WW2, the RAN.RCN.RNZN were parts of the RN operationally, ie not separate, once war started. So if the RN moves in , all the rest do.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Operationally once deployed, yes.....but much like ground and air forces, wasn't the allocation of units to joint forces a political negotiation? In this case, if we were looking at OTL, where were RAN & RNZN ships deployed when the Japanese launched their assaults? I'm assuming it was significantly further away than. Surabaya?
That's actually a damned good question! And I agree Darwin would be a solid secondary base and possible fallback position. Until too vulnerable that is.
For those who know this theater well, what would a good sub base location for best putting them in a position to intercept Japanese convoys coming down through and into the narrow waters from Indochina and Thailand to around the DEIs?
Lastly, what is the status of Rangoon in Burma as a possible back-up fleet base? It's closer than Ceylon thus more vulnerable to air attack, but (as the British lack our hindsight) likely not as much as Singapore. If nothing else it needs it's air fields, defenses, and port facilities to be built up as well, if anything can be spared.
Once war broke out, the RAN was placed under the control if the Admiralty. There was some local control of units the Admiralty had allotted to the Pacific/Indian ocean areas but the larger RAN assets like the cruisers and destroyers were totally deployed by the Admiralty.
And the RNZN did not exist until later in the war, 1 October 1941. Prior to that, it was the New Zealand Division of the RN.
Mea Culpa in advance if I'm wrong on this, but I was sure there were national political entities that played a role in determining which ships would fall under RN control and further specified the roles they could play. So the RN didn't have absolute power or control to call on any Commonwealth Naval Asset at any time....there were strict parameters of deployment that the RN had to follow as set by national political leadership. I just had to look up but the entity I was remembering appears to have been called the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board. If my recollection is still wrong (or requires additional elaboration), please do correct. Cheers, Matthew.
I may be conflating WWI and WWII somewhat. However, re-reading Gill Royal Australian Navy 1939-42 page 64, he states
"...(on) 7th November (1939) ... an Order in Council was issued transferring to the King's Naval Forces "all the vessels of the Commonwealth Naval Forces together with the officers and seamen of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, and the personnel of the Royal Australian Air Force borne on the books of those vessels",
Later, of course, Australia started to demand more control over their ships but it was more along the lines of requesting that the Admiralty send a 6 inch Cruiser to the Australia Station, preferably an RAN one, because we are getting a bit worried about Japan, rather than an order from RAN HQ that HMAS Hobart will proceed to Sydney.
Ships were allocated to the Australia Station and obviously a number of smaller ones were placed under the command of the NOIC Australia Station for him to dispose of them as he saw fit.
But the main fleet units were initially under direction of the Admiralty.
"...(on) 7th November (1939) ... an Order in Council was issued transferring to the King's Naval Forces "all the vessels of the Commonwealth Naval Forces together with the officers and seamen of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, and the personnel of the Royal Australian Air Force borne on the books of those vessels",
Later, of course, Australia started to demand more control over their ships but it was more along the lines of requesting that the Admiralty send a 6 inch Cruiser to the Australia Station, preferably an RAN one, because we are getting a bit worried about Japan, rather than an order from RAN HQ that HMAS Hobart will proceed to Sydney.
Ships were allocated to the Australia Station and obviously a number of smaller ones were placed under the command of the NOIC Australia Station for him to dispose of them as he saw fit.
But the main fleet units were initially under direction of the Admiralty.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Re Alternatives to Singapore or Ceylon
Darwin was a very useful anchorage, and had decent fuel supplies, but... defensively, both in coastal and AA guns, as well as an air defence it was poor, while ship maintenance and repair was negligible. It could, as has been said, be a useful secondary base, but still needed something more substantial to back it up.
