yeah the real shock here is the Germans did not use either their own Land air assets or U-boats.....
A Better Decade - a British TL.
- Thread starter Sarthak
- Start date
Hmm they are busy fighting against both the British, French and what's left of the Belgium army maybe the luftwaffer didn't have any with decent range to spare
Deleted member 94680
What’s that? Nazi internal rivalry resulted in sub-optimum performance adversely affecting their chances of victory? Well I never...
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Yes amazing still they are not the only ones i really feel the IJA and IJN really would only have been happy if they could fight a proper war against each other.
Considering they have gone down in the North Sea they will probably freeze to death most likely.
The North Sea is not a kind lady.
I dislike having to be the only voice raising up any objections, but you have proved receptive to constructive criticism in the past and this definitely needs it.
The naval battle is extremely unrealistic on a number of levels.
1.) The Germans were cognizant about not going out into the teeth of overwhelming odds in @, let alone up against a proven enemy with proven aircraft carrier operation.
2.) The commissioning of Graf Zeppelin would not be extremely worrying to the Royal Navy or anything like that.
3.) Seeking out a surface engagement when one has an edge in carriers makes no sense.
4.) Hood not only gets within visual range of Hipper, but is somehow unable to take on a single 8" cruiser? Has her zone of immunity against 8" guns been changed over the course of the timeline?
5.) The carriers are described as being only 10 miles away, yet take 9 minutes to fly the distance to the engagement.
6.) We now come onto the main issue: Why go for a gunline battle when RN doctrine was to wear the enemy down with carrier strikes first? Why isn't the RN fighting to the strengths you have created for them through previous 1930s wartime experience?
7.) Why on Earth would German heavy cruisers form line of battle against RN battleships?
8.) Why fight fair and end up losing two capital ships?
9.) German destroyers or any destroyers wouldn't be kept in reserve, neither as close-in protection for the carrier nor as a nonsensical rearguard.
10.) Why on Earth would submarines surface during a battle, rather than operate in the manner which was planned for them?
11.) The RN is extremely short of destroyers for a fleet engagement.
12.) Hood and Renown would comprise the Battlecruiser squadron, the KGVs would be their own battle squadron and the two QEs would need to operate separately; Royal Oak isn't going to be taken out to an engagement given her lesser speed.
13.) The number of hits inflicted on Graf Zeppelin alone is unrealistic for 26 Seawolves. To get 20 hits on a carrier or battleship at sea isn't unprecendented (cf Yamato and Musashi) but always took a heck of a lot more strike aircraft.
The end result of the battle isn't surprising or truly beyond the pale.
What is unrealistic is how the battle was fought, why the Germans rushed out like lemmings, how the RN fought like amateurs and indeed the entire general course of the battle.
This in many ways is representative of how you've had the war play out thus far:
- Germany is playing very much to historical-esque plans against a very different opponent
- The entire nature of the invasion of Crete is unrealistic: unrealistic in timing, unrealistic in force composition, unrealistic in the nature of landing tanks and unrealistic in its aftermath. Planning any sort of amphibious invasion took upwards of 6 months in some cases and requires many different technologies and tactical innovations. Using armour had been contemplated in the Great War, but needs LSTs and a lot more training before that can be put into a WW2 context.
- It isn't going to be done by Pakistanis (setting aside that particular contrivance) or any Commonwealth forces, but a very limited British force, yet there has been no reason to train up forces for amphibious operations or the use of armour therein
- The timeframe is wrong, the naval support composition is wrong, the description of naval support is wrong, the force composition is wrong, the shipping requirements are extremely complex and the level of opposition is wrong
- First flight in February and multiple squadron service by June for any aircraft simply is not realistic, let alone a jet. This is factoring in the 8 years of development, which are all well and good. The best solution to this lack of realism is to examine the difference in time between first flight and entry into active service for the Meteor and similar wartime jet fighters
- Greece fighting against Britain really doesn't make any sense for their interests to begin with. To have them do so after the Italians have had seven shades of excrement knocked out of them in a previous war crosses the line from extremely unlikely to unrealistic.
