This was an important point at the time: Louis-Philippe was king of the French, not king of France. (Also, his name is hyphenated. I don't know why the English Wikipedia page has the non-hyphenated version but this is incorrect.). Also, OTL Charles X abdicated in favor of Angoulême, who himself abdicated twenty minutes later, so there kind-of was a Louis XIX.




I did not believe these names at first, but this is completely correct. To clarify (all these Bonapartes are called Napoléon and/or Louis, making this family a mess):

- The former king of Holland is Louis Bonaparte. In 1830 he is 52 and in retirement in Austria.
- His first son Napoléon-Charles died in infancy.
- the people you write about here are his second son Napoléon-Louis, and his third son Louis-Napoléon (see?). TIL that Napoléon-Louis existed, and OTL he died of measles in 1831. And of course Louis-Napoléon eventually became Napoléon III.

(So you narrowly missed the eventuality of having Napoléon II fight against Napoléon III here).


While we're at it, what is Leo I's exact title, by which I actually mean at least three questions:
- what is the Greek title? (Basileus or some more-modern, less-Byzantine construction to placate the Powers)?
- (not a Greek speaker) I believe that Basileus is the katharevousa version and Vasilias the demotic one — which version is he using?
- is he king of Greece or of the Greeks?
- I am going to assume that *Hellenes* was the name used for the Greeks, right?
(Although all of these questions have one answer much more probable than the other, they delimitate an interesting spectrum from Vasilias tis Elladas to Basileus Rhomaioi).



Amour Sacré de la Patrie
Thank you for the heads up on Louis-Philippe, the correct title for the French Kings, and the correction on the song's title; I'll go back and amend them as soon as I can. I was actually aware that Charles' son, the Duke of Angoulême succeeded his father briefly before abdicating himself in favor of his nephew Prince Henri after all of 20 minutes. Its definitely an interesting story and I definitely didn't do it justice in the main update.

Napoleon Louis actually had a slightly longer reign than Angoulême reigning for 9 days in 1810 as King Louis II of Holland after his father King Louis I Bonaparte abdicated in favor of his son. ITTL he is still alive after the failed Italian uprising in 1831 and is actually living in Switzerland with his brother Louis Napoleon and his cousin Napoleon II who also survived ITTL. Fortunately the cousins didn't come to blows directly during the conflict, but it is interesting that Napoleon II and Napoleon III were essentially on opposing sides during the 1831 Italian Revolt.

Leopold's official title is O Vasiléfs tis Elládos, the King of Greece or the King of Hellas. O Vasiléfs ton Ellínon, the King of the Greeks/Hellenes, would imply sovereignty over the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and in the diaspora, as opposed to simply being the king of a specific plot of land. As such the Powers in the 1830 London Conference specifically gave Leopold the inferior title to mitigate any perceived rights the Greeks might have towards Ottoman territory on the basis of a Greek population living in those lands. You are correct, the Greeks called themselves Hellenes although many in the Ottoman Empire still considered themselves Romans, Rhomaioi at this time interestingly enough.
 
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Leopold's official title is O Vasiliás tis Elládas, the King of Greece or the King of Hellas.

It is *very* unlikely that the title used will be "Vasilias". Unreformed demotic will still be considered as vulgar in any timeline, and will be remote from literary Greek, which is what every educated Greek would be using. Even today, when Standard Modern Greek is "cleaned up" Demotic with a lot of Katharevousa admixtures, for official titles, archaic/Katharevousa forms are preferred. So the title should be the same as Otto's OTL one, "Vasilefs tis Ellados". You could, for variety's sake, have some other additions, like "Syntagmatikos Vasilefs tis Ellados", "Constitutional King of Greece", that was briefly and unofficially used IOTL after 1843.

what is the Greek title? (Basileus or some more-modern, less-Byzantine construction to placate the Powers)?
Basileus is also the ancient Greek title for king, plus the Powers (and pretty much anyone else) at this moment don't really know or care about any Byzantine claims (or even much of Byzantine history, which is viewed, if at all, through the lens of Edward Gibbon). Even the Greeks themselves did not decide upon a "Byzantine restoration" project until the 1840s, and it was not until Paparrigopoulos' and others' work a generation later that Byzantine history was (re)incorporated into the modern Greek national narrative.
 
