A Question on the Competence of Generals

Hello all, over the course of my time lurking on these forums I have noticed a general disdain for certain military figures that appears at the slightest mention of their names. The most prominent (at least post-1900) being Gen. Douglas MacArthur, most remembered for his botching of the defense of the Philippines and bringing the Chinese into the Korean War. But was he really incompetent? Yes, he was a glory-hound and had some major screw ups, but at the rest of the WWII and at least initially in Korea he doesn't seem to do anything as mindbogglingly stupid as the aforementioned actions.

So how competent was he really? And on the subject of competence, what about that of the leaders of the French military in the initial stages of the war and their failure to advance on Germany while it was dealing with Poland and then subsequent loss?
 
but at the rest of the WWII

So splitting the US forces with his Southwestern Pacific campaign wasn't an inefficient use of force?

As much as I feel quite a few have an unjustifiable hatred of MacArthur, he wasn't really that competent in the face of his own ego.


And on the subject of competence, what about that of the leaders of the French military in the initial stages of the war and their failure to advance on Germany while it was dealing with Poland and then subsequent loss?

France was really not in any position to be advancing further than they did.
 
Hello all, over the course of my time lurking on these forums I have noticed a general disdain for certain military figures that appears at the slightest mention of their names. The most prominent (at least post-1900) being Gen. Douglas MacArthur, most remembered for his botching of the defense of the Philippines and bringing the Chinese into the Korean War. But was he really incompetent? Yes, he was a glory-hound and had some major screw ups, but at the rest of the WWII and at least initially in Korea he doesn't seem to do anything as mindbogglingly stupid as the aforementioned actions.

So how competent was he really? And on the subject of competence, what about that of the leaders of the French military in the initial stages of the war and their failure to advance on Germany while it was dealing with Poland and then subsequent loss?

His strategic judgement was horrible. The Phillipines is a case in point: until MacArthur arrived, all US warplans rightly assumed the Philippines were indefensible. It was MacArthur himself who assured his superiors (in the Army - the Navy never believed him for a second) that he could hold and this got a sudden and vast influx of additional resources committed to the islands... resources that were destroyed or captured by the subsequent Japanese assault. From an operational perspective, he was slow and inept in his response to catastrophic changes in the situation both in the Phillipines in the winter of '41/'42 and against the Chinese in 1950. These were the only two times in his career as an operational that things went poorly for him, the rest of the time he tended to have such overwhelming superiority on his side that things tended to go well despite whatever he did, and as the saying goes the true test of a general isn't necessarily when things are going right but when they are going wrong...

Although when things are going right, one can also use that as an indicator of how good or bad a general is and with MacArthur... well, let's take what is undoubtedly his most successful masterstroke: Incheon. The landing was indeed a inspired and gutsy use of resources even if the idea of using the US's overwhelming seapower to land behind the Norks was rather obvious, but MacArthur threw away the possibility of utterly destroying the KPA with his fixation on retaking Seoul.

So splitting the US forces with his Southwestern Pacific campaign wasn't an inefficient use of force?

The Southwestern Pacific Campaign did make some sense, at least in 1942-43. There were valid strategic considerations in play regarding supply lines to Australia and the Guadalcanal campaign did plenty to ruin Japan by chewing up their airgroups, destroyer flotillas, and transport capacity. By '44 it was less so but by then American force was so overwhelming it didn't matter.
 
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He screwed up the defense of the Phillipines to an amazing extent. He grossly failed to prepare the islands for assault and misrepresented his capacity to defend them to Washington, and that was before the war even started. He knew about the strike on Pearl Harbor for many, many hours but completely failed to get his forces on alert, order the preplanned automatic counterstrike on the Formosa airfields that was supposed to happen as soon as word of war breaking out had reached the archipelago, or even get his planes in the air. As a result, his whole air force was destroyed on the ground. He then waffled on the plans, scrapping War Plan Orange and launching a counterattack against the Japanese on the beaches, but he didn't use the elite troops like the 4th Marine Regiment that he had who might have achieved victory, he used poorly-trained Phillipino formations that totally choked. Then he switched back to War Plan Orange again.

In Korea he both badly underestimated the Communists and overestimated his own forces (he figured he still had the U.S. Army that won WWII). which was at least a part of why they got driven so far back. I'll give him credit for Incheon, but then he completely screwed up in assessing the implications of advancing too far north and handling the Chinese intervention when he did.

And then there was the time he fired on the Bonus Marchers during the Great Depression and still other failures, along with his colossal ego. He was at least personally brave and a talented commander at the lower levels but he was just a jerk of incredible proportions.

Dude was a sucking chest wound for the U.S. Army from the minute he made general.
 
France was really not in any position to be advancing further than they did.

Can you expand on this? I know the French had issues with organization and manpower, but they barely advanced 10 miles then retreated after barely more than a week. Surely they could have done something, hell, anything more substantial than that?
 
Can you expand on this? I know the French had issues with organization and manpower, but they barely advanced 10 miles then retreated after barely more than a week. Surely they could have done something, hell, anything more substantial than that?

I don't think they had the logistics to punch a significant hole at the time. They'd probably wind up in danger of getting cut off or something once the Germans finished up in Poland. Their real failures involved the lack of reserves, overmanning the Maginot Line, and their anemic Air Force. Those, at least, could have been addressed sometime before Sedan when they were on the back foot for the rest of the campaign.
 
Guy tried to turn Korea nuclear because he got surprised. As far as I'm concerned, any general whose first instinct is "Nuke the bastards!" isn't fit to be in command of a force anywhere near the launch codes, or in MacArthur's case, the airfields.
 
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