It seems as if events aren't flowing from logical interests and developments, but to engineer the circumstances which can lead to the optimum British success or to showcase the optimal British strengths.
If you would like this to be considered as a realistic and viable timeline, rather than a story, then you might want to give some thoughts to these issues and others previously raised. That way, you will have an internally consistent and historically viable series of events that logically flow from a single PoD.
One key aspect of this is having other nations react to the "protagonist nation" and not just in the form of slightly accelerating some of their OTL endeavours/developments or buffing up their orbat, but in their own reactive developments to changed threats and changed circumstances.
Some of the central issues of realism that need a bit of consideration are:
- British economic growth. It is definitely possible, but not to the expansive extent described here. Even 15-20% by 1939 is darn useful, though (cf below)
- American-Canadian trade. The issue has been raised, but then swept away somewhat. Britain was Canada's leading trade partner until the end of the Great War, but the USA overtook it in the 1920s and began to pull away fast, due not only to the massive growth experienced by the US economy in the 1920s, but also emerging structural issues.
Something can be done due to US tariffs, however:
In 1913, the US took a unilateral step in trade liberalization, passing the Underwood Tariff as part of the Revenue Act of 1913. The US initiative was designed to improve competition in the US market. It included a general reduction in tariff rates and the addition of many items to the free list, and it was highly favourable to Canadian exporters. Zero or near-zero tariffs were introduced for steel rails, timber, iron ore, agricultural equipment and a range of farm products. The value of Canadian merchandise exports to the US rose from $34 million in 1886 and $104 million in 1911 to $201 million in 1915 and $542 million in 1921.
But this promising period in Canada–US economic relations came to an abrupt end. Faced with an agricultural crisis, as farm prices collapsed, the US passed the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, which sharply raised tariffs on agricultural imports. This was followed, in 1922, by the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, which completely reversed the trade liberalization in the Underwood Tariff initiative and dealt a harsh blow to Canada. Exports to the US fell to $293.6 million in 1922, from $542 million in 1921. Not surprisingly, Canada and other countries retaliated with higher tariffs of their own.
However, in 1922 and 1923, Canada invited the US to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement. There was no US response. (Canadian exporters did benefit from US prohibition, which ran from January 1920 to December 1933, though smuggling profits did not show up in official statistics).
www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca
But it isn't going to result in what you've got, which is the USA throwing in the towel and conceding Canada to the British.
- The Balkans situation in general. War with Greece is on the level of clubbing baby seals and they really couldn't field anywhere near the level of forces mooted
- The handwaved solution to India which has removed any of the issues that occurred in @, even the non-political ones. At a baseline, none of the subcontinental states or even the unified Raj aren't going to be deploying what amounts to armoured divisions as of 1940. It seems as if you are trying to fix every major problem and issue as quickly as possible, but sometimes, that doesn't yield the optimal situation.
- Handwaving away the Great Depression. I believe that you can further reduce the impact of the GD on the British economy, which already began to recover a long time before that of the USA comparatively speaking, but we can't knock it out of the way altogether. This leads onto our next point...
- Removal of British war debts by fiat. With a larger economy, they can be afforded, but paying a huge amount off would take the money away from more productive parts of the economy.
- In general, undershooting what is done in some areas and vastly overshooting it in others.
www.cambridge.org
The first link above has interwar spending levels for the Army, RN and RAF between 1924 and 1939, among other data.
The second has some more in-depth RN material for you.
Definitely have a read of the first. If we take the lower figure of 115% of @ GDP, then for the RN alone you have an extra 30 million quid between 1930 and 1934. There will be enough money for substantially more destroyers, 4-5 carriers by 1940 to join Courageous, Glorious and Furious, 5-6 16" KGVs with 6 Lions in the pipeline and more cruisers to cover all commitments if some of the sensible suggestions made in other threads by NOMISYRRUC are followed.