It is *very* unlikely that the title used will be "Vasilias". Unreformed demotic will still be considered as vulgar in any timeline, and will be remote from literary Greek, which is what every educated Greek would be using. Even today, when Standard Modern Greek is "cleaned up" Demotic with a lot of Katharevousa admixtures, for official titles, archaic/Katharevousa forms are preferred. So the title should be the same as Otto's OTL one, "Vasilefs tis Ellados". You could, for variety's sake, have some other additions, like "Syntagmatikos Vasilefs tis Ellados", "Constitutional King of Greece", that was briefly and unofficially used IOTL after 1843.


Basileus is also the ancient Greek title for king, plus the Powers (and pretty much anyone else) at this moment don't really know or care about any Byzantine claims (or even much of Byzantine history, which is viewed, if at all, through the lens of Edward Gibbon). Even the Greeks themselves did not decide upon a "Byzantine restoration" project until the 1840s, and it was not until Paparrigopoulos' and others' work a generation later that Byzantine history was (re)incorporated into the modern Greek national narrative.
That insight into Demotic and Katharevousa is very helpful Spatharios, so thank you for the correction.
 
It is *very* unlikely that the title used will be "Vasilias". Unreformed demotic will still be considered as vulgar in any timeline, and will be remote from literary Greek, which is what every educated Greek would be using. Even today, when Standard Modern Greek is "cleaned up" Demotic with a lot of Katharevousa admixtures, for official titles, archaic/Katharevousa forms are preferred. So the title should be the same as Otto's OTL one, "Vasilefs tis Ellados". You could, for variety's sake, have some other additions, like "Syntagmatikos Vasilefs tis Ellados", "Constitutional King of Greece", that was briefly and unofficially used IOTL after 1843.


Basileus is also the ancient Greek title for king, plus the Powers (and pretty much anyone else) at this moment don't really know or care about any Byzantine claims (or even much of Byzantine history, which is viewed, if at all, through the lens of Edward Gibbon). Even the Greeks themselves did not decide upon a "Byzantine restoration" project until the 1840s, and it was not until Paparrigopoulos' and others' work a generation later that Byzantine history was (re)incorporated into the modern Greek national narrative.

Paparrigopoulos was preceded by Spyridon Zabelios and Finlay and arguably all of them were effectively bringing forth the existing public sentiment but it hardly matters for our ends, basileus doesn't even have a proper synonym come to think of it, if you translate every other European king to basileus, you can't quite fail to do the same with your own. Unless someone wants to name Leopold avtokrator, but since this means emperor... not going to happen. And I have to concur it not going to be the demotic form of the word. After all if the remaining monarchists to this day still say basileus the 1840 Greeks aren't all that likely to be preferring the demotic form over the kathareuousa one.
 
Part 49: The Cyprus Affair
Part 49: The Cypriot Affair

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The Nicosia Riot

French support for the Khedivate of Egypt originally began in the years following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. At its onset, the relationship between Egypt and France was an attempt by Muhammad Ali to strengthen his grip on the Eyalet of Egypt through the modernization and reformation of the Egyptian military and economy. The restored Bourbon Monarchy in turn used it as an opportunity to export liberal officers and troublesome intellectuals to serve in Muhammad Ali’s court while also buying and selling various commodities between one another. Over the years, this relationship would expand to include the shipment of arms, munitions, and even warships which would help cement the Egyptian military as one of the finest in the world.

These shipments of officers and engineers, weapons and ships would continue unabated through the Greek War of Independence, despite French intervention on the sides of the Greeks in 1827. Even the overthrow of the Bourbons and the rise of the July Monarchy in 1830 failed to impair the relationship between Egypt and France.[1] The French support of Egypt would finally pay dividends during the First Syrian War as the Egyptian Navy, comprised almost entirely of French built warships, completely overwhelmed the cities and fortresses of the Ottoman littoral in Syria and Palestine. The effect was so great that the Ottoman position in the Levant had collapsed within a matter of weeks, rather than the months originally anticipated, bringing the conflict to a swift and decisive conclusion in favor of Muhammad Ali. This result would in turn lead the Ottoman government to seek military aid of its own from the Prussians, Austrians, and British, helping them to narrow the gap between themselves and the Egyptians.

