1930s Royal Navy Sanity options

A thought re the Battle of the River Plate, if the RN was perhaps a bit worried about the lack of heavy guns to punch through armour in TTL due to a lack (sadly) of Counties or Exeter type cruisers, how about putting a Town with Harwood as his flag? So 3 x Leander types and 1 x Town.
It will depend upon what's available at the time. There are only 10 Towns available in my TL the same as OTL. However, there are 4 Modified D (effectively Arethusas), one extra E and 16 extra Leanders, plus the 15 Leanders built instead of the Counties and Yorks. Dudley Pound would be telling Harwood, "You can have any class of cruiser you want as long as it's a Leander!"

Furthermore...
Four Leanders = thirty two 6" guns.

Three Leanders and one Town = thirty six 6" guns​

So I think you don't gain much in practice apart from a bigger target for Graff Spee to concentrate its fire on.
 
A thought re the Battle of the River Plate, if the RN was perhaps a bit worried about the lack of heavy guns to punch through armour in TTL due to a lack (sadly) of Counties or Exeter type cruisers, how about putting a Town with Harwood as his flag? So 3 x Leander types and 1 x Town.
OTOH I have decided to reprieve Hermes as an aircraft carrier.

Originally she was going to be converted to a seaplane carrier in 1935 when relieved by the Third Dreadnought class aircraft carrier. However, this coincides with the Abyssinian Crisis and I have now decided that her conversion would have been put on hold for the duration. This means she survives long enough for the Second London Treaty to be negotiated and the aircraft carrier requirement to be increased to 14 ships. Therefore like Courageous, Glorious and Furious she is kept on as an operational aircraft carrier until the Super Implacable class is built.

In September 1939:
  1. IOTL the aircraft carrier force was 6 ships (Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Glorious, Furious and Hermes) in September 1939 plus Argus as a depot ship.
  2. ITTL the aircraft carrier force was 12 ships (8 Dreadnought class, 3 Courageous class and Hermes) plus Argus and Eagle as depot ships. However, Britannia and Sans Pareil had only just commissioned and were working up.
In both timelines the requirement for 14 aircraft carriers was to meet a perceived need for 8 ships to work with the main fleets, a training ship and 5 ships to help the cruisers hunt down surface raiders on the far seas.

IIRC Ark Royal, Hermes and the French Bearn were each allocated to a hunting group. ITTL one of the six extra aircraft carriers would have been attached to Harwood's force. ITTL Admiral Graff Spee would have been the first warship to have been found and sunk by another warship beyond the horizon.

ITTL Graff Spee might not get as far as the River Plate because another aircraft carrier was allocated to the hunting group covering the Cape of Good Hope.
 
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This is from the transcript I made of Cabined Document CAB/24/247 Image Reference:0064. It is the First Report of the Defence Requirements Committee dated 28th February 1934.
Modernisation of Capital Ships
Cost: £1,861,000, spread over six years
(Table B, Item 2.)​

41. The Admiralty are faced with the fact that Japan, as well as the United States, is carrying out an extensive programme of capital ship modernisation. The Japanese programme will be completed by the end of 1937 and the American by 1938-39. Both the American and Japanese programmes allow for the modernisation of all capital ships, and include re-engining.

42. The Admiralty wish to modernise four capital ships within the next three years, leaving two to be done after 1936.The safest time for carrying out this work is at the same time as Japan; and the most economical time is when the capital ships become due for the large refit which is necessary at intervals in the life of every large man-of-war. The modernisation proposed will consist mainly of additional anti-aircraft protection and armament, and equipment for the operation of aircraft. The plan for modernisation does not include re-engining the ships as in the case of the United States because it is assumed that the battlefleet replacement programme will be insisted on at the 1935 Naval Conference.

43. By 1938,when the Japanese programme will be complete, we will, if this programme is carried out, have seven modernised ships, plus three that do not require modernisation, against the Japanese nine. By 1940 another one will be completed, bringing our total up to eleven. No provision is made for modernising the remaining four capital ships.

