A better High Seas Fleet for WW1

Not knowing in the era of the effectiveness of smaller cruiser squadrons as far as tech/doctrine, were they useful or not? Perhaps an expnasion of light cruiser dockyards is more economical and also isn't likely to touch off a heavier British response if smaller ships are viewed as less threatening.

I know at the Battle of Tsushima HE shells caused horrible fires on Russian ships. So one could have high speed light cruisers focused on small caliber guns with heavy volume of fire with the intent of landing lots of shots on larger enemy ships and decimating them by burning and ammo explosions? Not knowing how feasible this is doctrinally or technologically, but use of swarm tactics of charging in at very high speed to close the range and then win via volume of fire to cause fires...
Unlikely to work as predreadnoughts are stuffed to the gills with small to medium rapid fire guns precisely to deal with a bum rush of smaller units (at the time torpedo boats). Chances are any light cruiser bum rush will get lit up first before they could deal enough damage.
 
Not knowing in the era of the effectiveness of smaller cruiser squadrons as far as tech/doctrine, were they useful or not?
Yes they were and the KM didn't have enough of them, e.g. they didn't have enough to scout for the fleet.

That was in part due to heavy losses. IOTL 18 out of the 37 small cruisers that the KM had in August 1914 were sunk or damaged beyond repair during the war and so were 2 out of the 12 that were completed during the war, which makes a total of 20 out of 49 or nearly 40%.
Perhaps an expansion of light cruiser dockyards is more economical and also isn't likely to touch off a heavier British response if smaller ships are viewed as less threatening.
We've already discussed that and the conclusion was no it wouldn't.
I know at the Battle of Tsushima HE shells caused horrible fires on Russian ships. So one could have high speed light cruisers focused on small caliber guns with heavy volume of fire with the intent of landing lots of shots on larger enemy ships and decimating them by burning and ammo explosions? Not knowing how feasible this is doctrinally or technologically, but use of swarm tactics of charging in at very high speed to close the range and then win via volume of fire to cause fires...
That's roughly what Germany did IOTL. That is the Gazelle to Graudenz classes were armed with ten-to-twelve 4.1in guns and they didn't change to eight 5.9in until the early part of the war with the Pillau & Wiesbaden to Cöln classes.
 
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These are couple of intriguing articles from APL, i'm pretty sure they are not right about the OTL german program (Dodson's excellent book has the authorizations for each year). But at least there are some additional name ideas to use for any of the extra ships ITTL, though mostly they cover BCs.
 
Not knowing in the era of the effectiveness of smaller cruiser squadrons as far as tech/doctrine, were they useful or not? Perhaps an expnasion of light cruiser dockyards is more economical and also isn't likely to touch off a heavier British response if smaller ships are viewed as less threatening.

I know at the Battle of Tsushima HE shells caused horrible fires on Russian ships. So one could have high speed light cruisers focused on small caliber guns with heavy volume of fire with the intent of landing lots of shots on larger enemy ships and decimating them by burning and ammo explosions? Not knowing how feasible this is doctrinally or technologically, but use of swarm tactics of charging in at very high speed to close the range and then win via volume of fire to cause fires...

1 - as D K Brown points out when discussing Tsushima, there are reports that the fires at Tsushima were caused by the Japanese powder filled shells which completely failed to penetrate armour so had their own major problems; and that the Russian ships had coal stored aboard in unusual places due to their long passage, and this caused fires that burned for a long time. In addition, like any ships hit that hard, damage control parties and fire hoses suffered.

2- As he also points out, RN ships suffered few such fires despite plenty of them being hit hard. So the Russian experience doesn't seem to translate.

3- As others have noted, the Dreadnoughts came about because the idea of the "hail of fire" from lots of small guns hitting hard was outdated. I don't think the light cruisers did anything much to cause the fires at Tsushima - that was heavier calibre gunfire. The three British armoured cruisers that caught fire badly were under fire from guns far bigger than those of light cruisers, especially German ones which carried light guns.

4- German cruisers only have generally about a 6 knot advantage over the British battleships and are slower than many of the battlecruisers, so may not be able to approach at high speed

5- German light cruisers don't seem to have done very well against British light cruisers in gun actions (witness HMAS Sydney v Emden) and the Brits have plenty of their own light cruisers and destroyers.

