Chapter 1, Battle of Porto Praya
Chapter 1, The Battle of Porto Praya
Suffren’s Shadow: A History of the Naval War in the Indian Ocean, 1777-1783
The Battle of Porto Praya, for all of its diminutive size compared to other great naval battles of the American Revolution, compared to First Ushant, the Chesapeake, Grenada, the Saintes, Kokilai, has entered into the annals of history on the basis of the first of the independent victories of the great admiral the Bailli de Suffren, whose victories in the Indian Ocean were of such vital remit to the progress of the great war between England, France, and its allies. Victory at Porto Praya was decisive in forging the constellation of forces, men, and commanders who fought France’s war in the east to its conclusion.
If it is marked by historical import, Porto Praya is also known for its confused, chaotic fighting, a sign of the end of the era of classical, indecisive naval battles of the 18th century, prevalent since the end of the Nine Years’ War at the very least. Instead of stately and careful action, defined by limited losses and lines of battle, Porto Praya was a sign of the change of times - where the French fleet, like the British one as well, instead chose audacious and daring attacks, risking defeat for the greater prize of total victory and glory. Certainly, it was a transitional period of Suffren’s campaign, where his captains failed to all understand the new rules of aggression and offense, but Suffren’s blow would have important consequences nevertheless.
On the 16th of April, 1781, a French fleet of 5 ships of the line as well as accompanying lighter ships and a number of transports, under the command of the French admiral Bailli de Suffren, hove into view of the Portuguese port of Porto Praya, in the Azores. They had been tasked, in the context of the American Revolution and the British attack on the Dutch Republic, with reinforcing Dutch positions against possible British invasion in the Dutch Cape Colony, and bolstering French naval power in India. On their route, at Porto Praya, they wished to take on water and resupply. The forwardmost French ship, Artésien, spotted a fleet at anchor, which Suffren soon realized was British. Disregarding Portuguese neutrality, Suffren made the decision to attack, placing his own ship Héros in the front of the line.
The British fleet, which the French had correctly identified as 5 sails of line, was under the command of the British admiral George Johnstone. Just like the French fleet, it was resupplying and taking on water in the port, with a noticeably less powerful composition than the French - 1 74, 2 64s, and 2 50s, as compared to 2 74s and 3 64s on the French side, with the British accompanied by 3 frigates, a bomb vessel, and a substantially larger contingent of merchant ships, 37 in all, carrying supplies and 2,000 soldiers for service in India. Johnstone, despite having been provided decent and accurate intelligence on the movement and size of Suffren’s fleet, had failed to take any security precautions for his ships, with 1,500 men ashore, no patrols, and his flagship encumbered by surrounding vessels, leaving it hors combat until the chaos in the anchorage could be overcome. Not only this, but when Hero, the ship he was on, spotted the French fleet, he would waste further valuable time by rowing over to Hero from Romney, an ill-fated change of flag, then ordering his ships to weigh, rather than slip, anchors. The British fleet was badly positioned, crews still scattered, surprised, vessels preparing for combat, and with a French fleet bearing down on them. The state was set for battle, as the sails of Suffren’s ships bore closer, prows scything up and down through the waves.
Suffren’s ship Héros was the first to engage, firing two volleys as it passed along the line before the wind and currents carried it forward to anchor next to the ironically named British counterpart, Hero. Following it came the rest of the French ships in the line, with Annibal right behind - which astonishingly had neglected to clear for action but nevertheless gamely swung into battle, followed by Artésien, whose captain Chevalier de Cardaillac narrowly avoided being decapitated by a grapeshot round which whizzed past his shoulder,* and not so successfully by Vengeur and Sphinx, the captains of both of which engaged at long range in passing through the bay and then drifted off, carried by the currents. Both captains apparently could not believe that Suffren really would violate Portuguese neutrality in such a way. They failed to achieve much of note against the British merchant ships which they claimed their objectives were, and in fact received some degree of punishment back from the aroused Indiamen.
