With the Crescent Above Us 2.0: An Ottoman Timeline
- Thread starter Nassirisimo
- Start date
Honestly glad to see this back in action! I really loved the first WtCAU timeline, and the second one is looking promising.
Egypt's future will definitely depend on what happens within the Ottoman Empire. The problem is of course is that the Suez Canal makes Egypt a crucial point for any European power with colonies in Asia, so as long as they have the power to maintain themselves there the Europeans will likely not be leaving unless they're forced. Honestly, it's all a bit up in the air at the moment, as OTL's period of decolonization really gained steam 70 years or so after the POD.Hmm perhaps they would have the gut churning to put aside their differences in keeping out European influence, if Urabi revolt was successful. Cause Let's face it, Egypt CAN'T stop Europeans alone. It could have been like an autonomous province ( it still has a chance) where European interests were preserved under Ottoman tutelage. But considering the thing with Lenin and Alexey in your previous TL, Urabi and Abdulhamid are just icing on the cake. It wasn’t rare for enemies to work together in times of crisis. In that case, Whoever wants to protect Egypt from European influence must ally with Ottomans in future( yes, I know Urabi isn’t the last one to walk that line and i have a hunch that Masri decolonization would come at a very bad time for Europeans enough to kick them on the balls, hope I'm not spoiling anything,)
This might be interesting, but what if Egypt separate fully from Ottomans after age of colonialism is over? You know now that there is no security obligation why not go our Own way?
But again, More European influence in Egypt means Muslim brotherhood is eventually formed? Curious to see interaction between Ikhwanis and Ottomans. Hasan Al Banna was very much a sufi idealist initially which reflected in ikhwani base of spiritual cleansing. In that case, there might be deeper connection to Ottoman empire after independence in context of pan islamism.
Some kind of Islamic reform movement is already an inevitability as al-Afghani has already been spreading his message around but of course, what shape it will change all depends on what happens in the empire as well as Egypt.
Certainly, without Egypt, the Ottoman Empire is far weaker, but being a great power is also a matter of perception.
The Eastern Mediterranean basin covered in that Ottoman green is aesthetically pleasing, but I am trying to keep things quite plausible here. In the future, who knows what will happen?Welcome back Nassirisimo also Egypt and the ottoman empire look nice on the map together so Pls
Many thanks! I hope you enjoy the ride.
I just hope that it stays promising, and that I continue to work on it once lockdown is over here.
Rise of the Mahdist State - 1881 to 1891
Brian Lewis; Catastrophe - Africa's Path to Subjugation: Routledge
Revolution in Sudan? - The Rise of the Mahdist State
At the same time the tide of Egyptian nationalism was rising, further south in the Nile Valley discontent was also stirring. Sudan had been ruled from Cairo since its conquest by Mohammed Ali for decades, but as Egypt drew closer to Europe the situation in Sudan had become more unstable. Financial difficulties in Egypt led to tax increases in Sudan, and this alongside efforts to restrict the slave trade on the part of European officials in Egypt’s employ as well as a general disregard for the position of the native Sudanese within the country, led to a growing resentment of the Egyptian regime in Sudan. These forces added to the excitement caused by news flowing into Sudan from other areas of the Muslim world, feeding into a growing millenarianism that had come from the Muslim regions of Western Africa. By 1881 this had all culminated in the declaration of Jihad by a Sufi Sheikh from Omdurman named Muhammad Ahmad.
Muhammad Ahmad came from humble origins. His father was a carpenter from Dongola who had moved his family to Omdurman when Muhammad Ahmad was still a young boy. For many years Muhammad Ahmad had been a follower of the Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Sharif. However, the two had fallen out reportedly over Muhammad Ahmad’s increasingly egotistical behavior. Following a number of years in which Muhammad Ahmad had become an increasingly popular sheikh, his own sense of self-importance had grown, culminating in his claim that he was the Mahdi, a figure expected in the Islamic end times to restore justice to the world. For his part, Muhammad Ahmad grew increasingly critical of Muhammad al-Sharif’s behavior, considering his conduct toward women inappropriate to be un-Islamic. The conflict between the two men became more severe, with al-Sharif expelling Muhammad Ahmad from the Sammaniyya order. However, he was taken as a disciple by another Sammaniyya sheikh, succeeding him upon his death in 1880. In his subsequent travels across Sudan, he not only saw first-hand the discontent that had arisen from Egyptian rule in the region but made the connections and spread the influence that would be crucial when he rose the banner of Jihad.