44. This clearly shows the smallest possible margin of safety, and we feel sure the Cabinet could not contemplate the possibility that our battlefleet might have to meet an enemy, in an action on which the fate of our Empire may depend, with out-of-date ships.
This might explain why Malaya and Repulse weren't as heavily modernised as Queen Elisabeth, Renown, Valiant and Warspite. That is the refits started before the threat was upgraded.
 
This is from the transcript I made of Cabined Document CAB/24/259 Image Reference:0026. It is the Third Report of the Defence Requirements Committee dated 12th February 1936.
EXPLANATORY NOTES ON APPENDIX 1—BUILDING PROGRAMME.
(A)—Capital Ships.,

In paragraph 14 of Annex III to N.C. (M) (35) 50, Report by the British Representatives on the Anglo-German Naval Discussions, it was stated:—

"In these circumstances, it may be essential for the Naval Staff to recommend a more rapid replacement of the British battlefleet in order to ensure that in new ships the British Fleet does not fall behind the capital ship strength of Japan and Germany combined."

2. The more detailed information of the German building programme that has been communicated to us since the date of that report enables the position to be reviewed in greater detail, taking into consideration also the French and Japanese naval building programmes as far as they are known.

German Capital Ship Building Programme.

3. The German capital ship building programme, which it is intended to complete by the end of 1942, comprises five new capital ships. To enable the fifth ship to be constructed the Germans calculate on transferring tonnage into the capital ship category or on " adjusting " the category tonnage.

4. Capital Ships " D " and " E " of 26,000 tons with 11-inch guns (Ships "A," "B" and "C" are Deutschlands) are expected to complete by the end of 1938; Ship "F" of 35,000 tons with 14-inch or 15-inch guns will be laid down on the 1st July, 1936, and should complete in 1940; Ship "G," which will be of 35,000 tons if France builds a second 35,000-ton ship, is expected to complete in 1941; Ship "H" of the maximum qualitative limit that may be agreed upon is expected to complete in 1942.

Japanese Building Programme.

5. The Japanese building programme is not known, but for the purpose of this paper it is assumed to be not less than that indicated by Admiral Yamamoto as his personal programme, viz., 4 ships to be laid down in the six years 1937-1942, of which 2 ships might be completed by the end of 1942.

French Building Programme.

6. France is building 2 Battle Cruisers of the Dunkerque class, laid down in 1932 and 1934 respectively (26,500 tons each with 8-13-inch guns and high speed); she intends to lay down a new ship of the France class of 35,000 tons, with 15-inch guns, towards the end of 1935, and to lay down a second ship of this class on or after the 1st January, 1937. Further programmes are unknown and probably undecided.

Italian Building Programme.

7. Italy is building 2 ships of 35,000 tons and 15-inch guns, which were laid down in 1934.

Summary of New Ships.

8. Thus, at the end of 1942 we may be faced with a German Capital Ship force of 5 new ships (not including the Deutschlands). During the same period, Japan may have completed at least 2 new capital ships, France 4 or more, and Italy 2.

Modernisation.

9. Japan is modernising all her capital ships, and it is anticipated that all 9 ships will have been modernised before the end of 1937.

10. France is modernising the 3 ships of the Bretagne class which were completed in 1915 and 1916. The 3 ships of the Jean Bart class (completed 1913 and 1914) were extensively refitted in 1929, though it is not considered that they can be regarded as "modernised" ships. The Diderot class (completed, in 1911) have not been modernised and are considered to be of small fighting value. It is possible that they may be scrapped on completion of the new ships, and they have not been included in the comparison of numbers.

11. Italy is modernising her 2 ships of the Giulio Cesare class and greatly increasing their speed.

12. Of the British Fleet, Nelson, Rodney and Hood are post-war ships that do not require modernisation. Warspite, Queen Elizabeth and Renown will be completely modernised. Barham, Malaya, Royal Oak, and Repulse have been or are now in hand for partial modernisation, but they will not be re-engined, nor will they have improvements to main armament mountings or such increased armaments and aircraft. They cannot be counted as " modernised " ships. The remaining 4 ships of the Royal Oak class and Valiant are not being modernised at all.

