A MARKET-GARDEN alternative: plausibility check

[Gannt the chartist]

The burden on the Canadian Army to capture various fortress ports and then also clear the Scheldt was quite heavy and might have been somewhat alleviated had the 2nd BR Army taken over more of the subsequent objectives.

Not really feasible. The Germans have very large numbers of troops in South Beverland, Walcheren, and then back into Holland. The Forces guarding the Pas de Calais the allies have bypassed in the last week fall back that way/ There are several attempts to say cross the Albert Canal and isolate Walcheren but don't get far. If Br 2nd does reorientant earlier what does it not cover? Bradley is already overstretched, 9th army has been failing to take Brest for weeks, Whatever Devers does its with one small US army and a French one which will get bigger, much bigger now but needs time to train.

The Only offensive solution is to stop everyone else, give the resources to a single point so it can get supplied and move the troops it has left behind forward to keep the offensive going. Or pause until everything has caught up.

Bear in mind if I want a case of canned peaches delivered to the front the allocation of shipping to carry that had to made around D day so its ready to sail 6 weeks ago. And now you want to feed Paris and Brussels and Antwerp.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Not really feasible. The Germans have very large numbers of troops in South Beverland, Walcheren, and then back into Holland. The Forces guarding the Pas de Calais the allies have bypassed in the last week fall back that way/ There are several attempts to say cross the Albert Canal and isolate Walcheren but don't get far. If Br 2nd does reorientant earlier what does it not cover? Bradley is already overstretched, 9th army has been failing to take Brest for weeks, Whatever Devers does its with one small US army and a French one which will get bigger, much bigger now but needs time to train.

The Only offensive solution is to stop everyone else, give the resources to a single point so it can get supplied and move the troops it has left behind forward to keep the offensive going. Or pause until everything has caught up.

Bear in mind if I want a case of canned peaches delivered to the front the allocation of shipping to carry that had to made around D day so its ready to sail 6 weeks ago. And now you want to feed Paris and Brussels and Antwerp.

The supply situation is what it is - the Allies a victim of their own success in that regards - nothing can change that.

All I am suggesting is formalising what actually happened in that Antwerp which was in the CAN1 slice formally becomes part of the BR2 Slice - so this to your point about forward planning things - this is my point - by formalising the Army lines of responsibility the BR2 commanders can more clearly plan future ops in that region.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

But they would have to be doing that about 2 weeks after D Day. On 21 August the Falaise pocket is over. By 7 September the Canadians have invested Le Havre then Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk - 7 Sept then on to Ostend. Look up Operations Astonia Wellhit, Undergo and the Siege of Dunkirk. Ostend is the personnel access for 21 Army Group, Boulogne only falls on 22 September becomes the terminus for Pluto.

Antwerp is never on the cards as a priority objective until after Market Garden, The allied planning cannot require it as they have no idea it will be taken until its taken and every reason to believe the port will be wrecked. Its only because of the Belgian resistance and a single Bn of the KOSLI managing to defeat 10x their number of fanatical germans dug in in the City Centre before opening time that Antwerp is taken at all. Between 1 and about 10 September 21 AG are winging it for as long as they can ( so is 3rd army) with individual divisions exploiting the situation as fast and far as they can while building their supply net along the Channel coast per plan. Both the Dempsey and later SHAEF plans for Market Garden have to be seen in that context. The German army in France is routed and fleeing at some point it may/will stop and reorganise, noone knows if, when or where. And in context having a basically an army sized formation in South Beverland is not a major problem. Until then its pursuit and risks are worth taking. For all that is known it will disintegrate and ask for an armistice, it did last time.

Taking a left fork into Holland does nothing to keep up the skeer.

Once you stop, the likelihood increases that the Germans will recover. So any high risk operation becomes less and less likely, SHAEF is against it all 25,000 of them as they are looking at the broad front, with good reasons and above them guys need shipping for the Philippines in December and its not like ships grow on trees and wherever you go its now flooded, forested and winter. Also mountains and the westwall.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

But they would have to be doing that about 2 weeks after D Day. On 21 August the Falaise pocket is over. By 7 September the Canadians have invested Le Havre then Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk - 7 Sept then on to Ostend. Look up Operations Astonia Wellhit, Undergo and the Siege of Dunkirk. Ostend is the personnel access for 21 Army Group, Boulogne only falls on 22 September becomes the terminus for Pluto.

Antwerp is never on the cards as a priority objective until after Market Garden, The allied planning cannot require it as they have no idea it will be taken until its taken and every reason to believe the port will be wrecked. Its only because of the Belgian resistance and a single Bn of the KOSLI managing to defeat 10x their number of fanatical germans dug in in the City Centre before opening time that Antwerp is taken at all. Between 1 and about 10 September 21 AG are winging it for as long as they can ( so is 3rd army) with individual divisions exploiting the situation as fast and far as they can while building their supply net along the Channel coast per plan. Both the Dempsey and later SHAEF plans for Market Garden have to be seen in that context. The German army in France is routed and fleeing at some point it may/will stop and reorganise, noone knows if, when or where. And in context having a basically an army sized formation in South Beverland is not a major problem. Until then its pursuit and risks are worth taking. For all that is known it will disintegrate and ask for an armistice, it did last time.