Meanwhile, a furious fusillade ensued. Although in the main fight the British had 4 ships to the French 3, they were hampered by much of their crews being ashore, and the narrow and crowded confines of the anchorage leading to a great deal of friendly fire being sustained by the Royal Navy ships. Artésien engaged Romney, which was restricted by the frigate Jason immediately to her stern, without Romney being able to fire back, and the demoralizing, brutal, close range fire caused Romney to strike her colors and in the process capturing the British admiral Johnstone. Hero, Monmouth, and Jupiter continued to engage the French ships Héros and Annibal, but Artésien swung back south and east, tacking behind Monmouth, and forcing her too to strike its colors.
As the British vessels faced the tide of battle turning against them, the battleships Hero and Jupiter cut their cables and fled for the sea, leaving Isis alone. In the ensuing melee, Isis put up a dramatic fight, but was encumbered by the surrounding supply and logistics ships, one of which - the Lord Townsend - caught fire, which spread to Isis, burning her to the waterline before her magazine went off in a catastrophic explosion. The conflagration destroyed both the Isis and vengefully smote the culprit of the fire, the Lord Townsend. The British frigates Apollo, Active, and Diana, swift footed, escaped to open sea, but the frigate Jason was captured, and in the mopping up operations afterwards the French captured 22 of the transport ships, many of them East Indiamen, and the bomb ship Terror and fireship Infernal.
Thankfully for the British, the 98th and 100th infantry regiments were mostly ashore, saving them from capture, but leaving them and around a thousand sailors stranded in Portuguese territory - and completely hors combat. The British menace to Cape Town had been completely eliminated, and in half a day of combat, Suffren had inflicted one of the harshest defeats that the Royal Navy had known in nearly half a century, since Cartagena in 1741. Worse, it had been in a style that had long been that which the Royal Navy had assumed was its own exclusive trade: the aggressive attack on an anchored enemy fleet, bold, dashing, risky, and contemptuous of international law. The French left behind them a bay covered with pieces of shattered, drifting ships, blackened burns of powder smoke, bodies washing up on the azure waves upon the grey beaches of the island, as if even the sand wept for the men whose crimson red stained the shores. It had been a remarkably quick and brutal affair.
Porto Praya had significant effects on the balance of power in the South Atlantic, and to some extent the coming India Campaign. The loss of 2 ships of the line (the Romney and Monmouth) captured by the French, and a third, the Isis, destroyed, with 2 more forced to sail battered and bruised for the high seas, as well as a major blow to the British merchant marine and the at-least temporary loss of thousands of soldiers headed for India was a bruising blow to British pride and warmaking capabilities. Furthermore it meant that the British would not only be unable to contemplate attacking the Dutch Cape Colony as originally intended, but without additional reinforcements would be heavily outnumbered in the coming India campaign. It also landed the British government the humiliation of having to repatriate thousands of stranded soldiers and sailors, and even Admiral Johnstone, from the Azores. Markets in Britain reacted badly to the second major loss of a convoy in as many years, after the catastrophic commercial losses of the Action of August 9, 1780 less than a year prior, when a Spanish fleet had captured a major British trade convoy.
Suffren’s victory could have been even greater if it wasn’t for the captains of Sphynx and Vengeur, who had failed to enter the fray. But the most important part, perhaps even more than the actual tactical outcome of the battle, was the increased confidence, trust, and esprit de corps which began to be built among Suffren and the captains who did attack. Suffren, the great fighter, aggressive tactician, the brilliant thinker, friend of his sailors, lacked the strengths of preparing the training needed for his commanders to carry out his ideas, and precisely and clearly outlining his ideas in battle. Suffren needed a group of men who thought like him, who would act according to his ideas and principles, who would understand his intent - and yet Suffren, who adored shocking his captains, was not the man to do so. Only in the school of battle, in the school of victory of Porto Praya, could the beginning of an understanding which would overcome this be forged - for victory would be the balm of injured sensibilities and would give the respect and confidence which would enable triumph. Porto Praya would begin the long process of shaping the captains of the battle into the sword that Suffren would wield throughout India, to cut his path to destiny.
*This is the POD. OTL, Chevalier de Cardaillac was hit and killed, causing Artésien to fall out of line. Here, Artésien stays in line and gives the French the extra ship they need to win the battle.
