trajectory that intersected the ground. Whether the former counts as an orbit and the latter not seems to be more a philosophy than a physics question!
Hi,
Sorry I won't be able to respond to all the comments individually this week (and a lot of replies would be of the "wait and see" variety!), but here's a few points:
1) This report has been cobbled together from existing studies over about 3 weeks, so there is some obsolete information in there.
2) As Low quickly realised, they're taking the chance to ask for everything on the hope of getting something, which includes an expanded orbiter fleet to match the original flight rate (not realistic, as you said)
3) I probably screwed up a bit in drafting and should have lowered it to something like 30
Sorry I won't be able to respond to all the comments individually this week (and a lot of replies would be of the "wait and see" variety!), but here's a few points:
Yes, but a couple of points here:
1) This report has been cobbled together from existing studies over about 3 weeks, so there is some obsolete information in there.
2) As Low quickly realised, they're taking the chance to ask for everything on the hope of getting something, which includes an expanded orbiter fleet to match the original flight rate (not realistic, as you said)
3) I probably screwed up a bit in drafting and should have lowered it to something like 30
It's a fair question, but maybe it's not as much of an impact as you might think. As with Apollo, the Soviet moon landing makes great propaganda, as does its space station achievements, and contribute to the image of them being technologically advanced, but it doesn't impact people's day-to-day lives so much. The political impact would mostly be in foreign relations (and there quite marginal - maybe a couple of extra MoUs get signed, a trade deal is closed a little easier than it would have otherwise) and on the domestic economy in terms of the extra cost (though not much different, as a lot of the costs of Zvezda ITTL would be equivalent to those of Energia IOTL, and are dwarfed by other military spending). In terms of the lives of most people in the East, there will be a bit of a feel-good boost, but it's also a case of the TV vs. the Fridge: not much change to everyday reality. In the US, it will have a motivating impact on Congress to support a more robust response/hit their political opponents with a story of US decline, but that is part of the wider rise of a more adversarial approach to the USSR that came anyway IOTL. So I see the Soviet space achievements ITTL as more of an accelerant to existing trends rather than a push in a new direction (as opposed, for example, to what happedned in Kolyma's Shadow).
European space exploits will get a dedicated post.
Actually, Part 2 has a lot more focus on the US side (including the next post), so don't give up
Part 2 Post 2: What Would Reagan Do?
Post 2: What Would Reagan Do?
"Lovell was mesmerised by space and exploration, and wanted desperately to explore the moon. I was there because it was a battle in the Cold War. I wanted to participate in this American adventure of beating the Soviets. But that's the only thing that motivated me-- beat the damn Russians."
- Frank Borman, NASA Administrator 1981-85
++++++++++++++++++++
Following the election of Ronald Reagan as the 40th President of the United States in November 1980, the incoming administration was faced with some tough choices over the future direction of NASA. Under the previous Carter administration, NASA had not been a high priority, and had been shaped more by initiatives from Congress than from the executive branch.
At the time of the election, NASA’s primary focus was on achieving the first flight of the Space Shuttle, expected to come in 1981, and transitioning that system to regular operations as quickly as possible. Parallel efforts to develop the Shuttle-C cargo lifter and Skylab-B space station were a lower priority, their progress largely dictated by the shifting moods in Congress during the annual budget debates, and plans for their utilisation were correspondingly vague.
Initial plans to keep Skylab permanently crewed had come into question, with NASA having second thoughts over the risk of leaving people on the station between shuttle visits without an immediate means of escape. Proposals for an Apollo-derived “lifeboat” had so far failed to attract the necessary funds, and so missions to Skylab could be limited to the maximum two week endurance of the shuttle orbiter, with the station left uncrewed between visits. This raised questions as to the value of the station, with opponents claiming it offered little benefit over the planned missions with the European Spacelab module. Indeed, there were concerns from ESA that this capability overlap could see Spacelab missions reduced or eliminated in favour of Skylab.
At the same time, there was a growing recognition that the Soviets were pulling ahead in space capabilities. Although the shuttle was (rightly) seen as a far more sophisticated and technologically impressive vehicle than anything being fielded by the Soviets, the achievements of the Zarya military space stations, their heavy Slava support craft, and, most recently, the increasingly ambitious testing of the Zvezda moon-ship, gave rise to a public perception that America was treading water while the Soviets surged ahead. The Zvezda tests raised particular concern, as it was now obvious that the Soviets were developing a lunar capability well beyond that of Apollo. Claims that it didn’t matter as “if you’ve seen one moon landing, you’ve seen them all” rang increasingly hollow as the prospect of a Soviet flag on the Moon drew closer.
