The reality behind Deep Operations and ATL Barbarossas:

Let us say for the purpose of the thread that the Soviets still wind up with a variant of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. Let us say that for the purposes of this scenario the greater strength of an ATL Soviet Union lead the British and French to try to exclude it lest the Soviets start flexing their muscles in a way that threatens their interests at Munich, and that ITTL it's Soviet anger over this that serves as the motivation for the ATL Pact. Now let's further say that all this doesn't butterfly away the precursors to an ATL Barbarossa.

Now, realistically if the Red Army develops its doctrine and leadership from 1937-41, it's got the following advantages:

1) Much greater experience at all levels than IOTL. This gives it a leg up over both the Tsarist Army of WWI and the OTL Red Army, as its leaders are actually going to bee people with experience worthy the ranks they hold, not armies hobbled by inexperience and ineptitude resulting from that.

2) Soviet equipment and concepts for offensive war are far superior to OTL, meaning that Soviet equipment may on the whole develop in a much more even process to OTL, but at the same token the Red Army's still going to have a great deal of obsolete equipment and those C3 defects aren't going to be simple to resolve.

3) Soviet military institutions have the advantage of cleanly developing with a great deal of morale and skill, furthered by immunity to the Purges ITTL (for purposes of this thread, Stalin decides on a much more cynical view of letting his army win its war and *then* going after 'Bonapartists' while appealing to Marxism and to Russian history with some greater degree of plausibility. If people object, remember Bellisario's Maxim).

Soviet strengths, however, will be counterbalanced by realistic weaknesses:

1) Soviet thought IOTL never delved too deeply into defensive war. I'm not sure how having the 1937-41 phase to develop Deep Operations further alters this, and my personal feelings based on Stalin's gigantomania and obsession with the offensive is that the Soviets would not necessarily develop such a doctrine. Germany shoots first, which creates major issues.

2) The Soviets will still have problems of having their borders pushed further forward and likely disagreements with the regime over concentration of force, as well as a probable German concentration favoring Army Groups Center and North, not Army Group South.

3) Leningrad in particular is extremely vulnerable as the Soviets IOTL at least made plans to defend it from the Finns but had none to protect it from the Germans. Terrain makes it an area of the Front where small-unit actions and tactics prevail uber alles, which is good for Army Group North, not for the USSR.

What do you guys think would be the result of a realistic scenario where the Soviets develop their concepts more than IOTL but Germany still attacks in June of 1941?
 
If the Soviets are even remotely alert, it could save most of the Red Air Force from being destroyed on the ground.

No penny-packet deployment of tanks as infantry support vehicles means much more effective use of armor.
 
If the Soviets are even remotely alert, it could save most of the Red Air Force from being destroyed on the ground.

No penny-packet deployment of tanks as infantry support vehicles means much more effective use of armor.
True, but German armored doctrine as it evolved emphasized use of anti-armored weaponry, not putting tanks against tanks. So greater masses of armor will help, but not necessarily as much as it'd seem. I don't know quite if Deep Operations gaining another 4 years would lead to greater Soviet development of their own anti-armor weaponry, this was a major hole in their system that lasted for most of WWII IOTL.
 
Judging by the impact of Deep Operations, the Soviets have to survive the initial assault. Once they do that... they run through their opposition like they're made of tissue paper.
 
@ Snake- I bow to your superior knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII.
FWIW IMO it doesn't get the time and analysis that the WAllied efforts in Western Europe did.

Offhand, shooting from the hip, having a Soviet Army officer corps that hadn't been decimated and eviscerated by purges 1937 on would've greatly improved the Soviet Army's morale but I'm not so sure its effectiveness would be better.

IOTL Stalin figured the Red Army had plenty of bodies and gear to get the job done. That last thing Stalin wanted was competent and charismatic generals creating a rival power base to the NKVD. Part of it was probably Stalin's suspicion of Lev Trotsky being the architect of the Red Army.