When the Second Syrian War broke out in March 1840, it came as no surprise that the French continued to support their client in the face of the Ottoman aggression. If anything, the surprising success of the Ottomans on the battlefield in the initial weeks of the war necessitated further involvement by the French to prop up the beleaguered Khedivate lest they lose their foothold in the region entirely. As early as mid-April, French flagged ships began appearing along the Levantine coast bearing food, clothing, and medical supplies at first, but soon thereafter they were hauling rifles, cannons, and Egyptian soldiers to the front in Syria from Egypt stretching the bounds of their neutrality to the limit.

Unsurprisingly, the Ottoman Government would take great umbrage with this interference in their internal affairs and a formal complaint was dispatched to Paris, and the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Edouard Pontois was publicly lambasted by the ailing Sultan Mahmud II. Beyond this however, no hostility actually took place between the Ottomans and the French as both feared an escalation of the conflict between them. Eventually, tensions would cool as the conflict in Syria ground to halt following the battle of Ar Rastan, the death of Sultan Mahmud, and Sultan Abdulmejid’s subsequent call for a ceasefire. The magnanimous young Sultan even offered the French a seat at the peace conference as a mediator, alongside Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. But before that conference could take place, an incident at sea would threaten to unravel everything.

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Sultan Abdulmejid I (circa 1840)

On the 3rd of July, the French Frigate Résolue and her sister ship Thetis left port in Alexandria alongside 3 smaller merchant ships carrying the latest shipment of arms and munitions for the Egyptian soldiers in the Levant. Though the fighting had officially ceased, skirmishes and the occasional raid still occurred between the Ottomans and Egyptians necessitating the continued influx of military supplies into the region. The lack of a firm response to their earlier behavior by the Ottomans had made them careless, however, leading the French ships to choose the shorter route directly across the Mediterranean rather than the safer, albeit longer route along the Levantine coast. This decision would unfortunately be their undoing as it put them in the direct path of an Ottoman naval patrol that had set out from Cyprus earlier that same day.

By chance, the four Ottoman warships; the third rate Sadiye, the two frigates Chabal Bahari and Naoum Bahari, and the sloop Bayramli, successfully managed to intercept the French vessels some 22 nautical miles off the South-Eastern coast of Cyprus on the 4th of July. Initially, the Ottoman ships proved cordial enough to the French vessels, asking about their journey thus far, where they had departed from, and where they were headed towards. When it became clear that the ships were headed for Syria, the Ottoman commander Enver Reis requested to see the manifests for the ships. When these documents proved insufficient, he then requested permission to search the French ships of their cargo; baring that, the French vessels would have to be escorted to an Ottoman port where they would be docked until the end of the conflict between Egypt and the Porte to ensure that no breach of the cease fire took place. Panicked at this sudden development, the new Captain of the Résolue, Louis-Adolphe Bonard immediately cut communication with the Ottoman ships and made course for the Levantine Coast at full sail with the other French ships following its lead.

Enver Reis took great umbrage at this and after several attempts to peacefully divert their course, he directed his ships to fire a series of warning shots just ahead of the lead ship, the Résolue. A miscommunication would instead result in the Sadiye firing upon the Résolue itself rather than ahead of it as intended by Enver Reis. This shot was unfortunately well placed, punching through the ship’s stern, instantly killing three sailors who had unfortunately been in the wrong place at the wrong time, and wounding another seven. This act immediately prompted the young Captain Bonard to return fire on the chasing Ottoman ships with his full complement of guns. This in turn was followed seconds later by the Thetis which opened fire on their pursuers as well leading the Ottoman ships to retaliate as well.

What had been a relatively peaceful interaction only moments before, quickly degenerated into a bloody brawl as the French and Ottoman ships fired round after round on each other with complete abandon. Though the Ottomans technically had the advantage in number of warships at 4 to 2, the French frigates proved especially adept at hitting their targets while still maintaining their course for the Levantine coast. In an attempt to stop the violence before matters escalated any further, Enver Reis unilaterally ceased fire, an act which the French reciprocated, ending the confrontation three and a half minutes after it began. Despite its brevity, nearly 65 men would lose their lives in the skirmish, and another 384 suffered from varying injuries, from gunshot wounds to shrapnel wounds. Though the Ottoman ships would continue their pursuit of the French ships a little longer, they eventually gave up the chase and turned for the nearest port as night began to fall on the Eastern Mediterranean.