13. It is desired to emphasise once again that "modernisation" is not a substitute for a proper replacement programme. As was pointed out in the Appendix to N.C. (M) (35) 1, whatever rate of replacement (within practical limits) is adopted, the extreme age to which some of our ships will necessarily have to last must give cause for the greatest anxiety. The present modernisation programme is designed to make the older ships reasonably able to carry out their functions for the period that they must remain in service; it does not make them comparable to new ships. This especially applies to the partly modernised ships.

14. The minimum situation as regards numbers of capital ships with which we may be faced at the end of 1942 is shown below, together with the British position that will result from the adoption of the different replacement programmes indicated:—

There was an excellent chart here that the software won't import

(a) British replacement programme of 2 : 1 : 2 ships a year.
(b) British replacement programme of 2 ships a year.
(c) British replacement programme of 2 : 3 : 2 ships a year.

15. The figures for Japan in this table are based on the assumption that Japan scraps a ship for each new ship completed. Should Japan retain her old ships on completion of the new ones her total would be 11, and by retaining 2 of the older ships (which, however, would not be modernised ships) the British total would be 17. It is worth noting that 35 per cent, of the tonnage represented by these 17 ships would not give Germany sufficient tonnage to build more than the 5 ships already allowed for. If, however, the British number was increased to 18, Germany would have a reasonable claim to build a sixth ship.

16. It will be seen that the British total of 15 ships is approximately equal to the total of Germany and Japan, if we count the 3 Deutschlands as only equal to one ship, but there are 7 new ships in the German-Japanese total, and 7 modernised Japanese ships as well. A British building programme of 2 ships a year (Table C of Enclosure No. 3 to Appendix to N.C. (M) (35) 1) would produce only 6 new ships by the end of 1942, and a programme of 3 ships in 2 years only 5, even if the ships laid down in 1939 were started sufficiently early to ensure their completion within the year 1942. Both of these programmes are inadequate in the face of the German and Japanese programme, which, as stated above, will realise 7 new ships at this date.

17. A building programme of 7 ships in 3 years, to provide equality in new ships only with Germany and Japan, is, therefore, the least that gives reasonable security, and then only if the 1939 ships are laid down sufficiently early to be completed within the year 1942. Moreover, the first 2 ships should be laid down at the earliest possible moment, i.e., January 1937. If Japan starts building at a greater rate than has been assumed in this paper the rate of building would require further acceleration.
 
Also from the Third D.R.C. Report.
(i) Naval increases, such as the additional sum for the modernisation of 4 capital ships which was reported to the Ministerial Committee last July and increased equipments for the A/A armament of the fleet.

In addition, Germany's decision to re-build her fleet by the end of 1942 (limited though her fleet fortunately now is to 35 per cent, of our own) necessitates a more rapid replacement of our old ships.

This is most marked in the case of the capital ship category in which, by the end of 1942, Germany may possess 5 new ships whereas as the result of the postponement of replacement under the London Naval Treaty 11 of our 15 existing capital ships would be 26 years or more old at that time. Lack of manufacturing facilities enhances the importance of an early decision. For example, at present there are in the whole country only four gun pits for the erection of the largest gun mountings.
Therefore there were only enough gun pits in 1936 to build one battleship a year. Back in 1922-24 in the aftermath the Washington Naval Treaty the Admiralty wanted to maintain enough capacity to build 2 battleships a year from 1931.
 
This is from the transcript I made of Cabined Document CAB/24/247 Image Reference:0064. It is the First Report of the Defence Requirements Committee dated 28th February 1934.
This might explain why Malaya and Repulse weren't as heavily modernised as Queen Elisabeth, Renown, Valiant and Warspite. That is the refits started before the threat was upgraded.

Technically HMS Malaya had been treated a full refit just prior to HMS Warspite. Only HMS Barham never was given the full refit, all her sisters got. The Reift of HMS Malaya just was not vissually so vissible as on Warspite and follow up ships, though even she had been uparmored to some extend and had her superstructure altered to accomodate a crossdeck catapult installed, just as her other modernised sisters got, except Barham, which retained her boatstowage behind the funnel and had a catapult on X turret.

bbmalaya.png

HMS Malaya in 1941
hms_barham_1941-03722.jpg

HMS Barham 1941
 
Agree about the boiler additive the RN seemed to have missed a trick there, and leaky RN steam lines are mentioned a lot,

However the USS Washington was more efficent at low speeds because of her use of double reduction gears which let the turbines spin at a faster rate (more efficent) this is at the expense of more weight It also prevents higher speed as you have to increase engine revs a lot to spin the propellers faster.