The Mahdi’s rebellion was not a significant one at first. There are varying claims over where it had begun, with perhaps the most popular explanation being that he was outraged by a marriage sanctioned by the Egyptian authorities in al-Obeid [1]. For two years the revolt itself was limited in its scope to the outlying Kordofan region, though as the Mahdi’s popularity grew, he became an increasing concern for Egyptian authorities. 1882 had seen the Egyptian administration in the Sudan evermore distracted by events closer to home, which saw the Egyptian army clash with a coalition of European powers. The Mahdi grew ever stronger, joined by many groups such as the Baqqara nomads, who joined the Mahdi less because of religious fervor than due to considerations of their own political and economic interests. Nevertheless, the Mahdi did not merely wish to turn back the clock to the days of the Funj Sultanate who had ruled Sudan prior to the Egyptian conquest but wanted to create a more centralized state where the power would be firmly in his own hands. Many Sufi orders in Sudan were persecuted by the Mahdi, as they were often his strongest opponents. More often than not, they would refuse to swear allegiance to the Mahdi, even after his defeat of an Egyptian army under the command of William Hicks, a British officer in Egyptian service.
The Mahdi's army in action
1884 was a turning point in the history of the rebellion. The Mahdi had by now created an impressive army. The Egyptian Khedive in Cairo was increasingly desperate, with Sudan quickly falling out of his grasp. He had made a request to his European backers that they send an army to preserve what was left of his colony in Sudan but led by British Prime Minister Gladstone, his request was denied [2]. By the March of 1884, the Mahdist army had reached Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and laid siege to it. Almost all the Europeans of the city and many of the Egyptians had already left prior to the arrival of the Mahdists, and the siege lasted for around 4 months before the remnants of the Egyptian garrison were overwhelmed by their besiegers. The fall of Khartoum marked the end of Egypt’s Empire in Sudan, although garrisons remained in a few other parts of the country such as Wadi Halfa. In Egypt itself, this represented a significant blow to the prestige of the already unpopular Khedive Tewfik, and furthermore, it worried those European powers with an interest in Northeast Africa. The British had debated on sending a force to Suakin on the Red Sea Coast to protect shipping in the Red Sea from the Mahdist leader Osman Dinga but ultimately decided against it.
Much of Sudan was now in the hands of the Mahdi, and for the time being, he could build his new state without too much interference from European powers. The Mahdi was not an absolute ruler, however, and much of the power was in the hands of his chief lieutenants who were each known as Khalifa, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, Ali ibn Muhammad Hilu, and Osman Dinga. The Mahdi had successfully managed to carve out a large state, but it proved to be more difficult to construct an adequate administrative structure than to conquer an area. With Khalifa Abdallahi taking the leading role in developing the administration of the Mahdist state, many Turco-Egyptians who had served in the administration during the time of Egyptian rule now found themselves in similar positions of power. However, the challenges faced by the Mahdist state were grave indeed. International trade was greatly reduced and the 1880s saw an increase in famine throughout Sudan. This famine was exacerbated by the policy of resettlement, which saw nomadic peoples settled into agricultural areas which had been depopulated by the wars. The Mahdi found it expedient to continue his campaign of conquests to alleviate these domestic concerns, leading expeditions into Ethiopia, South Sudan, and even attempting an incursion into Egypt, which was repulsed by an Egyptian army.
By the end of the decade, the Mahdist state had for the most part ended its main period of expansion. By now the core Sudanese lands and the other easy conquests had now all been incorporated into the state, and to some extent, the revolutionary elan which had carried the Mahdi’s army to a number of great victories had come to an end. The Mahdi had originally hoped to carry his purifying message into other parts of the Islamic world, attempts to invade his Muslim neighbors such as Egypt ended in abject failure. Likewise, his campaign against Emin Pasha in Equatoria had ended in failure, as a relief force led by the famed Henry Morton Stanley not only provided much-needed supplies but also found Stanley being appointed the Egyptian governor of Equatoria. This left Ethiopia, which had been involved in a low-intensity border war in Sudan for decades at this point, as the most tempting target for further Mahdist campaigns.
The Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV had enjoyed some success in attempting to keep the very decentralized Ethiopian Empire together but was beset by both the Mahdists to his west and Italian colonists in Massawa to the Northeast. The Mahdi led a destructive campaign into Ethiopia, even managing to take and sack the ancient city of Gondar. Considering this incursion, Yohannes judged the Mahdists to be a greater threat than the Italians, attempting to come to an understanding with the latter so that he could focus his limited resources on the former. He had wanted to deal with the internal challenge from the King of Shewa Menelik prior to campaigning against the Mahdists but was dissuaded by members of his clergy. Yohannes managed to gather a larger army than the Mahdists, numbering well over 100,000 infantry and cavalry together, whereas the Mahdists could only field an estimated 85,000 warriors in all. The two armies clashed at the Battle of Gallabat, which would prove to be a turning point in the history of the Mahdist state. Not only would the Ethiopians crush the Mahdist army, inflicting enormous casualties, but they would also manage to kill the Mahdi himself, which crushed the morale of the Mahdist army. Much of it was slaughtered at Gallabat, ending the prospect of any serious incursions into Ethiopia for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the only thing which prevented an Ethiopian counter-invasion of Sudan was the prospect of a Civil War between Yohannes and Menelik [3].
With the Mahdi slain at Gallabat, the Mahdist state now stood at the brink of anarchy. His closest followers, the Khalifas, had all survived though there was disagreement over which path the state should take in the wake of the Mahdi’s death. Already Abdallahi had begun to take the reins of power into his own hands but was opposed by Khalifa Muhammad Sharif. In the end, it was the intervention of Khalifa Ali ibn Muhammad Hilu that prevented the power struggle from turning violent. A rare man without personal ambition, he had mediated between the two, ultimately ensuring that power would be in the hands of Abdallahi. He was not in an enviable position, however, as the Mahdist state faced potentially disastrous challenges. The internal issues which had pushed the Mahdi to embark on a campaign of conquest had not abated, many of the Sufi orders and tribes of Sudan resented the Mahdist state and Abdallahi’s attempts to impose more central control upon them, and the power of various European powers was beginning to increase in the Northeast of Africa. The next few years would prove to be critical to the Mahdist state.
[1] – The marriage was purportedly one between a man and an adolescent boy.
[2] - Without the British expedition, Gordon survives but more significantly, the phrase “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” never enters the English language.
[3] – Of course, Ethiopia will get its own update later on.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes - The Mahdist revolt in Sudan had deep roots, most of which were present by 1877 so it is unlikely that the POD would change things drastically. However, the change comes more from butterflies than anything else. With a different situation in Egypt, there is no Gordon coming to prolong Egyptian resistance in Sudan and make himself a martyr at Khartoum. This will have its own butterflies but the more significant one comes at alternate-Gallabat. This was an enormous battle that wasn't noticed much by Europeans at the time (a few newspaper entries that mention the battle identify an Ethiopian lord as dying, yet he actually died in the 20th century). Menelik's main competition is still alive and kicking and this will ensure changes for Ethiopia at a pivotal time.
Not saying to use this but while Egypt’s fate is still up in the air that’s still no reason for the Ottomans to not see to Tunisia and the Saharan Interior in Libya. After all while not perfect making sure Egypt’s Western and Eastern Border are both Ottoman is a nice way of hemming in Egypt. Maybe even cultivating the idea of “The Day” when the Ottomans can sweep into Egypt.
P.S. Now that we’ve got you back we now have 2 great Ottoman Alternate Time Lines!
Last edited:
Maudoldu00
Banned
Would Greece go to war with ottoman in this timelines? Because if i im not wrong you old timelines it been butterflied, would it butterflied away again?
