A broken sickle?

[pdf27]

I was reading Tooze's Wages of Destruction this morning, and for the first time realised just how close to failure Fall Gelb was (and indeed, how close to collapse the German economy was before it was saved by the materials plundered from France and the Low Countries). Some further reading has led to the following What If?

The Germans were outnumbered everywhere except the Ardennes during Fall Gelb, while the British and French were out of position and had limited control over their units - the result of the advance into Belgium, which also used up much of the French reserve and pushed the rest too far North.

The original (Escaut) plan was to defend more or less at the Franco-German border, and would presumably have had a much larger reserve available.

So the question is this: When Gamelin adopted the Dyle Plan, the French High Command's main objection was that it relied too much on the Germans doing what was expected of them, would immobilise the forces used for a while and used most of the reserve - exactly what actually happened. What If Gamelin lost the argument, and the Anglo-French forces stayed more or less where they were, with a powerful mobile reserve available. It is worth noting that Alphonse Georges (who almost ended up with Gamelin's job, but was rejected as being too right-wing politically) was one of those opposing Gamelin on this.

Fall Gelb essentially relied on pushing extremely powerful armoured forces down a grand total of four roads, in a narrow attack heading for the Channel. As I understand it, it worked because the British and French couldn't get a powerful enough force in position to oppose it, and were then cut off from their supplies and compelled to evacuate.
If the bulk of the British and French forces hadn't just advanced into Belgium when this plan was launched, things start looking very different. The flanks of any German penetration are going to be extremely vulnerable, and even if just one of the four roads is rendered impassable the attack is liable to grind to a halt long before it did. Additionally, the Allied forces haven't advanced into a giant pocket - they're still linked in to the rest of Metropolitan France. That means no Dunkirk, and no immediate collapse of the remaining French army as their best units will still be available.

 

[abc123]

Intresting.
But that would left Belgium unprotected...

 

[oldironside]

Easiest answer would be to leave the French 7th Army where it was, as the core of the strategic reserve in front of Paris. It was put there specifically to avoid the situation France faced in 1914 at the first Battle of the Marne.

Unfortunately, someone had the bright idea during the Phony War to shift it off to the left flank with the task of marching forward to help the Dutch.

Leave it where it was and Guderian will run straight into one of the two best armoured divisions in the French army.

 

[pdf27]

Intresting.
But that would left Belgium unprotected...

Belgium insisted on being unprotected by keeping the British and French out right until the Germans crossed the border. Protecting them means the British and French armies have to advance fast across Belgium to a defensive line, and occupy it/dig in with the Germans rapidly moving towards them. There's a good argument for telling the Belgians that if they aren't willing to let them in early to set up their defensive line, they aren't willing to charge straight in in the event of war. The biggest argument against leaving the Belgians seems to have come from the British, who were worried about the Germans establishing air bases there.
In war you can't do everything. This plan doesn't defend Belgium but ensures the French have a decent sized reserve. OTL, they defended Belgium but didn't keep a reserve.

Easiest answer would be to leave the French 7th Army where it was, as the core of the strategic reserve in front of Paris. It was put there specifically to avoid the situation France faced in 1914 at the first Battle of the Marne.

Unfortunately, someone had the bright idea during the Phony War to shift it off to the left flank with the task of marching forward to help the Dutch.

Leave it where it was and Guderian will run straight into one of the two best armoured divisions in the French army.

Guderian may still win that battle, but the entire German plan appears to have relied on EVERYTHING going right and knocking France out of the war that year. German industry was suffering badly from the lack of raw materials, while the French and British forces were rapidly getting more powerful with the influx of men and materiel, both from their own mobilizations and the US factories. The "phony war" plan appears to have been to hold the line for a year or so while building up a powerful armoured force, then to go on the offensive with it in 1941. That's a very different war, and the only way to forestall it is to either occupy a large fraction of France and capture the population, or force them to surrender as OTL.

 

[oldironside]

Guderian may still win that battle

Of course, anything is possible. However, given that he would be up against a decent number of B1 and Somua 35 tanks, which were close enough to their supply dumps that their range wasn't an issue, and that Guderian's ultimate boss had a crisis of confidence OTL without the reserve there, it's fairly likely that their mere presence could have had the same effect as the French reserves in 1914. i.e. The Germans probe, decided that the opposition is too strong for an exhausted force at the end of their logistic chain and the whole offensive collapses.