Surabaya, was possibly a better choice strategically, closer to the action, had very good ship maintenance and repair facilities, with reasonable coastal and AA defences, and given a radar network could provide an OK air defence, but, and a big but, it was shallow. the West Channel having to be dredged to 9 metres in anticipation of the never built Dutch Heavy Cruisers. The likes of USS Houston (7 metres) and HMS Exeter (6.2 metres) draught, as well as HNLMS Java (6.22 metres) were fine, HMS Prince of Wales (10.5 metres) was not. The eastern channel was much shallower, only destroyers and such like could navigate her. See https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Soerabaja.htm for greater detail of this naval base
Rangoon was of no use strategically, not sitting across any shipping lane, merely being at the end of one. It had no ship repair of building facilities of note, but was the single gateway to Burma, everything that went into ot out of Burma pretty much went through Rangoon. Defensively, it was poorer than Darwin.
and
as well as
Darwin was a very useful anchorage, and had decent fuel supplies, but... defensively, both in coastal and AA guns, as well as an air defence it was poor, while ship maintenance and repair was negligible. It could, as has been said, be a useful secondary base, but still needed something more substantial to back it up.
Surabaya, was possibly a better choice strategically, closer to the action, had very good ship maintenance and repair facilities, with reasonable coastal and AA defences, and given a radar network could provide an OK air defence, but, and a big but, it was shallow. the West Channel having to be dredged to 9 metres in anticipation of the never built Dutch Heavy Cruisers. The likes of USS Houston (7 metres) and HMS Exeter (6.2 metres) draught, as well as HNLMS Java (6.22 metres) were fine, HMS Prince of Wales (10.5 metres) was not. The eastern channel was much shallower, only destroyers and such like could navigate her. See https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Soerabaja.htm for greater detail of this naval base
Rangoon was of no use strategically, not sitting across any shipping lane, merely being at the end of one. It had no ship repair of building facilities of note, but was the single gateway to Burma, everything that went into ot out of Burma pretty much went through Rangoon. Defensively, it was poorer than Darwin.
MWI 41032716 Keren Falls
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 27 March;
The campaign in East Africa was going Britain’s way, after the loss of British Somaliland, and incursions into Sudan and Kenya in 1940, the Italians had halted, content to hold what they had, but allowing the British to slowly build their strength up, and now with 1941 arriving the British attacked. They had three divisions in the south under Lt Gen Alan Cunningham, the 1st South African Div, the 11th and 12th African divisions. And in the north, under Lt Gen William Platt, two divisions, the 4th and 5th Indian. And they were beginning to crumble away at the defences of the Italian East African colony.
In the south, it was a campaign of fast manoeuvre, the terrain, mostly hot, arid, desert like, allowed for that, the Italian forces, mostly colonial, often melting away before them. But in the north, the numerous granite mountains wouldn’t allow that fast pace. No, here it was a war of the infantryman, backed up by artillery, and as always logistics, which dominated the campaign on both fronts. And here, at Keren, the gateway to Asmara, the capital of the Italian Eritrea, the Italian had deployed their best troops.
The British were attacking from Kassala, a town in Sudan to the west, through which ran the railway line from Khartoum to Port Sudan. From the logistical bridgehead there, a road ran east through Agordat which they had captured at the end of January. There a railway as well as the road ran on to Asmara and its port of Massawa, but Keren sat in the way. Long identified as of strategic importance to the defence of Asmara, the Italians had built a fort, Dologorodoc, on a mountain, on the southeast side of the narrow Dongolaas Gorge, through which the road and railway passed into Keren. The Italians had also occupied positions on the mountains on the other side. From artillery observation posts up high, their artillery could control the pass. The key to breaking the defences was capturing the OP’s.
Because of the terrain, the fighting was difficult, the 11th Indian Brigade was first to try, starting on the 5th of February, attacking the mountain tops on the north-western side of the gorge, who, over the next four days, managed to capture Cameron ridge, which they then used as a jumping off point to assault Brig’s Peak. They were counter attacked by Italian infantrymen of the 65th Division "Granatieri di Savoia" who threw them back. While this was happening, the Indian 5th Brigade had attacked Fort Dologorodoc across ‘happy valley’, also having little success.
The next attack went in from the 10th to 13th, the 3/1 Punjab Regt capturing both Brig’s Peak and Mt Sanchil, but after heavy shelling, they were forced off by a counter attack from the Savoy Grenadiers again. Losses were heavy, and little to show for it, so Platt decided to pause, regroup and train before trying again.