Brian Lewis; Catastrophe - Africa's Path to Subjugation: Routledge
Revolution in Sudan? - The Rise of the Mahdist State
At the same time the tide of Egyptian nationalism was rising, further south in the Nile Valley discontent was also stirring. Sudan had been ruled from Cairo since its conquest by Mohammed Ali for decades, but as Egypt drew closer to Europe the situation in Sudan had become more unstable. Financial difficulties in Egypt led to tax increases in Sudan, and this alongside efforts to restrict the slave trade on the part of European officials in Egypt’s employ as well as a general disregard for the position of the native Sudanese within the country, led to a growing resentment of the Egyptian regime in Sudan. These forces added to the excitement caused by news flowing into Sudan from other areas of the Muslim world, feeding into a growing millenarianism that had come from the Muslim regions of Western Africa. By 1881 this had all culminated in the declaration of Jihad by a Sufi Sheikh from Omdurman named Muhammad Ahmad.
Muhammad Ahmad came from humble origins. His father was a carpenter from Dongola who had moved his family to Omdurman when Muhammad Ahmad was still a young boy. For many years Muhammad Ahmad had been a follower of the Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Sharif. However, the two had fallen out reportedly over Muhammad Ahmad’s increasingly egotistical behavior. Following a number of years in which Muhammad Ahmad had become an increasingly popular sheikh, his own sense of self-importance had grown, culminating in his claim that he was the Mahdi, a figure expected in the Islamic end times to restore justice to the world. For his part, Muhammad Ahmad grew increasingly critical of Muhammad al-Sharif’s behavior, considering his conduct toward women inappropriate to be un-Islamic. The conflict between the two men became more severe, with al-Sharif expelling Muhammad Ahmad from the Sammaniyya order. However, he was taken as a disciple by another Sammaniyya sheikh, succeeding him upon his death in 1880. In his subsequent travels across Sudan, he not only saw first-hand the discontent that had arisen from Egyptian rule in the region but made the connections and spread the influence that would be crucial when he rose the banner of Jihad.
The Mahdi’s rebellion was not a significant one at first. There are varying claims over where it had begun, with perhaps the most popular explanation being that he was outraged by a marriage sanctioned by the Egyptian authorities in al-Obeid [1]. For two years the revolt itself was limited in its scope to the outlying Kordofan region, though as the Mahdi’s popularity grew, he became an increasing concern for Egyptian authorities. 1882 had seen the Egyptian administration in the Sudan evermore distracted by events closer to home, which saw the Egyptian army clash with a coalition of European powers. The Mahdi grew ever stronger, joined by many groups such as the Baqqara nomads, who joined the Mahdi less because of religious fervor than due to considerations of their own political and economic interests. Nevertheless, the Mahdi did not merely wish to turn back the clock to the days of the Funj Sultanate who had ruled Sudan prior to the Egyptian conquest but wanted to create a more centralized state where the power would be firmly in his own hands. Many Sufi orders in Sudan were persecuted by the Mahdi, as they were often his strongest opponents. More often than not, they would refuse to swear allegiance to the Mahdi, even after his defeat of an Egyptian army under the command of William Hicks, a British officer in Egyptian service.
The Mahdi's army in action
1884 was a turning point in the history of the rebellion. The Mahdi had by now created an impressive army. The Egyptian Khedive in Cairo was increasingly desperate, with Sudan quickly falling out of his grasp. He had made a request to his European backers that they send an army to preserve what was left of his colony in Sudan but led by British Prime Minister Gladstone, his request was denied [2]. By the March of 1884, the Mahdist army had reached Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and laid siege to it. Almost all the Europeans of the city and many of the Egyptians had already left prior to the arrival of the Mahdists, and the siege lasted for around 4 months before the remnants of the Egyptian garrison were overwhelmed by their besiegers. The fall of Khartoum marked the end of Egypt’s Empire in Sudan, although garrisons remained in a few other parts of the country such as Wadi Halfa. In Egypt itself, this represented a significant blow to the prestige of the already unpopular Khedive Tewfik, and furthermore, it worried those European powers with an interest in Northeast Africa. The British had debated on sending a force to Suakin on the Red Sea Coast to protect shipping in the Red Sea from the Mahdist leader Osman Dinga but ultimately decided against it.