I agree with you re the Belgians. They needed to get off the fence earlier and decide whose side they were on. There was no real prospect that being neutral would work.

Of course, they could have just let the Germans march through and sent them a bill afterwards for any damage...

 

[Tamandaré]

I may be wrong, but it seems that we're looking at a WWI Retraux scenario here, until the British and the French accumulate enough armoured reserves to go on a big offensive. War ends in 1941 or 1942 when the Allies get into Germany and Hitler is thrown out.

Or the Generals overthrown Hitler as soon as they perceive their attack is not going anywhere and try to get a respectable peace treaty. Nobody wants to stay four years in trenches getting shot once again.

 

[oldironside]

I may be wrong, but it seems that we're looking at a WWI Retraux scenario here, until the British and the French accumulate enough armoured reserves to go on a big offensive. War ends in 1941 or 1942 when the Allies get into Germany and Hitler is thrown out.

Or the Generals overthrown Hitler as soon as they perceive their attack is not going anywhere and try to get a respectable peace treaty. Nobody wants to stay four years in trenches getting shot once again.

That was pretty much what the Anglo French command were planning for.

 

[pdf27]

Of course, anything is possible. However, given that he would be up against a decent number of B1 and Somua 35 tanks, which were close enough to their supply dumps that their range wasn't an issue, and that Guderian's ultimate boss had a crisis of confidence OTL without the reserve there, it's fairly likely that their mere presence could have had the same effect as the French reserves in 1914. i.e. The Germans probe, decided that the opposition is too strong for an exhausted force at the end of their logistic chain and the whole offensive collapses.

I just don't know enough about the distribution of forces at the time to make a good guess (any book recommendations BTW?).
The biggest difference is that even if Guderian wins the battle, without the Anglo-French forces advancing into Belgium he can't cut them off and force a retreat - his OTL line of advance to cut them off was pretty much straight through the ATL main line of defence. That forces them to go what, 100 miles further west to attempt the same plan? As I understand it, they were pretty much at the end of their logistical string when they stopped as it was, so they're limited to forming a long, thin salient in Allied lines.

So in a way, the biggest importance of 7th Army is in the minds of the French high command. OTL they realised there wasn't a reserve and panicked, which transmitted it down to the troops and effectiveness suffered greatly. With a powerful reserve in more or less the right place (and no prospect of their armies being encircled) they're likely to be much calmer and take a bit of time to think things through. If they realise how much of a desperate gamble Fall Gelb was, the odds are it'll fail.

I may be wrong, but it seems that we're looking at a WWI Retraux scenario here, until the British and the French accumulate enough armoured reserves to go on a big offensive. War ends in 1941 or 1942 when the Allies get into Germany and Hitler is thrown out.

Yep. Can't find the right bit in Wages of Destruction this morning, but IIRC the plan was to build about 40 armoured divisions between the British and French and go on the offensive in 1941 - doing as little as possible before then. Thing is, if this strategy had worked the Maginot line would probably be seen as a work of genius!

 

[oldironside]

This is going to be a very boring thread until someone comes in and disagrees with us.

I can recommend The Fall of France (don't have it to hand) and Die Blitzkrieg Legende.

 

[Cymraeg]

I recommend 'To Lose a Battle' by Alistair Horne. A classic. Depressing, but a classic.

 

[oldironside]

Ah, home again.

Okay, for a decent overview of the whole subject I can recommend The Fall Of France by Julian Jackson (Oxford University Press). It deals with the social, economic and political threads that led to the French defeat, and gives a good (if brief) overview of the military events. if you know nothing about French politics and society between the wars, this is the one for you.

For an entertaining read I can recommend Len Deighton's Blitzkrieg.

From the German perspective, Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend is well researched and very extensive, although at times I find that the evidence he digs up goes somewhat against his conclusions. Also, the technical data table of combat aircraft is suspect (Hurricane II during the Battle of France?), so it makes me wonder what other problems there might be. Still, a fascinating view from the other side of the line.

 

[pdf27]

Thanks guys. I've ordered To Lose a Battle, Blitzkrieg and The Fall of France from AbeBooks (The Blitzkrieg Legend was a bit steep - I can only justify my reading habit if I can get the books secondhand for under a fiver ), I'll add them to the reading pile and see where I get.

If the POD still seems plausible after I've read that (don't know enough right now), I might have a crack at doing a story based on it. My writing skills aren't up to much, but the potential changes to the course of the war - and hence the postwar world - are huge and fascinating.

