175th Anniversary of the Great Revolutions - A short 1848 TL with a German focus

Hi everyone,

when I had to cease writing my last TL, Feeble Constitution, I was certain that I would never again write another TL. It had been my fourth TL, and great fun, too, but it was just so much work, and I was sure I would never be able to again find sufficient time for writing without neglecting my job or my family.

But here I go again! Turns out, I’m addicted to this. To keep things limited, though, I’ve decided to make this a TL in 8 installments only. Here is the plan:

It’s going to be a timeline about successful revolutions in 1848, focusing primarily on Germany. Well, “successful” means they bring about far-reaching changes, not necessarily implying that it’s all for the better.

The TL builds on another unfinished TL from this forum, Primavera d’Italia by @Tarabas and @LordKalvan What this implies is that, before things really take off into my new direction in Germany here, the Italian revolutionaries have already been way more successful than IOTL, uniting behind a confederal solution with a president-type King of Italy and defeating the Habsburg armies decisively, forcing them to the negotiation table. For more details, read their excellent TL!

This TL also builds on another little episode from Primavera d’Italia, which Tarabos, Lord Kalvan and I had come up with together anyway: the Offenburger Blutnacht. It’s going to be an important point of reference for the First Installment, therefore I will quote their description for context then (see below).

The general framework of this TL is that each installment will be from ATL 2023, when Europe celebrates or commemorates (depending on your political-historical perspective) the 175th anniversary of the revolutions. Each installment will be by a different allohistorical author, espousing a different political and historical perspective on TTL’s post-1848 history each time.

And, and here comes the complicated twist:

Each of these installments / texts will be in the form of TTL’s “alternate history”. This means that the installments will actually be DBWI. I have, nevertheless, decided not to post this TL in “Shared Worlds”, because all my authorial comments and any discussion in the thread is not supposed to be “in context”, i.e. it doesn’t require us role-playing that that alternate history that I’m telling as background has actually really happened. Each installment will reflect and speculate on what would have happened if things had gone differently than they went ITTL – and these “divergences” will, in the best tradition of DBWIs, be much closer to OTL’s course of events than TTL’s canon. Thus, what “actually happened” ITTL will indirectly emerge from these speculations and their comparisons with what they declare as real history (but which is, of course, just this allohistorical timeline that I am sketching).

Given that all eight texts are looking back at 1848 from alt-2023, you can imagine that I have sketched the entire history of the world throughout the 175 years in between – although this sketch is, necessarily, very, very general. This sketched framework I shall try to stick with, come what may in terms of criticism and suggestions, because otherwise the entire edifice would collapse and it would be a LOT more work for me, which I do not feel up to shouldering. But that doesn’t mean that I’m not open to suggestions at all: The sketch is, as I said, rather rough and has many blanks all over the world and in much of the details. Thus, if you come up with suggestions about specific events, places or time spans, I’m always open to discuss them and even to include them if they’re not likely to change the broad strokes of the course of world history that I have already composed.

Now, without further ado, let’s plunge right in! Hope you enjoy it!

Installment One: What if Hecker had not been shot?

This year, we are celebrating the 175th anniversary of our Revolutions, along with many other European countries. 1848 marked a historical watershed in many countries: constitutions were established, liberties enshrined, political participation widened. Of all these revolutionary transformations, those in our country stand out in uniqueness. Not only because the French and the Dutch, Danes, Romanians and others obtained their freedoms with relatively little bloodshed, while our struggle for national unification and independence, freedom and democracy lasted for two exhausting years and claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of national martyrs.

It also stands out because, of all the revolutions that swept our continent, the German one was not only the one facing the worst odds, but also the one most likely not to unfold as a real revolution at all.

If you looked at Europe in the spring of 1847, just a year before the revolutions took their course, you would not have believed that the German monarchs and their oppressive governments would really face a united and determined opposition in just one year’s time. Bad harvests and crop diseases were causing famine across the continent, petty craftsmen threatened in their livelihood by the burgeoining industries protested violently, while industrial production suffered a downturn, too, creating unemployment and abject poverty in the sprawling urban-industrial regions in turn. The suffering continent was in agony and just one step away from uproar, yes. But just as the greatest crisis of the old order was drawing near, the main oppositional political forces in the German lands seemed to drift farther and farther apart from each other, sometimes mistrusting the other more than they mistrusted their governments. The Hallgartenkreis, which had been the most important forum of dialogic exchange between various oppositional factions from all over the German lands since 1832, had no longer brought together moderate liberals and radical democrats in the past two years as cautious moderates like Friedrich Daniel Bassermann and Heinrich von Gagern had no longer frequented it, leaving only the Radicals still meeting there. From their exile in Brussels, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had enthusiastically proclaimed in a manifesto that “the specter of communism” was haunting Europe, and Bassermann was warning against sans-culottist anarchism in the “Deutsche Zeitung”. As dissatisfaction and despair grew across the German lands, radical democrats and moderate liberals had already begun to prepare for two separate conventions, both of which were supposed to take place in the comparatively liberal Grand Duchy of Baden. The Left had chosen Offenburg for their meeting. The meeting of the moderates was supposed to take place in Heppenheim – but it was cancelled by a committee presided over by Johann Adam von Itzstein after the bloodbath of Offenburg and Hecker’s martyrdom there. Cancelling the Heppenheim convention happened firstly out of fear that another such tragedy might occur – but secondly, and much more importantly, it happened because key Southern German liberal thinkers like Itzstein and Karl Mathy had lost their faith in achieving their reform agenda by working towards concessions from the governments and concluded that, if the old regime was too rigid and tactless and unable to prevent a popular revolution against it, then the sensible moderate politicians would have to lead it onto an orderly path. Thus came about the rapprochement between liberals and radicals, in which Robert Blum, Heinrich von Gagern and Mathy played important roles at this stage, the common support for demands based on the “Offenburg Charter”, including the establishment of national guards, which proved of utmost value in the military confrontations that followed.

But what if Friedrich Hecker had not been shot? What if the authorities had had the common sense not to create martyrs, and had sent spies instead of dragoons, and let the assembled radicals meet, and disperse again, perhaps apprehending and indicting one or two among them afterwards for good measure?

We have no way of gaining certainty about this question. But if Hecker had not been killed, the moderate “halves” would have met separately from the radical “wholes”, and there would have been two conflicting strategies vis-à-vis the state governments and the path to national unification. We are so used to the party duopoly of Liberals and Democrats, to their perennial rivalry and mutual accusations of betrayal of the national cause, the first of which the Democrats insist was committed in 1850 by the Liberals, that we tend to forget that these differences had emerged markedly before the Revolution already. It is indeed rather the two or three years before and during the Revolution and the ensuing war and their alliance between the various moderate/liberal and radical/democratic factions that stands out as the historical oddity. If the bloodbath of Offenburg had not occurred and had not welded the rivalling oppositional factions back together, their enmities might have persisted uninterrupted, and that would have certainly influenced the course of 1848ff. Revolutionary turmoil might still occur after the events in France and Italy, but an opposition divided among itself might have been more easily suppressed. Or, if the powers of the old order had not just had the good sense not to shoot at unarmed civilians, but also to offer concessions when popular pressure increased, they might have been able to avert a bloody political conflict in 1848 altogether and embarked on a path of incremental change over the following decades.

The revolutions of 1848 happened, and succeeded, because of political, economic, social, religious, and cultural changes that went much deeper – generally speaking. But the dynamics of a revolution are always unpredictable, as we have only recently witnessed in the Ottoman State. If Hecker had not become a martyr, if the government of Baden had not squandered the moderates’ trust in that black night in Offenburg – then Germany might not have inherited France’s reputation as the continent’s leading manufacturer of revolutions. The course of its history might even have resembled more closely that of our arch-rivals across the Channel. Small causes can sometimes bring about great effects.



***

And with TTL’s formulation of the Butterfly Effect, I’ll conclude the first installment. I am curious to hear about your opinions!As I said, I took the idea of the Offenburger Blutnacht from the TL Primavera d’Italia, along with that TL’s entire take on events in Italy and its war with Austria; that is all canon for TTL, too. You can read up on @LordKalvan’s and @Tarabos’s tale of the Offenburger Blutnacht here.