Much of Sudan was now in the hands of the Mahdi, and for the time being, he could build his new state without too much interference from European powers. The Mahdi was not an absolute ruler, however, and much of the power was in the hands of his chief lieutenants who were each known as Khalifa, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, Ali ibn Muhammad Hilu, and Osman Dinga. The Mahdi had successfully managed to carve out a large state, but it proved to be more difficult to construct an adequate administrative structure than to conquer an area. With Khalifa Abdallahi taking the leading role in developing the administration of the Mahdist state, many Turco-Egyptians who had served in the administration during the time of Egyptian rule now found themselves in similar positions of power. However, the challenges faced by the Mahdist state were grave indeed. International trade was greatly reduced and the 1880s saw an increase in famine throughout Sudan. This famine was exacerbated by the policy of resettlement, which saw nomadic peoples settled into agricultural areas which had been depopulated by the wars. The Mahdi found it expedient to continue his campaign of conquests to alleviate these domestic concerns, leading expeditions into Ethiopia, South Sudan, and even attempting an incursion into Egypt, which was repulsed by an Egyptian army.
By the end of the decade, the Mahdist state had for the most part ended its main period of expansion. By now the core Sudanese lands and the other easy conquests had now all been incorporated into the state, and to some extent, the revolutionary elan which had carried the Mahdi’s army to a number of great victories had come to an end. The Mahdi had originally hoped to carry his purifying message into other parts of the Islamic world, attempts to invade his Muslim neighbors such as Egypt ended in abject failure. Likewise, his campaign against Emin Pasha in Equatoria had ended in failure, as a relief force led by the famed Henry Morton Stanley not only provided much-needed supplies but also found Stanley being appointed the Egyptian governor of Equatoria. This left Ethiopia, which had been involved in a low-intensity border war in Sudan for decades at this point, as the most tempting target for further Mahdist campaigns.
The Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV had enjoyed some success in attempting to keep the very decentralized Ethiopian Empire together but was beset by both the Mahdists to his west and Italian colonists in Massawa to the Northeast. The Mahdi led a destructive campaign into Ethiopia, even managing to take and sack the ancient city of Gondar. Considering this incursion, Yohannes judged the Mahdists to be a greater threat than the Italians, attempting to come to an understanding with the latter so that he could focus his limited resources on the former. He had wanted to deal with the internal challenge from the King of Shewa Menelik prior to campaigning against the Mahdists but was dissuaded by members of his clergy. Yohannes managed to gather a larger army than the Mahdists, numbering well over 100,000 infantry and cavalry together, whereas the Mahdists could only field an estimated 85,000 warriors in all. The two armies clashed at the Battle of Gallabat, which would prove to be a turning point in the history of the Mahdist state. Not only would the Ethiopians crush the Mahdist army, inflicting enormous casualties, but they would also manage to kill the Mahdi himself, which crushed the morale of the Mahdist army. Much of it was slaughtered at Gallabat, ending the prospect of any serious incursions into Ethiopia for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the only thing which prevented an Ethiopian counter-invasion of Sudan was the prospect of a Civil War between Yohannes and Menelik [3].
With the Mahdi slain at Gallabat, the Mahdist state now stood at the brink of anarchy. His closest followers, the Khalifas, had all survived though there was disagreement over which path the state should take in the wake of the Mahdi’s death. Already Abdallahi had begun to take the reins of power into his own hands but was opposed by Khalifa Muhammad Sharif. In the end, it was the intervention of Khalifa Ali ibn Muhammad Hilu that prevented the power struggle from turning violent. A rare man without personal ambition, he had mediated between the two, ultimately ensuring that power would be in the hands of Abdallahi. He was not in an enviable position, however, as the Mahdist state faced potentially disastrous challenges. The internal issues which had pushed the Mahdi to embark on a campaign of conquest had not abated, many of the Sufi orders and tribes of Sudan resented the Mahdist state and Abdallahi’s attempts to impose more central control upon them, and the power of various European powers was beginning to increase in the Northeast of Africa. The next few years would prove to be critical to the Mahdist state.
[1] – The marriage was purportedly one between a man and an adolescent boy.
[2] - Without the British expedition, Gordon survives but more significantly, the phrase “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” never enters the English language.
