I'm not so sure that German-Americans will be having a better time ITTL. I have no doubt America's relations with Britain are going to be worse, but I don't see how that translates into relations with Germany being better. Some Americans may be angry at the British for getting nothing out of their dead soldiers, but that doesn't mean they'll warm up to the Germans, whose soldiers they were fighting and dying against. Isolationists will certainly make the argument that dealing with Britain or Germany requires a lot of skepticism.
To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
- Start date
The mind boggles sometimes with this timeline that I can get 75 likes on a post in less than 24 hours. Cheers all, glad you enjoyed!
.. about "profitability" of esp. the german colonies ... let me "recycle" some of my posts from not so long ago :
Well, I have to admit I don't have much knowledge/source on the economical situation and statistics of the colonies and similar territories of the non-german powers at that time but for the german colonies I've looked up some source :
So, alltogether ... the german colonies were well on their way to become a considerable plus in economics as well (and possibly even more important) a plus in global political weight
https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/kai...tische-angaben-zu-den-deutschen-kolonien.html
Somewhat more 'time-consuming :
https://www.digizeitschriften.de/dms/toc/?PPN=PPN514401303
(the statistical alamnacs of the German Realm/ Deutschen Reiches)
In 1913/1914 following colonies/"Schuttzgebiete" had a negative balance sheet for the empire
Namibia, German South-West
Kamerun
Tanzania, German East Africa
Kiautschou
New-Guinea, Kaiser-Wilhelm Land
Micronesia
Means : these received more money from Berlin, than Berlin received from them. though their absolute amount was esp. for the last two rather negligable.
Most of these 'cost' for Berlin came from investment goods :
railway equipment
minig equipment
communication equipment
and the costs for their installation
as there were mayor development operations going on esp. in Kiautschou (development of the naval base there), Kamerun and East Africa (mayor infrastructure development => railways).
Interestingly these mayor regions of ongoing development were the colonies with a negative trade-balance as well :
Kiautschou, East Africa and Kamerun
while all other colonies had a positive trade balance after 2-3 decades of german administration. The trade 'neagtives' of the other colonies were also 'dwindling' over the last 5-10 years before the Great War and would most likely be even smaller if the 'public' investments of the state might be de-accounted for.
So, alltogether ... the german colonies were well on their way to become a considerable plus in economics as well (and possibly even more important) a plus in global political weight
Source for 'short' :https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/kai...tische-angaben-zu-den-deutschen-kolonien.html
Somewhat more 'time-consuming :
https://www.digizeitschriften.de/dms/toc/?PPN=PPN514401303
(the statistical alamnacs of the German Realm/ Deutschen Reiches)
However ... regarding other than german colonies I would be pleased if someone could show me the way to similar statistics of i.e. french, italian, british, US-american colonies. ... and maybe dominions and similar 'relabeled' regions of dependancy.
... for that part also a
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It must be pointed out that German East Africa and German Southwest Africa didn't produce much in terms of resources, apart from diamonds in the Sperrgebiet... about "profitability" of esp. the german colonies ... let me "recycle" some of my posts from not so long ago :
... and of some longer time ago :
As long as we don't know what 'profits' were made with colonial goods in the 'metropoles' such statements about profitability are IMHO rather ... not well sourcedWell, I have to admit I don't have much knowledge/source on the economical situation and statistics of the colonies and similar territories of the non-german powers at that time but for the german colonies I've looked up some source :
In 1913/1914 following colonies/"Schuttzgebiete" had a negative balance sheet for the empireNamibia, German South-WestKamerunTanzania, German East AfricaKiautschouNew-Guinea, Kaiser-Wilhelm LandMicronesia
Means : these received more money from Berlin, than Berlin received from them. though their absolute amount was esp. for the last two rather negligable.Most of these 'cost' for Berlin came from investment goods :railway equipmentminig equipmentcommunication equipmentand the costs for their installationas there were mayor development operations going on esp. in Kiautschou (development of the naval base there), Kamerun and East Africa (mayor infrastructure development => railways).