Given the natural strength of the position, and the Italians commitment to its defence, Platt decided he would need to attack using both Indian Divisions, which would take time to prepare. In the meantime, to keep the Italians on their toes, numerous small probing patrols were made around both flanks, but no alternative line of attack could be found. While time was spent bringing both supplies and munitions forward from Kassala, Platt planned his attack, deciding that 4th Indian Division would attack Brig’s Peak and Mt Sanchil on the left, 5th Indian Division would attack Fort Dologorodoc and Mt Zeban on the right, or south. To maximise artillery support, 4th Indian would attack first, and once her objectives were secured, the artillery would switch targets and support the 5th Indian’s attack. The date of the attack was set for the 15th March.
4th Indian attacked first at dawn, progress was slow, with mounting casualties, but some success was had, causing the Italians to mount costly counterattacks of their own. This attractional battle continued for several days, as all the reserves were gradually fed in, with 4th Indian not making any further progress, but tying up large numbers of defenders.
Mid-morning on the 15th, 5th Indian attacked, and also spent all day achieving little, pinned down, but that night the attacking troops were replaced by fresh troops which first captured two minor hills in front of Fort Dologorodoc, and while they were fighting off counter attacks from the fort defenders, an assault on the fort itself by 2 West Yorkshire Regt took an alternative route and successfully captured it after a short savage fight. This gave General Platt a much-coveted artillery observation point, which allowed British artillery to become more effective. The Italian reaction was vicious, repeated counter attacks were beaten back over several days on both sides of the gorge, the two Indian divisions hanging onto what they had.
On the nights of 16/17 and 17/18, Indian Engineers attempted to begin clearing the road blocks in the gorge, but failed, suffering from steady Italian defensive fire. However, on the floor of the gorge it became clear to General Heath that the key Italian defensive positions were on low hills either side of the gorge, called the ‘Railway Bumps’ and not Mt Sanchil, as had been thought. The British now assumed a more defensive posture, holding what they had, while they reorganized for a further attack along the gorge.
The night of the 24/25 they attacked again, the lower hills on the southern side being taken first and then the northern ones falling by mid-morning. Predictably, the Italians counter attacked, but these were easily beaten off. With control of the ‘Railway Bumps’, the sappers got to work clearing the gorge of roadblocks and mines, rotating all three Field Engineer Companies of 5th Division, to provide 24 hours working. By the end of the 26th, the road was clear, and with the British artillery switched to fire on reserve fortifications, an Indian infantry brigade attacked along the gorge. The Italians broke, and with what troops that could, fled towards Asmara, but much of what was left of the Savoy Grenadiers Division, their best troops, were left cut off and with no prospect of escape, low on supplies, surrendered.
The Indian troops had fought very well in the victory, any suggestion that they might be second class was well answered here, two of them, Premindra Singh Bhagat (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) and Richhpal Ram (Subedar in 6th Rajputana Rifles), posthumously, awarded the Victoria Cross. There were many others given medals, mentioned in despatches, or simply noted for promotions, take for instance, Naik Gurpreet Dhillon 4/11 Sikh Regt, who suffered bad lacerations and a broken leg, when blown off a hillside by a shell, on the same day Richhpal Ram won his VC. And Havildar Asif Khan 4/10 Baluch Regt, wounded in the back and buttocks by rock fragments from a mortar shell burst as he led an assault on one of the ‘Railway Bumps’. Or Subedar Abdur Choudhury 2 Field Coy Bengal S&M, half buried under falling rock while helping clear the gorge for the final push.
The capture of Keren quickly led to the fall of Asmara and Massawa, with Italian morale badly shaken, and ultimately the fall of the Italian East African colonies, terrain and logistics becoming the major obstacles to an earlier surrender. British and Indian casualties were high, especially in 4th Indian Division, although there were a lot more wounded than killed, flying rock fragments contributing greatly to the injuries. Both divisions would go on to fight in many more battles and campaigns, while both their commanders, Noel Beresford-Peirse of 4th Indian, and Lewis Heath of 5th Indian, as well as the southern commander Alan Cunningham, would gain promotions thanks to their achievements in this campaign.