[3] – Of course, Ethiopia will get its own update later on.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes - The Mahdist revolt in Sudan had deep roots, most of which were present by 1877 so it is unlikely that the POD would change things drastically. However, the change comes more from butterflies than anything else. With a different situation in Egypt, there is no Gordon coming to prolong Egyptian resistance in Sudan and make himself a martyr at Khartoum. This will have its own butterflies but the more significant one comes at alternate-Gallabat. This was an enormous battle that wasn't noticed much by Europeans at the time (a few newspaper entries that mention the battle identify an Ethiopian lord as dying, yet he actually died in the 20th century). Menelik's main competition is still alive and kicking and this will ensure changes for Ethiopia at a pivotal time.
LET'S GOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
Love the new posts, they're definitely more realistic outcomes comparing to the Old Crescent Above Us TL. Yet enjoyable read. In any case, awesome way to make a comeback on AH Forums. Great to have you back and grace us with your posts, Nassir.
Well ironically a continuation of the current situation is totally ok for Italy both on political and economic terms and frankly there is the possibility that this butterfly away the Italo-Abyssinian war as the French takeover of Tunisi was one the formative event on the political carrer of Crispi (a proto-duce that was the main force behind the war on the italian side, without him at most become a simple local punitive expedition in Tigrai with some limited gain in the region...that was used by Menelik to get rid of competition)
I really love seeing the butterflies hit the mahdi, you do not see that often. Love it.
I really hoped I wouldn't fall into the habit of forgetting to check if it's threadmarked or not. Thanks for pointing it out!
Tunisia and Libya are definitely of lesser interest than Egypt for European powers, but the same goes for the Ottomans too. They had re-integrated Libya back in the 1830s but at this point, I feel that Ottoman attempts to exert closer control in Tunisia will raise the ire of Italy and France. It is possible that in the future there will be more of a desire to exert control both here and in Egypt though. It's still early days after all.
I am thinking of doing a full-on update about transportation in the empire at some point. Basically the long and short of it is that there is more money to fund the construction of railways, but not a whole of a lot more. Certainly, the network will be looking more impressive later on, but we won't see a European-style dense railway network any time soon. But since I'm something of a railway fan, who knows what may happen in the future?
I really, really need to catch up on that timeline.
It's possible. If Greece did it alone, in all likelihood she would be smacked down as hard as she was in 1897 in OTL, but alongside others, well who knows?
This is actually the dawn of a timeline in which the Mahdists conquer the world. The Ottomans were all just a smokescreen guys.
It's been fun reading and writing for this so far, so I hope the outcome is a nice, plausible timeline. In retrospect, the old timeline was a tad bit on the Otto-wank side, and I guess I felt like I wanted to rectify that.
I'm still in the process of researching what will happen in Ethiopia, and it is likely that Italy will have different priorities when 1896 comes around, as will Ethiopia. This is going to have a big impact on both countries of course and may improve Italy's standing. Not gaining the infamous reputation of being the only European country to be defeated in a war by a native African power will change things within Italy and in Ethiopia too. I suppose the key thing here is what happens between Yohannes and Menelik. Gallabat was every bit as decisive as Adwa in both OTL's history and TTLs, just one that has been ignored because there were no European particitipants.
He was little more than a footnote in the previous timeline. I suppose in that sense, the first few years of WTCAU 1.0 were more or less simply a way to beef up the Ottomans as quickly as possible so they could have the resources necassary to act as a great power. I wanted to take a more evenly paced, detailed look here.
Narrative - To far-away islands (1883)
Ibrahim Osman, Zeynep Osman; Adventures in the East, A Memoir of a Naturalised Mohammedan: Palgrave Macmillan
Constantinople, 1883
Curiosity can be a powerful emotion, but it soon wears away. I found that this was especially the case for me in the first years after I joined the army. For certain renegades such as myself were always an object of curiosity but after some time, we had to rely on our talents if we were to make our way in Turkish society. We could indeed make our way, as any study of the career of Omer Pasha can attest, but it also involved a great deal of effort.
By the time of 1883, I had become somewhat impatient for advancement. Still languishing at the rank of captain or Yüzbaşı, I had for some time thought to myself that I needed to perform some great act in order to make my name. But this was not easy in the Turkish army of this time, for in these days it was an army that was fighting a rear-guard action against the tide of history. It could have successes here and there, such as in 1877 but for the most part, it was pushing against a great wave of change from Europe, and I had seen this for myself first-hand. When traveling through the provinces in particular, you found places little changed since the medieval era. The plough represented the height of technology in these areas. Even Turkish cities were largely devoid of the smokestacks and modern industry which by that time had come to dominate Britain.