Interestingly these mayor regions of ongoing development were the colonies with a negative trade-balance as well :Kiautschou, East Africa and Kamerun
while all other colonies had a positive trade balance after 2-3 decades of german administration. The trade 'neagtives' of the other colonies were also 'dwindling' over the last 5-10 years before the Great War and would most likely be even smaller if the 'public' investments of the state might be de-accounted for.
So, alltogether ... the german colonies were well on their way to become a considerable plus in economics as well (and possibly even more important) a plus in global political weight
Source for 'short' :
https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/kai...tische-angaben-zu-den-deutschen-kolonien.html
Somewhat more 'time-consuming :
https://www.digizeitschriften.de/dms/toc/?PPN=PPN514401303
(the statistical alamnacs of the German Realm/ Deutschen Reiches)
However ... regarding other than german colonies I would be pleased if someone could show me the way to similar statistics of i.e. french, italian, british, US-american colonies. ... and maybe dominions and similar 'relabeled' regions of dependancy.
... for that part also a
The main aim for Germany should be to wrestle control of the Baku oilfields from the Ottomans
We don't view that as a loss, at least not in America's history books. ITTL WW1 is an undeniable loss.
The Zimmerman telegram and unrestricted submarine warfare was hardly 'British propaganda'. There were legitimate American grievances with Germany, that aren't going to immediately vanish just because the war is over. In fact, I'm willing to bet US fear of Germany removes their main objection to continued co-operation with Britain: Freedom of the seas and Britain giving up the right to blockade.
I'll be interested to see whether the Americans are quite as ruthless in demanding repayment of the war debt with Germany victorious and France presumably defaulting earlier. I do think they'd at least not demand terms as stringent as they did IOTL, if not Keynes' proposal of mutual cancellations. If they are still stringent, I can see Britain simply stop paying it earlier than the 1930's ITTL.
This is getting massively ahead of things IMO. Germany is in a worse position than Britain as it currently stands. In the long term probably not but it really depends on where this timeline goes - Many of the Brest-Litovsk territories will require a large expensive garrison both to maintain Berlin's reach, and ward off any Russian salami tactics. Whether the Germans get back what they put in remains to be seen.
There are also almost counter-intuitive ways Britain will be better off ITTL. For example, the French took reparations in the form of coal at some points, which greatly hurt British coal exports as the price collapsed. Here that wont happen (trivial point, and of course not better than actually winning the war, but there are some silver linings.).
On colonialism. Britain is more dominant in the Middle East than IOTL. They'll probably create several Arab states under British influence as planned IOTL until the French forced a U-turn. Hell with Russia in chaos, Curzon may actually get his quasi-protectorate over Persia (admittedly unlikely as it was Persian resistance more than anything that stopped it).
This to me implies Britain was ruling with force above everything. Force was usually an absolute last resort. Indian collaboration with the empire was absolutely essential. Rowlatt Act was the Viceroy's quid pro quo for agreeing to Montagu reforms, perhaps with a British defeat in Europe, he removes this objection, and so doesn't galvanise Indian opposition as much (probably not realistically)?The high noon of nationalism in much of the empire is 1919-1920. If Britain can survive this, the situation will ease as it did IOTL. I'm going to hope we avoid Amritsar ITTL as British leaders are probably going to be more conciliatory (not that they ordered the massacre anyway). Gandhi may not be arrested which set off the agitation that led to it. Though there is the distinct possibility there are more Dyer type's that resort to violence on their own initiative if they get more twitchy. It will be interesting to see where the timeline goes.
If Britain can avoid messing up completely in the first few years after the war, they're going to be in an alright position in India. Most calls were for greater autonomy within the British system, not outright independence. And in this timeline, the Russian threat is much less, so the British aren't going to be as paranoid about outside interference.
What I'm basically saying is there is a million different variables in India, and we shouldn't jump to conclusions. The situation could easily either be much better or much worse depending on where the TL goes.
We can obviously discuss the details, but the general trend was for huge colonial empires to grow more and more unprofitable and economically un sound.
That was the trend in the British Raj as well, and even in case they "just" get autonomy, the situation is just going to spirale out of control pretty soob
That was the trend in the British Raj as well, and even in case they "just" get autonomy, the situation is just going to spirale out of control pretty soob
Is it though? Seems like a similar end result to me.