This perception of a surrender of American leadership had been played up by the Reagan campaign, but it left the new administration with a dilemma as to how to address the situation. Despite the president-elect’s personal enthusiasm for space, and his stated view that (unlike in many other areas) space was “one of those things that the federal government ought to do”, the Reagan administration’s first priorities were to decrease the national deficit and improve defence preparedness. This meant a massive increase in military spending, balanced by decreases in almost every other area of the federal budget, combined with tax cuts intended to stimulate economic growth. Reagan saw NASA as an important symbol of American leadership, but the Nixon doctrine of NASA as just one agency among many competing for federal dollars still applied.
Reagan’s preferred approach to policy making was to allow all the relevant stakeholders to have their say, then take a decision, preferably by consensus. However, the Soviet challenge brought a new urgency to planning for NASA’s future that accelerated his usual careful, deliberative approach. Even before appointing a new NASA Administrator, Reagan set up an Interagency Working Group to propose a new direction for US space policy going forwards. This group started work in February 1981 and featured representatives from NASA, the Defense Department, State Department, Commerce Department, and Office of Management and Budget. It was impressed upon them that the president wanted a near-term but cost-effective response to the expected imminent Soviet moon landings. Meanwhile, in a joint address to Congress on 28th April that focussed heavily on cutting the federal budget, President Reagan flagged up the need to maintain funding for NASA in response to the Soviet threat. Speaking as the Soviet Zvezda 2 mission was approaching the Moon, Reagan said: “The space program has been and is important to America, and we plan to continue it. We believe that in the face of increasingly aggressive moves in space from our adversaries, a reordering of priorities to focus on the most important NASA programs can ensure continuing American leadership in space in a cost-effective way.” Reflecting this balance of capabilities and economics, Reagan’s FY 1982 budget proposal maintained the $7 billion requested for NASA by the outgoing Carter administration, but shifted spending away from space science programs in favour of crewed spaceflight and Shuttle-C.
Despite this strong support from the top, the initial deliberations of the Interagency Working Group were inconclusive. NASA Acting Administrator Alan Lovelace presented a bold plan for a return to the moon as a stepping stone to Mars, to be supported by a new in-line Shuttle derived heavy launch vehicle twice as capable as Shuttle-C. The DoD representative rejected this blue-sky planning, demanding a focus on ensuring the shuttle was quickly brought into full operations, and in particular that the OV-103 and 104 vehicles authorised the previous year were delivered on-schedule and with the necessary capabilities to support the heaviest military payloads, and ensuring that Shuttle-C would be available as a back-up. Commerce backed DoD’s position, as well as pushing for the privatisation of the legacy expendable launch vehicles and commercial users of the space shuttle and Skylab. Meanwhile, the OMB representative sat and scowled, pointing out that, with inflation in double-digits and a ballooning deficit, now was not the time for an expansive new space initiative. It would hardly promote American leadership if the Soviets could just sit back and watch as the US government bankrupted itself in pursuit of vanity projects.
The discussions gained new direction with the confirmation in May of the new NASA Administrator, former astronaut Frank Borman. Borman had been commander on the Gemini 7 and Apollo 8 missions, and had been MSC Director Robert Gilruth’s first choice to head up the Apollo project in the aftermath of the Apollo 1 fire. Borman had turned down the opportunity, and the job had ultimately gone to George Low, who would later head up Reagan’s NASA transition team following the 1980 election. Borman had gone on to act as a special advisor to the Nixon White House, undertaking a number of missions overseas to liaise with allied space agencies, as well as a tour to garner international support for the release of American PoWs held by North Vietnam. Since 1970 he had been a senior executive, then later Chairman of the Board, at Eastern Airlines, overseeing a return to profitability for the airline. Though somewhat lacking in political experience, Borman’s steady competence, married to the star quality that came from being a former astronaut, made him an attractive choice as the White House sought to promote America’s achievements in space, and Low had been quick to reach out to him after the election. The appointment of Borman was a timely reminder that the United States had been first to the moon, and signalled the nation’s determination to lead once again.
Together with his new Deputy Administrator, Hans Mark, Borman immediately set to work reordering NASA’s priorities to propose a path that aligned with the president’s priorities while ensuring an achievable and safe path forward. Straight away, Borman made two important decisions on the existing NASA programmes: First, that NASA needed a fifth shuttle orbiter to enable it to support the projected flight rate of 24 missions per year while allowing sufficient maintenance time for safe operations; Second, Skylab-B would never be left with crew aboard without there being a return vehicle docked at the station. In other areas, Borman showed a willingness to discuss and compromise, but on these issues, rooted in astronaut safety, he was unwavering.
