As a corollary to Livy’s account, it is rather noteworthy to mention that a supposed diary from one of the scouts present in Quintodemus on the cold morning of April 13th, 713 AUC, exists and is currently housed in the Imperial Archives, building B, in Lutetia. I have had the privilege of viewing the rather obscure ancient document first-hand during one of my many trips to the Imperial Archives while writing my dissertation at the Academia Nicomedia. I often consulted the archives to help write my dissertation because, as any avid historian knows, the Imperial Archives offer the largest collection of ancient documents anywhere in the world (even more inclusive than the massive collection in the Imperial Chinese Archives located in Beijing).
I digress; the purpose of me stating the aforementioned diary was simply to quote verbatim a supposed first-hand account of the Dacian reaction to Duritista’s execution on that somber April morning. As a historian, I truly hope that the document is authentic and not simply a forgery created by some swindler trying to make quick money. I will state that it is my opinion that the document is in fact real, and that it gives not only the best account of the Dacian reaction on April 13th, but in fact, the only account. Despite the fact that many believe the document to be a fake, forged by the 25th century AUC entrepreneur (and certifiably mentally unstable), Hadrian Otyerius, I believe the evidence as to its authenticity lies in the opposite direction (the carbon dating results, chemical analysis performed on the fabric, etc.). The diary entry (written by an author simply known as The Dacian), taken from page 43, describes the soldier’s emotions and confusion as he gazes across the Ister:
As mentioned before, Caesar entertained Duritista’s prior offers of peace simply to buy the time necessary to prepare a working invasion plan. Caesar understood the consequences of a mistake, or worse a total defeat, of his army at this juncture, and realized the importance of carefully contriving every military maneuver. The general decided on this occasion to leave Marc Antony in charge of formulating a plan for the crossing of the River Ister and the invasion of Dacia. Many historians are aware of Dacia’s enormous wealth (and the ancient Dacian goldmines in particular) and according to Livy, Caesar was all too aware of the intrinsic value of conquering the rich Dacian lands. In addition, Roman scouts sent across the Danube on numerous times before and during the time of Caesar had concluded that Dacian lands were almost perfectly contained between two semi-circular rivers, the Ister and the Tisia. This unique geography made the territory easily defendable and an indispensable staging ground for the future invasion of Germania.
Antony’s ingenious battle plan involved marching a small army to Viminiacium in northwestern Moesia by following the bank of the Ister, allowing the Dacians to see the Roman army just across the river. While marching to Viminiacium, Antony would light at least three times as many fires while camping than was actually needed by the number of men he commanded (estimated by Tobias to be approximately 10,000 men) each night. The second portion of Antony’s plan involved Caesar simultaneously marching a large army to Troesmis in northeastern Moesia. The final part of his invasion scheme involved both armies simultaneously building bridges across the Ister while maintaining the false impression that Antony commanded the much larger force. As a failsafe, Antony also retained a small force to light superfluous camp fires across from Quintodemus as a distraction to the Dacian force across the river.
This method of deception is referred to in modern military terms as the Antonite Method, a now defunct strategy of creating the impression that one’s army is larger than it actually is while maintaining a larger force on the enemy’s flank, and utilizing a surprise attack to defeat the enemy’s main force. The most infamous historical instance of its use for most Romans (though it has been used countless times throughout the Empire’s history since Antony’s magnificent deception of Comosicus) is Bartolomaeus Proditor’s use of the strategy at Geruivuseum in 2254 AUC, the battle that effectively ended the Empire’s struggle to defeat the rebellion during the Agnetian Revolution.
I digress; the purpose of me stating the aforementioned diary was simply to quote verbatim a supposed first-hand account of the Dacian reaction to Duritista’s execution on that somber April morning. As a historian, I truly hope that the document is authentic and not simply a forgery created by some swindler trying to make quick money. I will state that it is my opinion that the document is in fact real, and that it gives not only the best account of the Dacian reaction on April 13th, but in fact, the only account. Despite the fact that many believe the document to be a fake, forged by the 25th century AUC entrepreneur (and certifiably mentally unstable), Hadrian Otyerius, I believe the evidence as to its authenticity lies in the opposite direction (the carbon dating results, chemical analysis performed on the fabric, etc.). The diary entry (written by an author simply known as The Dacian), taken from page 43, describes the soldier’s emotions and confusion as he gazes across the Ister:
“I was aghast as a spied the Roman camp, merely 200 paces directly to my left across the River, and saw him. His body was limp, drooping from that vile cross, white as a ghost and as dead as any soldier I have ever seen on the battlefield. My first thought was to cry out to my comrades and make them aware of the Roman deceit. Instead I woke my brother, Avartus, and quickly divulged the information to him, perhaps just to get the horrible image out of my head, or maybe just to share the burden with someone else. Either way, he awoke and, looking out across the River, turned pale as a ghost. He promptly climbed down the ladder to the tent below and informed our commander, Vertuderus, of the situation. He immediately called a meeting of his subordinates and they disappeared inside the commander’s tent. The next day we were told to prepare for the worse and pray to the gods and the River, in the vain hope that perhaps they would stop the inevitable Roman invasion.”
As mentioned before, Caesar entertained Duritista’s prior offers of peace simply to buy the time necessary to prepare a working invasion plan. Caesar understood the consequences of a mistake, or worse a total defeat, of his army at this juncture, and realized the importance of carefully contriving every military maneuver. The general decided on this occasion to leave Marc Antony in charge of formulating a plan for the crossing of the River Ister and the invasion of Dacia. Many historians are aware of Dacia’s enormous wealth (and the ancient Dacian goldmines in particular) and according to Livy, Caesar was all too aware of the intrinsic value of conquering the rich Dacian lands. In addition, Roman scouts sent across the Danube on numerous times before and during the time of Caesar had concluded that Dacian lands were almost perfectly contained between two semi-circular rivers, the Ister and the Tisia. This unique geography made the territory easily defendable and an indispensable staging ground for the future invasion of Germania.
Antony’s ingenious battle plan involved marching a small army to Viminiacium in northwestern Moesia by following the bank of the Ister, allowing the Dacians to see the Roman army just across the river. While marching to Viminiacium, Antony would light at least three times as many fires while camping than was actually needed by the number of men he commanded (estimated by Tobias to be approximately 10,000 men) each night. The second portion of Antony’s plan involved Caesar simultaneously marching a large army to Troesmis in northeastern Moesia. The final part of his invasion scheme involved both armies simultaneously building bridges across the Ister while maintaining the false impression that Antony commanded the much larger force. As a failsafe, Antony also retained a small force to light superfluous camp fires across from Quintodemus as a distraction to the Dacian force across the river.
This method of deception is referred to in modern military terms as the Antonite Method, a now defunct strategy of creating the impression that one’s army is larger than it actually is while maintaining a larger force on the enemy’s flank, and utilizing a surprise attack to defeat the enemy’s main force. The most infamous historical instance of its use for most Romans (though it has been used countless times throughout the Empire’s history since Antony’s magnificent deception of Comosicus) is Bartolomaeus Proditor’s use of the strategy at Geruivuseum in 2254 AUC, the battle that effectively ended the Empire’s struggle to defeat the rebellion during the Agnetian Revolution.
