In an article from the Canadian Militery Journal, entitled "Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo", by Rob Stuart, it states that a floatplane from Tone sighted the RN cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall at 1200 hrs. 88 Vals were dispatched and an attack ensued beginning at 1338 hrs. It was over at 1355 hrs. with total Japanese success. The Tone floatplane had stayed close by to observe the cruisers, and hadn't wondered about their track, which led to Somerville's fleet in a distance of 84 miles, according to Warspite's radar. Mr Stuart came up with a WI, wherein the Tone's floatplane came to the same conclusion that had come to some American dive bomber pilots two months later, and followed the track for 84 miles instead of just hanging around. Well, WI?
A floatplane off Tone
- Thread starter Just Leo
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All will depend on the mission profile, which in the case of a SOC aircraft, like the one of Tone was to shadow the sighted targets, if considered important enough. Heavy cruisers were considered important enough to be a prime target for a Carrier TG, if no toher targets were located by other scouts.
For that reason the SOC aircraft of Tone should remain at the sighted enemy force, untill after the attack. It should not continue to search for additional targets normally, unless ordered to do so by the C&C on the Carrier Group. As Nagumo was not the sort of commander to make bold decissions, the OTL thing was the most logical one.
For that reason the SOC aircraft of Tone should remain at the sighted enemy force, untill after the attack. It should not continue to search for additional targets normally, unless ordered to do so by the C&C on the Carrier Group. As Nagumo was not the sort of commander to make bold decissions, the OTL thing was the most logical one.
Radar wasn't infallible. But yeah, that's a not-unlikely outcome. Question is: would the Tone plane get off a report first?
I believe the RN equipment was Fulmar and Martlet, but attacking with naval aircraft, in the event of a radio transmission, would reveal the presence of carriers. Also, it seems that Somerville would be aware that his cruisers were likely to be the subject of air attack, and he could just as easily have dispatched a fighter group to defend his cruisers.
Indomitable had 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars, Formidable had 16 Martlets.
On the afternoon of the 5th, two FAA scouts located KB - one was shot down before transmitting, and the other was damaged before it could escape, and the damage included the radio. I therefore figured something similar would be the likely fate of OP's E13A, given that it's 100 mph or so slower than the fighters hunting it.
On the afternoon of the 5th, two FAA scouts located KB - one was shot down before transmitting, and the other was damaged before it could escape, and the damage included the radio. I therefore figured something similar would be the likely fate of OP's E13A, given that it's 100 mph or so slower than the fighters hunting it.
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This, and the fact is American pilot followed the Japanese destroyer, which was more likely to linger away from the main body, as opposed to heavy cruisers, so Japanese pilots had every right to consider the two CAs as independent unit or crippled ship with her consort, while a destroyer had no business being alone in mid ocean and indicated a larger main body somewhere around...
Delta Force
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That too. A heavy cruiser is the most powerful unit generally used for independent operations. They also tended to be the most powerful surface combatant for many task forces and even entire secondary fronts. Cruisers deployed in a screening role for the fleet would likely have smaller screening and torpedo attack ships with them, so finding cruisers by themselves is a good indication that you have run into an independent cruiser unit.
This makes me wonder why the cruisers were operating without escort so close to a friendly fleet. It was late enough into the war for the Royal Navy to have known that capital ships were liable to be swarmed by aircraft operating like that.
The had been among the ships in port on Ceylon, seperate from the main fleet that was ported at Addu Atol. Hermes was another major ship in the Ceylon ports when the Japanese fleet was first discovered in the Indian Ocean. The two cruisers and the Hermes were separately heading from Ceylon south west to join the main fleet, or in the case of the Hermes to get out of harms way to the west. the cruisers were approaching Sommervilles fleet, but it is not clear to me if he or his staff knew where they were. The British did have a fair idea of the Japanese Navy signal intel capability, which was relatively good in 1942. Since Sommerville hoped to ambush Nagumos fleet he was probablly keeping radio silence. So there may not have been any helpful position reports from the cruisers.
Attached is a map that may clarify the situation.
I believe that Somerville thought the danger had passed and ordered the two cruisers back to Ceylon for their scheduled refits and ordered HERMES back to Trincomalee so it could get ready for Operation Ironclad.
"Danger past"
Brit intel had the mostly likely date for the raid in late March. That would have been correct but Nagumo was delayed. Sommervilles staff did issue orders for some administrative actions which did send some ships off on urgent errands. I dont have a reference at hand to check details
Brit intel had the mostly likely date for the raid in late March. That would have been correct but Nagumo was delayed. Sommervilles staff did issue orders for some administrative actions which did send some ships off on urgent errands. I dont have a reference at hand to check details
"Danger past"
Brit intel had the mostly likely date for the raid in late March. That would have been correct but Nagumo was delayed. Sommervilles staff did issue orders for some administrative actions which did send some ships off on urgent errands. I dont have a reference at hand to check details
Alan Warren's Burma 1942 is a great source. Just got it in the mail the other day. I'm using a lot of his information to develop my Alternate Indian Ocean ATL:
http://www.amazon.com/Burma-1942-Ro...TF8&qid=1392692342&sr=8-1&keywords=Burma+1942