From mid-March 1848 on, a PoD ensures that this TL diverges from the course of events outlined in Primavera d’Italia. I will divulge that PoD in the Second Installment. Therefore, a few of the descriptions given in the quoted passage from Primavera d’Italia do not belong in the canon of TTL. Here, I present you with a modified quotation from their TL here to mark what exactly is canon ITTL:

A Waterloo of Law and Order - Part 2

London - 12 April 1848, Evening

"It doesn't mean that we can be confident that the Germanies are stable, though. The Grand Duchy of Baden may become a significant concern on the map of Germany, small as it is. In September last year, the radicals organized a political rally in a small town named Offenburg: ostensibly, it was a campaign rally for a by-election to the Lower Chamber. It shouldn't have been worthy of notice, but Offenburg appears to be a node of the western Germany railways, and instead of the few scores of people that such a rally would have attracted, over a thousand radicals arrived in Offenburg, not just from Baden but also from Frankfurt, Hesse, and the Prussian Rhineland. For reasons I find very hard to fathom, the government of Baden had the brilliant idea of dispersing the rally, even if by all account it was quite a peaceful demonstration: a lot of speeches, a list of demands, the signing of petitions. If I had to guess, I'd say that Metternich is the true culprit for what happened: since the rally was notified in advance to the authorities, some petty bureaucrat in Frankfurt must have decided that the rally contravened the Carlsbad Dictates, and put on notice his counterpart in Baden. They didn't send constables to keep an eye on the rally and disperse it if it was going to become too bumptious: they sent two hundred dragoons, probably under the command of some aristocratic blockhead, and things went from ugly to worse. There was a score of casualties, three scores of arrests, but that was not the worst." Lord Palmerston stopped for a moment, to sip from his glass of sherry, then went on: "There were a number of journalists covering the event, and by next day the news of the Offenburg Night-of-Blood (1) was reported all over Western Germany, including the list of demands presented by the radicals and all the gory details of the affray. Overnight, a folk hero was born: a Friedrich Hecker, who was portrayed killed in cold blood, defending women and children.
The government of Baden didn't even have the good sense to let things go: the arrested were put on trial, and suddenly there was a cause célèbre, with all the proceeds reported on a daily basis. There was a lively parliamentary debate in the Lower House of Baden, with motions and interrogations which failed to carry a majority, but had the effect of pushing liberals and radicals into closer cooperation. When the news of the French revolution reached Karlsruhe, there were rallies and riots, and on 4 March the Lower House approved almost unanimously the Charter of Offenburg, as it came to be known. The old government was replaced by a new one, a coalition of democrats and liberals, a National Guard was formed, and armed. Even the army had to swear fealty to the Constitution and Parliament. It goes without saying that the events in Karlsruhe influenced all its neighbors: Hesse and Wurttemberg have already granted a National Guard, and even Bavaria, where king Maximilian was only recently crowned after the Estates forced his father to abdicate for being a spendthrift and also for his scandalous relationship with a dancer […], is seriously considering it.
Similar events happened in Saxony too, although without violence. A petition based on the Charter of Offenburg was submitted, there were rallies in Dresden, and in the end, the government resigned, and the Charter was approved. Now there is a liberal government there too, a National Guard has been created and the army has sworn an oath on the constitution.
The situation is potentially very unstable, because a preliminary parliament has self-installed itself in Frankfurt, with a significant radical presence, and German political expatriates in France and Switzerland have crossed the border of Baden.”
[…]

Footnotes

  1. The Offenburger Blutnacht is where the political history of Germany diverges from OTL. The harshness of the repression did much to shatter the complacency of the Western German liberals. It didn't happen in Baden, the German state with quite a decent constitution, by happenstance: the most astute political observer that is playing a center-stage role in this TL, the Count of Cavour, commented that granting a Constitution is not the end of a political process, but rather the start of it, and its effect cannot be truly understood until things start to change in a macroscopic way. The press coverage of the massacre gave unexpected publicity to the Offenburg Charter, a German folk hero was born (and not the usual caricature of a revolutionary or an anarchist: for good or for bad, Friedrich Heckler became overnight a byword for a stout German burgher who stands firm in defense of women and children. It's doubtful that he had time for any significant last word, but all the reporters wrote that in his last defiance he spoke the same words that Luther spoke at the Diet of Worms: "Hier stehe ich. Ich kann nicht anders", "I stand here. I cannot do otherwise", and even nowadays these words remain an integral part of his legend). The divergence started slowly, first the horror for the massacre, then the sympathy for the Demands of the People, followed by a tentative rapprochement between liberals and radicals, and finally the integral adoption of the Charter by the Lower Chamber of Baden.
 
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Hello @Salvador79 .
I love your approach to the seminal years of 1848-49, and I will certainly follow with interest the way you're going to develop the narration.

You're quite right when you say that the reactionary governments developed a strategy of appeasement of the revolutionaries and insurgents in order to survive the first critical months of 1848 (as a matter of fact, I do believe it wasn't so much a conscious decision, but rather the effect of the paralysis of said governments after the Metternich system went crashing down and both Metternich and Guizot were kicked out of the position of power that they had enjoyed for many years. Whatever the reason for this appeasement, the net result was very beneficial for the reaction: as they say, sometimes the only winning strategy is not to play ;) ). This also explains why in our TL @Tarabas and I chose to have the reaction to react in a stronger, and dumber, way.
 
Hello @Salvador79 .
I love your approach to the seminal years of 1848-49, and I will certainly follow with interest the way you're going to develop the narration.

You're quite right when you say that the reactionary governments developed a strategy of appeasement of the revolutionaries and insurgents in order to survive the first critical months of 1848 (as a matter of fact, I do believe it wasn't so much a conscious decision, but rather the effect of the paralysis of said governments after the Metternich system went crashing down and both Metternich and Guizot were kicked out of the position of power that they had enjoyed for many years. Whatever the reason for this appeasement, the net result was very beneficial for the reaction: as they say, sometimes the only winning strategy is not to play ;) ). This also explains why in our TL @Tarabas and I chose to have the reaction to react in a stronger, and dumber, way.
Great to have you on board!

Yes, Offenburg was a dumb and strong reaction. In TTL's March 1848 and the following months, I have planned with a mixture of dumb-and-strong and passive/adaptive reactions.
Only, "adaption" will mean something different ITTL than IOTL because the protesting opposition groups are pursuing a more militant course, and the dumb-and-strong reactions of some governments create entirely different circumstances for everyone else involved. The agreement to field National Guards in your and this TL by some governments is already a sign for how "adaptation" means something different from OTL here.
 
Great to have you on board!

Yes, Offenburg was a dumb and strong reaction. In TTL's March 1848 and the following months, I have planned with a mixture of dumb-and-strong and passive/adaptive reactions.
Only, "adaption" will mean something different ITTL than IOTL because the protesting opposition groups are pursuing a more militant course, and the dumb-and-strong reactions of some governments create entirely different circumstances for everyone else involved. The agreement to field National Guards in your and this TL by some governments is already a sign for how "adaptation" means something different from OTL here.
I don't want to appear to be pushy, but I was musing on the possibility that the expulsion of the Prussian Constitutional Assembly from Berlin and its removal to Brandenburg might come earlier ITTL (say at the end of June-mid July 1848 instead of early November). There are different reasons which might produce this result: Austria has been compelled to ask for a cease fire in Italy and the peace talks have started (the Austrian position is very weak, both internally and internationally, in particular after the double defeat in Friuli, coupled with the dissatisfaction of the Croats and Serbians in the empire and the highly likelihood of heightened ethnic strife in Bohemia: this might end up to a military occupation of Prague, like OTL, and even to talks for a very early Ausgleisch with Hungarians), the king of Prussia might have declined to intervene in Holstein (which almost happened OTL, and anyway the Prussians pulled out very quickly), the Prussian aristocracy might be more vociferous or the health of the king might take a turn for the worse, with an early temporary regency of the Kronprinz. Just a few ideas tossed up to see if anything sticks.
 