6- I'm not sure about WW1 costs, but just before WW2 a 6000 ton cruiser cost 31.8% as much as a 35,000 ton battleship to buy and run over the long term, so the "swarm" isn't going to be enormous.
 
The Germans would need to focus less on battle cruisers and more on battleships. The High Seas Fleet need a brute force to deal with the Royal Navy.
A few battle cruisers would be useful if they were employed aggressively, as in hunting down cruisers that were taking part in the blockade. That would force the British to commit Battleships to the blockade, Allowing the German Battleships the potential for a large engagement on favorable terms.
 
Not knowing in the era of the effectiveness of smaller cruiser squadrons as far as tech/doctrine, were they useful or not? Perhaps an expnasion of light cruiser dockyards is more economical and also isn't likely to touch off a heavier British response if smaller ships are viewed as less threatening.

I know at the Battle of Tsushima HE shells caused horrible fires on Russian ships. So one could have high speed light cruisers focused on small caliber guns with heavy volume of fire with the intent of landing lots of shots on larger enemy ships and decimating them by burning and ammo explosions? Not knowing how feasible this is doctrinally or technologically, but use of swarm tactics of charging in at very high speed to close the range and then win via volume of fire to cause fires...
This was the theory of the Jeune Ecole school.

Germany small cruiser design from the 1890s until the Pillau class of 1913 incorporated more guns than other navies: 10 or 12, of lighter caliber 105mm/4.1", with a higher rate of fire, and longer range due to higher elevation mountings. In practice, I can't think of a World War One situation where smaller faster cruisers bested larger, more heavily armed ships. But I can't think of an occasion where the Germans had much in the way of local superiority like you describe.

Torpedoes are more capable of making small ships lethal vs. larger ships. Torpedo boats and destroyers were created for this task, but doctrine evolved to compensate.

The Kaiserliche Marine and Royal Navy both used light cruisers as scouts and destroyer flotilla leaders. These light ships screened the main battle line from enemy light ships, and kept enemy torpedo outside of torpedo range. Battlecruisers were used as the eyes of the fleet and kept to themselves in their own squadrons, screened by lighter ships.

I guess the drawback of creating ships for a special kind of situation is that you then need to spend all your time trying to create that special situation. Most of the cruiser vs cruiser fights in World War One had Royal Navy forces with superior numbers or superior strength, or both.
 
The Germans would need to focus less on battle cruisers and more on battleships. The High Seas Fleet need a brute force to deal with the Royal Navy.
A few battle cruisers would be useful if they were employed aggressively, as in hunting down cruisers that were taking part in the blockade. That would force the British to commit Battleships to the blockade, Allowing the German Battleships the potential for a large engagement on favorable terms.
Actually imo it's the other way around. They need more BCs with hindsight because they proved much more durable than the RN BCs. If they get into a situation in which the german BCs would pretty much anihilate the british opposites (like almost happened at Jutland) with minimal losses, then the remaining german BCs would bring their firepower against the RB battleships, and "dance" around them as needed due to their superior speed while providing crucial scouting/ information and support to the german BBs. The british and german BBs were much closer in durability so they can't get much of an advantage there since the british had more BBs anyway, but the germans having BCs left and the RN not would give the germans a crucial advantage.
 
Are you sure? Can a few knots speed advantage allow anyone to "dance" around anything? The German battlecruisers were about 6 knot quicker than the main body of the British battle line. I've spent a lot of time at sea at 6 knots, and I can't ever recall "dancing" around anything that could hit me from 12 nautical miles, or twice as fast as I could go in an hour. What hit percentages could the German battlecruisers expect while "dancing" at long range?

Exactly how does this scouting advantage work? What are the British light cruisers going to be doing at the time? If the 6 knot speed advantage of the German battlecruisers over the main part of the British battle line is so important, then what about the 3+ knot speed advantage of the QEs over the High Seas Fleet? Isn't that at least 50% as important?

The HSF was outnumbered 28 to 16 in battleships, ie there were 57% as many German dreadnoughts as British. Even with the loss of three battlecruisers on the British side, the effective loss of one German battlecruiser left the Germans at a 5 to 4 disadvantage in battlecruisers and 21 to 32 in capital ships. Even assuming that three more British battlecruisers are sunk for every German battlecruiser knocked out, that leaves the Germans with only two battlecruisers left and and the German battleships at 16 to 28, and Germans at an 18:28 disadvantage overall in capital ships, as well as having a disadvantage in smaller vessels.