 

[oldironside]

(The Blitzkrieg Legend was a bit steep - I can only justify my reading habit if I can get the books secondhand for under a fiver

I only read it because a friend of mine insisted on lending it to me.

I'm looking forward to reading your timeline.

 

[pdf27]

Might be a little while - I've got a sketch of what I think will happen (and it looks like a total France-wank, which given what happened OTL is somewhat inevitable). Problem at the moment is the more I sketch it out the more I realise I need to know about France, and particularly French politics: several of the personalities who look like they'll be critical for the government appear to have hated each other. Looks like I've got a week or two of reading ahead of me before I can start writing.

When I do, would it be best to post here or in a new thread?

 

[ryackov]

I was reading Tooze's Wages of Destruction this morning, and for the first time realised just how close to failure Fall Gelb was (and indeed, how close to collapse the German economy was before it was saved by the materials plundered from France and the Low Countries). Some further reading has led to the following What If?

I've read differently in other books, apparently the Germans had replaced much of their trade with France and other nations with that of neutral European nations.

And the Dyle Plan would have been implemented regardless... abandoning Belgium would be untenable.

 

[pdf27]

I've read differently in other books, apparently the Germans had replaced much of their trade with France and other nations with that of neutral European nations.

Not so much volume as specifically what they couldn't get. Copper is one example (Tooze cites warehouses full of shells with no driving bands due to a desperate shortage). I've no doubt that much of this would be replaced by supplies from the Soviet Union, but it was liable to take time and require an increase in German exports. That in turn requires a reduction in armaments production. However you slice it, Germany is significantly weaker if it doesn't conquer France.

And the Dyle Plan would have been implemented regardless... abandoning Belgium would be untenable.

The original plan, which seems to have been generally accepted, was to defend Belgium from the Schelde rather than the Dyle river. That is AIUI a stronger line, significantly shorter, and hence allows the French to keep a reserve. When adopting the Dyle plan they essentially committed their entire reserve to the Gembloux gap. Further, the advance to the Dyle line (being significantly longer than the advance to the Schelde line) left the forces out of fuel and in need of maintenance.
The Dyle plan was not universally popular with the French General Staff - Gamelin seems to have championed it, while his deputy Georges was against it (largely, from what I've read so far, because it left the French without a reserve and relied on the Germans doing what was expected of them).

It doesn't seem at all ASB to have them sticking to the earlier Eschaut (Schelde) plan, which in turn leaves them with a significant mobile reserve. By the time the Germans find out that the French are trying to defend the Dyle rather than Schelde, it's too late to cancel the Sichelschnitt plan. That means the attack goes ahead, but given the orientation of the Anglo-French forces it needs to be redirected South, towards Paris.

 

[ryackov]

Not so much volume as specifically what they couldn't get. Copper is one example (Tooze cites warehouses full of shells with no driving bands due to a desperate shortage). I've no doubt that much of this would be replaced by supplies from the Soviet Union, but it was liable to take time and require an increase in German exports. That in turn requires a reduction in armaments production. However you slice it, Germany is significantly weaker if it doesn't conquer France.


The original plan, which seems to have been generally accepted, was to defend Belgium from the Schelde rather than the Dyle river. That is AIUI a stronger line, significantly shorter, and hence allows the French to keep a reserve. When adopting the Dyle plan they essentially committed their entire reserve to the Gembloux gap. Further, the advance to the Dyle line (being significantly longer than the advance to the Schelde line) left the forces out of fuel and in need of maintenance.
The Dyle plan was not universally popular with the French General Staff - Gamelin seems to have championed it, while his deputy Georges was against it (largely, from what I've read so far, because it left the French without a reserve and relied on the Germans doing what was expected of them).

It doesn't seem at all ASB to have them sticking to the earlier Eschaut (Schelde) plan, which in turn leaves them with a significant mobile reserve. By the time the Germans find out that the French are trying to defend the Dyle rather than Schelde, it's too late to cancel the Sichelschnitt plan. That means the attack goes ahead, but given the orientation of the Anglo-French forces it needs to be redirected South, towards Paris.