If I were able to climb in a TARDIS, boost my execrably inadequate Russian to fluency, and free rein to school folks at the Frunze and keep my students from work camps or shot by the NKVD by purges-
Deep Battle emphasizes mobile offensive warfare and slicing deep behind the the lines to wreak havoc in the enemy rear.
Nice is you're going forward or at least actively finding and exploiting weak spots in opponents but the gear and tactical doctrine weren't in place by 1940, barring some massive prep.
If you're staying put or defense-in-depth, not terribly helpful.

In Operation Barbarossa, Red Army got caught forward-deployed without a lot of defensive preparation and piss-poor air-ground coordination due to Red Army NOT HAVING ENOUGH RADIOS OR A FLEXIBLE ENOUGH DOCTRINE to adjust on the fly.
It didn't help that Stalin kept ordering his generals to stand their ground to the last man instead of escaping the "cauldrons" that yielded the 2 million+ Soviet POWs to the Wehrmacht. Vlasov and other Soviet commanders weren't dummies, they just had stupid orders.

As we're fond of saying on this board, the Soviet Army of 1940 and the Ukrainian, Baltic, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts that made Bagration happen in 1944 were two different animals.
 
perhaps Finland senses the increased Soviet strength and decides to settle without war, otherwise the German might notice greater Soviet competence during the Winter war, unless the nature of the war doesn't allow for implementation of better tactics anyway.
 
If the Germans find the going very tough in 1941, perhaps never getting further than the Dnieper, and getting some divisions destroyed in counter attacks, they might find some common ground to agree to a October 1941 peace (May 41 status quo). It also might scare the Japanese some while they are making war plans. Of course these are regimes where prestige is important so nothing perhaps can change and the Germans go to their destiny earlier.

By 1942 if Leningrad is never tightly encircled and Kharkov and the Donets basin never lost, with the extra production, with the better tactics, the Soviet war machine could be quite fearsome.

Even if the war ends earlier in Europe I don't see a whole lot different post war there, as far as who controls what, the Soviets are going to want to deal with the Allies peacably as in OTL to digest their gains, keep getting lend lease etc..

I see the Soviets though in the Pacific attacking Japan perhaps by late 44, occupying all of Korea and most of Japanese held China and even part of the Japanese home islands by the end of the war, changing this area dramatically post war.

However the world could be better with a definite Germany like partition of Japan into occupation zones (and the Soviets trying to control a big part of China) they might be happy trying to consolidate this for quite some time, willing to maintain peace with the west, trying to control too much to cause us much trouble.
 
@ Snake- I bow to your superior knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII.
FWIW IMO it doesn't get the time and analysis that the WAllied efforts in Western Europe did.

Offhand, shooting from the hip, having a Soviet Army officer corps that hadn't been decimated and eviscerated by purges 1937 on would've greatly improved the Soviet Army's morale but I'm not so sure its effectiveness would be better.

IOTL Stalin figured the Red Army had plenty of bodies and gear to get the job done. That last thing Stalin wanted was competent and charismatic generals creating a rival power base to the NKVD. Part of it was probably Stalin's suspicion of Lev Trotsky being the architect of the Red Army.

If I were able to climb in a TARDIS, boost my execrably inadequate Russian to fluency, and free rein to school folks at the Frunze and keep my students from work camps or shot by the NKVD by purges-
Deep Battle emphasizes mobile offensive warfare and slicing deep behind the the lines to wreak havoc in the enemy rear.
Nice is you're going forward or at least actively finding and exploiting weak spots in opponents but the gear and tactical doctrine weren't in place by 1940, barring some massive prep.
If you're staying put or defense-in-depth, not terribly helpful.

In Operation Barbarossa, Red Army got caught forward-deployed without a lot of defensive preparation and piss-poor air-ground coordination due to Red Army NOT HAVING ENOUGH RADIOS OR A FLEXIBLE ENOUGH DOCTRINE to adjust on the fly.
It didn't help that Stalin kept ordering his generals to stand their ground to the last man instead of escaping the "cauldrons" that yielded the 2 million+ Soviet POWs to the Wehrmacht. Vlasov and other Soviet commanders weren't dummies, they just had stupid orders.