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The Résolue Incident

While the incident at sea was bad enough, it was unfortunately compounded even further by events on land when the damaged Turkish ships arrived in port at nearby Larnaca for repairs. The Bayramli had lost its main mast, the Chabal Bahari was taking on an alarming amount of water, the Sadiye was riddled with holes, and the Naoum Bahari has suffered damage to its rudder. More importantly, however, 38 Ottoman sailors had lost their lives in the engagement and another 194 had been wounded including the Squadron’s commander Enver Reis who had been struck in the shoulder by a flying piece of shrapnel. The return of the Ottoman squadron so soon after it had departed was a concerning development for the gathered crowd, but the sight of mutilated ships and numerous men being carried away on stretchers infuriated the placid crowd that had gathered at the docks.

According to accounts of the incident, several individuals proceeded to gin up the angry mob to the point of violence. Hellbent on avenging the wrongs that had been committed that day, the enraged populace soon marched from the docks in the direction of the French quarter in the town. French traders were harassed, their stores were vandalized, and their goods were stolen. Windows of French owned properties were smashed, buildings were set ablaze, and some Frenchmen were even killed in the streets in retribution for the attack at sea. A more brazen act would take place in Nicosia on the following day, when the Turkish populace of the city marched on the French consulate once they learned of the events at sea. In their anger, the crowd threw rocks, roof tiles, and other projectiles at the diplomatic compound striking one French official dead and injuring several others in the process. Shouts of anger and cries of sorrow filled the air as protestors angrily berated the French for their impropriety. The violent mob even attempted to storm the consulate before the Ottoman soldiers moved to secure the scene finally ending the confrontation.

The riots were not limited to the French communes in Nicossia and Larnaca sadly, as the neighboring villages of Lakatamia, Strovolos, Lympia would also report incidents of violence and unrest as well. Despite their innocence in the whole matter, some Greek Cypriots were targeted for attacks by the angry masses of Turkish Cypriots who wantonly terrorized their neighbors, looted their homes and stores, and even killed some unfortunate Greek Cypriots who attempted to calm the situation. Eventually the violence on Cyprus would come to an end when the Ottoman authorities cracked down on it, but by that point 17 Frenchmen had been killed as had an undetermined number of Greek Cypriots who had unfortunately been caught up in the commotion.

Some of this anger can be attributed to the incident itself between the French convoy and the Ottoman Squadron, as a handful of Turkish Cypriots had been aboard the effected ships during the engagement against the French, but a more likely cause of this expression of rage originated from the French role in the war against the Egyptians. Many Turkish Cypriots had been conscripted into the Ottoman Army and Navy to fight in the ongoing conflict and those left behind were beset with heavy taxes to support the war effort. While certainly burdensome, these policies were tolerable so long as the Ottomans continued to find success on the battlefield and the prospect of a short war remained alive. However, thanks to French efforts to aid the Egyptians through the continued shipment of arms and munitions the war had stalemated and the Egyptians spine had been steeled. As a result, the ongoing standoff in Syria was as much France’s doing as it was Egypt’s. Regardless of the rationale behind it, the Larnaca and Nicosia Riots unnecessarily escalated an already tense relationship between the French and Ottomans.

In the days and weeks that followed the incident at sea and the ensuing riots on land, relations between the French and Ottomans Governments steadily declined with each blaming the other for the confrontation. The Ottomans blamed the French for refusing to accept Ottoman demands to search their ships, while the French for their part blamed the Sublime Porte for deliberately firing upon a neutrally flagged ship and failing to prevent the violence on Cyprus. The only success after several days of tense negotiation was an official statement by the Ottoman government lamenting the loss of life on both sides, but saying little on the events that resulted in that loss of life nor offering any restitution to the French for their destruction of their property and the deaths of their men. Suffice to say, this response proved unsatisfactory to the French Government who responded by dramatically escalating the situation in the following days.

Four weeks after the skirmish at sea on the 31st of July, the majority of the French Mediterranean Fleet departed for the Eastern Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Julien Pierre Anne Lalande.[2] Their target was the island of Cyprus which they were resolved to blockade until the Porte complied with their demands for proper restitution and a formal apology for causing the incident. Cyprus was deemed a satisfactory target for French retribution due to its proximity to the initial naval confrontation some 20 miles off its coast and for its involvement in the ensuing riots and pogroms against French citizens on the island. Provided they did nothing further to antagonize the Sublime Porte, it was believed by the crowned heads at Tuileries that a French blockade of Cyprus would be deemed insufficient to elicit a proper military response from the Ottomans given Cyprus’ peripheral strategic and economic importance to the Ottoman empire. Once they made a show of their determination to seek reparation, they believed that the Ottoman Government would submit to their demands to save face and the confrontation would be ended peacefully.