In what major combat action was the side with a 1 to 1.5+ disadvantage at a "crucial advantage" overall?
 
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Are you sure? Can a few knots speed advantage allow anyone to "dance" around anything?
You are correct. Greater speed does allow a ship or flotilla of ships certain advantages. The faster ship can choose when to engage, and when to break off engagement, it can choose the range of engagement, and maybe get a more advantageous position. The faster ships might be better able to cross the T of the slower ships for example. And chase down a slower ship.

But a 6 knot advantage does not turn a ship into Mohammed Ali.

It is possible with the technology of the day to use strategies like salvo chasing to make a ship harder to hit, but that throws one' own gunnery off as well.
 
The faster ship can choose when to engage, and when to break off engagement

For all of Jackie Fisher's public mantras that "speed is armor," I am struck by how often *this* advantage of greater speed over an opponent is emphasized in his correspondence that I have read to date.
 
THe speed advantage is something that was highlighted at Tishushima. The IJN fleet had a speed advantage of about 3 - 5 knots over the Russians and this allowed them to control the range and gave them more of an advantage in manouvering and this was something that Fisher had been thinking of before when he was CinC of the Med Fleet. He raised the fleet cruising speed from 9 to 12 knots and had the fleet training to move and fight at higher speeds than their opponents would often move at, giving a strategic and tactical advantage. That's an extra 3 MPH, and that means you could in an intercept whilst still closing, be able within a few hours or even a day or so be able to get a positional advantage.

In the Battlecruiser the speed of 25 knots meant that basically no armoured cruiser was safe, and so was the case with most light cruisers who wouldn't be able to run away fast enough to get out of range quickly enough. The original idea of the battlecruiser was to sweep aside screening/scouting elements which they could do with ease, and then move and act in support of the battle line, forcing an opponent to split their fire etc.

And whilst battlecruisers were not that well armoured, the 7 inch belt of an I class BC was basically proof against the 8.2 inch guns and at longer ranges the 11-inch gun too would struggle to penetrate. The Spendid Cats with their 9-inches were largely protected against 12-inch gunfire, the Tiger's proof that they could take a hammering.

And an example of 'speed is protection' could be more like lets say you've managed to get your enemy against the coast, because you've been able to get ahead of them in the night and unless they want to run aground, they have to turn to face you, which reduces their firepower. You can then control the battle to keep your opponent coming at you and use your speed to dictate the range and angle of the engagement.

And of course during this thread, we've not seen the RN's reaction, because there would be one.
 
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In the Battlecruiser the speed of 25 knots meant that basically no armoured cruiser was safe, and so was the case with most light cruisers who wouldn't be able to run away fast enough to get out of range quickly enough.

Used in this way, you can see the results in the Battle of the Falklands. The Germans had no chance once they hove into Sturdee's view. They could not outrun him, nor, certainly, outgun him.

I still think battlecruisers were, overall, not a good use of resources for any major navy. But maybe the Falklands were the exception that proves the rule.
 
In the design of the invincibles 25 knots was considered a maximum speed so that there would be a significant advantage over the German main line.

I believe there was an argument that battlecruisers were fast enough to turn a corner on the German fleet.

Put the BC at the head of the battleline sail in front of the battleships and cut the Germans off. As long as the German 1st scouting group remained in service the BCF couldn't do something like that.

Something like below, Royal Navy Battleships are BB, German battleships are SS (Schlachtschiff) and British Battlecruisers are BC.

Then multiple battlecruisers would be threatened by a single battleship.

BC BC BC BC
BB SS
BB SS
BB SS
BB SS

For naval purposes thats dancing around the opponent. This is not something that the Germans would be likely to do had they won the battlecruiser engagement as their battleline is shorter than the Royal Navy battleline. They relied on the battlecruiser to be able to match the Royal Navy in numbers.
 
Used in this way, you can see the results in the Battle of the Falklands. The Germans had no chance once they hove into Sturdee's view. They could not outrun him, nor, certainly, outgun him.

I still think battlecruisers were, overall, not a good use of resources for any major navy. But maybe the Falklands were the exception that proves the rule.

Indeed, the Falklands and Helgoland Blight showed exactly what Battlecruisers could do in the roles they were designed for, hunting down armoured cruisers and crushing hostile scouting forces that are not capital ships.
 
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