You know, I've been thinking, what will China claim from Russia in the event of a victory? Carlton's spoken of territorial revisions in Turkestan, which I think is probable; the biggest issue is probably control over the Pamir mountain range in Tajikistan, control of which was settled largely in Russia's favor in the 1890s, but which China continued to dispute up until very recently. Also, I imagine that it would benefit China's strategic situation to have full control over the Altai, Dzungar, and Tianshan mountains and their passes especially, which would also involve a general push westwards of the Chinese border into Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. If China reasserts control over Mongolia, I imagine they would want to resolve the situation in Tuva to their benefit as well.
However, I can think of one other major territorial revision which has not yet been mentioned, Outer Manchuria, as described in this map here. China only ceded this territory to Russia fifty years ago, but it is, quite, simply, one of, if not the most valuable portion of the Russian Far East at the present time. China would have a historical claim on this territory, and I think that reversing the Unequal treaties of Aigun and Peking, which led to this, would be something that China would be greatly interested in.
Sure China can claim all of these territories but do they have the capability to actually take them? From what I read it seems that they will only be able to drive the Russians out of Mongolia. It's not like Germany can help out in east Asia.
They can certainly put pressure on the Russians at the peace conference. And bear in mind that while Germany is not at all interested in the political future of China or Japan per se, it will be more than happy to help them buiting off big chucks of Russia. The better to forestall any future alliances.
Worse, it invalidates the de facto attempted annexation of Manchuria the Japanese are working on. Not going to happen. They wouldn't even let Chinese troops through to fight, I'd say.
True. The Japanese wouldn't want Chinese claims in the area, and China depends completely on Japanese support for its war effort.
Adolf von Elm is a perceptive man.
He's also from the opposite side of the movement in every sense. A worker who made his way up in the world ('von' is a locative byname, not a noble title), a moderate Bernsteinian, experienced politician, and leading light of the Genossenschaftsbewegung with a vested interest in maintaining a cash economy and markets. Not to mention old enough to be Ganetsky's father.
Because it wouldn't do to have too sanguine a view of who the Polish Socialists are, would it?
Well, yes and no. ON the one hand, Ganetsky is completely delusional. On the other, he is successful beyond anyone's wildest imaginations.
Obviously Ganetsky's "friends in Zurich" include Lenin's Bolsheviks in exile (where we know they will stay, or else die if they try coming back to Russia) and either only the outer, enthusiastic but not too bright circles of them, or else he doesn't listen very carefully when people like Lenin talk.
IDK just how many of the OTL Bolshevik inner circle took the idea of carrying on with "War Communism" in Russia when they had just won the Civil War, if any, or if it was entirely a front-line cadre idea. Certainly the Politburo took a breath and enacted NEP instead.
Not immediately, though. But you have to recall three things here:
Ganetsky is young. He's not even thirty yet, and most of his youth was spent in the Socialist underground. He is a great admirer of Lenin's idea of the vanguard party forcing the change they want for society (in this, he disagrees both with Pilsudski, who is more in favour of gradual reform, and Dzerzhinski, who believes that the people will genuinely demand full Socialism once they've been educated.
Ganetsky has very little understanding of the ecomony from the bottom. He always lived a privileged existence, first as the son of a factory owner, then as a professional revolutionary funded by the party. As far as he is concerned, workers are like those little figures in Civ III: You give them enough of everything from columns 1 through 4 (food, clothing, housing, morale) and they'll be happy. His expertise, which doesn't amount to that much, is in managing numbers.
And, he operates in the context of a country torn apart by war. More than half the population under his tutelage are refugees. The retreating Russians destroyed everything of value. And he's having to invent running a war economy as ge goes along, because nobody has a blueprint for that. as a result, his view of both his own achievements and the malleability of society is a bit more than sanguine.
This is certainly a dash of cold water on Ganetsky. Parsing it carefully in Marxist-for-grammar-school terms--the Germans pay the Poles for what they sell the Germans in Marks, that is, in more or less still "hard" currency--if the war doesn't ruin the Mark that is. But for now it's hard; they could take the Marks and go buy things in say, New York or London and they'd exchange for dollars or pounds just fine. And this means they are worth a certain amount of labor-content. The Marks the Polish enterprises (or I gather, the government, acting as their agent) acquire thus in part fully compensate the Polish labor that was done--both the share actually paid to the workers in wages, and the part that accrues to the enterprise as profit. In addition to that, the Poles must, on paper, purchase raw materials from the Germans, which ordinarily means alienating some hard value, that is labor-content, via money or barter in payment to the supplier--the alternative being to buy on credit, which is to say a promise to supply the hard value later. The German government is currently enabling them to do just that latter thing; all the raw materials they are consuming in their productive labor processes (and also the food the workers consume) are being "sold" for paper of very dubious credit; Polish bonds first of all can only be worth something if the Poles win (which does seem like a surer thing every day now, but still is at least theoretically in doubt) and then have both the means and the honor to pay their accumulated bill in some kind of hard value, at a rate competitive with other investments the Germans might have made. Whereas the goods the Germans hand over are hard values, representing someone's useful labor in the past, much of it German labor.