Unsurprisingly, the Ottoman Government refused to acquiesce to French saber rattling, especially once the governments of Britain and Austria openly sided with the Porte against the French. Though Austria and Britain had sympathized with France over their loss of life at Larnaca and Nicosia, they recognized that this outcome was a direct result of their actions to flagrantly aid the Egyptians in their war against the Ottomans. Moreover, their blockade was completely irresponsible and a blatant display of gunboat diplomacy. Though they made no official act against the French initially, they believed that diplomatic pressure would be enough to persuade the French Government from its current course once it became clear that Britain and Austria would not allow the Ottomans to cave to French demands. The French however, proved especially stubborn in the maintenance of their blockade despite the protests of London and Vienna and as a result, this tense standoff would continue for nearly 10 days without resolution.

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The Blockade of Cyprus

While the blockade had little effect on the French or the Ottomans it did have a significant effect on the island of Cyprus itself as law and order on the island slowly collapsed despite the best efforts of the Ottoman officials to the contrary. In the neighboring Kingdom of Greece, the French blockade of Cyprus would elicit a flurry of activity and debate as well once news from the island made its way to Athens in the following days. Seeking to take advantage of this opportunity, members of the Kingdom’s small, but relatively influential Cypriot community practically begged the Greek Government to intervene and liberate the island for Greece on their behalf. Many believed that the poor treatment of the Greek Cypriots in recent days demanded action by the Greek state, however, King Leopold and much of the Greek Government proved reluctant to interject themselves militarily in this present matter, a matter which was deteriorating by the day.

Although the French were belligerent towards the Ottomans, they were not quite at war with one another yet, and while the treatment of the Greek Cypriots was appalling, it was not apparent that it had been carried out on behalf of the Ottoman government. It was clear that the Greek Government was content to wait and see what took place on Cyprus for good or for ill. Aside from refitting the aging RHS Hellas for active duty following a brief sojourn as a training ship and authorizing the raising of an additional 4 battalions for Hellenic Army and 4 battalions for the Ethnofylaki (National Guard), they made no definitive efforts to provoke the Ottomans, nor did they make any official claims to the island of Cyprus.[3] Without official backing from the Greek Government, some Cypriots would ultimately back down on the call for war, others like the Cypriot hero from the Revolutionary War, Nicholas Theseus did not, however, and began making their own preparations.

Next Time: The Labor of Theseus


[1] Several French Naval officers were aboard the Egyptian ships at Navarino on October 20th, 1827 in OTL but they were sent ashore after some negotiation by Codrington and de Rigny right before the battle took place.

[2] Lalande was the French admiral in command of the French Levant Fleet during the OTL Second Egyptian Ottoman War. He actually proposed that the French seize the Ottoman forts in the Dardanelles region, thus preventing the Russian Black Sea fleet from joining with the Ottoman, British, and Austrian fleets in the Mediterranean. Suffice to say, this would have been an act of war by France and an escalation of the OTL war into something much worse.

[3] The Greek Prefix for their ships is ΒΠ (VP) which stands for Βασιλικόν Πλοίον (Vassilikón Ploíon) "Royal Ship", hence the English translation being "Royal Hellenic ship" (RHS).
 
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Someone cynic could point to Austrian flagged ships carrying supplies and troops for both the Ottomans and the Egyptians during the Greek war of independence and Vienna complaining of piracy when the Greek navy went seizing said ships but of course this would matter little anywhere beyond French newspapers. Or pro-liberal ones hating Metternich's guts for that matter.

And oh we are having an apparent showing of the advantages in having Leopold instead of Otto on the throne in Athens, with the Greek government keeping its distance from France while it's probably getting both some respect in London and European public opinion on its side... for doing nothing. And if Theseus launches an uprising on his own while Cyprus is so conveniently blockaded by the French, why who in Europe can blame the poor Cypriots after two rounds of massacres in less than 20 years (1821 and TTL 1840)? Official Greece is keeping scrupulously neutral after all. Private ships and volunteers that just happen to run through the French blockade if something happens why that's will likely be a different matter.
 