I don't want to appear to be pushy
Oh, don't worry, keep the good ideas coming! :) Always good to speculate with others who are knowledgeable about the situation of 1848.
Austria has been compelled to ask for a cease fire in Italy and the peace talks have started (the Austrian position is very weak, both internally and internationally, in particular after the double defeat in Friuli, coupled with the dissatisfaction of the Croats and Serbians in the empire and the highly likelihood of heightened ethnic strife in Bohemia:
Yes, all of this applies here and influences the course of action in the German lands. I'll discuss the situation in the Habsburg Empire in the Fourth Installment in some detail. Emperor Franz Karl's government is truly weak indeed right now. I've been trying to exactly ascertain, but somehow found it difficult to find out exactly when von Metternich is dismissed in your TL (OTL, it was on March 14th). He is not replaced by Kolowrat like IOTL, if I guess it right, but by whom? Schwarzenburg? Fiquelmont?
but I was musing on the possibility that the expulsion of the Prussian Constitutional Assembly from Berlin and its removal to Brandenburg might come earlier ITTL (say at the end of June-mid July 1848 instead of early November) [...] the Prussian aristocracy might be more vociferous or the health of the king might take a turn for the worse, with an early temporary regency of the Kronprinz. Just a few ideas tossed up to see if anything sticks.
One of these suggestions comes somewhat close to what I will indeed reveal in the Second Installment ;-)
 
Yes, all of this applies here and influences the course of action in the German lands. I'll discuss the situation in the Habsburg Empire in the Fourth Installment in some detail. Emperor Franz Karl's government is truly weak indeed right now. I've been trying to exactly ascertain, but somehow found it difficult to find out exactly when von Metternich is dismissed in your TL (OTL, it was on March 14th). He is not replaced by Kolowrat like IOTL, if I guess it right, but by whom? Schwarzenburg? Fiquelmont?
Metternich was sent packing on schedule on 14 March 1848, and by the beginning of May should be in Great Britain, arriving from the Netherlands. Obviously the different turn of events in Italy will ensure that he will not receive a warm welcome and will be advised to go back to the Netherlands or Belgium earlier than it happened IOTL, where he stayed in London for 18 months (having a Metternich lobbying in the shadows during the peace conference might be a source of embarrassment for the British government. Of course, the peace conference between the Italian Confederation and Austria does not necessarily needs to be held in London. Bruxelles or Zurich might be good suggestions for alternate sites).
After Metternich's dismissal, von Kolowrat was chosen as Chancellor by Archduke Ludwig, who was the chair of the Staatskonferenz (the Regency Council for the impaired emperor Ferdinand, his nephew). Von Kolowrat was certainly a statesman, but his power basis was restricted to Treasury, and he was also handicapped by bad health.
The truth is that Metternich was in power for too many years, and his sudden dismissal left a vacuum which was difficult to fill. In the end, von Kolowrat lost his chancellorship both IOTL and TTL, and was replaced by von Fiquelmont, the minister for Foreign Affairs (and a former protégé of Metternich).
Von Schwarzenberg was (no surprise) another protégé of Metternich, and ITTL he returns to Vienna earlier than IOTL: the big difference is that ITTL he has a completely different perception of Italian affairs and is convinced that the war must end before the empire breaks up. He may be a good choice for the Chancellorship (with the support of Archduke Franz Karl and his wife Sophia of Bavaria) and is certainly a better politician than von Fiquelmont but both of them are clearly on the reactionary side (and von Kolowrat is not a bleeding liberal for sure).
Now the big questions are:
  • when will a ceasefire be in place and the peace conference is planned?
  • is Austria going to make some stupid diplomatic move to put pressure on the south-western German states who are going liberal?
  • will Schwarzenberg be able to solidify his planned cabal with von Kolowrat and general Alfred von Windisch-Graetz (who is in command of the Austrian troops outside Vienna? Note that the three of them are from Bohemian families, and von Windisch-Graetz married a Schwarzenberg princess. Of course, the cabal needs some support in the dynasty, which is why I mentioned Sophia of Bavaria (Franz Karl is not the man for decisive actions)
One of these suggestions comes somewhat close to what I will indeed reveal in the Second Installment ;-)
Happy to hear that. :)
Oh, don't worry, keep the good ideas coming! :) Always good to speculate with others who are knowledgeable about the situation of 1848.
Totally in agreement with you. :)
 
Guys,
there is good news (for me personally), which are probably bad news for this TL project.
I have been offered a permanent professorship at a German university, something which I have been striving towards for the last couple of years. I am quite happy now, as you can imagine. But it also means yet more work and responsibility, and probably even less time for AH.com.
I fear this might mean at least a hiatus for this TL. I don't know yet if I'll take it up later or not - the topic certainly continues to fascinate me, and throwing away all the work I've done in planning it also doesn't sit well with me. But, as I said, there will be very very little time for such projects in the foreseeable future.
Sorry folks!
 
Installment 2 and Announcement of Abandoning the TL: What if Friedrich Wilhelm IV. had not died in 1848?
OK, so I've settled a little into my new position, and it probably will allow me to dedicate small, marginal amounts of time to writing AH.com, I think.
But the thing with this TL idea is... I have come to see one of its cornerstones as probably too much wishful thinking on my part.
Therefore, I've decided to drop this project and officially declare the TL abandoned.
But not without disclosing my notes and thoughts and opening them up for discussion with you, if you're interested.

I'll structure this mostly in accordance with the notes for the six future updates which I had sketched, and interspersed with the notes for each of these updates, I will expand on some things in greater detail (like how I thought the revolution would proceed, why I now doubt this course of action, but also what other developments in terms of German politics, European conflicts etc. I had in mind and still find interesting, even though I think the way there is flawed).

To make it more readable, I'll divide the sketch into mini-sketches for the updates which I had initially planned, threadmark these, and also indicate in the title what else can be found in that sketch.

Installment no. 2 is already written, so I just retconed a few things, and here it is:

Installment 2: What if Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Had Not Died in 1848?

Daydreams of Phoenixes, or: Why Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Would Not Have Made Any Difference


A political blog entry by Francesca Ramelow [1]

On my way home from the commemoration ceremony around our home town’s cenotaph, I overheard a conversation of a couple of Phoenixes [2] who were roughly of the same age as I am. He said something to the usual Phoenix tune of “all this hero cult of the dead is crap, yeah sure it’s awful that so many people had to die, but they started a war, what can you expect from a war except to die?” I was already annoyed by him, but what she said really surprised me – in a bad way, even for a Phoenix: “Yes, such a big stupidity. If only Friedrich Wilhelm had not died – he could have averted it all.”

Of course I spoke up. I had to congratulate them for choosing to live in a country where they were free to express their opinion, regardless of how stupid it was, without having to fear political police and prison. And that the heroes of 1848 had fought and died so that they could enjoy this freedom. The usual sermon.

What I did not reply to was the monarchist nonsense of the woman. The gigantic moronity of it has haunted me all day. Therefore, this is the reply that I should have given her:

No, Friedrich Wilhelm IV., King of Prussia, would not have averted “it all”. If he had not died of his apoplectic stroke on March 19th, he would in all likelihood have taken the same decisions that in the real course of events, his brother, King Wilhelm the Traitor, took. [3] Why? Because all Prussian monarchs with any amount of real power were always ever focused on one thing: maximizing their power. Wilhelm drowned the Polish Revolution in blood, just like his grandfather had done before him. [4] Wilhelm tried to prevent his people with guns from freely electing their representatives, just like his nephew would four decades later. [5] Wilhelm called the Russians, just like his father had sworn to do when he and Tsar Alexander had forged their unholy alliance. Wilhelm trusted nobody but his aristocratic military officers, like all Prussians kings. What evidence is there to assume that Friedrich Wilhelm IV. would have acted radically different as King of Prussia in response to the unfoldings of the Great Revolution, which threatened his power? Why would he allow free elections to the National Assembly when it was clear that they yield republican majorities? [6] What would compel him to accept von Thile’s resignation in the midst of revolutionary chaos? [7] Why would he allow the Poles to form a free nation when he could slaughter them so easily? [8]

Condemning war for the horrors it inflicts upon many, and also wishing for ways in which the martyrs of the revolution did not have to die so young, are understandable impulse we may have all felt at some point in time. Fooling yourself that their sacrifices could have been unnecessary, if some benign ruler had steered an enlightened course, is dangerously naïve at best. It devalues the sacrifice of our forefathers and jeopardises their heritage which we enjoy today, in the light of renewed autocratic threats. I hope that others in my generation, and those who are younger still, will realise in greater numbers that behind the cool, unorthodox, bohemien, profound-sounding, pacifistic attitude of Phoenix student groups and the like only lurks the grimace of aristocratic elitism.