Taking a left fork into Holland does nothing to keep up the skeer.

Once you stop, the likelihood increases that the Germans will recover. So any high risk operation becomes less and less likely, SHAEF is against it all 25,000 of them as they are looking at the broad front, with good reasons and above them guys need shipping for the Philippines in December and its not like ships grow on trees and wherever you go its now flooded, forested and winter. Also mountains and the westwall.

We broadly agree

I am happy with a change in boundaries after MG (assuming it fails) and once the clearing of the Scheldt becomes the responsibility of 1st CAN along with their other responsibilities that is when the boundaries should change as it was fairly clear that 1 CAN did not have the manpower - which Monty admits too after the event.

If not boundary changes then give 1 CAN more forces perhaps at the expense of 2nd BR.

Or not and let the poor SOBs slug it out as OTL?

 

[Sasza]

Supply is still a problem. Unless the Dunkirk garrison withdrew on its own if such a possibility arose from their perspective.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

On the game boards the 'Holland Gambit' can be sprung on a unwary German player, but it realistically does not take much to boost the defenses and make it a non starter. Generally its better for the Allied player to focus on getting the Scheldt and Antwerp open. Using the fuel to propel the Canadian Army north to the Scheldt is one aspect. The airborne operations seize the main ferry crossing on both sides of the Scheldt, the small airfield on Beveland, the neck connecting the Beveland to the mainland, and a couple other key locations. Unlike the SS and several other key formations further east the 15th Army was composed of a high portion of third rate units, and morale was low. If this AB operations is run early enough, between the 4th and 10th September a large portion of the 15th Army will still be south of the Scheldt and crowded in columns on a flat featureless coastal plain. Seeing a mass of paras dropped ahead cutting off the Scheldt crossings/retreat route just might trigger another 15, 20, or 50 thousand PoW as occurred in Falaise, the Mons Pocket, or when the Dijon retreat route was closed.

One technical problem with a late autumn amphibious operation is the remaining US and Common wealth units in the UK had negligible training in amphibious ops. The US Army ceased even pro forma amphibious training in the latter half of 1943. They kept recycling the same trained & experienced formations through each seaborne invasion. So, if there is to be a large scale landing to seize Rotterdam, Amsterdam, etc... either experienced units will have to be withdrawn from France & Belgium & given a brief refresher rehearsal, or the Green units given a 4-6 weeks crash course in how to get on and off boats.

 

[Aber]

We broadly agree

One little wrinkle on boundaries; if Brussels is allocated to the US, then 2nd Army can probably get an armoured division across the Albert Canal and block off South Beveland. This does not open the Scheldt faster but may offer better flank protection to Market Garden.

 

[MrHappy]

I’m curious about the landings around Hague. Would the waters there be mined?

I don't know if the Nazis mined the waters but they did tear down Dutch neighborhoods to build a 15 km long, 500 m wide defensive zone, with a massive anti-tank ditch, right through The Hague parallel to the landing beaches. Hit the embedded link to better view the attached aerial reccon photo.

 

[Aber]

You're quoting from Ryan's book who IIRC reports this as Eisenhower's comment to Montgomery at the Brussels airport meeting.

Are you saying that Ryan lied, made mistakes etc as he was a very respected biographer, well respected and like by the members of the military etc who he used in his novels?

No

Here's Ryan's source notes of his interview with Eisenhower see page 35
https://media.library.ohio.edu/digital/collection/p15808coll15/id/2229

It's likely Eisenhower "remembering to his advantage", as this was well after the war. EDIT: early 60s IIRC

There's evidence that SHAEF thought Montgomery wanted to go to Berlin, based on one of Montgomery's telegrams about getting to Berlin to end the war. In reality it reads as more of a throwaway remark to remind SHAEF about the ultimate aim of the campaign, and Tedder's (no friend of Montgomery) account of the 10th September meeting does not really match the Eisenhower quote.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Are you saying that Ryan lied, made mistakes etc as he was a very respected biographer, well respected and like by the members of the military etc who he used in his novels?

Everybody is fallible. Cornelius Ryan may have been good, but that doesn't make him god.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

No

Here's Ryan's source notes of his interview with Eisenhower see page 35
https://media.library.ohio.edu/digital/collection/p15808coll15/id/2229

It's likely Eisenhower "remembering to his advantage", as this was well after the war. EDIT: early 60s IIRC

There's evidence that SHAEF thought Montgomery wanted to go to Berlin, based on one of Montgomery's telegrams about getting to Berlin to end the war. In reality it reads as more of a throwaway remark to remind SHAEF about the ultimate aim of the campaign, and Tedder's (no friend of Montgomery) account of the 10th September meeting does not really match the Eisenhower quote.

Thus proving you're contradicting yourself.

On the one hand you say Ike "remembering to his advantage" but ignore the fact that others will likely do otherwise such as Monty, Tedder etc.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

Everybody is fallible. Cornelius Ryan may have been good, but that doesn't make him god.