It is possible to go even further by avoiding/changing the 1930 LNT or even rationalising some of the 1920s construction programmes - a stitch in time saves nine and building cruisers in the 1920s saves having them on the ways when you are fighting a war in 1940.
You wouldn't need to make sweeping statements as to the British economy being much stronger than it could be, as, if you use all of the 1920s effectively as suggested, the building blocks for "more than good enough" will be there.
The naval battle is extremely unrealistic on a number of levels.
1.) The Germans were cognizant about not going out into the teeth of overwhelming odds in @, let alone up against a proven enemy with proven aircraft carrier operation.
2.) The commissioning of Graf Zeppelin would not be extremely worrying to the Royal Navy or anything like that.
3.) Seeking out a surface engagement when one has an edge in carriers makes no sense.
4.) Hood not only gets within visual range of Hipper, but is somehow unable to take on a single 8" cruiser? Has her zone of immunity against 8" guns been changed over the course of the timeline?
5.) The carriers are described as being only 10 miles away, yet take 9 minutes to fly the distance to the engagement.
6.) We now come onto the main issue: Why go for a gunline battle when RN doctrine was to wear the enemy down with carrier strikes first? Why isn't the RN fighting to the strengths you have created for them through previous 1930s wartime experience?
7.) Why on Earth would German heavy cruisers form line of battle against RN battleships?
8.) Why fight fair and end up losing two capital ships?
9.) German destroyers or any destroyers wouldn't be kept in reserve, neither as close-in protection for the carrier nor as a nonsensical rearguard.
10.) Why on Earth would submarines surface during a battle, rather than operate in the manner which was planned for them?
11.) The RN is extremely short of destroyers for a fleet engagement.
12.) Hood and Renown would comprise the Battlecruiser squadron, the KGVs would be their own battle squadron and the two QEs would need to operate separately; Royal Oak isn't going to be taken out to an engagement given her lesser speed.
13.) The number of hits inflicted on Graf Zeppelin alone is unrealistic for 26 Seawolves. To get 20 hits on a carrier or battleship at sea isn't unprecendented (cf Yamato and Musashi) but always took a heck of a lot more strike aircraft.
The end result of the battle isn't surprising or truly beyond the pale.
What is unrealistic is how the battle was fought, why the Germans rushed out like lemmings, how the RN fought like amateurs and indeed the entire general course of the battle.
This in many ways is representative of how you've had the war play out thus far:
- Germany is playing very much to historical-esque plans against a very different opponent
- The entire nature of the invasion of Crete is unrealistic: unrealistic in timing, unrealistic in force composition, unrealistic in the nature of landing tanks and unrealistic in its aftermath. Planning any sort of amphibious invasion took upwards of 6 months in some cases and requires many different technologies and tactical innovations. Using armour had been contemplated in the Great War, but needs LSTs and a lot more training before that can be put into a WW2 context.
- It isn't going to be done by Pakistanis (setting aside that particular contrivance) or any Commonwealth forces, but a very limited British force, yet there has been no reason to train up forces for amphibious operations or the use of armour therein
- The timeframe is wrong, the naval support composition is wrong, the description of naval support is wrong, the force composition is wrong, the shipping requirements are extremely complex and the level of opposition is wrong
- First flight in February and multiple squadron service by June for any aircraft simply is not realistic, let alone a jet. This is factoring in the 8 years of development, which are all well and good. The best solution to this lack of realism is to examine the difference in time between first flight and entry into active service for the Meteor and similar wartime jet fighters
- Greece fighting against Britain really doesn't make any sense for their interests to begin with. To have them do so after the Italians have had seven shades of excrement knocked out of them in a previous war crosses the line from extremely unlikely to unrealistic.
It seems as if events aren't flowing from logical interests and developments, but to engineer the circumstances which can lead to the optimum British success or to showcase the optimal British strengths.
If you would like this to be considered as a realistic and viable timeline, rather than a story, then you might want to give some thoughts to these issues and others previously raised. That way, you will have an internally consistent and historically viable series of events that logically flow from a single PoD.