Thousands dead, then back to status quo (for America). In fact WW1 would be far less of an American defeat than 1812 as the Americans didn't start WW1 as the agressors then have their capitol burnt
I'm not really sure what this is supposed to be for?
It's not about Britain having not lost the war, its about Britain's superiority complex leading to them believing they can place rules like 'this country cannot have free movement of their own naval vessels within their own territory' and then being able to back them up. Not every country would be quite that fucking entitled to the idea that they get to Own The Sea.
No one made Britain the European Policeman, but they seem to be pretty certain that's their gig too.
But this isn't Britain "believing" they can do it. They can do it and have, because a) they do rule the waves in 1918 and the only competition is an British ally (or co-belligerent) and b) Germany cannot survive under blockade for much longer.
It's Germany who believes they have the right to do what they want despite barely winning (and even then not beating the Brits or the Americans).
This is just the reality of Germany's situation: they didn't beat the UK so they have to get rid of the sub threat or starve and collapse. If they dont like that they can restart the fighting and try another sortie of the HSF to break the blockade...
Yes how mean of Britain, poor Germany. I am sure the Reich would never develop their own 'superiority complex' and 'place rules' on other sovereign countries *looks into camera*
Erm.... No? The whole point of the Balance of Power doctrine was so Britain did not have to play European policeman. Hell Britain was so reluctant to play that game it abided by Castlereagh's pragmatic doctrine of non-intervention in nations' internal affairs for a century. Palmerston may have lectured Metternich on the advantages of constitutional government - he never tried to impose them though.
Well it didn't after the Montagu reforms or the 1935 Government of India act. So I'm not sure why it would here.
I'd say there is a degree of arrogance in the British demand that Germany not deploy naval forces to Africa, though this arrogance is actually a quite understandable and militarily sensible policy.
It's the kind of policy where in practice it would likely have minimal impact in wartime but in peace time constrains Germany's ability to develop submarine basing facilities overseas without triggering a diplomatic incident which would justify British military action.
I suspect in Germany it would be seen as Anglo arrogance, but even German leadership would sympathise to Britain's demand - even if they disliked it. After all, they only dislike it on account of their own desire to put pressure on Britain through those deployments, so it is logical that they would concede in that area to secure peace, given global submarine warfare can still be used later on.
Essentially the ill informed nationalist might go "bloody Anglos" but most well informed military and diplomatic strategists would be more like "fair enough". As for the rest of the world, I doubt they'd care much.
It's the kind of policy where in practice it would likely have minimal impact in wartime but in peace time constrains Germany's ability to develop submarine basing facilities overseas without triggering a diplomatic incident which would justify British military action.
I suspect in Germany it would be seen as Anglo arrogance, but even German leadership would sympathise to Britain's demand - even if they disliked it. After all, they only dislike it on account of their own desire to put pressure on Britain through those deployments, so it is logical that they would concede in that area to secure peace, given global submarine warfare can still be used later on.
Essentially the ill informed nationalist might go "bloody Anglos" but most well informed military and diplomatic strategists would be more like "fair enough". As for the rest of the world, I doubt they'd care much.
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You mentioned in the chapter that the deployment limitations are considered a dead letter by the german military, doesn't this mean they'll snatch the first oportunity they see to begin development of the naval infrastructure in the colonies?
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Ah but that is merely the prerogative of empire. Any empire. From the Pax Romana dictating what sovereign nations could do inside their borders, Spain's prerogative to divide the world with Portugal in spheres of influence, the Ming's ability to unseat rulers and decree morality, to the British prerogative to control the seas which extends to the American empire of today. All empires have an vested interest in telling non empires precisely what they can and cannot do on the world stage.
Empire is kinda bad like that.
We got our objectives from 1812, impressment of our seamen being the most important. But also clear up British claims to western territory around the Great Lakes and Louisiana, Great Britain arming Native American tribes out west, and GB attacking American ships thinking they might be holding British prisoners. 1812 settled all of these questions
Canada annexation was a goal, but it was far from the most important or only goal.
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