Someone cynic could point to Austrian flagged ships carrying supplies and troops for both the Ottomans and the Egyptians during the Greek war of independence and Vienna complaining of piracy when the Greek navy went seizing said ships but of course this would matter little anywhere beyond French newspapers. Or pro-liberal ones hating Metternich's guts for that matter.

And oh we are having an apparent showing of the advantages in having Leopold instead of Otto on the throne in Athens, with the Greek government keeping its distance from France while it's probably getting both some respect in London and European public opinion on its side... for doing nothing. And if Theseus launches an uprising on his own while Cyprus is so conveniently blockaded by the French, why who in Europe can blame the poor Cypriots after two rounds of massacres in less than 20 years (1821 and TTL 1840)? Official Greece is keeping scrupulously neutral after all. Private ships and volunteers that just happen to run through the French blockade if something happens why that's will likely be a different matter.
You are certainly right as per usual Lascaris. I'm sure you already know this, but Otto became a strong believer in the Megali Idea during the latter part of his reign as a means of improving his rather poor domestic image. Unsurprisingly, it backfired spectacularly especially when he tried to get involved in the Crimean War which resulted in the occupation of Piraeus by the British and French until the end of the war. Suffice to say, it weakened his already poor standing in Greece even further and would ultimately begin the chain of events that resulted in the coup which removed him from power in 1862.

Leopold, being the adept and incredibly cautious politician that he is, will not rush into every conflict that appears in the Ottoman Empire in a desperate bid for public approval. If it were entirely up to him, he would bide his time until the perfect time to strike appeared, which may or may not be approaching now. I will say that his cautious nature can be both a positive and a negative trait for him as he could very well miss a perfectly good opportunity while waiting for a better opportunity that may or may not come. That being said, Leopold is not an absolute monarch so if he were forced to intervene in Cyprus by the government, he would have to get involved despite his own personal misgivings.

The Greek Government and Greek society as a whole though are a bit more divided on the issue of intervention in Cyprus. Many like Ioannis Kapodistrias would like to get involved, but they realize that Greece simply isn't ready for another war with the Ottomans just yet. Others like Nicholas Theseus are among a rather vocal minority who strongly believe that this is the perfect opportunity to get involved and are making their own preparations in lieu of the Government's inaction.

Ultimately, Theseus' revolt will prove to be quite the conundrum for Greece in the coming weeks and month.
 
You are certainly right as per usual Lascaris. I'm sure you already know this, but Otto became a strong believer in the Megali Idea during the latter part of his reign as a means of improving his rather poor domestic image. Unsurprisingly, it backfired spectacularly especially when he tried to get involved in the Crimean War which resulted in the occupation of Piraeus by the British and French until the end of the war. Suffice to say, it weakened his already poor standing in Greece even further and would ultimately begin the chain of events that resulted in the coup which removed him from power in 1862.

Leopold, being the adept and incredibly cautious politician that he is, will not rush into every conflict that appears in the Ottoman Empire in a desperate bid for public approval. If it were entirely up to him, he would bide his time until the perfect time to strike appeared, which may or may not be approaching now. I will say that his cautious nature can be both a positive and a negative trait for him as he could very well miss a perfectly good opportunity while waiting for a better opportunity that may or may not come. That being said, Leopold is not an absolute monarch so if he were forced to intervene in Cyprus by the government, he would have to get involved despite his own personal misgivings.

The Greek Government and Greek society as a whole though are a bit more divided on the issue of intervention in Cyprus. Many like Ioannis Kapodistrias would like to get involved, but they realize that Greece simply isn't ready for another war with the Ottomans just yet. Others like Nicholas Theseus are among a rather vocal minority who strongly believe that this is the perfect opportunity to get involved and are making their own preparations in lieu of the Government's inaction.

Ultimately, Theseus' revolt will prove to be quite the conundrum for Greece in the coming weeks and month.

Greece dealt with about a revolt per decade in Crete and half a dozen more revolts in Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia in OTL without stumbling into a war, with the notable exception of 1897. So they should manage, with better diplomats at the helm to begin with.
 
Earl,first thank you for mentioning my home town,and second how theseus will arm the rebels?can i assume that the french will give some backdoor assistance to the rebels and then take advantage of the situation?
 