[1] Our author is a female born into a Protestant family from which IOTL the Linke politician Bodo Ramelow emerged. Like her OTL kin, she is a left-leaning person, and she is specifically anti-monarchist, as this article clearly shows. In OTL’s present-day Germany, there are almost no supporters of any kind of monarchy left, thus it does not make much sense to define oneself as an anti-monarchist. ITTL, things are different.

[2] A cultural-political group which I'll explain in the next sketch.

[3] This is where my TL diverges from Primavera d’Italia. IOTL and ITTL, the protests escalated in Berlin on May 18th/19th, where the revolutionaries erected barricades and the Prussian military shot at them, killing over 300 people in the process. IOTL, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. is rumoured to have almost suffered a stroke. ITTL, he succumbs to this stroke. IOTL, he cunningly decided to pretend to take up the mantle of national liberation, beginning with his famous tour of Berlin on the 21st, wearing the black-red-and-gold. ITTL, his brother Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig, whom OTL knows as “Wilhelm I.” but most of TTL’s Germans call “Wilhelm the Traitor” while most Poles call him “Wilhelm the Butcher”, takes over. During the revolution, he earned the epithet “der Kartätschenprinz”, so the kind of repression that ensued should not be unpredictable.

[4] OTL reference to Friedrich Wilhelm II. partitioning Poland and defeating Koszciuszko’s Revolt.

[5] – Adjusted footnote, now I don’t plan to write the TL properly: -- This will probably not be disclosed in sufficient detail, but I will shortly sketch what I had in mind for the rest of the 19th century in one of the next sketches.

[6] They would ITTL – quite differently from OTL – because those regions under Wilhelm’s control did not allow the elections to happen, so votes only came in from regions controlled by the rebels. (Mostly from the Rhineland and Westphalia.)

[7] IOTL, FW4 accepted von Thile’s resignation because his scheme to make himself look like the leader of German national unity seemed to work and to fool the revolutionaries. FW4 appointed, after a short intermezzo with the head of the Herrenhaus, Arnim-Boitzenburg, the moderate reformer Ludolf Camphausen, which gave the liberals high hopes.

[8] IOTL, FW4 used a mixture of false promises, which induced the Polish rebels to abandon their efforts at arming themselves, and violent repression. ITTL, Poland is the first victim of Wilhelm the Butcher’s anti-revolutionary clampdown; there are no promises of Polish representation given at all; instead, the military is sent in against a quickly forming Polish revolt. Throughout April, the revolt unfolds its full tragic potential, with the rebels resisting over the course of several weeks, only to be slaughtered by the thousands.

As with her other rhetorical questions, Francesca may be excused for her implicit assumption of tertium non datur, since in her TL, this maneuvre of feigned concessions, followed by hard-handed restoration, is really not something she could have learned from observing 19th century German history. (But, of course, looking at how strong peasant revolts were treated in the Middle Ages could have given her a clue.)



This installment really calls for an explanation of German political groups. Who are the Phoenixes, and what other political groups are there? I'll elaborate on that in my next sketch post.
 
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Sketch for German Political Groups and Parties post-1848
So here are my ideas for a system of German parties and political groups from 1848 onwards, as much as possible towards the present, attempting to explain who these weird "Phoenixes" are, too:

I would expect a parliamentary system based on a constitution written in 1848 (or 1849) to be based on a first-past-the-post-system. There are three main reasons for that:
  • Political parties are just about to form. They already exist in Britain, to some extent, and in the US. In Germany, they are only just emerging, and basing elections on lists only makes sense if these lists are carried by parties.
  • The models the revolutionaries could look to, Britain and the US, both are first-past-the-post-systems. And, most importantly,
  • The OTL electoral law established a first-past-the-post-system with constituencies of (principally) 100,000 people, too.
FPTP election laws tend to favour two-party systems (complemented by regional parties or temporary third parties at best). I would assume this goes for Germany, too, with the role of minor regional parties played by national parties of the Czech in Bohemia, the Slovenians in Carinthia, and Poles / Kashubians in the Eastern half of Prussia. (Not the Danes in Südschleswig because of how the 1848 revolution unfolded ITTL, with no war ensuing in 1864 and thus Schleswig remaining a part of Denmark in its entirety.)

The two main parties, I imagined, would be the Democrats and the Liberals.
They would be the victorious, yet rivalling, forces of the Great Revolution, at the same time being the heirs of the pre-revolutionary "wholes" and "halves".
In many ways, we would consider the Democrats to be the more left-leaning party, and the Liberals to be the more right-leaning party:
The Democrats supported (and achieved) nationalised railroads and mining, and they would continue to advocate for (and partly achieve, at times) more state ownership and intervention into industrial matters; they supported the abolition of any public debts resulting from the abolition of feudal privileges wholeheartedly and pressed for land reform in the 19th century; they are seen as more close to the trade unions and in favour of comprehensive welfare, free, comprehensive, secular and non-tiered public education, of progressive income taxation to fund all of this, and the like.
The Liberals oppose(d) much of the above, supporting (and partly achieving) better opportunities for private enterprises on all levels, free trade (well, most of the time), the sacronsanctity of property rights, less state inferference in education, and lower taxes (especially for the well-to-do).
But Democrats and Liberals ITTL would also take on positions that we might not associate so easily with the left or the right respectively, as a result of how different TTL's history of Germany (and the world) proceeded:
In short, the Democrats are seen, and see themselves, as the heirs of those who steered the National Assembly into its collision course with the monarchical powers of the day, who oversaw the armament of the population / the levee en masse and the orchestration of (mostly Rhenish) industry towards fully supporting the republican side in the first industrial mass war on German soil, as the ones who supported democratic revolutionaries abroad, too, and also the ones who were stabbed in the back by the Liberals and associated generals and the conspiracy who had secured Britain's and France's (and other minor powers') support for a constitutional settlement that, to some extent, restored Germany's monarchies in a new constitutional fashion, and which enabled a peace deal with Russia.
The Democrats are not exactly the equivalent of the Jacobins of the French Revolution, not just because they didn't have much time for guillotines and didn't ramble on about the Supreme Being or virtue and instead were economically a lot more socialistic, but also because, threatened by Russia's invasion in alliance with Prussia's King Wilhelm, they were the Party of War in 1848/9 (which in the French Revolution was more like the Girondins' role).
In the first post-revolutionary parliaments and presidencies, the Democrats formed the opposition. Socio-economic circumstances were not quite ready for their ambitious economic program yet - and on that matter, the Democrats were also divided between an anti-industrial crafters' wing and the pro-development wing led by Karl Marx, who ITTL was a Secretary for Armament and Industrial Organisation from mid-1848 on and later became a leading parliamentarian member of the Democrats -, and a war-exhausted populace preferred peace over another bloody campaign to help liberate the Poles etc., too. Liberal Presidents and Volkshaus majorities in the 1850s, on the other hand, sought to tread carefully and integrate Germany into the emerging new continental order without behaving like a bull in a china shop.
As a result, the Democrats have always been seen as the party of military intervention in favour of democracy and liberation. This Left is not pacifistic at all, and neither is it anti-nationalistic, in spite of Marx being there and important. The Democrats have supported, as much as they could, the Polish, Hungarian, Romanian etc. struggles for national liberation. The same cannot be said consistently about the inhabitants of the colonial possessions which this Germany would acquire, sadly, though: throughout the 19th century and for the first part of the 20th century, too, the Democrats - aside from minoritarian strands within the party - stood by and even actively pursued the agenda of Germany's colonial empire, cloaking it in the usual hypocritical discourses about "helping backwards people to progress faster", "abolishing slavery", "bringing modernity" etc. These times are past today, and Democrats as well as Liberals have come to see colonialist racism in different, more critical terms mostly, like the political mainstream of other European nations, too - but the Democrats certainly aren't and have never been anti-nationalist. The black-red-and-gold is waved on trade union rallies, strikes and protest marches supported by Democratic politicians to a degree that an OTL German of 2023 (or any other time post-1945) would find weird for "the Left".