The campaign in East Africa was going Britain’s way, after the loss of British Somaliland, and incursions into Sudan and Kenya in 1940, the Italians had halted, content to hold what they had, but allowing the British to slowly build their strength up, and now with 1941 arriving the British attacked. They had three divisions in the south under Lt Gen Alan Cunningham, the 1st South African Div, the 11th and 12th African divisions. And in the north, under Lt Gen William Platt, two divisions, the 4th and 5th Indian. And they were beginning to crumble away at the defences of the Italian East African colony.
In the south, it was a campaign of fast manoeuvre, the terrain, mostly hot, arid, desert like, allowed for that, the Italian forces, mostly colonial, often melting away before them. But in the north, the numerous granite mountains wouldn’t allow that fast pace. No, here it was a war of the infantryman, backed up by artillery, and as always logistics, which dominated the campaign on both fronts. And here, at Keren, the gateway to Asmara, the capital of the Italian Eritrea, the Italian had deployed their best troops.
The British were attacking from Kassala, a town in Sudan to the west, through which ran the railway line from Khartoum to Port Sudan. From the logistical bridgehead there, a road ran east through Agordat which they had captured at the end of January. There a railway as well as the road ran on to Asmara and its port of Massawa, but Keren sat in the way. Long identified as of strategic importance to the defence of Asmara, the Italians had built a fort, Dologorodoc, on a mountain, on the southeast side of the narrow Dongolaas Gorge, through which the road and railway passed into Keren. The Italians had also occupied positions on the mountains on the other side. From artillery observation posts up high, their artillery could control the pass. The key to breaking the defences was capturing the OP’s.
Because of the terrain, the fighting was difficult, the 11th Indian Brigade was first to try, starting on the 5th of February, attacking the mountain tops on the north-western side of the gorge, who, over the next four days, managed to capture Cameron ridge, which they then used as a jumping off point to assault Brig’s Peak. They were counter attacked by Italian infantrymen of the 65th Division "Granatieri di Savoia" who threw them back. While this was happening, the Indian 5th Brigade had attacked Fort Dologorodoc across ‘happy valley’, also having little success.
The next attack went in from the 10th to 13th, the 3/1 Punjab Regt capturing both Brig’s Peak and Mt Sanchil, but after heavy shelling, they were forced off by a counter attack from the Savoy Grenadiers again. Losses were heavy, and little to show for it, so Platt decided to pause, regroup and train before trying again.
Given the natural strength of the position, and the Italians commitment to its defence, Platt decided he would need to attack using both Indian Divisions, which would take time to prepare. In the meantime, to keep the Italians on their toes, numerous small probing patrols were made around both flanks, but no alternative line of attack could be found. While time was spent bringing both supplies and munitions forward from Kassala, Platt planned his attack, deciding that 4th Indian Division would attack Brig’s Peak and Mt Sanchil on the left, 5th Indian Division would attack Fort Dologorodoc and Mt Zeban on the right, or south. To maximise artillery support, 4th Indian would attack first, and once her objectives were secured, the artillery would switch targets and support the 5th Indian’s attack. The date of the attack was set for the 15th March.
4th Indian attacked first at dawn, progress was slow, with mounting casualties, but some success was had, causing the Italians to mount costly counterattacks of their own. This attractional battle continued for several days, as all the reserves were gradually fed in, with 4th Indian not making any further progress, but tying up large numbers of defenders.
Mid-morning on the 15th, 5th Indian attacked, and also spent all day achieving little, pinned down, but that night the attacking troops were replaced by fresh troops which first captured two minor hills in front of Fort Dologorodoc, and while they were fighting off counter attacks from the fort defenders, an assault on the fort itself by 2 West Yorkshire Regt took an alternative route and successfully captured it after a short savage fight. This gave General Platt a much-coveted artillery observation point, which allowed British artillery to become more effective. The Italian reaction was vicious, repeated counter attacks were beaten back over several days on both sides of the gorge, the two Indian divisions hanging onto what they had.
On the nights of 16/17 and 17/18, Indian Engineers attempted to begin clearing the road blocks in the gorge, but failed, suffering from steady Italian defensive fire. However, on the floor of the gorge it became clear to General Heath that the key Italian defensive positions were on low hills either side of the gorge, called the ‘Railway Bumps’ and not Mt Sanchil, as had been thought. The British now assumed a more defensive posture, holding what they had, while they reorganized for a further attack along the gorge.