I never stated that he was infallible did I.

Interviewing someone whose memories might be corrupted by the length of time passed or by their own bias doesn't make him fallible, that's why any good author/biographer will cite multiple references and people asked.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

One little wrinkle on boundaries; if Brussels is allocated to the US, then 2nd Army can probably get an armoured division across the Albert Canal and block off South Beveland. This does not open the Scheldt faster but may offer better flank protection to Market Garden.

The need for assault troops to attack the main Island meant that the final clearing of the Scheldt could not take place much before it did.

However with a boundary change we might see BR2 forces cut off South Beveland earlier - allowing for the subsequant operation to clear it to be slightly 'less hard'?

 

[Aber]

Thus proving you're contradicting yourself.

On the one hand you say Ike "remembering to his advantage" but ignore the fact that others will likely do otherwise such as Monty, Tedder etc.

Montgomery would certainly remember to his advantage, but Tedder's quote is from a letter he wrote to Portal immediately after the meeting, and the closest we have to a contemporaneous note; far more reliable than an interview 15+ years later where Eisenhower is struggling to remember Patton's name.

 

[steel_captain]

Market-Garden was simply for Montgomery to glorify himself after his dismal performance at Caen and Eisenhower should never have greenlighted it instead demanding that Monty get off his ass and clear the Scheldt Estuary so Antwerp can be used. Only after that is done allow Monty the resources to have a northern spearhead to get into the Ruhr Valley. With a usable Antwerp all the needed supplies will be within 200km so getting them to the front will be a piece of cake when compared to them coming all the way across France.

Plus SHAEF should have seen how M-G was all based on rosey assumptions by Monty and that is any of them proved ill conceived that the plan could not work and we know from the OTL that pretty much every of Monty's assumptions were wrong.

When it was clear that Ike was no Monty lover, I will never understand why he seemed to give him everything Monty demanded? Let that insufferable inflated ego whine and cry all he wants, that the broad front was the right strategy to pursue all along!

 

[prester.john208]

Eisenhower ... demanding that Monty get off his ass and clear the Scheldt Estuary so Antwerp can be used. Only after that is done allow Monty the resources to have a northern spearhead to get into the Ruhr Valley. With a usable Antwerp all the needed supplies will be within 200km so getting them to the front will be a piece of cake when compared to them coming all the way across France.

Agreed. Monty for some reason had a blind spot for this. Logistics bottlenecks were the major constraint on Shaef's operations in France. They needed Marseilles in order to supply Devers' army group.

 

[Aber]

Agreed. Monty for some reason had a blind spot for this. Logistics bottlenecks were the major constraint on Shaef's operations in France. They needed Marseilles in order to supply Devers' army group.

No, they were mostly a bottleneck for US operations. 21st Army Group didn't really have large logistics issues, save for the 3000 lorries myth.

The are a lot of reasons for US logistics issues; Washington didn't approve enough road transport units, they fell between 2 stools with Brest neither taking it quickly or masking it, insufficient thought on how to defeat heavy fortifications (Churchill Crocodiles made a large impact), perhaps cancelling Operation Chastity too quickly, SoS using a lot of transport to move to Paris, and advancing on a broad front with virtually all units until they ran out of petrol.

It is near impossible to open Antwerp quickly. It is guarded by a heavily armed Atlantic Wall fortress at the mouth of the Scheldt - Walcheren Island. Airborne assault is not realistic so it needs a seaborne assault force. They were tied up off Le Havre until 12 September after which they need refurbishing and matching up and training with the landing forces.

On 10 September a large airborne attack was the best way to continue the attack.

 

[Aber]

Market-Garden was simply for Montgomery to glorify himself after his dismal performance at Caen and Eisenhower should never have greenlighted it instead demanding that Monty get off his ass and clear the Scheldt Estuary so Antwerp can be used.

Eisenhower was demanding Montgomery open ports, just he was asking for Rotterdam and Amsterdam, not Antwerp.

 

[steel_captain]

Eisenhower was demanding Montgomery open ports, just he was asking for Rotterdam and Amsterdam, not Antwerp.

The Allies already had captured Antwerp as of Sept. 4th but could not use it because the Germans still held both banks of the Scheldt. It wasn't till the 29th of November that Antwerp finally received the first Allied merchant ships almost three full months after the port had been available to them. Here one must blame Eisenhower for allowing Montgomery to fail so profoundly.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

Montgomery would certainly remember to his advantage, but Tedder's quote is from a letter he wrote to Portal immediately after the meeting, and the closest we have to a contemporaneous note; far more reliable than an interview 15+ years later where Eisenhower is struggling to remember Patton's name.

So you're basing your entire premise on a letter Tedder wrote after the meeting . . . . but not based on any of the minutes of said meeting? Thus making anything Tedder, Portal, Monty or even Ike said by your own metric unreliable or untrustworthy!

Personally this is where I leave the conversation by pressing (((ignore))) on the thread list as you seem to be just continually going around in circles contradicting yourself and life it too short to be wasting time this way and there's other threads that want my attention.