In response to the Soviet lunar challenge, Borman and Mark pushed for a US return to the moon that would leverage existing capabilities to deliver initial results as quickly and safely as possible, and which could be expanded in the future into a sustainable off-Earth presence. Dropping grandiose schemes for orbital waystations and nuclear ferries, they proposed a two-phase lunar programme based upon the Space Transportation System.
The first phase would see the rapid development of an Apollo-derived capsule that could support a crew of two on the journey to the Moon, and return them to Earth. This capsule, together with an ascent stage using storable propellants, would be launched with its crew aboard a space shuttle orbiter. With the crew in Earth orbit, a Shuttle-C would then bring a hydrogen-oxygen transfer stage and descent stage, which would dock with the ascent/crew stage and boost the whole complex to the moon. Once in lunar orbit, the descent, ascent and crew modules would undock and land on the surface. The astronauts would spend several days on the surface, before using the ascent stage to send them directly back to Earth.
The second phase of the project would expand on the first by adding a cargo module, enabling a single Shuttle-C launch to pre-position 10 tonnes of supplies on the lunar surface. This would support a mission by three astronauts for several weeks on the Moon. Additional cargo launches would enable the gradual establishment of a permanent base on the Moon.
Making use as it did of the new capabilities of STS now coming on-line, while limiting new developments to relatively small capsules and rocket stages that were themselves derivatives of older systems, Borman’s proposal gained support within the Interagency Working Group as a pragmatic response to the Soviet challenge. The DoD liked the fact that the increased use of Shuttle-C meant that the heavy lifter would mature more rapidly and so be more likely to be available for military missions. DoD backed Borman’s call for a fifth shuttle orbiter for similar reasons, with the Departments of Commerce and Transportation also in favour as a way of ensuring that Skylab and lunar missions wouldn’t overly limit opportunities for commercial users of the shuttle. For similar reasons, Commerce backed a proposal to use the new lunar capsule as a lifeboat for Skylab, enabling the station to be permanently crewed. This would provide new opportunities for commercial exploitation of the station, in particular long term experiments in pharmaceutical and metallurgy that could incubate profitable new industries for the eighties.
The main naysayer in the group was, as expected, OMB. Although cheaper than many of the options previously discussed, the new lunar programme would still entail a significant increase in NASA’s budget over the coming years. With the launch of the Zvezda 4 mission coming just as the Working Group was drafting its final recommendations, OMB found it impossible to stand against some sort of effective response, but they nevertheless managed to gain a number of concessions in the final report. These included a recommendation that NASA’s fifth orbiter be a refurbishment of the OV-101 prototype rather than a new-build vehicle, as well as a commitment to reduce or eliminate the subsidies to commercial users of the shuttle by 1985 rather than the then-planned date of 1988. OMB also backed a State Department proposal to invite allied nations to develop systems in support of Skylab and the Phase 2 lunar programme to offset some of the costs to the American taxpayer. Finally, they inserted recommendations for the rapid privatisation of US remote sensing and weather satellites, and of the legacy expendable launch vehicles that STS was slated to replace.
September 1981 saw the triumphant return of the Zvezda 4 crew to Earth, rapidly followed by a near-flawless first mission for the Space Shuttle Columbia. With the Interagency Working Group’s report now delivered, President Reagan attended the landing of Columbia at Edwards Air Force Base and delivered a speech foreshadowing America’s next steps in space.
“The landing of the Columbia is the historical equivalent to the driving of the golden spike which completed the first transcontinental railroad. It marks our entrance into a new era. The space program in general and the shuttle program in particular have gone a long way to help our country recapture its spirit of vitality and confidence. The pioneer spirit still flourishes in America. In the future, as in the past, our freedom, independence, and national well-being will be tied to new achievements, new discoveries, and pushing back new frontiers.
“To ensure that the American people keep reaping the benefits of space and to provide a general direction for our future efforts, we will set new goals for space that are ambitious, yet achievable. They include establishing a more permanent presence in space, both in Earth orbit and on the Moon. The new abilities provided by the space shuttle will enable us to expand American science and commerce further than ever before, building on the legacy of the pioneers of Apollo to ensure a bright future of lunar and space exploration, under a flag of freedom.
“This future will see us continue space activity for economic and scientific benefits, expanding private investment and involvement in space-related activities, promoting international uses of space, cooperating with other nations to maintain the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind, strengthening our own security by exploring new methods of using space as a means of maintaining the peace.
