7th February 1940
General Gamelin sat at his desk after the meeting he’d had with his staff for the new Dyle plan. It hadn’t gone well – his staff was split, while his deputy Georges was downright scathing. Not particularly about the details of the plan – he’d been quite complimentary about those, unusually for him, but one point he’d thundered on about at some length. “Where is the Reserve?” The various Army commanders had their own reserves, of course, but there was no real central one. For what they expected the Germans to do it was the best plan available – but Georges’ accusation that he was planning to fight the last war had struck a nerve. If they did try something new, he’d be in trouble. At the back of his mind, a shred of doubt started to bother him – Georges had been imposed by his political enemies and wanted his job, but was still a very competent general.
Alone in his office, he got the maps out and started to sketch out an alternative plan with the strong reserve that Georges wanted. He’d then have his staff game out both options, and hopefully that would make things a little clearer.
Between his forces and the British he had 44 divisions available in the North, and another 48 manning the Maginot line. It was too dangerous to just transfer forces from the south to give his Northern forces the reserve they needed – the cornerstone of French strategy was to channel a German attack to the North where mobile forces could deal with it – but he could use some of the forces there as a powerful reserve for employment after the axis of a German attack had been identified.
In Flanders, to create a reserve he had no option but to shorten the line. He daren’t weaken the forces holding the Dyle or especially the Gembloux gap, and without them there was no reserve. That in turn meant reverting to the Eschaut plan, with a few modifications.
15th February 1940
The staff meeting was over. Georges had seemed far less sure of his demand for a reserve, while Gamelin hadn’t mentioned audacity once. The main result was a long list of questions for the Military Intelligence branch. How much warning would they have of a German attack? What sort of co-operation would the Belgians give them? How strong was the KW line, really? How did the crossings of the Dyle and Schelde compare? Colonel Vallory realised he wasn’t going to be getting much sleep for the next two weeks, and started drawing up orders for some of his subordinates to take a “motoring holiday” in Belgium.
General Gamelin sat at his desk after the meeting he’d had with his staff for the new Dyle plan. It hadn’t gone well – his staff was split, while his deputy Georges was downright scathing. Not particularly about the details of the plan – he’d been quite complimentary about those, unusually for him, but one point he’d thundered on about at some length. “Where is the Reserve?” The various Army commanders had their own reserves, of course, but there was no real central one. For what they expected the Germans to do it was the best plan available – but Georges’ accusation that he was planning to fight the last war had struck a nerve. If they did try something new, he’d be in trouble. At the back of his mind, a shred of doubt started to bother him – Georges had been imposed by his political enemies and wanted his job, but was still a very competent general.
Alone in his office, he got the maps out and started to sketch out an alternative plan with the strong reserve that Georges wanted. He’d then have his staff game out both options, and hopefully that would make things a little clearer.
Between his forces and the British he had 44 divisions available in the North, and another 48 manning the Maginot line. It was too dangerous to just transfer forces from the south to give his Northern forces the reserve they needed – the cornerstone of French strategy was to channel a German attack to the North where mobile forces could deal with it – but he could use some of the forces there as a powerful reserve for employment after the axis of a German attack had been identified.
In Flanders, to create a reserve he had no option but to shorten the line. He daren’t weaken the forces holding the Dyle or especially the Gembloux gap, and without them there was no reserve. That in turn meant reverting to the Eschaut plan, with a few modifications.
15th February 1940
The staff meeting was over. Georges had seemed far less sure of his demand for a reserve, while Gamelin hadn’t mentioned audacity once. The main result was a long list of questions for the Military Intelligence branch. How much warning would they have of a German attack? What sort of co-operation would the Belgians give them? How strong was the KW line, really? How did the crossings of the Dyle and Schelde compare? Colonel Vallory realised he wasn’t going to be getting much sleep for the next two weeks, and started drawing up orders for some of his subordinates to take a “motoring holiday” in Belgium.