I was attending a formal dinner for some such civil servant whose name now escapes me in the autumn of 1883. These dinners were beginning to resemble what you would think of when you think of high society in any European country. Men in dinner jackets and sometimes even women in the latest European fashions, depending on how liberal their husbands were of course. It still astonishes me to think that while some Turkish women presented themselves as any European woman would, others hid behind the veil or the wooden screen-windows of the harem.
But I digress. It was at this dinner when it appeared that the opportunity of which I had been hoping for finally presented itself to me. I was introduced to some middling functionary in the foreign service who was describing the plight of some poor benighted Muslims in some outlying corner of the world. I found him to be a rather boring man, like some university professor who now lacked the energy to even lecture properly. He had mentioned that the Sultan himself, wishing to advance the cause of Muslims around the world, wished to enable these far-flung Muslims to defend themselves, as we had done. “The Sultan is also the Caliph, the leader of every Muslim in every corner of the world, from here to Timbuctoo to the furthest Indies. But we have not been able to help them until this point” he explained.
“And he intends to defend the Muslims by making war on the Dutch?” replied I.
“No, we don’t have the strength for that. Oh, but we wish to send some good, pious men to aid these poor men” For all the later talk of a global Muslim brotherhood, I saw just as much of this patronizing paternalism from Turkish or Egyptian Muslims towards their darker coreligionists as I did amongst the Europeans of my time.
I had tired of conversation with this droopy-faced man, and rebuffed him as strongly as I could while maintaining a front of politeness. “Well I hope you will find your good, pious men who do not care a whit about malaria then. Good evening to you”
For much of the night I had not been too interested in this man’s wistful droning, but the more I thought about it, the idea to get away from Turkey and see a bit more of the world was an interesting prospect. At this point, I cared not a whit for the poor situation of these far-away w**s, but any British person had heard that great reputations were made not at home, but in far-away places. A few days and a few meetings later, I found myself boarding a ship in Constantinople bound for the port city of Singapore, the great entrepôt colony of the British in the East Indies.
I didn’t care much for the journey, as we spent most of it journeying through the ocean with not a sight of land, besides the great Suez Canal which now linked Britain’s greatest colony of India with the Mediterranean and Europe. We made a few stops in places such as Port Said and Jeddah to pick up goods, people, and pilgrims. Within 38 days of travel (which I am told was rather fast), we had arrived at our destination. Singapore was a rather interesting place in those days, as I suppose that it always is. Although a British colony, most of the people residing there were Chinese, who stared at you and jabbered in their incomprehensible language, in which every word seems to sound the same. Another thing of note was the heat. It was the 3rd of December when I arrived in Singapore, and the great heat and humidity seemed as bad as any day I had endured in the summertime in England or Turkey.
While I would not go so far as to describe my mission as that of a spy, there was nevertheless a need to disguise the true nature of my mission. For a few days, I was free of any duties or responsibilities, however, so as to best as I could, I prepared for what lay before me. I employed a local Malay porter to instruct me in the local language, which despite its exotic sound is a damned sight easier than Turkish or Arabic. After around a week or so, I had gained some command of the language, which I reasoned would help me far away from this great outpost of civilization.
When it came time to leave Singapore and head for the island of Sumatra, then I began to have misgivings about the whole endeavor. I had mentioned malaria before, and that was a great concern for me. I’d never ventured into the tropics, and I was deathly afraid of some horrible tropical disease at that time. Before we left, we met a few natives of the place that we were going to. I learned that although related, the Malay language is not the language that is spoken there, though fortunately a few of them could speak it. They were strange-looking people, much like the Malays. They were all of them small in stature, with thin, bony bodies. They glared at you when you first met them but share a meal with them and they will be soon chattering away to each other, smiling broadly.
