About a month ago I made a post related to my brainstorming PODs for a timeline about pre and post-WW2 Britain.
In short that post’s idea ran aground in relation to the premise of my timeline. Upon going back to the drawing board however, one part of that original post would spark a new idea.

“[Stafford Cripps was] A leader of Labour’s left-wing faction who was temporarily expelled for attempting to a form an anti-appeasement coalition containing conservatives and communists…”

This is the idea I intend to discuss in this post, specifically:
  1. How feasible it would’ve been for the Popular Front to be successfully formed?*
  2. Whether a Popular Front could’ve unseated the National Government and form an anti-appeasement Cabinet?
  3. What would’ve the consequences of a Popular Front government have been?^
* I say this because in OTL the Labour Party rejected ideas of a Popular Front, going as far as to expel some of its proponents (such as Stafford Cripps) while other
anti-appeasement advocates (i.e: Conservatives such as Churchill, or Liberals such as Sinclair) never made any overt** overtures towards a Popular Front.
** Though efforts such as the Anti-Nazi Council or Churchill’s willingness to openly criticise other Conservatives do display the potential for cooperation that led
me to consider ideas of such as timeline.
^ Some ideas I myself have for such a POD lend me to suggest late 1936 as a likely starting point for such a government. I intend to elaborate once some
discussion has built up.
 
I'm not sure an Anti Appeasement government could be formed. I just can't see such a diverse group of MP's being able to firstly get the required votes to win a vote of no confidence and secondly to get enough members to form a stable government.

However, some form of anti appeasement understanding / alliance is more likely and could be more effective. Just look at how groups of backbenchers threatening to rebel on important votes have been able to get significant concessions from governments in the modern era as an example of what could have been achieved.

In such a Chamberlain risk defeat with his policy of limited liability in 1937? Whereby the RN and RAF got the dosh at the expense of the Army. In the above scenario, if the rebels had enough votes to be awkward, it's likely that exta cash would be found for the army to get the policy agreed. Probably at the expense of another Department of State which doesn't have a special interest group looking out for it.
 
I'm not sure an Anti Appeasement government could be formed. I just can't see such a diverse group of MP's being able to firstly get the required votes to win a vote of no confidence and secondly to get enough members to form a stable government.

However, some form of anti appeasement understanding / alliance is more likely and could be more effective. Just look at how groups of backbenchers threatening to rebel on important votes have been able to get significant concessions from governments in the modern era as an example of what could have been achieved.

In such a Chamberlain risk defeat with his policy of limited liability in 1937? Whereby the RN and RAF got the dosh at the expense of the Army. In the above scenario, if the rebels had enough votes to be awkward, it's likely that exta cash would be found for the army to get the policy agreed. Probably at the expense of another Department of State which doesn't have a special interest group looking out for it.
It could be argued that the Chamberlain government was anti-appeasement as they did start rearmament. Appeasement after that point could then be viewed as a means of deferring war until ready rather than being the preferred way of avoiding war.
The $64,000 question is then what could an anti-appeasement government do if no appeasement was acceptable but Britain was not yet ready for war? Bluffing might work, but could do more harm than good.
 
The $64,000 question is then what could an anti-appeasement government do if no appeasement was acceptable but Britain was not yet ready for war? Bluffing might work, but could do more harm than good.
In fairness during early incidents, like the remilitarisation of the Rhineland or Sudetenland Crisis, Germany could be viewed (especially in the former) as bluffing to some extent seeing as the Wehrmacht at those points was weaker (in 36' much weaker) than in 39' and 40'.

I've read a few threads of the Rhineland incident and I've noticed it being mentioned multiple times that German forces had orders to retreat/withdraw if a French response.
I've seen mixed views on whether the French could've responded in time/sufficiently, and whether Germany would've/could've stood and fought, though the consensus seems to lean yes and no respectively.
 
Now my idea is centred on Britain, but it seems that one of the main factors in OTL that resulted in France accepting the remilitarisation was the British government (then under Baldwin) refusing to back a French response (i.e: in case of escalation).

A difference in government (even if it is pressure rather than office like Derwent suggested) could alter this stance, though I also know that the Popular Front only really coalesced later in 1936 (which certain PODs could change).
 
The problem here is that the National Government was very strong and very popular, and that the UK left in this same period is relatively moribund and has been devastated by a series of spilts that has seen large numbers of "National Liberals" and "National Labour" politicians peel away to the Conservatives, creating a formiable coaliton attached to a already very formiable Conservative Party machine. Meanwhile Labour is squabbling with Indepedent Labour and the remaining Liberals are having an identity crisis. The failure of the Great Reform Act to introduce proportional representation means that the leftish opposition parties, that always struggle under the first past the post system, are having to go up aganist "National" candidates who have three parties united behind them. The far-right is also struggling to make the kind of breakthrough you'd expect them to make during such a big Depression, because most of the Reactionary Tories prefer to plot inside of the Conservative Party than get mud on their boots marching with Mosley's blackshirts outside, and are quite appeased by appeasement anyway. The Communist Party, which is mechanically going through the motions of Popular Front tactics because that's what Moscow said it should do, is no where near electorally relevant enough for anyone in mainstream politics to take the idea of an alliance with them seriously. The successes of Stanley Baldwin paved the way for Neville Chamberlein to sleep walk the country into the disater of appeasement.

So what you need to do is destablise British politics at a earlier point, allowing for a stronger left and a more contestable version of the National Government. You also probably need to do something about all the pacificism on the left and all the pro-German, pro-Fascist sympathies on the right, but that's a bit more esoteric a change.
 
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Now my idea is centred on Britain, but it seems that one of the main factors in OTL that resulted in France accepting the remilitarisation was the British government (then under Baldwin) refusing to back a French response (i.e: in case of escalation).

A difference in government (even if it is pressure rather than office like Derwent suggested) could alter this stance, though I also know that the Popular Front only really coalesced later in 1936 (which certain PODs could change).
There is a difference between appeasement and remilitarisation. Churchill was strong on remilitarisation, less so on appeasement until it became egregious. And that is the problem - many potential Popular Front supporters did not want to remilitarise but equally didn't want Germany too either. Which left them hanging in the wind a bit.
 
There is a difference between appeasement and remilitarisation. Churchill was strong on remilitarisation, less so on appeasement until it became egregious. And that is the problem - many potential Popular Front supporters did not want to remilitarise but equally didn't want Germany too either. Which left them hanging in the wind a bit.
I meant  Germany remilitarising the Rhineland in that paragraph, not rearmament, which yes I'm aware that Labour and many other would-be Popular Fronters were anti-appeasement and anti-rearmament.
 
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