I've discussed the
capabilities of Soviet air defenses and the [
in]capabilities of Anglo-American air forces at the start of conflict quite at length in other threads. But the incapacities of Anglo-American air forces won't last and once they are fixed, then the Soviets will be subjected to relentless air and industrial attrition by an extended campaign, just as Germany was. In the long-run, the VVS/PVO will break before the USAF does. The fundamental dynamic here is simply one of armament in breadth vs armament in depth.
For those not familiar with the terminology, it's actually borrowed from a briefing given by German General Georg Thomas in May 1939 in his capacity as head of the Defense Economy and Armament Office of the Wehrmacht and has been used by a number of historians since as the terms are rather useful. He defined "armament in breadth" as "the number and strength of the armed forces in peacetime and the preparation made to increase them [in the short-term, via mobilization] in time of war." On the other hand, "armament in depth" was defined as "all those measures, particularly affecting materials and of an economic nature, which serve to provide supplies during war [over the long run] and therefore strengthen our powers of endurance."
The Soviets would be starting this war with incredible armament in breadth, as far as ground and air forces go. They have an absolutely crushing advantage in this, much more so than Germany did in 1939/40, and this would be the source of much of their early victories. Western armament in breadth, on the other hand, was tiny: most equipment had been junked during demobilization and what was left were hand-me-downs.
The problem was that when it came to armaments-in-depth, the crushing advantage is on the Americans side. That is not to say the Soviets have no armament in depth themselves. Indeed, compared to either themselves during WW2 in 1941-45 or Germany during that same time, they actually have considerably more armament in depth in 1947/8. It's just they are still massively, crushingly outweighed by the US and --- once the Americans are able to fix the deficiencies within SAC --- their armament in depth would be subjected to an ever-growing conventional and nuclear bombardment.
Operation Dropshot rather specifically planned to utilize nukes and did not envision some elaborate plan of "severing their communications network protocol". It largely envisioned the war as following the format of the late-1940s plans I described above, despite supposedly being set in 1957.