The First Anglo-Burmese War ends with a draw?

[Vinization]

Despite ending with a peace treaty that permanently crippled Burma's economy (and thus its ability to defend itself), the First Anglo-Burmese War was an extremely expensive undertaking for the British as well, driving the EIC to the brink of bankruptcy.

So, was there any way British finances could be strained to the point they can't end the war with something like the Treaty of Yandabo? I have an idea for a POD: after their victory at the Battle of Ramu, the Burmese had a chance to advance into Chittagong, which was lightly defended. The general in charge didn't know that, however, and so decided against such a move so as to avoid overextension.

The POD is, of course, that he decides otherwise, and captures Chittagong without much trouble. They get kicked out there by the British eventually, but the time, money and effort they spend in doing so gives the Burmese a chance to perform better elsewhere. The war thus ends with Burma handing over Assam but keeping Arakan and Tenasserim. The indemnity, if they pay any, is also much smaller.

How is Asian history changed with Burma remaining a force to be reckoned with? What about India, particularly Bengal? Could the BEIC keep its monopoly over the opium trade as a way to make up for its financial losses?

 

[Wendell]

Despite ending with a peace treaty that permanently crippled Burma's economy (and thus its ability to defend itself) the First Anglo-Burmese War was an extremely expensive undertaking for the British as well, driving the EIC to the brink of bankruptcy.

So, was there any way British finances could be strained to the point they can't end the war with something like the Treaty of Yandabo? I have an idea for a POD: after their victory at the Battle of Ramu, the Burmese had a chance to advance into Chittagong, which was lightly defended. The general in charge didn't know that, however, and so decided against such a move so as to avoid overextension.

The POD is, of course, that he decides otherwise, and captures Chittagong without much trouble. They get kicked out there by the British eventually, but the time, money and effort they spend in doing so gives the Burmese a chance to perform better elsewhere. The war thus ends with Burma handing over Assam but keeping Arakan and Tenasserim. The indemnity, if they pay any, is also much smaller.

How is Asian history changed with Burma remaining a force to be reckoned with? What about India, particularly Bengal? Could the BEIC keep its monopoly over the opium trade as a way to make up for its financial losses?

It will be interesting to see if this results in Burma moving into the French orbit and/or whether the fate of Zomia changes.

 

[moro]

If the war went more favorably for the Burmese and consequently the peace treaty went more favorably, they would continue to be a real threat to the British.
They will most likely look to France for help, although I don't know how successfully: France is in a turbulent time, with the Restoration and then the July Revolution in a few years, so they will be able to give limited help.
But surely the Burmese will be much more careful after getting burned hard with the British, so I still see them being very defensive and paranoid towards Siam and British India.

 

[Vinization]

Since the BEIC won't have the Yandabo indemnity to pay for all the financial losses it suffered during the war, could the Doctrine of Lapse (the annexation of Indian states under various justifications) be enacted earlier?

 

[Domz]

The Burmese military, despite its reputation, performed pretty poorly during the First Anglo-Burmese War. The British Indian administration (which ran the war) was actually its own worse enemy, failing its logistics by having a British Army march hundreds of miles to Ava from Rangoon during the Burmese monsoon season.

Having the Burmese win the First Anglo-Burmese War would set them ripe for overconfidence and get kicked in the ass even harder in a still likely Second Anglo-Burmese War (the British kicked the Boers and Afghans’ asses after losing the first war against both of them). I see Burma remaining overconfident of its abilities for another 10-20 years and likely gets whooped in the ass bad (contrary to Napoleon II France-wank timelines). Burma did engage in some talks with Vietnam over forming a coalition against Siam in the early 1820s but Vietnam never responded (perhaps it was because Emperor Min Mang was a radical Neo-Confucianist). Even if they did invade Siam in the 1830s and 1840s, they are fighting against a very competent Siamese leadership under Rama III that historian Victor Lieberman would call “perhaps the most powerful/greatest state in Mainland Southeast Asia”. The Siamese elite established a proto-nationalism in the aftermath of the destruction of Ayutthaya, to protect “the king and the Lord Buddha” and instituted harsh capital punishments to conscript deserters and dissidents. If Siamese proto-nationalism saw the Burmese as warmongering heathens (although the Siamese did destroy Vientiane in 1827 much like how the Burmese destroyed Ayutthaya), how much better would the Siamese populace see the radical Neo-Confucianism of Nguyen dynasty Vietnam, who in the 19th century invaded Cambodia and tried to implement cultural genocide upon Cambodian Theravada Buddhists (which then resulted in the OTL Siamese-Vietnamese War of 1841-1845) and not pull a Russia 1812 (like the Siamese did between 1767 and 1812 against the Burmese)?