Suffren’s Shadow: A History of the Naval War in the Indian Ocean, 1777-1783
The Battle of Porto Praya, for all of its diminutive size compared to other great naval battles of the American Revolution, compared to First Ushant, the Chesapeake, Grenada, the Saintes, Kokilai, has entered into the annals of history on the basis of the first of the independent victories of the great admiral the Bailli de Suffren, whose victories in the Indian Ocean were of such vital remit to the progress of the great war between England, France, and its allies. Victory at Porto Praya was decisive in forging the constellation of forces, men, and commanders who fought France’s war in the east to its conclusion.
If it is marked by historical import, Porto Praya is also known for its confused, chaotic fighting, a sign of the end of the era of classical, indecisive naval battles of the 18th century, prevalent since the end of the Nine Years’ War at the very least. Instead of stately and careful action, defined by limited losses and lines of battle, Porto Praya was a sign of the change of times - where the French fleet, like the British one as well, instead chose audacious and daring attacks, risking defeat for the greater prize of total victory and glory. Certainly, it was a transitional period of Suffren’s campaign, where his captains failed to all understand the new rules of aggression and offense, but Suffren’s blow would have important consequences nevertheless.
On the 16th of April, 1781, a French fleet of 5 ships of the line as well as accompanying lighter ships and a number of transports, under the command of the French admiral Bailli de Suffren, hove into view of the Portuguese port of Porto Praya, in the Azores. They had been tasked, in the context of the American Revolution and the British attack on the Dutch Republic, with reinforcing Dutch positions against possible British invasion in the Dutch Cape Colony, and bolstering French naval power in India. On their route, at Porto Praya, they wished to take on water and resupply. The forwardmost French ship, Artésien, spotted a fleet at anchor, which Suffren soon realized was British. Disregarding Portuguese neutrality, Suffren made the decision to attack, placing his own ship Héros in the front of the line.
The British fleet, which the French had correctly identified as 5 sails of line, was under the command of the British admiral George Johnstone. Just like the French fleet, it was resupplying and taking on water in the port, with a noticeably less powerful composition than the French - 1 74, 2 64s, and 2 50s, as compared to 2 74s and 3 64s on the French side, with the British accompanied by 3 frigates, a bomb vessel, and a substantially larger contingent of merchant ships, 37 in all, carrying supplies and 2,000 soldiers for service in India. Johnstone, despite having been provided decent and accurate intelligence on the movement and size of Suffren’s fleet, had failed to take any security precautions for his ships, with 1,500 men ashore, no patrols, and his flagship encumbered by surrounding vessels, leaving it hors combat until the chaos in the anchorage could be overcome. Not only this, but when Hero, the ship he was on, spotted the French fleet, he would waste further valuable time by rowing over to Hero from Romney, an ill-fated change of flag, then ordering his ships to weigh, rather than slip, anchors. The British fleet was badly positioned, crews still scattered, surprised, vessels preparing for combat, and with a French fleet bearing down on them. The state was set for battle, as the sails of Suffren’s ships bore closer, prows scything up and down through the waves.
Suffren’s ship Héros was the first to engage, firing two volleys as it passed along the line before the wind and currents carried it forward to anchor next to the ironically named British counterpart, Hero. Following it came the rest of the French ships in the line, with Annibal right behind - which astonishingly had neglected to clear for action but nevertheless gamely swung into battle, followed by Artésien, whose captain Chevalier de Cardaillac narrowly avoided being decapitated by a grapeshot round which whizzed past his shoulder,* and not so successfully by Vengeur and Sphinx, the captains of both of which engaged at long range in passing through the bay and then drifted off, carried by the currents. Both captains apparently could not believe that Suffren really would violate Portuguese neutrality in such a way. They failed to achieve much of note against the British merchant ships which they claimed their objectives were, and in fact received some degree of punishment back from the aroused Indiamen.