Against these natives, however, I was not alone, alongside me were three other Turkish officers, all a middle rank such as myself, and another functionary from the foreign office. Rifat Ali, his name was. I usually don’t have much in the way of respect for government bureaucrats, who have far too comfortable a life, and far too much to show for it. But there was something about him that was different. He was physically unremarkable, about fifty years of age, a beard that was greying, a darkened complexion. We were on a smaller local boat, the kind that the locals use to sail the coastal waters, making our way up the coast. The sky was grey, as seems to be usual in this part of the world, and the coast filled with a great deal of lush vegetation. I asked Rifat if he had ever been to a place like this, and he answered me “not for a long time. Maybe when I was a young man such as yourself, but it was different back then. Fewer steamships, more natives waiting to throw a spear at you”
“That’s the kind of people we will be helping?”
He shook his head. “Once upon a time, perhaps. But for the past hundred or so years, the Europeans have been strengthening their position here. They used to control a few isolated ports, influence a few sultans, but those days are over”
I nodded my head as he continued. “There used to be a great many pirates in these waters, but between the British and their vassal in Sarawak, they are mostly gone. Though of course in those days, you could not tell the difference between a pirate and a prince”
“I hope that they have some fighting spirit left in them,” said I.
“You will find that they do. Especially these Acehnese. They’re a warrior people, as the Dutch are finding out. They have been trying these past ten years to bring them to heel, but every time the Dutch army turns its back, some Acehnese chuck spears right back at them. We’re going to help them do something more than that”
I had fought a European war already at this point, but even the privations of a Balkan War are nothing compared to what I would find in the jungles. Oh, the Acehnese are certainly great fighters. The Dutch had declared the war finished in 1881, already eight years after they had invaded, but this was an absurd fantasy. A Sultan, Ibrahim Mansur Shah, remained at large and there were several leaders who stood against them.
It was the Ulama, Islamic scholars, who were the backbone of this resistance. We had arrived in Aceh, and after several days trek in a steaming jungle, we came upon a village. It was there that we met the most famous of these resistance leaders, Teungku Cik di Tiro. This village was not a military base of any kind, but deep in the mountains of Aceh it seemed secure enough. As it transpired, this was the native village of Cik di Tiro.
Cik di Tiro was not simply some ignorant village mullah, however. He conversed with us in Arabic, playing the part of a gracious host. We were sat on the floor of his house, eating the local food which was rice and something akin to an Indian curry served on what looked like a banana leaf. I felt it rude to clarify, and we had more important topics to discuss. It was in this way that, for a time, we became part of the Caliph’s secret war in Aceh.
Zainab’s notes;
Recent research has corroborated that Sultan Abdülhamid did indeed send clandestine support for the Acehnese [1]. This raises interesting questions about the Sultan’s pan-Islamic policy. For the most part, scholars have emphasized that this policy was largely a tool to preserve the Sultan’s own domain rather than defending outlying Islamic states, but the fact that Abdülhamid kept his aid to the Acehnese a secret suggests that this mission was carried out not for self-aggrandizement but possibly due to a genuine concern to provide aid for the Acehnese, who had previously requested Ottoman help prior to Abdülhamid’s ascension to the Sultanate.
[1] – Needless to say this didn’t happen in OTL, for the reasons that Zainab notes.
Last edited:
Maudoldu00
Banned
Wow Sultan Abdul Hamid genuinely help the Acehnese. He indeed practice the Caliph role more than his predecessor. Make me wonder if he the one declared jihad in WW1 would it make a bigger Muslim resistance around the world at the time.
Glad to see this timeline’s back.
Considering how extremely tough the Aceh War was for the Dutch even in OTL, any amount of even secretive Ottoman aid probably hurts them a lot. But it still might not be enough for an Acehnese victory.
Considering how extremely tough the Aceh War was for the Dutch even in OTL, any amount of even secretive Ottoman aid probably hurts them a lot. But it still might not be enough for an Acehnese victory.
A more cynical reading might be that Abdulhamid II wanted to enlarge Ottoman influence in any sort of victorious Aceh.
Abdulhanid would have declared war and Jihad on his own terms but response would have been more or less same, but overall effectiveness would have increased since Sherif Hussein was literally eating From Sultan's hand.
Maudoldu00
Banned
Ah
Ah so There will be some changes then. I think lawrence would a bit hard to convince arab to revolt then