Political reform usually comes when the current political order fails (whether its the French Revolution replacing the Ancient Regime, the Bangkok elite replacing destroyed Ayutthaya, or Meiji Absolutism replacing the Tokugawa Shogunate’s inability to keep itself isolated from the West), plus having a strong enough pro-reform opposition to deliver an ultimatum to the people running the country. Going back to the point, it took two disastrous wars and Burma becoming a rump hinterland state before the reform faction under Mindon Min successfully took over the throne and implemented Western reforms, albeit too little too late.

 

[Concerned Brazilian]

The Konbaung Dynasty would keep some of India and have a stronger military and economy. They would remain a threat to British interests in the region until the 1850s at the very least.

 

[Beatriz]

The Burmese military, despite its reputation, performed pretty poorly during the First Anglo-Burmese War. The British Indian administration (which ran the war) was actually its own worse enemy, failing its logistics by having a British Army march hundreds of miles to Ava from Rangoon during the Burmese monsoon season.

Having the Burmese win the First Anglo-Burmese War would set them ripe for overconfidence and get kicked in the ass even harder in a still likely Second Anglo-Burmese War (the British kicked the Boers and Afghans’ asses after losing the first war against both of them). I see Burma remaining overconfident of its abilities for another 10-20 years and likely gets whooped in the ass bad (contrary to Napoleon II France-wank timelines). Burma did engage in some talks with Vietnam over forming a coalition against Siam in the early 1820s but Vietnam never responded (perhaps it was because Emperor Min Mang was a radical Neo-Confucianist). Even if they did invade Siam in the 1830s and 1840s, they are fighting against a very competent Siamese leadership under Rama III that historian Victor Lieberman would call “perhaps the most powerful/greatest state in Mainland Southeast Asia”. The Siamese elite established a proto-nationalism in the aftermath of the destruction of Ayutthaya, to protect “the king and the Lord Buddha” and instituted harsh capital punishments to conscript deserters and dissidents. If Siamese proto-nationalism saw the Burmese as warmongering heathens (although the Siamese did destroy Vientiane in 1827 much like how the Burmese destroyed Ayutthaya), how much better would the Siamese populace see the radical Neo-Confucianism of Nguyen dynasty Vietnam, who in the 19th century invaded Cambodia and tried to implement cultural genocide upon Cambodian Theravada Buddhists (which then resulted in the OTL Siamese-Vietnamese War of 1841-1845) and not pull a Russia 1812 (like the Siamese did between 1767 and 1812 against the Burmese)?

In Look to the West Siam eventually annexed Pegu, Laos, Cambodia, Southern Vietnam, Malaya excluding Johor and Aceh over the course of the 19th century

 

[Domz]

In Look to the West Siam eventually annexed Pegu, Laos, Cambodia, Southern Vietnam, Malaya excluding Johor and Aceh over the course of the 19th century

Interesting, though one must note that Siam sent military expeditions into these lands in order to get manpower (manpower was a scarcity in Mainland Southeast Asia) and ceremonial tribute first and foremost and vassalage a far second. The geography of Southeast Asia just makes it impossible that a capital can order a vassal 500 miles away what to do so even at its most developed, premodern Siam was fairly decentralized, centered around cities since that's where the money was and living in the rural Southeast Asian countryside in premodern times you'd be at risk of dying from disease or from predators (basically only runway slaves, escaped prisoners, and hermits lived there). Ayutthaya, the great Siamese kingdom of Early Modern Asia, was an urbanized polity.

The tribute system of Southeast Asia meant that vassals can have more than one liege. I think at one point, 19th century Cambodia sent tribute four times a year to Bangkok and two times a year to the Nguyen court at Hue.

In premodern Mainland Southeast Asia, the handover of white (albino) elephants, considered sacred in Therevada Buddhist Hinduisized kingdoms due to their rarity, was enough of a symbolic gesture to denote that one kingdom was vassal to another. It was considered a humiliation for a king to give away white elephants to another liege. This was however mostly done with the handover of people and goods too.

 

[Zincvit]

The Burmese military, despite its reputation, performed pretty poorly during the First Anglo-Burmese War. The British Indian administration (which ran the war) was actually its own worse enemy, failing its logistics by having a British Army march hundreds of miles to Ava from Rangoon during the Burmese monsoon season.