Meanwhile, a furious fusillade ensued. Although in the main fight the British had 4 ships to the French 3, they were hampered by much of their crews being ashore, and the narrow and crowded confines of the anchorage leading to a great deal of friendly fire being sustained by the Royal Navy ships. Artésien engaged Romney, which was restricted by the frigate Jason immediately to her stern, without Romney being able to fire back, and the demoralizing, brutal, close range fire caused Romney to strike her colors and in the process capturing the British admiral Johnstone. Hero, Monmouth, and Jupiter continued to engage the French ships Héros and Annibal, but Artésien swung back south and east, tacking behind Monmouth, and forcing her too to strike its colors.
As the British vessels faced the tide of battle turning against them, the battleships Hero and Jupiter cut their cables and fled for the sea, leaving Isis alone. In the ensuing melee, Isis put up a dramatic fight, but was encumbered by the surrounding supply and logistics ships, one of which - the Lord Townsend - caught fire, which spread to Isis, burning her to the waterline before her magazine went off in a catastrophic explosion. The conflagration destroyed both the Isis and vengefully smote the culprit of the fire, the Lord Townsend. The British frigates Apollo, Active, and Diana, swift footed, escaped to open sea, but the frigate Jason was captured, and in the mopping up operations afterwards the French captured 22 of the transport ships, many of them East Indiamen, and the bomb ship Terror and fireship Infernal.
Thankfully for the British, the 98th and 100th infantry regiments were mostly ashore, saving them from capture, but leaving them and around a thousand sailors stranded in Portuguese territory - and completely hors combat. The British menace to Cape Town had been completely eliminated, and in half a day of combat, Suffren had inflicted one of the harshest defeats that the Royal Navy had known in nearly half a century, since Cartagena in 1741. Worse, it had been in a style that had long been that which the Royal Navy had assumed was its own exclusive trade: the aggressive attack on an anchored enemy fleet, bold, dashing, risky, and contemptuous of international law. The French left behind them a bay covered with pieces of shattered, drifting ships, blackened burns of powder smoke, bodies washing up on the azure waves upon the grey beaches of the island, as if even the sand wept for the men whose crimson red stained the shores. It had been a remarkably quick and brutal affair.
Porto Praya had significant effects on the balance of power in the South Atlantic, and to some extent the coming India Campaign. The loss of 2 ships of the line (the Romney and Monmouth) captured by the French, and a third, the Isis, destroyed, with 2 more forced to sail battered and bruised for the high seas, as well as a major blow to the British merchant marine and the at-least temporary loss of thousands of soldiers headed for India was a bruising blow to British pride and warmaking capabilities. Furthermore it meant that the British would not only be unable to contemplate attacking the Dutch Cape Colony as originally intended, but without additional reinforcements would be heavily outnumbered in the coming India campaign. It also landed the British government the humiliation of having to repatriate thousands of stranded soldiers and sailors, and even Admiral Johnstone, from the Azores. Markets in Britain reacted badly to the second major loss of a convoy in as many years, after the catastrophic commercial losses of the Action of August 9, 1780 less than a year prior, when a Spanish fleet had captured a major British trade convoy.
Suffren’s victory could have been even greater if it wasn’t for the captains of Sphynx and Vengeur, who had failed to enter the fray. But the most important part, perhaps even more than the actual tactical outcome of the battle, was the increased confidence, trust, and esprit de corps which began to be built among Suffren and the captains who did attack. Suffren, the great fighter, aggressive tactician, the brilliant thinker, friend of his sailors, lacked the strengths of preparing the training needed for his commanders to carry out his ideas, and precisely and clearly outlining his ideas in battle. Suffren needed a group of men who thought like him, who would act according to his ideas and principles, who would understand his intent - and yet Suffren, who adored shocking his captains, was not the man to do so. Only in the school of battle, in the school of victory of Porto Praya, could the beginning of an understanding which would overcome this be forged - for victory would be the balm of injured sensibilities and would give the respect and confidence which would enable triumph. Porto Praya would begin the long process of shaping the captains of the battle into the sword that Suffren would wield throughout India, to cut his path to destiny.
*This is the POD. OTL, Chevalier de Cardaillac was hit and killed, causing Artésien to fall out of line. Here, Artésien stays in line and gives the French the extra ship they need to win the battle.