“There are those who thought the closing of the western frontier marked an end to America's greatest period of vitality. And there are those today who see the successes of the Soviet Union in space as proof that America has turned its back on its pioneering history. Yet we're crossing new frontiers every day. The high technology now being developed, much of it a byproduct of the space effort, offers us and future generations of Americans opportunities never dreamed of a few years ago. Today we demonstrate our confidence that the limits of our freedom and prosperity have again been expanded by meeting the challenge of the frontier.”
++++++++++++++++++++
Frank Frederick Borman II (March 14, 1928 – November 7, 2023)
Another wonderful update to A Sound Of Thunder. As much I like Borman (rip), his proposal for phase-two lunar missions seems... insufficient? Sending fewer crew on a more complicated mission seems like a recipe for failure or apathy. If they're looking for a way to upstage the Soviets, this doesn't seem like it'll be it.
Also rather concerned by this passage from the OMB...
Great update though, can't wait for more!
Also rather concerned by this passage from the OMB...
Refurbishing OV-101 for a fifth shuttle? There feels like there should be good reasons to not do this. Does anyone have insights into what this tradeoff might mean?
Great update though, can't wait for more!
Same ones as OTL. Enterprise is heavy (even worse than Columbia) and rapid changes during development mean alot of design elements need to be rebuilt to conform to the final design. It can be done but there are good reasons NASA wriggled out of it OTL.
Oh and @Nixonhead, 24 flights a year is still four or five per bird even if they were all in operation at once (which they won't be). As OTL I assume go fever wil cause something terrible eventually?
This one I'm pretty sure I did check, and 24 flights/year was still the official target as of 1980.
The refit of Enterprise will be expanded on later, but the TL/DR is it will be considerably more expensive than Challenger, but cheaper than a new-build, delivering the least capable orbiter, but still one sufficient for most missions from KSC, freeing the newer orbiters to support more DoD missions.
Well it probably is realistic based on pre Challenger flight rates but like I said, something will happen eventually as the way they were operating was just asking to roll snakeyes sooner or later.
Also I assume the E will end up doing what Columbia did OTL, all the LEO grunt work with things like Spacelab?
The early landings are not much more complicated than the Soviet missions. They simply require two launches (with a minimum demonstrated pad turnaround at LC-39 of 17 days, this means both 39A and 39B will have to be ready, where in OTL 39B wasn't used for the shuttle until STS-51-L) to get the minimum mission, and four to get a better mission. From the text, it feels like a version of the OTL 1993 proposal from General Dynamics called "Early Lunar Access", only with a shuttle-c replacing the improved Titan IV.
Edit: This plan also abides by Akin's 39th Law which states (paraphrased) "No New Launch Vehicles."
So, as noted OV-101 was heavier than the later orbiters, but she was built to the same design as OV-102, and thus would not have been heavier than her sister.
OMB's savings is a bit false because she will need to be taken apart and have her components sent back to the original factories for reconstruction to full flight configuration. This reconstruction does offer a chance at some weight savings, at the cost of time and money. Historically (and in this TL) STA-099 (Challenger) was converted as the second orbiter because there were fewer items to remove before the conversion to orbital flight status could occur. Even with increases in funding, OV-101 is not likely to be ready for flight before about 1986.
Last edited:
There were a number of changes between 101 and 102, notably around the aft fuselage which will probably have to be completely rebuilt. Also while the connections exist literally everything needs installing and the landing gear isn't even powered and will have to be removed and replaced with a proper set.
Also while not an issue right now Enterprise (like Columbia) probably won't be able to reach Russian preferred orbits which will prevent any use on a Shuttle Mir or ISS program later on.
If they don't want to build a new orbiter from scratch maybe they could loan/sell it to ESA, Canada, Britain or Japan? In the sense that the US will pay half the price and use it half a year and subsequently the other partner will shoulder half the cost but use it also half a year? Or enticing them for a Moon landing ticket?
No launch facilities and as Vandenberg proved OTL that's half the issue/cost. If your borrowing a bird that has to use US maintenance systems, US launch pads and can only reach orbits available from the cape it's really not much of an independent capability to be paying billions for...
The plus side of refurbishing Enterprise rather than building Endeavour from the structural spares left over from Discovery and Atlantis is if/when an orbiter is destroyed either from the highly likely foam strike, the less likely SRB seal malfunction or a new and interesting catastrophe, and the Shuttle architecture has the potential for a few of those, there are still those structural spares lying around that could be used to build a replacement orbiter.