Having the Burmese win the First Anglo-Burmese War would set them ripe for overconfidence and get kicked in the ass even harder in a still likely Second Anglo-Burmese War (the British kicked the Boers and Afghans’ asses after losing the first war against both of them). I see Burma remaining overconfident of its abilities for another 10-20 years and likely gets whooped in the ass bad (contrary to Napoleon II France-wank timelines). Burma did engage in some talks with Vietnam over forming a coalition against Siam in the early 1820s but Vietnam never responded (perhaps it was because Emperor Min Mang was a radical Neo-Confucianist). Even if they did invade Siam in the 1830s and 1840s, they are fighting against a very competent Siamese leadership under Rama III that historian Victor Lieberman would call “perhaps the most powerful/greatest state in Mainland Southeast Asia”. The Siamese elite established a proto-nationalism in the aftermath of the destruction of Ayutthaya, to protect “the king and the Lord Buddha” and instituted harsh capital punishments to conscript deserters and dissidents. If Siamese proto-nationalism saw the Burmese as warmongering heathens (although the Siamese did destroy Vientiane in 1827 much like how the Burmese destroyed Ayutthaya), how much better would the Siamese populace see the radical Neo-Confucianism of Nguyen dynasty Vietnam, who in the 19th century invaded Cambodia and tried to implement cultural genocide upon Cambodian Theravada Buddhists (which then resulted in the OTL Siamese-Vietnamese War of 1841-1845) and not pull a Russia 1812 (like the Siamese did between 1767 and 1812 against the Burmese)?

Political reform usually comes when the current political order fails (whether its the French Revolution replacing the Ancient Regime, the Bangkok elite replacing destroyed Ayutthaya, or Meiji Absolutism replacing the Tokugawa Shogunate’s inability to keep itself isolated from the West), plus having a strong enough pro-reform opposition to deliver an ultimatum to the people running the country. Going back to the point, it took two disastrous wars and Burma becoming a rump hinterland state before the reform faction under Mindon Min successfully took over the throne and implemented Western reforms, albeit too little too late.

I must say the charge of cultural genocide of Minh Mạng is pretty overblown, in some of his edicts he just required vassals to begin wearing court clothing to address officials, he’s even willing to reward native Cambodians in the successful handling of a Thai invasion. If the two front invasion happened during his time, I can see the Vietnamese doing pretty decently, since he’s one of the most competent emperors of the Nguyễn Dynasty. If the invasion happened later like in the 1840s then his son Thiệu Trị won’t care (he otl ordered troops to withdraw from Cambodia do to it being a quagmire)

 

[Wendell]

It would be interesting to see how a final border into modern times might develop between India and Burma. Might a watershed border come into use?

 

[Domz]

I must say the charge of cultural genocide of Minh Mạng is pretty overblown, in some of his edicts he just required vassals to begin wearing court clothing to address officials, he’s even willing to reward native Cambodians in the successful handling of a Thai invasion. If the two front invasion happened during his time, I can see the Vietnamese doing pretty decently, since he’s one of the most competent emperors of the Nguyễn Dynasty. If the invasion happened later like in the 1840s then his son Thiệu Trị won’t care (he otl ordered troops to withdraw from Cambodia do to it being a quagmire)

The historian Victor Lieberman doesn't put a positive light to that incident at all and his book is an r/askhistorians recommended book.

 

[Zincvit]

The historian Victor Lieberman doesn't put a positive light to that incident at all and his book is an r/askhistorians recommended book.

I use Liam C. Kelley works on his blog (he's one of the main western historians on Vietnam) and he argued that many historians tend to misrepresent Vietnamese sources because they can't read literary chinese and he also made a pretty credible rebuttal to me anyway to the views that the Vietnamese rule was particularly brutal.

 

[Domz]

I use Liam C. Kelley works on his blog (he's one of the main western historians on Vietnam) and he argued that many historians tend to misrepresent Vietnamese sources because they can't read literary chinese and he also made a pretty credible rebuttal to me anyway to the views that the Vietnamese rule was particularly brutal.

I see your point, but you can also argue then that Siam was a bellicose militaristic state, which their brutal sacking of Vientiane in 1827 and the various sackings of the Cambodian capital points to, although historians have said that this type of total warfare was normal and endemic during this period, as seen starting with the Konbaung dynasty and later adopted by Thonburi-Rattanakosin.

 

[Zincvit]

I see your point, but you can also argue then that Siam was a bellicose militaristic state, which their brutal sacking of Vientiane in 1827 and the various sackings of the Cambodian capital points to, although historians have said that this type of total warfare was normal and endemic during this period, as seen starting with the Konbaung dynasty and later adopted by Thonburi-Rattanakosin.

Well I'm not trying to argue that warfare in those times were not brutal, I'm just trying to push back against the idea that the Vietnamese, Minh Mạng particularly want to genocide Cambodians and colonized them with Vietnamese which is remarkably similar to many nationalist talking points.

 

[Domz]

Well I'm not trying to argue that warfare in those times were not brutal, I'm just trying to push back against the idea that the Vietnamese, Minh Mạng particularly want to genocide Cambodians and colonized them with Vietnamese which is remarkably similar to many nationalist talking points.

And how about the French justification for the invasion of Vietnam due to the persecution of Vietnamese Catholics? And what about how the Vietnamese treated the Cham and the Khmer speaking populations of the Mekong Delta?