The Liberals, on the other hand, are not exactly what you'd expect from a right-of-centre political group of Germany's OTL history at any given point in time post-1848, either: they're not jingoistic (most of the time), they're not anti-semitic (at least not more than the rest), they're not specifically pro-American (I'll come to that when I talk about continental and world political consequences of 1848), they're rather Francophile. They're just as much positively obsessed by the idea of "progress" as the Democrats are.

This specific duopoly leaves, like any constellation of course especially in a FPTP system, quite a bit of political preferences marginalised. Initially, this meant primarily conservative groups. They were tainted by the association with the old regime which had called on the Russians to help murder hundreds of thousands of freedom-loving Germans, and a proper conservatism would never really emerge within the German political landscape again. That doesn't mean conservative views are not shared by people, too - but they don't cohere into a sufficiently large political bloc. The same goes for religious / confessionalist groups - IOTL the only confession which coalesced into a political party early was Catholics, and the Kulturkampf had a lot to do with that. ITTL, new religious groups are forming in 1848 like they were IOTL, and while there are some associations of which confession is more likely to vote Liberal or Democrat, it's not something that would really form a sufficient base for a successful third party.

The "Phoenixes" which I mentioned in update 2 are a mixture of many of the things that are being left out or marginalised by the political duopoly which I have described here, combined with longer-standing cultural tendencies within the German-speaking realms. They're the latest reiteration of a number of vaguely oppositional groups and movements that emerged at the turn of the 19th/20th centuries and took on different shapes in different generations.
Where both Liberals and Democrats support military interventions, where deemed necessary by state reason, the Phoenixes (or "Greens" as they are also sometimes referred to here and how some of them used to call themselves at some points in time, but don't confuse them with OTL's Greens!) are avowed pacifists.
Where both Liberals and Democrats support industrialisation, enhancing infrastructure (like railways, canals, dams, power plants, roads, electricity lines etc.), the Phoenixes defend their idealised view of untouched "Nature".
Where both Liberals and Democrats support state-controlled educational curricula and globally competitive institutions of higher learning and scientific research, the Phoenixes propagate "experiencing nature" (from hiking camps over nudism to agricultural experiments that would make even OTL's Rudolf Steiner raise his eyebrows), "free art", "free talk" and "real community" (you all have stereotypes of 1960s/70s sects in your head that might suit here - combine them with OTL's German youth culture of the 1900s to 1920s...), and they would gladly quote OTL's Pink Floyd's "Hey teacher, leave them kids alone!".
Where the youth organisations of the two major political parties are pragmatic machines in which those engage who want to "play the political game seriously", the Phoenixes draw on all sorts of excentric groups and tastes who shout loudly and love to parade their chosen fringe identity.
Now while ill-meaning voices might say this doesn't sound so very different from at least the early years of the OTL Greens, here are some features of the Phoenixes that don't have anything to do with what we know as the Greens, and instead hearken back to cultural strands from at least as far back as the Romanticists:
Where the underlying social culture of both the Liberal and Democratic milieus are corporatist to some degree - whether it is your trade union, your lawyers' guild, your church, your football club: you choose it rationally / strategically, and then you superficially conform to its established common customs, while privately thinking and doing whatever you like -, the Phoenixes are wildly individualistic and celebrate what they deem as "unique genius" above everything else. This is a streak which, from the beginning, has attracted many a dislodged young person of aristocratic descent to their ranks - just like the next one:
Where both Liberals and Democrats are looking optimistically towards the future and consider themselves "progressive" (probably both inheriting some dose of Hegelianism, but that was also just a symptom of a wider 19th century belief in things which IOTL probably only got shattered by two world wars which ITTL won't begin in the German-speaking lands and therefore, I thought, might never happen at all), the Phoenixes love to idealise a mythicised past - and the myths are many and have varied from generation to generation and current to current: ancient Germanic groups, anything from the Middle Ages, and lately also more early modern phenomena. Hence why they call themselves "Phoenixes" - they seek a rebirth, individually, as groups, and - on a purely conceptual matter - as a purer and better German polity, too.
More things that certainly don't fit with OTL's Greens: When I said, above, that neither Liberals nor Democrats have strong anti-semitic currents, then the same cannot be said for the Phoenixes. Of course they're not all Jew-haters, but quite a few groups and individuals among them are. Perhaps not so much of Hitler's pseudo-scientific kind, but Phoenixes love conspiracy theories, they idealise mythical homogeneous communities (while despising them in the present for their mediocrity, celebrating their genial individuality instead), they mythicise one's supposed ties to a piece of earth, they're avowed anti-materialists (and the narrative of Jews as "home-less" and "greedy usurers" was potent in the 19th century), so there is that.
The social composition of the Phoenixes is mostly upper and upper middle class, while the Liberal and Democratic voter base is mostly middle and working class (tendentially: respectively, but the picture is more mixed of course). At times and in places, there have been third party candidates close to movements like the Phoenixes, and they had some presence in the Volkshaus, but FPTP prevented them from ever becoming a serious political factor. Which doesn't mean they're not a very present phenomenon on the streets, on campuses etc.

OK, tomorrow I'll render my sketch for what should have been the third update "What if Schwarzenberg had put the Austrian military at the disposal of the Vollzugsausschuss?" - a piece which I wanted to write from the viewpoint of a Transilvanian Romanian who views Habsburg nostalgia very critically. It would be accompanied by some more explanations as to how events would unfold through March, April, and May 1848.
 
Sketch for Installment 3 and (Unlikely) Course of Revolutionary Events - Hence Why I Abandoned the TL
In Installment 3, I had intended to give a Transilvanian Romanian a voice who would, like Ramelow did in Installment 2, restate the mainstream view of his country that the Habsburg Monarchy had attempted to modernise its empire without liberalising, democratising or opening it up for the participation of its various national minorities until TTL's European War of 1905-7, in which Austria-Hungary ultimately broke apart (like it did IOTL in 1918). Our author Mihalache would argue against groups similar to the German Phoenixes in his country who mythicise the Habsburg era as a time of peaceful trans-nationality and a (better) precursor to present (pragmatic) continental attempts at closer cooperation (similar to OTL's EU).

His text would also deal with a What If question, which means it's also a DBWI for us, namely:

What If Schwarzenburg had put the Austrian military at the disposal of the Vollzugsausschuss?

To even understand what this divergence from TTL's course of events means, I'll have to divulge at least what happened until May 1848. But I'll go on and tell the whole story of how I had planned the Great Revolution of 1848/9 to unfold - because the military course of events is what ultimately caused me to drop the entire project. But I'll let you judge the whole thing...

March 1848

After the French and Italian models, mass protests erupt across the German countries, too, much like IOTL. Also, much like IOTL, the monarchic governments in Berlin and Vienna attempt to crush these protests, killing hundreds of protesters each, while various smaller principalities cave and install "reform governments" (Märzministerien), also like IOTL. Like IOTL, von Metternich quits on schedule on March 13th, and von Thile offers his resignation in Berlin, too, on March 18th. As I've divulged in Installment 2, in Berlin, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. suffers an apoplectic stroke, though, becomes incapacitated and dies soon after, his younger brother Wilhelm takes over (FW4 had no offspring) and refuses to accept von Thile's resignation.
Also unlike IOTL, as I've explained in Installment1 already, the revolutionary committees across much of Germany, especially in the West and South, are much more coalitions of (moderate) liberal and (radical) democratic groups, whereas IOTL they were dominated by moderate liberal constitutionalists who did their best to marginalise more radical voices (for the reason see Installment 1 on the Offenburger Blutnacht). As a consequence, the revolutionary committees arm the population wherever they can, forming "Volkswehren", in accordance with the March demands for popular militaries instead of standing princely armies.