RN ships had in the case of the KGV single reduction turbines, and thus easier to obtain higher speeds, more turbine RPM gives you more propeller RPM that's why POW could make 29 knots before Engaging the Bismark.

The downside was that at low speeds the turbines had to use lower revs and were thus less efficient hull shape also played a part.

Long story short the USN's battleships were more efficent but slower, the RNs ships were more efficent at high speeds.

I think that USN machinery was in fact a little heavier as they used double recduction gearing and economisers (heat exchangers) to improve fuel efficiency,. While the RN tended to go for heavier Gun armament in the. Pre war destroyers,

Ideally you would go for a Stronger RFA and invent rubber hoses for transferring fuel oil before the Germans.
I think that DR gears and UNIT machinery for destroyers are at best a luxury for the Royal Navy and at worst would do more harm than good.

AFAIK they take up more space than single reduction gears, which therefore require a bigger hull and a bigger displacement, which means fewer ships can be built while the tonnage quotas are in force. My guess is that they are also more expensive than DR gears. IIRC unit machinery was rejected for destroyers because they would be excessively long.

I think that an important reason why the USN put more effort into high pressure boilers, double reduction gearing and refuelling than the RN because its mission was to relieve the Philippines and it only had Hawaii and Guam between the West Coast and Subic Bay.

OTOH the Royal Navy's mission was to relieve Singapore. It could refuel at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden and Trinconmalee if going via the Suez Canal. If it went around the Cape of Good Hope then there were the bases at Freetown and Simonstown between Gibraltar and Aden/Trinconmalee.

The lack of bases could also be why American machinery was more reliable. Put crudely, they didn't want their ships to break down thousands of miles from the nearest garage.
 
Technically HMS Malaya had been treated a full refit just prior to HMS Warspite. Only HMS Barham never was given the full refit, all her sisters got. The Reift of HMS Malaya just was not vissually so vissible as on Warspite and follow up ships, though even she had been uparmored to some extend and had her superstructure altered to accomodate a crossdeck catapult installed, just as her other modernised sisters got, except Barham, which retained her boatstowage behind the funnel and had a catapult on X turret.

bbmalaya.png

HMS Malaya in 1941
hms_barham_1941-03722.jpg

HMS Barham 1941
From June '34 to August '36 Royal Oak was undergoing a major refit. I don't know how much it cost, but it must have been substantial.
Accepting that the R class aren't suitable for major refits, and switching the effort & money to get either a full refit of Malaya, Barham, or Hood looks like a much better use of the money.
Getting the QE's, Renown & Repulse, & Hood battleworthy gives a solid base for a battlefleet with a minimum speed of 23 kts.
Add on the Nelrods and for the mid 30s that is good enough for deployment to wherever they are needed.
The R class then become the reserve fleet, 21 kts (or less as they get older) and good enough to hold the ring while the main fleet is confronting the major threat.
And replaceable as the KGVs come on line.
 
I agree that refitting the R class was pretty pointless. A short refit to work on the machinery and maybe update the AA fit is all the effort that should be expended.
Refitting Hood in 34 instead would be way better; the main reason she wasnt scheduled in OTL was that by 35-36 she was seen as too valuable due to various crises - get her in early before it gets politically difficult.
 
Unit machinery for destroyers starts to look sensible once the displacement gets towards 2,000t. At that size there is a reasonable chance of surviving a single torpedo hit.
With the earlier, small destroyers of around 1400t, its far more likely that a single torpedo will sink or cripple you anyway, so its not worth paying for the extra survivability.

What was really needed was proper trials of RAS, so that in cases where ships had to do long range work they could be refuelled. You might still have problems in the Atlantic in winter, but when the weather is that bad the U-boats aren't usually attacking either.

The RN had actually tried HP steam in two of the A-class destroyers. Apparently it worked well and gave a big fuel saving, but there were vibration issues. These were likely due to the turbine designs of the time not being up to the need. In the mid-30's, the USN beneffitted from a long period of power plant turbine development, which solved the problem. Now if the RN did the same - new turbines, use a modernised version of the proven plant in the A-class, they'd have something not quite as good as the US design, but still a big improvement for not much development work.
 