Earl,first thank you for mentioning my home town,and second how theseus will arm the rebels?can i assume that the french will give some backdoor assistance to the rebels and then take advantage of the situation?
I'm always open to requests and your comments have been incredibly helpful to me in crafting these Cyprus updates, so it was really the least I could do.

Theseus' return to Cyprus will be an unexpected development for France, but certainly a welcome one as he can provide some additional pressure on the Ottomans without directly involving France. Without going into too much detail, some individuals within the French government will certainly seek to support/take advantage of Theseus and his followers to further their own ends in the region. Some Greeks on the mainland will also seek to aid their kinsmen in their revolt/uprising as well, but this support is primarily limited to private donations rather than the full financial and military support of the Greek state which is decidedly neutral in this matter for the time being.
 
You are certainly right as per usual Lascaris. I'm sure you already know this, but Otto became a strong believer in the Megali Idea during the latter part of his reign as a means of improving his rather poor domestic image. Unsurprisingly, it backfired spectacularly especially when he tried to get involved in the Crimean War which resulted in the occupation of Piraeus by the British and French until the end of the war. Suffice to say, it weakened his already poor standing in Greece even further and would ultimately begin the chain of events that resulted in the coup which removed him from power in 1862.

Leopold, being the adept and incredibly cautious politician that he is, will not rush into every conflict that appears in the Ottoman Empire in a desperate bid for public approval. If it were entirely up to him, he would bide his time until the perfect time to strike appeared, which may or may not be approaching now. I will say that his cautious nature can be both a positive and a negative trait for him as he could very well miss a perfectly good opportunity while waiting for a better opportunity that may or may not come. That being said, Leopold is not an absolute monarch so if he were forced to intervene in Cyprus by the government, he would have to get involved despite his own personal misgivings.

The Greek Government and Greek society as a whole though are a bit more divided on the issue of intervention in Cyprus. Many like Ioannis Kapodistrias would like to get involved, but they realize that Greece simply isn't ready for another war with the Ottomans just yet. Others like Nicholas Theseus are among a rather vocal minority who strongly believe that this is the perfect opportunity to get involved and are making their own preparations in lieu of the Government's inaction.

Ultimately, Theseus' revolt will prove to be quite the conundrum for Greece in the coming weeks and month.

Earl, I presume that the OTL uprising of Nicholas Theseus in 1833 has not taken place in this TL. In OTL Theuseus was a friend of the French consul and had been promised some support from him (which never materialized ). Theuseus and his family had been wealthy Greek Cypriot merchants, operating mainly in Marseilles. He had fought in the Greek war of Independence and had donated substantial amounts of money.
Unless France intervenes directly I don't see many chances for a successful uprising in Cyprus. Unlike mainland Greece, Cyprus did not have a tradition of war experienced clefts and chieftains. However there was a substantial number of Cypriot fighters in the Greek War of Independence...
 
Unless France intervenes directly I don't see many chances for a successful uprising in Cyprus. Unlike mainland Greece, Cyprus did not have a tradition of war experienced clefts and chieftains. However there was a substantial number of Cypriot fighters in the Greek War of Independence...
Plus, well, here's the issue. It's a blockade being done by the French. Not the Ottomans. Meaning that while the locals there might not like the Ottomans, they know that it's not their fault. And if it gets out he's got French support....
 
Earl, I presume that the OTL uprising of Nicholas Theseus in 1833 has not taken place in this TL. In OTL Theuseus was a friend of the French consul and had been promised some support from him (which never materialized ). Theuseus and his family had been wealthy Greek Cypriot merchants, operating mainly in Marseilles. He had fought in the Greek war of Independence and had donated substantial amounts of money.
Unless France intervenes directly I don't see many chances for a successful uprising in Cyprus. Unlike mainland Greece, Cyprus did not have a tradition of war experienced clefts and chieftains. However there was a substantial number of Cypriot fighters in the Greek War of Independence...
If I remember correctly over a thousand Cypriots fought in the Greek War for Independence, with many dying in the defense of Missolonghi and Athens in OTL. ITTL, the Greeks successfully escaped from Missolonghi and the 2nd siege of Athens never took place, so many of the Cypriots who fought in the war managed to survive it including Nicholas Theseus.