One key aspect of this is having other nations react to the "protagonist nation" and not just in the form of slightly accelerating some of their OTL endeavours/developments or buffing up their orbat, but in their own reactive developments to changed threats and changed circumstances.
Some of the central issues of realism that need a bit of consideration are:
- British economic growth. It is definitely possible, but not to the expansive extent described here. Even 15-20% by 1939 is darn useful, though (cf below)
- American-Canadian trade. The issue has been raised, but then swept away somewhat. Britain was Canada's leading trade partner until the end of the Great War, but the USA overtook it in the 1920s and began to pull away fast, due not only to the massive growth experienced by the US economy in the 1920s, but also emerging structural issues.
Something can be done due to US tariffs, however:
In 1913, the US took a unilateral step in trade liberalization, passing the Underwood Tariff as part of the Revenue Act of 1913. The US initiative was designed to improve competition in the US market. It included a general reduction in tariff rates and the addition of many items to the free list, and it was highly favourable to Canadian exporters. Zero or near-zero tariffs were introduced for steel rails, timber, iron ore, agricultural equipment and a range of farm products. The value of Canadian merchandise exports to the US rose from $34 million in 1886 and $104 million in 1911 to $201 million in 1915 and $542 million in 1921.
But this promising period in Canada–US economic relations came to an abrupt end. Faced with an agricultural crisis, as farm prices collapsed, the US passed the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, which sharply raised tariffs on agricultural imports. This was followed, in 1922, by the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, which completely reversed the trade liberalization in the Underwood Tariff initiative and dealt a harsh blow to Canada. Exports to the US fell to $293.6 million in 1922, from $542 million in 1921. Not surprisingly, Canada and other countries retaliated with higher tariffs of their own.
However, in 1922 and 1923, Canada invited the US to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement. There was no US response. (Canadian exporters did benefit from US prohibition, which ran from January 1920 to December 1933, though smuggling profits did not show up in official statistics).
Canada–US Economic Relations
Economic relations between Canada and the US are of paramount importance to Canada....
www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca
But it isn't going to result in what you've got, which is the USA throwing in the towel and conceding Canada to the British.
- The Balkans situation in general. War with Greece is on the level of clubbing baby seals and they really couldn't field anywhere near the level of forces mooted
- The handwaved solution to India which has removed any of the issues that occurred in @, even the non-political ones. At a baseline, none of the subcontinental states or even the unified Raj aren't going to be deploying what amounts to armoured divisions as of 1940. It seems as if you are trying to fix every major problem and issue as quickly as possible, but sometimes, that doesn't yield the optimal situation.
- Handwaving away the Great Depression. I believe that you can further reduce the impact of the GD on the British economy, which already began to recover a long time before that of the USA comparatively speaking, but we can't knock it out of the way altogether. This leads onto our next point...
- Removal of British war debts by fiat. With a larger economy, they can be afforded, but paying a huge amount off would take the money away from more productive parts of the economy.
- In general, undershooting what is done in some areas and vastly overshooting it in others.
Interwar (Chapter 1) - Fighting the People's War
Fighting the People's War - January 2019
www.cambridge.org
The first link above has interwar spending levels for the Army, RN and RAF between 1924 and 1939, among other data.
The second has some more in-depth RN material for you.
Definitely have a read of the first. If we take the lower figure of 115% of @ GDP, then for the RN alone you have an extra 30 million quid between 1930 and 1934. There will be enough money for substantially more destroyers, 4-5 carriers by 1940 to join Courageous, Glorious and Furious, 5-6 16" KGVs with 6 Lions in the pipeline and more cruisers to cover all commitments if some of the sensible suggestions made in other threads by NOMISYRRUC are followed.
It is possible to go even further by avoiding/changing the 1930 LNT or even rationalising some of the 1920s construction programmes - a stitch in time saves nine and building cruisers in the 1920s saves having them on the ways when you are fighting a war in 1940.
You wouldn't need to make sweeping statements as to the British economy being much stronger than it could be, as, if you use all of the 1920s effectively as suggested, the building blocks for "more than good enough" will be there.
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