Also from the Third D.R.C. Report.Therefore there were only enough gun pits in 1936 to build one battleship a year. Back in 1922-24 in the aftermath the Washington Naval Treaty the Admiralty wanted to maintain enough capacity to build 2 battleships a year from 1931.

That wasn't the case.
There were 3 erecting pits at Vickers Barrow, and 4 at Vickers Elswick on Tyne. These were capable of building a triple 16" turret (as per the Nelrods)
After all, the OTL build was 5 BB every 2 years, plus some modernisation work. Hardly one BB a year.
 
Only HMS Hood and the Queen Elisabeth class were worthy a complete refit. HMS Renown was just a prototype for such a major rebuilding, though even after this, she never was an equal in the battlefleet to the other capital ships, so no need to waist money on her aging sister HMS Repulse. Better put this money into new construction, for more benefit. Also the proposed refitting of HMS Nelson and Rodney should have been sped up as good as possiblke, since these two were the most heavily armed ships in the fleet. If this would mean junking HMS Repulse, the fleet would not have been weakened seriously, due to the very limmited fightingcapabilities of the old thincladded ship.
 
That wasn't the case.
There were 3 erecting pits at Vickers Barrow, and 4 at Vickers Elswick on Tyne. These were capable of building a triple 16" turret (as per the Nelrods)
After all, the OTL build was 5 BB every 2 years, plus some modernisation work. Hardly one BB a year.
A lie in British official documents! Surely not!:eek:
 
That wasn't the case.

There were 3 erecting pits at Vickers Barrow, and 4 at Vickers Elswick on Tyne. These were capable of building a triple 16" turret (as per the Nelrods).

After all, the OTL build was 5 BB every 2 years, plus some modernisation work. Hardly one BB a year.
Was that in February 1936 which is the date of the Report? None of the KGVs had been ordered at that point.

Strictly speaking the build was 2 a year except for 3 in 1937-38...

KGV and PoW were ordered in 1936-37, DoY, Anson and Howe in 1937-38, Lion and Temeraire in 1938-39, followed by Conqueror and Thunderer in 1939-40 with 2 more Lions projected for 1940-41.

The original plan was for a laying down rate of 2-3-2-2 over 1937-1938-1939-1940. However, the source might mean the financial year ending 31st March and not the calendar year ending 31st December. This was changed to 5-0-2-2 by bringing the 1938 ships forward to 1937. KGV and PoW were laid down on the earliest possible date allowed by the WNT as amended by the 1LNT, i.e. 1st January 1937.
 
Has anybody got access to a copy of Battleships 1856-1977 by Anthony Preston? IIRC that has the building schedule of KGV and PoW which includes the planned and actual dates for fitting the turrets and it was late delivery of the turrets that were the main cause of their late completion.
 
Was that in February 1936 which is the date of the Report? None of the KGVs had been ordered at that point.

Strictly speaking the build was 2 a year except for 3 in 1937-38...

KGV and PoW were ordered in 1936-37, DoY, Anson and Howe in 1937-38, Lion and Temeraire in 1938-39, followed by Conqueror and Thunderer in 1939-40 with 2 more Lions projected for 1940-41.

The original plan was for a laying down rate of 2-3-2-2 over 1937-1938-1939-1940. However, the source might mean the financial year ending 31st March and not the calendar year ending 31st December. This was changed to 5-0-2-2 by bringing the 1938 ships forward to 1937. KGV and PoW were laid down on the earliest possible date allowed by the WNT as amended by the 1LNT, i.e. 1st January 1937.

I believe the 7 pits was the state during the 30's. The plan was to start the KGV's on 1 Jan 37, and they didnt reopen any pits, so they must have had enough to do the 2 1/2 BB a year they planned.
They were also building some heavy guns for coastal batteries during the 30's; its possible the reference to a BB limit assumed (at the time) that the pits would not have been available.

There is useful info in 'Building for Victory' on a lot of the resources and decisions, as well as manpower alocation.