Towards the end of the month, the Vereinigte Landtag (united general estates) of Prussia convenes in Berlin, having been called by FW4 already. It votes, like IOTL, in support of free elections for a new Prussian and German constituante. Wilhelm, though, refuses to sign the decree. The Left (as far as one can speak of it in the old estates - that includes many very moderate liberals) walks out in protest, and new riots break out. The provincial administrations in a number of Prussian provinces nevertheless allow for the elections to take place in their realm, though, under massive pressure from the streets. Wilhelm announces that he will not have any of this nonsense. The military is alerted.

The Hungarian estates pass their 13 points, as IOTL.

April 1848

As I've said before, the first ones to feel Wilhelm's iron fist are the Poles. The new King sends his military to the East into Posen province to crush the nascent Polish revolt. It takes a number of bloodbaths to really break the back of the rebellion. This both binds Prussia's military resources, and causes shock and outrage among the wider public throughout the German-speaking lands and beyond.

The revolutionaries see their fears confirmed: there's no real hope for a constitutional compromise with such a Prussian monarch - the nation must prepare itself for the onslaught of the Reaction... The revolutionary committees everywhere, busy with organising elections, watching over the reform governments, pressing for the formation of Volkswehren, form a "Provisorischer Vollzugsausschuss" (provisional executive committee) who decides with its liberal-democratic coalition majority that, once the National Assembly convenes, it should immediately elect a Vollzugsausschuss (i.e.: a government) for the Deutsche Bund, who would also claim command of the all military forces at the disposal of the Bund. This claim does not go uncontested, of course: previously, the Bund's military contingents, fielded by its constituent states, were under a common command structure instituted by and responding to the old reactionary Bundestag, which the revolutionary Provisorische Vollzugsausschuss now declared as suspended, to be replaced by the Constituent Assembly. In each member state of the Bund, thus, pro-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces contended, and depending on which way the balance tipped, this state's military contingents would either pledge their allegiance to the revolutionary Vollzugsausschuss, or stay loyal to the old structures.

While in the West and much of the South as well as in the Saxon and Thuringian countries, the revolutionary contingents coalescing into the forces submitting themselves to the Vollzugsausschuss were rather radical and explicit defenders of the democratic protests, in Hannover they took on a much less democratic and more pronouncedly nationalist stance (not that the democrats elsewhere were not nationalists... see my last comments): Here, the military basically pushed for a March Ministery itself and succeeded, with the explicitly stated aim to support the Schleswig-Holstein rebels in their cause to resist integration into the politically newly-constituting Danish state. The Hannoverian reformers had looked to Berlin for assistance, but Wilhelm refused to make common cause with rebels and decided to kill Polish insurgents instead, and so they now looked to Frankfurt, where the Provisional Executive Committee held on to any string it could get hold of, promising everything to everyone if only they didn't turn their weapons against the protesting masses.

Within the Prussian army - which was the most non-aristocratic army of all German states in its rank and file composition, but its leadership was of course aristocratic -, cracks have appeared, with commanders in the Rhine Province, under pressure by their own troops, assuring the revolutionary committees that they would not execute any orders to shoot at people who only wanted a unified Germany.
(Here, I'm in doubts over my sketches already. It will get crazier still, but while the Prussian army was indeed a heterogeneous bunch, I'm not really sure how plausible its disintegration really is. IOTL, it was loyal to the crown.)

Meanwhile, the Austrian military get their heads bashed in by the Italians, diverging from OTL as described in the Primavera d'Italia TL from which this TL was supposed to form a sub-divergence, and along with good Austrian-German regiments, this also applies to Jelacic's Croats. After Metternich, a succession of unsuccessful chancellors come and go: first von Kolowrat, then von Fiquelmont, but his seat already looks shaky, too. In Vienna, Franz von Pillersdorf's constitutional draft contains some concessions, but is almost unanimously rejected as insufficient by the protesting masses.

Revolutionary France votes, too, on OTL schedule, with the results being only slightly further to the Left than IOTL - the reason for some more Leftist votes being more enthusiasm and more radicalism throughout its continental neighbours; the reason why the majority will still be Moderate is because rural France knows its interests are not particularly well-served by Parisian socialists catering to Parisian workers with provincial tax money...

May 1848

The National Assembly convenes in Frankfurt and, under the impression of unveiled threats from Berlin to deal them "the Polish medicine", quickly elects a multi-party Vollzugsausschuss, officially claiming to take over the mantle from the Bundestag and ordering all the institutions of the Bund to respond to the Vollzugsausschuss. The Prussian and Mecklenburgian governments are the only ones which openly defy this claim. From Vienna, deliberately unclear signals are sent, calling for "further deliberations", while the Austrian military is sent for one last ditch attempt down into Italy to try to crush the revolution there and save of the empire's most profitable holdings whatever can be saved. When news of a crushing Italian victory reaches Frankfurt (and Paris, Budapest, Bucharest, ...), the revolutionaries are elated and emboldened in their own attempts not to bow anymore before the crowns. Vienna is in disarray; it appears that a peace treaty with the Italian rebels in which quite painful losses in Italy must be signed off can no longer be avoided. Behind the scenes, military commander Felix zu Schwarzenberg pulls the strings for a reshuffle both on the throne and in the chancellery as IOTL, and he also makes contact with Frankfurt's Vollzugsausschuss, signalling that Austrian contingents, once available again, would "honor their obligations towards the Bund" (a statement that can mean many things). Elated revolutionaries, who are reinforced from the West by the arrival of the German Democratic Legion, indulge in wishful thinking, projecting the hopes which IOTL flew to Berlin and FW4 onto Vienna and prospectively a new (a few months earlier than IOTL because of the more dramatic desaster in Italy instead of victory IOTL) Emperor Franz Joseph.

Wilhelm of Prussia threatens the Frankfurters, but his troops on the Rhine mostly mutiny and defect to the Revolution, while his loyal forces have their hands full in their more Easterly provinces, where protests also break out and rebels try to storm arsenals.

(As I said before, I am not so sure about this anymore. Might be too much wishful thinking. I've been writing TLs on revolutions ever since I've come to this forum, it's kind of "my thing", and 1848 had always been on my heart, but I've never been really really certain about this.. and writing with a wank-goal in mind is something I've come to view critically myself, so that's why I'm leaving this TL in the state of mere sketch.)

June 1848

Austria has to sign a humiliating peace deal with the Italians in order to hold on at least to Southern Tyrol and parts of Trentino. Von Fiquelmont resigns, and Emperor Ferdinand leaves the throne for his nephew Franz Ferdinand, who flees with his whole court and government from rebellious Vienna to the more quiet Innsbruck. Schwarzenberg becomes the new chancellor.

In Frankfurt, many issues regarding the new constitution are debated. Three rivalling drafts begin to take shape:
  • the Left favours a presidential republic with a unicameral parliament and a strong central government with only very limited competencies left to the member states;
  • while among the moderates / centrists, two drafts compete: a "Greater German" one favoured by more conservative liberals like Bassermann, Droysen and Mevissen, with the Austrian Emperor as Head of the Bund, too, with a bicameral parliament and census suffrage, and a great degree of autonomy for the member states;
  • while a compromise faction around Itzstein, Mittermaier, Fallmerayer, Zerzog and Mathy sought to combine elements of both of the above and was divided among itself over the question of a Small German nation state version with a presidential government and a Great German Bund under an Austrian crown but with universal suffrage and a central military responding to a government that had to be confirmed by both parliamentary houses.
While these debates were still hot, Wilhelm of Prussia let his words follow deeds and sends troops Westwards, after the situation in Brandenburg and Pomerania is brought under some manner of control. The first assembly of troops under the command of the Vollzugsausschuss that the monarchist Prussian troops encounter are the mostly Hannoverian forces who were on their march Northwards in order to assist their Schleswig-Holsteiner brethren against the Danish military. The Prussians prevail in the Battle of Celle, and then they march on Hannover in order to restore "order" there, too. - The fact that the Prussian military has butchered one of the most conservative contingents of the pro-Frankfurt side and killed nationally-minded Germans who wanted to wrestle Schleswig-Holstein from Danish rule begins to alienate many moderately conservative nationalists from Wilhelm of Prussia's policies, too. In Prussia, the new reactionary First Minister von Gerlach leaves no doubt that Prussia will not have any of the rebellious new fashions and will exercise its god-ordained duty to restore order to the troubled German lands.