The night of the 24/25 they attacked again, the lower hills on the southern side being taken first and then the northern ones falling by mid-morning. Predictably, the Italians counter attacked, but these were easily beaten off. With control of the ‘Railway Bumps’, the sappers got to work clearing the gorge of roadblocks and mines, rotating all three Field Engineer Companies of 5th Division, to provide 24 hours working. By the end of the 26th, the road was clear, and with the British artillery switched to fire on reserve fortifications, an Indian infantry brigade attacked along the gorge. The Italians broke, and with what troops that could, fled towards Asmara, but much of what was left of the Savoy Grenadiers Division, their best troops, were left cut off and with no prospect of escape, low on supplies, surrendered.
The Indian troops had fought very well in the victory, any suggestion that they might be second class was well answered here, two of them, Premindra Singh Bhagat (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) and Richhpal Ram (Subedar in 6th Rajputana Rifles), posthumously, awarded the Victoria Cross. There were many others given medals, mentioned in despatches, or simply noted for promotions, take for instance, Naik Gurpreet Dhillon 4/11 Sikh Regt, who suffered bad lacerations and a broken leg, when blown off a hillside by a shell, on the same day Richhpal Ram won his VC. And Havildar Asif Khan 4/10 Baluch Regt, wounded in the back and buttocks by rock fragments from a mortar shell burst as he led an assault on one of the ‘Railway Bumps’. Or Subedar Abdur Choudhury 2 Field Coy Bengal S&M, half buried under falling rock while helping clear the gorge for the final push.
The capture of Keren quickly led to the fall of Asmara and Massawa, with Italian morale badly shaken, and ultimately the fall of the Italian East African colonies, terrain and logistics becoming the major obstacles to an earlier surrender. British and Indian casualties were high, especially in 4th Indian Division, although there were a lot more wounded than killed, flying rock fragments contributing greatly to the injuries. Both divisions would go on to fight in many more battles and campaigns, while both their commanders, Noel Beresford-Peirse of 4th Indian, and Lewis Heath of 5th Indian, as well as the southern commander Alan Cunningham, would gain promotions thanks to their achievements in this campaign.
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All this is OTL, so if we continue to follow OTL, the 4th Indian are headed back to Egypt. (If we're following OTL, Rommel is in full rampage through Cyrenaica at this point).
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Yes, except
Yes, you're right, I needed some fictional characters for later stories
MWI 41032811 The Fall of Jones In A Week
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 28 March;
It had been coming for some time now, and the old proverb, “give him enough rope and he’ll hang himself” had finally proved right. Caldecott had been at pains to explain what he wanted, even detailing it in a letter to the Colonial Secretary, but old ‘Starchy’ couldn’t help himself. His ability to procrastinate, was legendary, and he was universally hated for it, but as yet Caldecott had been unable to move him out of office.
It all came to a head in a meeting on the Monday, with the Sultan of one of the Un-Federated States. The Governor had been quietly working behind the scenes to expedite the purchase of some land for a new army camp from the Sultan, the both of them reaching an understanding of how it could be done with little fuss. This meeting was just the formality of signatures and agreement of payment dates, when Stanley Jones, Colonial Secretary, pointed out, quite insistently that due notice of the sale wasn’t being given, not allowing any petitions to be raised against it.
Jones formal disproval had sunk the deal, the Sultan fearing public exposure, and criticism from his subjects of being a pawn of the British, had withdrawn from the deal, and as a consequence Caldecott estimated it would take about four months, if everything went well, for the purchase to go ahead, assuming there were no petitions, and that was a big ask!
Later, when Caldecott got Jones alone, and he demanded to know why he had acted in such a way, Jones had taken a sacrosanct view of maintaining standards and following the process strictly to the letter. Caldecott was furious, and had latter that day, cabled the Colonial Office in London, complaining about Jones and requesting his removal. The mandarins in London couldn’t see the problem, Jones was following the process, and had advised Caldecott of that, which in their eyes, was the very correct thing to do.
