A MARKET-GARDEN alternative: plausibility check

[alspug]

The number one problem with Arhnem was that the road leading to it was literally the only firm ground, both sides of the road would cause tanks to get bogged. IE the allied advance was restriced to a single line that never allowed sufficent mass to be focused to punch the flanks of defensive positions.

Pre-war the Dutch used the area as an Officer training exercise and failed any attempt to advance up the road due to the very nature of the side terrain.

Antwerp was useless as a port until Walchern was taken. Thus it never did what was required. The operation could only be considered a success if it took Arnhem bridge. It failed. thus the operation was a failure.

 

[Aber]

So you're basing your entire premise on a letter Tedder wrote after the meeting . . . . but not based on any of the minutes of said meeting?

What minutes?

There was no note-taker at the September 10th meeting, nor at most of the important Eisenhower-Montgomery meetings which were 1-1 in Montgomery's caravan. Historians have spent a lot of time and effort trying to piece together what actually happened based on the follow-up letters, and comments made to insiders at the time. The recollections of Eisenhower and Montgomery themselves often many years after have to be taken with a pinch (or more) of salt.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Timing is everything, between D-day and Market Garden there were numerous plans for airborne drops that were either overtaken by events or considered unnecessary for other reasons. I am not sure if there was such a scheme for clearing the Shelde estuary. With the speed of the advance on Antwerp I have always wondered what effect dropping the 6th airborne in a single lift on to Walcheren Islandand South Beveland to seize and isolate them. Holding the bridges and causeways to Woensdrecht'
Two objectives here. One close the Breskens-Vissingem route of escape for the German forces that will be caught in the Breskens Ppcket and secondly take the island defence from the rear so that the costal batteries can be cleared so that over the beach reinforcements can be landed around Domburg .
As I understand it Around the time that Antwerp was seized the situation on Walcheren was complete chaos and the defences in disarray, that is in fact the case then that chaos is what the Airborne are there to exploit. Holding the Island s and trapping far more German troops in the Brecken's pocket could well make it far harder to hold that om OTL . Hence the Scheldt estuary might well be cleared a month of more earlier thereby easing the logistics for the attack on the Rhine.

 

[Aber]

With the speed of the advance on Antwerp I have always wondered what effect dropping the 6th airborne in a single lift on to Walcheren Islandand South Beveland to seize and isolate them. Holding the bridges and causeways to Woensdrecht'

Brereton and FAAA rejected airborne involvement multiple times:

I refused [Walcheren] because of intense flak on Walcheren, difficult terrain that would prevent glider landings, excessive losses likely because of drowning, non-availability of US troops, and the fact that the operation is an improper use of airborne forces.

6th Airborne were not available before 1 October, as they were refitting after being involved in combat up to the Seine crossing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6th_Airborne_Division_advance_to_the_River_Seine

Walcheren is a fascinating target as there is no easy way to take it, and the one they chose (sink the island) is almost unbelievable.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

What minutes?

There was no note-taker at the September 10th meeting, nor at most of the important Eisenhower-Montgomery meetings which were 1-1 in Montgomery's caravan. Historians have spent a lot of time and effort trying to piece together what actually happened based on the follow-up letters, and comments made to insiders at the time. The recollections of Eisenhower and Montgomery themselves often many years after have to be taken with a pinch (or more) of salt.

Exactly you dumb fuck!!!!, . . . that's what I've been trying to get into that thick skull of yours!

How can you base anything without any minutes being taken?, Basing your assumptions on letters written by Tedder after the fact is no more 'fact' than Ike's or Monty's months even years later.

It's like a Police Officer interviewing a suspect, then writing the suspects words half hour after the interview has ended!

Now you're either being

A)Accidentally being an ignorant cunt?
B)Deliberately being a ignorant cunt?
C)Both?

Which one is it?

 

[CalBear]

Exactly you dumb fuck!!!!, . . . that's what I've been trying to get into that thick skull of yours!

How can you base anything without any minutes being taken?, Basing your assumptions on letters written by Tedder after the fact is no more 'fact' than Ike's or Monty's months even years later.

It's like a Police Officer interviewing a suspect, then writing the suspects words half hour after the interview has ended!

Now you're either being

A)Accidentally being an ignorant cunt?
B)Deliberately being a ignorant cunt?
C)Both?

Which one is it?

Sometimes Mod Decisions can actually be easy

Kicked for a week.

 

[prester.john208]

How can you base anything without any minutes being taken?, Basing your assumptions on letters written by Tedder after the fact is no more 'fact' than Ike's or Monty's months even years later.

It's like a Police Officer interviewing a suspect, then writing the suspects words half hour after the interview has ended!

Lee Harvy Oswald and the Dallas PD say hi.
National Archives
""
As discussed in chapters IV and V, Lee Harvey Oswald was interrogated for a total of approximately 12 hours between 2:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, and 11:15 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1963. There were no stenographic or tape recordings of these interviews.
""