As we're fond of saying on this board, the Soviet Army of 1940 and the Ukrainian, Baltic, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts that made Bagration happen in 1944 were two different animals.
I think that Stalin, if he felt himself endangered by a real threat around his borders, might forestall the Purges but secretly ready himself for them by virtue of reasoning that he can exploit fear of victorious generals overthrowing the system. After all there is quite a precedent here in Russian history, including the most recent example in WWI of the generals helping to topple the Tsar.

perhaps Finland senses the increased Soviet strength and decides to settle without war, otherwise the German might notice greater Soviet competence during the Winter war, unless the nature of the war doesn't allow for implementation of better tactics anyway.
We're talking Adolf Hitler. He'd probably just say that Finland was run into the ground by Jews or a bunch of Asiatics and ignore the danger signs here. Hitler is a man whose ideas are far more powerful to him than reality, right up until they go very, very horribly wrong.
 
If the Germans find the going very tough in 1941, perhaps never getting further than the Dnieper, and getting some divisions destroyed in counter attacks, they might find some common ground to agree to a October 1941 peace (May 41 status quo). It also might scare the Japanese some while they are making war plans. Of course these are regimes where prestige is important so nothing perhaps can change and the Germans go to their destiny earlier.

By 1942 if Leningrad is never tightly encircled and Kharkov and the Donets basin never lost, with the extra production, with the better tactics, the Soviet war machine could be quite fearsome.

Even if the war ends earlier in Europe I don't see a whole lot different post war there, as far as who controls what, the Soviets are going to want to deal with the Allies peacably as in OTL to digest their gains, keep getting lend lease etc..

I see the Soviets though in the Pacific attacking Japan perhaps by late 44, occupying all of Korea and most of Japanese held China and even part of the Japanese home islands by the end of the war, changing this area dramatically post war.

However the world could be better with a definite Germany like partition of Japan into occupation zones (and the Soviets trying to control a big part of China) they might be happy trying to consolidate this for quite some time, willing to maintain peace with the west, trying to control too much to cause us much trouble.
I think that the Germans are going to still reach the environs of Leningrad, if we judge by the equivalent of the OTL battles. Unless the Soviets fill in that hole of anti-armor weaponry, they're going to run into the problems of sending massed armored columns that serve as target practice for 88 mm guns, enabling Army Group North to defeat a force it outnumbers 3:1 on the OTL schedule. The Leningrad Front had no preparation to defend south of the city, and a stronger USSR isn't going to be any more focused on that than the OTL one was.

But the Germans here have the special circumstances of (relatively) weak Soviet control in the region, superior numbers, and this being one area they really were initially heralded as liberators by a good number of people, including all the native anti-Semites in particular. So they'd have at least one area where they will do really well, and two others where they will not so much.
 
Don't the Soviets have superior offensive doctrine here though? Deep Operations is far ahead of its time, so shouldn't, if they go on the offensive, they be able to counter at least some of the German advantages in anti-armor weapons from this?
 
I think that the Germans are going to still reach the environs of Leningrad, if we judge by the equivalent of the OTL battles. .
I will thinking Leningrad could go better for the Soviets in 1941 due to OTL they were able to pull off (at least temporary) a couple of division size encirclements of the Germans in counterattacks in the summer of 41, so conditions must have been favorable, troop concentrations less or something, to allow deep operations.
 
Don't the Soviets have superior offensive doctrine here though? Deep Operations is far ahead of its time, so shouldn't, if they go on the offensive, they be able to counter at least some of the German advantages in anti-armor weapons from this?
Offensive doctrine doesn't help when you're being invaded as opposed to doing the invading.

I will thinking Leningrad could go better for the Soviets in 1941 due to OTL they were able to pull off (at least temporary) a couple of division size encirclements of the Germans in counterattacks in the summer of 41, so conditions must have been favorable, troop concentrations less or something, to allow deep operations.
It could, but I'm not sure how much the strategic factors behind the encirclement change. If the Soviets impose their rule on the Baltic States as per OTL that's not exactly going to help them in terms of local sympathy during the invasion.
 
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