But Caldecott didn’t let it rest there, and discussed it further, with his friend Lord Gort, who, the following morning, sent a cable to the War Office, and more importantly to General Dill, complaining about the delay in setting up much needed army camps, due to civil government red tape. On the Wednesday, Dill had taken great delight in just dropping a disappointing note over the length of time it took to purchase new land military use in Malaya, embedded deep in his report at the next JCS meeting with Churchill, who, ever on the lookout for inefficiency or waste, quickly seized on it and began demanding answers. Dill was able to redirect the questions levelled at him onto the Colonial Office, who quickly became uncomfortable about the scrutiny Churchill was beginning to place on them.
By Friday 28th March, it was all over, a cable was sent to Caldecott, giving him the authority, and at 11am, he was able to formally dismiss Jones, who was to return to the UK, and for Caldecott to name a temporary replacement. Caldecott chose and it was later accepted that Hugh Fraser, currently Federal Secretary of the Federated Malay States, and the main agent in the setting up the land purchase deal with the Sultan, would be the new Colonial Secretary. With Jones gone, and Fraser installed, Caldecott felt he could make headway in changing the attitude of the Malayan Civil Service, towards a more responsive and helpful form of government.
It had been coming for some time now, and the old proverb, “give him enough rope and he’ll hang himself” had finally proved right. Caldecott had been at pains to explain what he wanted, even detailing it in a letter to the Colonial Secretary, but old ‘Starchy’ couldn’t help himself. His ability to procrastinate, was legendary, and he was universally hated for it, but as yet Caldecott had been unable to move him out of office.
It all came to a head in a meeting on the Monday, with the Sultan of one of the Un-Federated States. The Governor had been quietly working behind the scenes to expedite the purchase of some land for a new army camp from the Sultan, the both of them reaching an understanding of how it could be done with little fuss. This meeting was just the formality of signatures and agreement of payment dates, when Stanley Jones, Colonial Secretary, pointed out, quite insistently that due notice of the sale wasn’t being given, not allowing any petitions to be raised against it.
Jones formal disproval had sunk the deal, the Sultan fearing public exposure, and criticism from his subjects of being a pawn of the British, had withdrawn from the deal, and as a consequence Caldecott estimated it would take about four months, if everything went well, for the purchase to go ahead, assuming there were no petitions, and that was a big ask!
Later, when Caldecott got Jones alone, and he demanded to know why he had acted in such a way, Jones had taken a sacrosanct view of maintaining standards and following the process strictly to the letter. Caldecott was furious, and had latter that day, cabled the Colonial Office in London, complaining about Jones and requesting his removal. The mandarins in London couldn’t see the problem, Jones was following the process, and had advised Caldecott of that, which in their eyes, was the very correct thing to do.
But Caldecott didn’t let it rest there, and discussed it further, with his friend Lord Gort, who, the following morning, sent a cable to the War Office, and more importantly to General Dill, complaining about the delay in setting up much needed army camps, due to civil government red tape. On the Wednesday, Dill had taken great delight in just dropping a disappointing note over the length of time it took to purchase new land military use in Malaya, embedded deep in his report at the next JCS meeting with Churchill, who, ever on the lookout for inefficiency or waste, quickly seized on it and began demanding answers. Dill was able to redirect the questions levelled at him onto the Colonial Office, who quickly became uncomfortable about the scrutiny Churchill was beginning to place on them.
By Friday 28th March, it was all over, a cable was sent to Caldecott, giving him the authority, and at 11am, he was able to formally dismiss Jones, who was to return to the UK, and for Caldecott to name a temporary replacement. Caldecott chose and it was later accepted that Hugh Fraser, currently Federal Secretary of the Federated Malay States, and the main agent in the setting up the land purchase deal with the Sultan, would be the new Colonial Secretary. With Jones gone, and Fraser installed, Caldecott felt he could make headway in changing the attitude of the Malayan Civil Service, towards a more responsive and helpful form of government.
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Driftless
Donor
I'll be interested to see where you take this civil service shakeup. Some of the old hands will cling desperately to old methods, as that is what they know, plus maybe out of a sense of loyalty to Jones as a "good and faithful servant". Some will waffle around like Captain Renault, trying to decipher which way the wind blows. Some will embrace the change for a variety of reasons.
