1934 Defence Requirements Committee

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I've just started reading John Terraine's The Right of the Line, and one section from very early in the book has jumped out at me.

The Defence Requirements Committee was formed of three senior civil servants (Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Secretaries to the Foreign Office and Treasury, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three services. Their recommendations (march 1934) were:

- Modernisation of the RN battle fleet
- 16 new squadrons for the Fleet Air Arm
- Preparation for an expeditionary force roughly equivalent in size to the BEF of 1914
- Expansion of the RAF at home to 52 squadrons
- Expansion of the RAF overseas by 10 squadrons

Importantly, these were recommendations made jointly by all three Chiefs of Staff. From Terraine's book, they appear to have been derailed almost single-handedly by Neville Chamberlain (at the time Chancellor of the Exchequer). In it's place came a scheme for a much larger expansion of the RAF at home (to 80 squadrons) at the almost complete expense of the RAF overseas and Fleet Air Arm, and 50% cuts to the Army and Navy.

The question then arises - what if Chamberlain had lost the argument? It opens up the possibility of much better cooperation between the services, rather than the turf wars we've seen all too much of. Malaya and Singapore would have been much better defended. The RN battlefleet would have been in better condition, and the BEF would most likely have been stronger too.

 

[Derek Jackson]

So in 1940 Britain has another thousand Gloster Gladiators??

 

[Awilla the Hun]

Or that in 1938, Britain can make a more effective stand over Czechsolovakia. Of course, that depends quite heavily on soft factors (e.g. political opinion.) However, the General Staff at the time were highly pessimistic about the outcome of an attack on the Germans due to the percieved weakness of the British Army. A stronger BEF and RAF (preferably one with a more powerful offensive arm) could increase British confidence.

 

[Cook]

A stronger BEF and RAF (preferably one with a more powerful offensive arm) could increase British confidence.

Look at the figures again, the BEF may be stronger but it would be at the expense of the RAF, which would be weaker.

 

[Awilla the Hun]

Numerically, yes. However, Chamberlain re-routed the focus of defence spending towards a purely air defence based policy, rather than an offensive arm in the form of strategic bombing. A force of bombers able to pulverise resistance on the continent (so the thinking went at the time) could mean a stronger stand against Hitler thanks to this powerful deterrent. Or it could mean nothing due to the bomber always getting through their weak air defence.

 

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The actual aircraft mix wouldn't be a lot different - the bottleneck for the RAF was always pilots, not aircraft - and the development work for both Hurricane and Spitfire predates Chamberlain's intervention.

As I understand it, the changes would be:

Army and Navy stronger, particularly the Fleet Air Arm.
Fighter Command weaker, defence of the colonies stronger, RAF otherwise unchanged.

I'm not sure if there would be much of an impact for quite some time however - the UK was never going to go to war without France, and these changes wouldn't make France any more ready to fight over Czechoslovakia. What they do appear to do, however, is strengthen several areas where the British did badly - at the expense of Fighter Command. One notable area is Malaya - the Japanese were explicitly mentioned as a threat and Chamberlain rubbished this, arguing that the best way to defend against them was to increase the size of Fighter Command, thus deterring Germany.

 

[Hoist40]

But if the RAF at home is not as strong, wouldn’t the British pull back squadrons from places like Singapore to fight the Battle of Britain? Just because there would be a few more overseas squadrons in 1939 does not mean that after two years of fighting in Europe that those squadrons would still be there.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

This is a 1934 proposal, so before the official formation of the Luftwaffe. As the situation in Europe deteriorates I would expect the RAF allowance to be increased. With the British facing a real threat at home I would expect that Australia and New Zealand would be under alot of presure to increase their miniscule armed forces and take a greater part in defending both themselves and the Empire. To a certain extent the same could be said of India but political considerations in the UK would severly limit any move to self sufficency for the sub continent.

One thing that the increase in the Fleet Air Arm could affect would be the timing of it's hand over to the Navy, even a couple of years earlier would make a large difference.

 

[pdf27]

Digging through old issues of Flight for 1934 it appears what actually emerged was 22 new squadrons for the RAF at home, 3 for the Fleet Air Arm and nothing overseas (no idea what happened to the Army and Navy).

Still looking for what the RAF strength at home was in 1934 - the plan previous to this report appears to have been to reach 52 squadrons in 1935-36. At a guess implementing the recommendations would have left

Fighter Command worse off to the tune of 10-20 squadrons.
Fleet Air Arm better off to the tune of 13 squadrons (a very significant increase - in 1939 it was only 20 squadrons!).
Army expeditionary force and RN battle fleet better off.