Germany is significantly weaker against what? French invasion? Soviet invasion? Germany had no imminent threats in '40. Yes, Germany had shortages. In fact towards the end of the war, Germany partially filled explosive shells with salt. But a reduction of armaments production probably wouldn't prevent Germany from overrunning France or the Soviet Union. The issue with history books is that there's a certain bias to advance a certain narrative. In retrospect, things might seem more obvious then they would have been.

It doesn't seem at all ASB to have political leaders not meddle in military affairs, but such things happen. Belgium will probably be forced to give transit rights to the Germans, if the French don't deploy a sufficient number of troops into Belgium.

Edit: replaced conquering with overrunning, was a bit hurried when I wrote this

 

[pdf27]

But a reduction of armaments production probably wouldn't prevent Germany from overrunning France or the Soviet Union.

Just relative to OTL - probably 10-15% below that which they achieved. When including the US imports, that means the Anglo-French alliance is outproducing Germany. That's one of the reasons Hitler seems to have forced a war when he did - the British and French were rearming faster than Germany, so the lead they had by starting the arms race was disappearing. If the French can hold through 1940, things will be much more equal next year.

It doesn't seem at all ASB to have political leaders not meddle in military affairs, but such things happen. Belgium will probably be forced to give transit rights to the Germans, if the French don't deploy a sufficient number of troops into Belgium.

A large part of the problem was that Belgium wouldn't permit French or British troops to enter the country until it was actually invaded by the Germans. There wasn't any issue of transit rights - they were strictly neutral until they were invaded and very quickly stomped flat. That's why the allied forces which did deploy were so badly wrong-footed when they had to redeploy again when their rear was cut off - they'd just had to advance into positions a long way ahead of where they started that they hadn't been able to recce in advance.
The request for Anglo-French forces to occupy Belgium in the event of a German invasion seems to come from two sources:
1) The British Air Ministry, who were worried about German aircraft based there attacking the UK. This was the era of "the bomber will always get through", but they were also the junior coalition partner - if the French General Staff said it wasn't happening, that was that.
2) Gamelin didn't think that the French Army was ready for offensive operations yet. Accordingly, he wanted to grab as much of Belgium as possible when it was easy, rather than having to fight for it. Sound logic, but he overreached himself and simply didn't have sufficient combat power to hold what he had taken and keep a reserve.
So in reality it seems to have been a military, rather than a political decision. The POD here would be to stick with Gamelin's original plan, rather than his later modification. It largely complies with point (1) above, as the coast is still in Allied hands, with the difference in (2) being down to how strong the Dyle line is perceived to be. Arranging for some French "tourists" to visit the KW line and report back to the General Staff might do so nicely.

 

[ryackov]

But how would have Hitler known that invading France was opportune anyway? It seems like Hitler more likely blundered into it, rather then as a consequence of a willful decision to invade before the French rearmed, particularly given the ineptitude of German intelligence.
Blitzkrieg economics wasn't an all deciding factor. Dupuy has also noted that a defensive modifier for relative French military strength would have caused stalemate. Once again, retrospect.

Oh, by-the-bye, the French was short of manpower, which American industry could not assist in. France would have crumbled, eventually exhausting their reserves.

So in reality it seems to have been a military, rather than a political decision. The POD here would be to stick with Gamelin's original plan, rather than his later modification. It largely complies with point (1) above, as the coast is still in Allied hands, with the difference in (2) being down to how strong the Dyle line is perceived to be. Arranging for some French "tourists" to visit the KW line and report back to the General Staff might do so nicely.

I doubt it was solely military.

 

[pdf27]

Oh, by-the-bye, the French was short of manpower, which American industry could not assist in. France would have crumbled, eventually exhausting their reserves.

But it isn't just France. It's the British and French Empires against Germany. The Imperial troops were only just starting to arrive (a Canadian division arrived in the UK after Dunkirk, 5 regiments of Tirailleurs Sénégalais were already in France when the battle started, etc.). IF the Entente are willing to draw on their empires for manpower - which has interesting butterflies all of it's own - then they have significantly larger manpower reserves than the German. The (volunteer) Indian Army, all by itself, was almost the same size as the Wehrmacht for the invasion of Russia.

If you look at just about any metric, the latent power of France and the UK was significantly higher than that of Germany - but it was going to take them at least another year, probably two, to be able to fully apply it. Sichelschnitt was always going to give the French major problems, but to actually knock them out of the war it relied on the majority of their army and the BEF moving forward into Belgium where they could be surrounded and cut off. Remove that move and while they're in deep trouble it isn't catastrophic.