Caldecott, as an old hand himself, will know the existing staff will mostly work along those lines, so I'd be he's got some follow on plans to help Fraser make the transition
Caldecott, as an old hand himself, will know the existing staff will mostly work along those lines, so I'd be he's got some follow on plans to help Fraser make the transition
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An excellent example of how the Colonial Service operated was Kuala Lumpur railway station, a major terminus. Railway stations had canopies and canopies had a set standard - they had to be able to support the weight of snow equal to their area over the heads of travelers sheltering underneath. Now KL was on the equator where it rarely, very rarely ever snows. This requirement held up construction for over 10 years. It was finally waived when someone intelligently pointed out that it rained in KL not snowed. The station was then built.
Do the air defenses and facilities of Darwin or Rangoon have to remain the same as OTL, however? Could they be upgraded due this TL's changing military priorities and strategic differences. True Rangoon isn't on any major shipping lanes, for example, but that's a peacetime concern, wartime changes priorities and a harbor that was of minor importance before can, because of now very different priorities, become a vital point.
Rangoon, for example may not be important in peacetime, but one look at a map when it comes to war in the East Indies shows Rangoon to be well situated as a possible forward naval and air base...if properly improved and defended of course. Same with Darwin.
Malta and Tobruk spring to mind in this regard as comparisons. Both were fairly minor ports in peacetime, but became major strategic points of contention and logistical hubs in wartime despite their initial limits.
So while limited yes, they don't have remain so. I also concede you've got to find the manpower, trained personnel, money, supplies, equipment, and guns to do this, and that's very up in the air. At least Rangoon does seem have a developed harbor, being a major exporter of rice and raw materials.
Not sure I agree with that. I did just look at a map, and concluded that Rangoon isn't much closer to the Malacca Strait than Colombo is, and the route lies for the entire distance along a potentially hostile coastline that is either under the control, or within easy reach, of Japanese forces in Thailand.
The Japanese being able to make it all the way down the Malay peninsula to take Singapore overland was a major surprise. The Japanese quickly being able to overrun southern Burma from Thailand certainly shouldn't have been.
There were basically zero reliable transportation links between Thailand and southern Burma IIRC. And the terrain is both very mountainous and covered with jungle. So Japan being able to support as large an offensive as it did in that area was legitimately a surprise. And a pretty impressive achievement on the Japanese part.
There's also the problem that Rangoon has effectively no land communications to India (or Malaya), so before your fleet starts drawing supplies from Rangoon you first have to get the supplies to Rangoon - where they'll be fighting for wharf space with anything being sent to China along the Burma Road. And, as noted, the approaches to Rangoon are within easy hitting range of hostile aircraft basing out of western Thailand.
It looks like even today the road links from western Thailand to southern Burma can be counted on one hand with fingers over. Which means that Rangoon can (should) be defensible with quite a small force, even if Thailand is hostile. But it also means that an overland offensive from Burma to remove any Japanese bases from Thailand is a non-starter.
Of course the pre-war British have no idea of just how far the Japanese are prepared to push their limited logistics.
I take it this is an actual OTL event and not a hypothetical POD?
If so I'd be interested to know more. What time? I assume you mean transited the Corinth canal heading west, which puts them at something like 7 or 8 hours steaming at 30 knots to get to somewhere near the the action
On reflection I'm not sure I fancy their chances of finding anything at night without radar - and with evidently very limited ability to communicate by radio with Cunningham's fleet, pretty high chances of blue-on-blues with the highly aggressive British destroyers.
I’ll try to find the details (at work) but it was presented as ‘a missed opportunity’ when I read about it.
There was a great deal of confusion during the night actions but more on the part of the Italians.
For example 1 Aussie DD found itself being challenged by an Italian destroyer through the medium of firing a Breda machine gun into the air.
RN and Commonwealth RN destroyer crews being a bunch of hooligan pirates the DD crew of course had a captured Breda of their own and replicated ‘the signal’ and managed to sneak off.
On the other hand 3 British BBs tip toed up to 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers getting so close that when they turned on their search lights on max arc they were only illuminating half a cruiser each.
Prince Phillip ( in charge of the searchlights on Valiant) recalls that they were whispering as they closed with the unfortunate Italians.