The delays caused by the turrets in the KGV was the late change to 10x14", they hadn't designed a twin turret and design resources were overloaded.
 
Post 371 on Page 19 has now been updated to Version 3.4 by adding aircraft carriers. I doesn't look that big, but in Word it took up a page-and-a-half, with the margins reduced to 0.5 cm.
 
I believe the 7 pits was the state during the 30's. The plan was to start the KGV's on 1 Jan 37, and they didnt reopen any pits, so they must have had enough to do the 2 1/2 BB a year they planned.

They were also building some heavy guns for coastal batteries during the 30's; its possible the reference to a BB limit assumed (at the time) that the pits would not have been available.

There is useful info in 'Building for Victory' on a lot of the resources and decisions, as well as manpower alocation.

The delays caused by the turrets in the KGV was the late change to 10x14", they hadn't designed a twin turret and design resources were overloaded.
The change from nine 15" to twelve 14" and finally ten 14" didn't help.

However, what I was quoting from was a Cabinet Paper dated February 1936. At the time it was a Top Secret document. I don't see why the Government would say that there were four gun pits in the whole country if there were really seven.
 
Unit machinery for destroyers starts to look sensible once the displacement gets towards 2,000t. At that size there is a reasonable chance of surviving a single torpedo hit.
With the earlier, small destroyers of around 1400t, its far more likely that a single torpedo will sink or cripple you anyway, so its not worth paying for the extra survivability.
Can't remember the names but in the squabbles round Guadalcanal I believe at least one destroyer took a torpedo hit that blew a hole clean through the hull from side to side. If the choice is e.g 10 ships with unit machinery or 12 without, the RN would definitely be better off with 12.
That wasn't the case.
There were 3 erecting pits at Vickers Barrow, and 4 at Vickers Elswick on Tyne. These were capable of building a triple 16" turret (as per the Nelrods)
After all, the OTL build was 5 BB every 2 years, plus some modernisation work. Hardly one BB a year.
I've always been confused by this "gun pit" measure that gets thrown about and why expanding them was such a constraint and so expensive. Then I got "The Battleship Builders" it seems that what was actually present was a large and specialized turret assembly and testing hall, with prodigious hoists and turntables and finishing machinery and whatnot, plus a set number of pits that the turrets were assembled into. So while some expansion was done by adding additional pits into the existing halls, I get the impression the real constraint was all the surrounding infrastructure.

Nearest equivalent I can think of is using 'body drop' as a shorthand for a car assembly line. It gives a good indication of capacity by counting a key constraint, but fails to make clear that adding more body drops doesn't result in lots more cars unless accompanied by more engine foundries, steel presses, body dies, gear cutting, etc etc etc.

Long story short - two buildings in the whole country kitted out for heavy turrets, each capable of working on a few simultaneously and with very limited expansion opportunities unless someone ponies up the capital cost of a whole new facility, plus training specialist labor, plus special machinery, yadda yadda yadda. I think Elswick was actually extended from 3 to 4 in 1936 to support KGV, and there is mention of funding for Barrow to get "three new pits for 14in costing £250,000 to add to the twelve" but that 12 must include smaller pits.

The Vanguard turrets were apparently refurbished in the reopened old COW Scotstoun facility using four pits there, but that plant may not have been capable of fully manufacturing new turrets.

So if there were four added in the 1936 timeframe ( 1 Elswick + 3 Barrow) that might square the numbers conflict.
 
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Has anybody got access to a copy of Battleships 1856-1977 by Anthony Preston? IIRC that has the building schedule of KGV and PoW which includes the planned and actual dates for fitting the turrets and it was late delivery of the turrets that were the main cause of their late completion.

My copy has these dates - Provisional / Actual. Preston says the provisional dates were drawn up in February 1936.

Order for the gun mountings - Apr 36 / Apr 36

Order for two ships - Sep 36 / Jul 36

Laying down of two ships - Feb 37 / Jan 37

Launch - Jan 39 / Feb & May 39

1st turret installed - Mar 39 / Feb 40

2nd turret installed - May 39 / Apr 40

3rd turret installed - Dec 39 / May 40

Completion of ships - Jul 40 / Dec 40 & Mar 41
 
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