So for now, the Germans pay twice for the Polish goods they use in the war. If the Poles later default a big part of the war expenditures would have turned out to have cost double!
Yes and no. The Mark the Germans are paying in are not convertible (the notes are stamped 'for use in Poland only' and will not be redeemed for specie, but they can be exchanged for - equally nonconvertible - paper mark at the border if you have the right paperwork). Only a few select importers are allowed access to expressly convertible funds. Germany MOst of Germany's imports are paid for by exports paid in hard currencies, which obliges German industry to produce a lot of non-war critical stuff (cue headlines about industrialists exporting German coal to France while warrior widows shiver in poorly heated housing).
So not only is Ganetsky neglecting the likelihood that Polish Socialist leaders like Pilsudski would prefer to keep the capitalist and other propertied Poles on side by to some degree honoring their property claims, he is also ignoring the German elephant in the room that will want to be first in line and making no concessions assuming Pilsudski does that. And if he doesn't--then toss him out and put in someone who does.
Pretty much, yes.
I hoped the italics would indicate I was teasing, without festooning the sentence with emoticons.
Actually though this does bring up something that bothered me. Von Elm is not just thinking of Ganetsky when he reflects that these Polish Socialists are "frightening" when you get to know them.
And if Ganetsky really is a competent economist who really has been successful in organizing work processes and getting solid results--why should such elementary facts slip by him? He knows, or should know, how much of the value of what his enterprises put out is due to German subsidy, and the idea of just how many Reichsmarks the Polish nation owes the Germans should be haunting him, not forgotten!
I wouldn't call him a brilliant economist. He has a basic grasp of economics and a flair for management, but he's in his twenties, inexperienced, excitable, and caught up in a bubble of his own making. The debt does not worry him too much because, even assuming there is no world revolution coming, it can be paid off with the product of Poland's labour (who will, naturally, eagerly volunteer to free their newly won country of that burden so they can then advance into the new, bright future). He is convinced that a managed command economy will be much more productive than a creaky laissez-faire thing, so that won't be a huge deal. And he has a record of success that makes all this look credible to him. After all, Poland is in a much better state than it was a year ago. By his metrics, he's brilliant. The mobilisation of refugee labour, basically in return for food and a blanket, has produced enormous manpower reserves for the army's logistics. Practically nobody has starved to death this year (except for peasants in remote areas who refused to join the work brigades, and of course the people in the penal units, who are supposed to). And given his lack of patience with failure, his subordinates bring him only good news.
He is going to be in for a rude awakening when he finds out that the Army Council considers his whole little fiefdom a temporary emergency measure.
Anybody with sufficient knowledge of affairs will be worried. A revolutionary organization with Dzierżyński near the top is bound to be terrifying. And now it turns out that the communists are not only influential, but actually think they are successfully running a country. At least Piłsudski regards socialism as a means to an end ("Comrades, I took the red tram of socialism to the stop called Independence, and that's where I got off. You may keep on to the final stop if you wish, but from now on let's address each other 'Mister"), and can be expected to try to prevent communist nonsense afterwards, assuming he resembles his OTL self. So postwar Poland will be a rump state and German satellite, but it at least probably avoids a communist disaster (other then Dzierżyński) to add insult to injury.
THat's the plan. THe Army Council has a real problem with manpower, which partly explains the problem. They could only use people they trusted, because there were so many Okhrana agents around in the early years. With Dmovski walking out in a huff, the expertise of the moderate conservative side is gone. THe church is incrasingly seen as the enemy, and its interest in cooperating with a war economy is practically nil, anyway. Most people in army leadership can sort of rub along while there's fighting to be done, but the civilian support branches are desperate for competence (Nobody wants to tell little Agniezka the rousing story of how they totted up output statistics in the great war). That's how people like Ganetsky and Dzerzhinski get promoted. They're willing to do dirty work.
The difference is that Dzerzhinski is a scheming bastard with an immediate aim. He'll last. Ganetsky is an idealist. He won't.
Another sign of where the racist/conservative reaction is going to come from. When all those German men come back to the farm, and the Poles aren't going home because the wages are too good?
Yeah. Unfortunate.
A lot of them probably will (Germany has no compunctions expelling them, either), but it will be a contributing factor.
This will be worsened by the economic depression sure to hit once all the soldiers return to find they don't have any surplus money to spend. Production will decrease, meaning layoffs, meaning less jobs and more destitution. Any "outsider" holding a job in Germany will be seen with hostility.
Imagine how well the German public will react when they find out that all their blood and tears won them very little. The good news is that it won't be that bad. Germany has a competent leadership and a successful export industry. But German workers will, for decades to come, be earning less and working more than their French, British or Dutch neighbours to pay off the war debt and finance the new allies. It doesn't take massive unemployment surges to make people grumble. And the hard right will be more than happy to point out that Germany could be the master of all those lands now if only the government pansies had actually dared to dictate a real conqueror's peace...