In Frankfurt, the Vollzugsausschuss hastily does what it can to mold the heterogeneous contingents under its control into something vaguely resembling an army that could withstand Wilhelm's forces, and equip it. To this end, industrial production along the Rhine is ordered to produce what it takes to arm the nation. At the same time, contacts are established with the government in Paris, and while the cautious French are still determined not to interfere in whatever unfolds in Germany directly, orders for military goods are taken and, since the Paulskirche is short of money for anything, these orders are even accompanied by loans extended to the Deutsche Bund to cover the expenses of these military orders.

In France, this invigorates industrial production, and the new Republican government decides not to abandon the National Workshops but to repurpose them towards producing military goods destined for export into Germany (and Italy, too, which is building up its new confederal armed forces, too, at a pace that local production can hardly fully cover). As a result, no June Days.

(to be continued)
 
The rest of 1848 and further events in 1849 have always been more hazy - probably, I have to acknowledge, because I couldn't really conceptualise in a very plausible way how the ragtag revolutionaries would indeed be able to hold their ground, and then to reverse the military fortunes and be about to defeat, the loyal army of the Prussian King. How I roughly conceptualised it was:
  • Hannover is another bloodbath, and another call to arms for even the more reluctant freedom-lover.
  • In Western Hannover and the lands of Lippe, the Prussians wipe out another smallish forward contingent of likewise traditional military forces.
  • The Frankfurters go all in militarily: North of the Ruhr, they field a mass army commanded by von Gagern, armed with everything they could find and the kitchen sink, and in a horrible carnage which shocks even the most hard-boiled, the Prussian intervention force, which was a lot more organised and coherent and experienced, but vastly outnumbered, stood its ground for a long time and inflicted disproportionate, horrendous losses on the Revolutionary forces, but was ultimately defeated and massacred by infuriated revolutionaries. In the Battle of Hörde, specifically the Radical commander Gustav Struve and a heroically fighting young revolutionary leader Carl Schurz distinghuished themselves.
  • Hörde was a shock not just for the Prussian government, but also for the Revolutionaries. Numbers and artillery had been the only thing that had worked in their favour - if they didn't want to lose so many people in the future, they would have to use their industrial capacities to greater advantage. The Vollzugsausschuss orders a temporary emergency control of one of its Committees over all war-relevant industrial production. At first, some industrialist is appointed as Commissar here, but after a few failures and accusations of embezzlement and incompetence, a socialist thinker with a plan is put at the helm of the Committee: Karl Marx. He devotes all his time, energy and creativity to the task of enabling the young Republic to fight the first industrial war in history.
  • In Berlin, even some conservative voices call for moderation, compromise and arrangement and a return to the forefront of the national cause. Not so much the King, who is seriously afraid of the revolution, and neither his government. After Hörde, Gerlach is replaced by the equally arch-conservative Friedrich Julius Stahl. Stahl and Wilhelm prepare another intervention force, this time directed at the smaller threat to their South, pro-Frankfurt Saxony.
  • The National Assembly in the Paulskirche is divided over whether to appeal to Schwarzenberg and Emperor Franz Joseph now for help, or whether Hörde had shown that the only salvation was one's own popular action. In Vienna, there is similar indecision, especially since revolts have now also broken out in Prague, and the Hungarian Parliament is increasingly radicalising itself. This is the situation in which the DBWI was supposed to be situated: If Schwarzenberg had openly allied with the Paulskirche and got the emperor around to his plan, maybe Wilhelm of Prussia would have been deterred from what he did afterwards ITTL: namely, after another intervention force sent towards the Rhine also gets mauled, and easier than before, and the enthusiastic victorious Revolutionaries begin on a counter-offensive, in which they use the new railroads for the first time in a meaningful way in a military conflict to transport troops and materiel fast, Wilhelm calls on the Russian Tsar Nicholas to save the divine monarchical order, as their predecessors had sworn each other in the Holy Alliance. Arguably, Nicholas might not have obliged if the Austrian Emperor had sided with the Revolution. Also, within the Prussian camarilla, cooler heads might have prevailed in the face of such a strong opponent, and the kind of changes at the head of state and government which took place one year later, after many defeats, might have taken place a year earlier, avoiding the death of hundreds of thousands on the battlefields of the revolution. Or maybe not.
  • Throughout 1848, the Austrian leadership is distracted with Hungary, Transilvania and Bohemia, attempts to appease its peasantry by abolishing the Erbuntertänigkeit (servitude) and containing the increasingly radical Viennese revolutionaries.
  • The Revolutionaries have already reached and liberated Hannover and Braunschweig when the Russian intervention force crosses into East Prussia. It's only a middle-sized army - after all, Nicholas has also sent forces into the unruly Principate of Moldova and keeps a wary eye on the Ottomans, too -, but Russians and royal Prussians regain the initiative and roll back recent Revolutionary gains, inflicting yet more grievous losses.
  • But by the end of 1848, the Revolutionary Army has gradually gained coherence and been molded in the fire of battle into a functional army, with new commanders promoted for their successes in battle, and new military equipment begins to be meaningfully employed. A cold and snowy winter slows down both sides.
  • And with their spring offensive in 1849, the Revolutionaries finally manage to overwhelm, overrun, encircle and defeat various Prussian and Russian divisions, using the railroads in their advance, and they're at the gates of Berlin already, when...
  • ... cooler heads ultimately, finally do prevail in Berlin - and in Frankfurt, too. Wilhelm is convinced to step down and make way for the unpolitical Albrecht as new King of Prussia (Prince Carl died on the battlefield), finally choosing a liberal set of ministers who agree to an offer by the compromise faction in the Paulskirche, which would allow a truncated Kingdom of Prussia to retain a significant degree of autonomy within the new Deutsche Bund, in exchange for the withdrawal of the Bund's forces from the gates of Berlin, tsar Nicholas should withdraw his forces, too. Nicholas is not exactly convinced, and neither are the battle-hardened and zealous Revolutionary army leaders and the more politically motivated volunteers among their soldiers. But British, French, and Austrian envoys, whom the moderate Paulskirche conspirators had conversed with for months, chafing under the de facto political leadership of the Radicals, manage to convince Nicholas that there is nothing to be gained here (even if nobody back then knew what the "sunken cost fallacy" was). The radicals among the soldiers are not so easily swayed, and they would tell for many years to come the story of how the Republic was stabbed in the back at the gates of Berlin by Liberal conspirers. "Volunteers" decide to at least head for Schwerin to wipe away the last outpost of Reaction (the dukes had signalled their willigness to install Reform Ministeries, too, already, but it was too late; they were small and ultimately thrown under the bus in order to placate the Radicals, who proceeded to help a handful of local Radicals to install Republics in the Mecklenburgian lands).
The compromise constitution of 1849, voted by the Centre-Right, the Centre and the Centre-Left against a rivalling draft of the Left, would create a mixed beast of a Deutsche Bund without Austria and Bohemia (until 1907), which I can sketch in another short contribution.

For months, I was thinking of ways in which to make the above sketch somehow believable, and entertaining, and engaging, and balanced... and I failed at it. That's the main problem here. I started with a different premise - but I believe that if the revolution had been more militant, and if Friedrich Wilhelm IV. had indeed been replaced by Wilhelm and Wilhelm would have refused or failed to feign a compromise, then there may indeed have come a confrontation, or one may have hoped for Austrian leadership, but I don't really see that coming, either.. and so, 1848 would probably have been crushed, just like it was IOTL, too, only this time with Prussia looking a lot worse in it, which would have created an interesting post-1848 political dynamics, but that was not what I had initially wanted. I couldn't solve this dilemma.
 