Theseus' 1833 uprising did take place ITTL, but it was somewhat different due to the different circumstances in the Ottoman Empire at the time with the ongoing conflict in Albania and Bosnia. Generally though, the results of TTL's 1833 uprising were more or less the same as the OTL revolt with Theseus and his followers being forced to flee Cyprus for Greece where they have remained ever since. You are certainly right though, if there is to be any possibility of success for the Cypriots in 1840 they need outside help from Greece and one of the Powers as well, with France being the obvious choice at the moment.

Plus, well, here's the issue. It's a blockade being done by the French. Not the Ottomans. Meaning that while the locals there might not like the Ottomans, they know that it's not their fault. And if it gets out he's got French support....
And there in lies part of the problem with French support for Nicholas Theseus.
 
I think it is kind of too early for a possible unification of Cyprus with Greece. I kind of doubt that the support is big enough there to warrand a unification, plus the nationalistic spirit that came later in WW1 hasn't yet been established and let us not forget that Cyprus was an important island for the Ottoman Empire as both a resupply base and a rich territory which served to fill the coffers.

Overall, by having Cyprus unite with Greece this early you are losing a significant trump card for the later wars, and giving a huge boost to Greece.
 
I think it is kind of too early for a possible unification of Cyprus with Greece. I kind of doubt that the support is big enough there to warrand a unification, plus the nationalistic spirit that came later in WW1 hasn't yet been established and let us not forget that Cyprus was an important island for the Ottoman Empire as both a resupply base and a rich territory which served to fill the coffers.

Overall, by having Cyprus unite with Greece this early you are losing a significant trump card for the later wars, and giving a huge boost to Greece.

However, looks like the French were adamantly set for Cyprus as well. I think several countries are looking for the island right now. The Ottomans, of course. Britain surely don't want Cyprus to fall in French hands. Egypt maybe, but I guess its main concern is Syria. Naturally Greece, albeit a chain of events which would grant them the island look very difficult.

But we'll see how this will fold.
 
The Island I see it staying in the Ottoman hands cause as said the Greek unification is far off like a century off, and Britain with its own interest in the Island due to Egyptian interest don’t want it to be French, so for Britain and it’s allies the Status quote is for it to remain Ottoman... of course the British will need concessions for this after all the modernizing Ottoman state needs...foreign observers mostly British, Austrian, and Prussian to ensure things stay calm on the island.
 
Hmmm, this discussion got me thinking about an aspect that this TL might explore: the relationship between the wider Greek world and the independent Greek kingdom. IOTL, as ITTL at this time, Hellenism was pretty widespread, and still present in many of its historic homelands around the basin of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This meant several identities and varieties of existence for Greeks, as Ottoman subjects, Russian subjects, etc. There was even IOTL a (small) ideological tendency that favoured Greco-Ottoman collaboration, something along the lines of the Greeks providing the brains and the Turks the brawn. For obvious reasons, it never got anywhere.

IOTL, the kingdom was pretty successful in pushing its claim to be the sole representative of Hellenism at the expense of the patriarchate of Constantinople and other local identities, helped by the rise of nationalism. However, the corollary of this was that Greek populations were identified with a foreign power by the governments of the countries they resided in, which made them vulnerable. While the Megali Idea envisioned expansion of the Greek state to include all Greeks, what actually happened (especially after the Asia Minor disaster and the Bolshevik takeover in Russia) was that Hellenism actually shrunk within the confines of the Greek state. This happened with other ethnicities at the same period, of course, but in the Greek case, due to the large diaspora, the effects were very striking: a map of Greek presence in 1900 would not look to dissimilar to one from the 6th century BC, but by 1950 it was reduced to the borders of OTL Greece. So in a sense narrow Greek nationalism prevailed at the expense of a more cosmopolitan "Greek world" that was spread over a far larger area and intermingled with other nations.

Again, the same can be said of pretty much any nation in eastern Europe, and obviously, the rise of nationalism cannot be averted ITTL. However, if places like Cyprus (or Pontus) start breaking off from the Ottoman body earlier (in whatever form), then it is possible that regional Greek identities might survive that do not look so much to the supposed "national centre" in Athens, having their own interests and peculiarities, and perhaps allow for something of a "Greek commonwealth" to survive/evolve, which would make for interesting dynamics. I don't know how plausible it would be to pull this off, however, without feeling contrived, since it needs a sequence of events to come about just right. It may however be interesting to consider that.
 
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