 

[Zincvit]

And how about the French justification for the invasion of Vietnam due to the persecution of Vietnamese Catholics? And what about how the Vietnamese treated the Cham and the Khmer speaking populations of the Mekong Delta?

I'm going to see if I still have my academic papers about them or not then I will make a reply and if you're talking about the Katip Sumat revolt then many pre-modern states tend utilize brutal suppression campaigns to destroy rebellions. And I do agree that persecution of Christians existed and was pretty brutal (the Nguyễn Dynasty viewed Christians as not fufilling their piety to their ancestors ann spirits and not partaking in communal rites so it's "correct" in their opinion that this "subversive and heterodox" faith be destroyed). Also the French pretty much cynically used this justification, showing the fact that they continue to launch military campaigns against the Nguyễn even after the persecution stopped and officials was tasked with suppressing anti-Christian and anti-Western rebellions.

 

[Domz]

I'm going to see if I still have my academic papers about them or not then I will make a reply and if you're talking about the Katip Sumat revolt then many pre-modern states tend utilize brutal suppression campaigns to destroy rebellions. And I do agree that persecution of Christians existed and was pretty brutal (the Nguyễn Dynasty viewed Christians as not fufilling their piety to their ancestors ann spirits and not partaking in communal rites so it's "correct" in their opinion that this "subversive and heterodox" faith be destroyed). Also the French pretty much cynically used this justification, showing the fact that they continue to launch military campaigns against the Nguyễn even after the persecution stopped and officials was tasked with suppressing anti-Christian and anti-Western rebellions.

And what about how the Vietnamese treated the Cham and the Khmer speaking populations of the Mekong Delta? And the radicalism of Neo-Confucianism is overstated?

 

[Zincvit]

And what about how the Vietnamese treated the Cham and the Khmer speaking populations of the Mekong Delta? And the radicalism of Neo-Confucianism is overstated?

Haven't gotten the sources for the former so I will just answer the latter, from what I read, the Neo-Confucianism is not that radical, the Confucian Bureaucracy in the North just won out, Minh Mạng's father, Gia Long chart a middle course after he unified Vietnam between the North and South. Minh Mạng, after being given a standard Confucian Educationand not being forced to account for political realities like his father had want to return to the old Neo-Confucianism of earlier dynasties and his suspicion of Gia Long's former Southern followers made him want to centralize the state. And I argued that earlier Vietnamese monarchs were way more radical, Lê Thánh Tông despised merchants, and isolated Đại Việt nearly totally from the outside world, raiding and enslaving sailors that crossed his domain both Chinese and non-Chinese and waged wars of conquest in Laos, and the Confucian scholars called it "The Blessed Reign of Hồng Đức" so I do think many later monarchs see Neo-Confucianism as a recipe for success.

 

[Domz]

Haven't gotten the sources for the former so I will just answer the latter, from what I read, the Neo-Confucianism is not that radical, the Confucian Bureaucracy in the North just won out, Minh Mạng's father, Gia Long chart a middle course after he unified Vietnam between the North and South. Minh Mạng, after being given a standard Confucian Educationand not being forced to account for political realities like his father had want to return to the old Neo-Confucianism of earlier dynasties and his suspicion of Gia Long's former Southern followers made him want to centralize the state. And I argued that earlier Vietnamese monarchs were way more radical, Lê Thánh Tông despised merchants, and isolated Đại Việt nearly totally from the outside world, raiding and enslaving sailors that crossed his domain both Chinese and non-Chinese and waged wars of conquest in Laos, and the Confucian scholars called it "The Blessed Reign of Hồng Đức" so I do think many later monarchs see Neo-Confucianism as a recipe for success.

You have a degree in Vientamese history right? And how did Neo-Confucianist and pre Neo-Confucianist Vietnam interact with its neighbors?

 

[Domz]

Haven't gotten the sources for the former so I will just answer the latter, from what I read, the Neo-Confucianism is not that radical, the Confucian Bureaucracy in the North just won out, Minh Mạng's father, Gia Long chart a middle course after he unified Vietnam between the North and South. Minh Mạng, after being given a standard Confucian Educationand not being forced to account for political realities like his father had want to return to the old Neo-Confucianism of earlier dynasties and his suspicion of Gia Long's former Southern followers made him want to centralize the state. And I argued that earlier Vietnamese monarchs were way more radical, Lê Thánh Tông despised merchants, and isolated Đại Việt nearly totally from the outside world, raiding and enslaving sailors that crossed his domain both Chinese and non-Chinese and waged wars of conquest in Laos, and the Confucian scholars called it "The Blessed Reign of Hồng Đức" so I do think many later monarchs see Neo-Confucianism as a recipe for success.

And what do you think of Christopher Goscha's "Vietnam: A New History"? I thought about buying the book but I don't have an income : p