OK, before I continue dumping my sketches here, here's the list of them:
(4) WI the Russians had triumphed at Magdeburg? - This should have been a thoughtful self-reflection of how Russia has been the bogeyman and arch-enemy for both Liberals and Democrats ever since 1848, what the political narrative of the "Threat from the East" has done to German political culture and consensus. It includes reflections on Russia's development without the reforms of Nicholas' successor Alexander II., which the author shortly considers, but then refutes as ultimately inevitable, even if Russia had been spared the bloody nose in the West.
(5) Of course: WI No Compromise at the Gates of Berlin? - This should have been a piece from a Liberal standpoint, exasperatedly refuting the age-old slurs of betrayal hurled at them by the Left, by sketching quite a dystopian German future, had the Radicals not heeded the Paulskirche's call: Bonapartism and jingoism marking the political culture of Germany in the 1850s and onwards, isolating the country among the concert of greater powers, reducing its opportunities to profit from the economic growth of the era.
(6) WI a Chartist Revolution in Britain? - This piece looks at the eternally tense German-British relations of TTL, and asks whether a Britain in which the Chartists had been more militant and achieved universal suffrage earlier, would have aligned more with Germany (because the tensions between Germany and Britain are often framed in ideological terms). The author would have ultimately rejected this idea and argued that it would not have made much of a difference because British long-term geopolitical strategies had always been focused on maintaining a balance on the continent, and Germany was dangerously big enough as it was already, so any and all close alliance which the Germans concluded, any influence they exerted on neighboring states would have been viewed with great wariness by British diplomats and politicians. Reversely, German participation in the concert of great world powers, as long as Austria- Hungary and Russia barred any extension of Germany's sphere of influence towads the East on the continent itself, could only happen through the acquisition of overseas colonies and increased worldwide trade, which in turn required a navy and thus inherently challenged Britain where Britain was most sensitive.
This one would have included a longer outlook into the future post-1848, up to at least the 1900s.
(7) WI Semper died in the Revolution? - This one would have been on architecture, art in general and cultural trends in Germany ITTL in the 19th century.
(8) And ultimately an update about how the Altkatholiken and other reformist theological movements would have developed without the Revolution, so a piece on religious issues.
 
I'll combine elements of (4) and (6) and divulge what I had in mind for beyond 1849 and for wider European developments as well as political constitutions and systems and their development/succession... I'll let you be the judges of whether this might flow plausibly from this different, successful 1848, or not.

1848/9 Elsewhere:
Germany and Italy have been somewhat covered by my sketches and of course the magnificent TL Primavera d'Italia. I would have trusted its authors to know best how, for example, the first free elections would go in Italy, and in fact I never really bothered to make Italian internal politics up at all.

France is not undergoing the kind of crisis and isolation that they suffered IOTL. Its financial situation is different - for decades to come, France is now Germany's creditor, and while that is a shitty heritage of the revolution for Germany, it's nice for France. All in all, especially without the June Days and with Francois Arago not replaced by Cavaignac, I don't think it's a given that Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte would win TTL's Presidential elections. He might - but he might as well not. I'll go with No Nappy3 and instead a centrist candidate eking out a narrow victory in a four-way race against a socialist, LNB, and (another) monarchist.

In Spain and Latin America, events would probably unfold much like IOTL (and slightly later than in France, Italy and Germany) at first.
Likewise, the Young Irelanders and the March protesters in Sweden are probably getting suppressed like IOTL, while Denmark gets its first liberal constitution like IOTL.

That leaves Austria-Hungary and the Balkans.
Here, Schwarzenberg takes on a role which he must have found tragic. His plan had been to let Austria take over the mantle of national reform in Germany and build a double empire centered in Vienna: with the Habsburg Emperors being both Austrian Emperors, Hungarian Kings etc. etc. and at the same time Emperors of the Germans, leaders of the Deutsche Bund - an invincible powerhouse on the continent. He is livid about Wilhelm of Prussia's stupidity to not just shoot protesters and Poles, but also send the army against the Rhein and then even call the Russians in. Many a diplomatic note suggesting different courses of action have been sent from Vienna to Berlin, to no avail. Frankfurt calls on Vienna to provide its contingents for the defense against the Prusso-Russian threat. Schwarzenberg is not whole-heartedly behind the plan to oblige this call and put Austrian troops at the disposal of Rhenish and Badenian radicals who ultimately seek a Republic - and the new Emperor Franz Joseph will have none of it, especially as the Parliament in Buda radicalises, like IOTL but also encouraged by the victory of the Italians and the resolve of the German revolutionaries.
And so, relations between Frankfurt and Vienna cool down and sour; the compromisers begin to tend towards the Small German solution and support the Left which has been skeptical of Vienna from the start and now leads the defensive effort. Schwarzenberg is unhappy about the prospect of the double empire falling apart in front of his eyes. After some lethargic weeks and months full of disbelief, he must regain the initiative, though, and he does so by acting very much against the vision which he had projected in the spring. He had had a supranational super-empire in mind - now he must promulgate plans to devolve the Habsburg Empire and grant the various smaller nations greater autonomy in order to gain them as reliable allies against the Hungarian plans which are steering more and more towards independence and building their own French-style nation state which would Magyarise the Romanians and Saxons and Slovaks and Serbs and, maybe, even the Croats. Both in Agram / Zagreb and among the Transilvanian Romanians, resistance against Lajos Kossuth's vision and his nascent Hónved are forming and picking up arms, too.
This strategy culminates in the promise of the so-called Schwarzenberg Constitution (although it was others who conceptualised it) which would apply to all Habsburg lands, guarantee civil rights and create separate Parliaments not just for Cisleithanian Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia, Galicia-Wolhynia and Gorizia, but also for Transleithanian Croatia-Slavonia, Slovakia, Banat and Transilvania - each of them, like the German-Austrian and the Hungarian Parliament, with noble upper houses and popular lower houses, whose suffrage would be designed in ways that benefitted particularly the peasantry (who was grateful for their liberation and otherwise tendentially conservative and royalist) and marginalised the (politically left-leaning and anti-monarchist) urban proletariat.
Schwarzenburg's plan was popular with the various minorities, and it divided the revolutionaries in Vienna and Buda. While the Left in Vienna as well as Kossuth's faction in Buda rejected it, more moderate voices signalled support or at least considered it something to build on and in any way not worth shedding blood to fight against.
While Vienna does not erupt into new violence - also because the Academic Legion and many of the most radical revolutionaries were fighting somewhere in Northern Germany against Prussians and Russians -, Palatin Lambert's assassination happens in Hungary like IOTL, and troops from Austria and Croatia move into Hungary.
Unlike IOTL, where Austria called on Russia to suppress Hungarian independence, this does not happen ITTL because Schwarzenberg wants his government to appear like Reformers and not to forge too many groups into a potential enemy bloc against the emperor. This buys the Hungarians time, and over the course of a whole year, it takes all the forces loyal to the emperor combined to wrestle down the Hungarian separatists and force Lajos Batthyany's government to the negotiation table. Again unlike IOTL, where the Reaction had triumphed everywhere and suppressing the rebellion with a hard hand had been somewhat acceptable, ITTL Batthyany is not imprisoned and executed, but left to sign off on an only slightly modified Schwarzenburg Constitution octroyed upon the lands of the Hungarian Crown and remains in his position until the new parliaments are elected. (Kossuth, on the other hand, dies in battle.)
Just when the situation in Hungary is brought under control, the situation in the German-speaking parts escalates anew. Disillusioned radical forces return from the gates of Berlin back to their homes in German-speaking Cisleithania, and they don't just all go back to their private lives. Radical riots in Frankfurt are quickly suppressed, but from Karlsbad to Vienna and from Salzburg to Klagenfurt, revolts flare up for months to come, and thousands more are killed by the empire's military forces.

In contrast to the Deutsche Bund, thus, which is now a democratic constitutional federal nation state, and from which the German-speaking Habsburg lands have seceded, Austria-Hungary is not a state built on the Great Revolution, but rather an old empire which has just about managed to fight and compromise its way through the troubled waters, and a large political Left, now republican-oriented and nationalist, forms a very disgruntled and angry opposition against the new regime both in Vienna and in Buda/Pest. The smaller parliaments are also riddled with their own conflicts, not just between left and right, but also between the various ethnic groups which inhabited the new devolved periphery of the empire.

(to be continued, if I find the time over the next few days... I am also starting to write in advance for a new TL project, so I might stop this sketch-dumping here soon...)
 
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