No GNW (or “Peter goes South”)

[Jürgen]

Yes, but some parts of the CA had economic value, like a fertile part of Bukhara (cotton) and Kashgar.

Yes, but they’re secondary, you’re far better off growing cereal with farmers loyal to the state than growing cash crops in regions with potential rebels. The real value of conquering Central Asia has always been it enable to enforce stability, it was in the same way with the European conquest of a North Africa, the land itself was not important, the fact that it got rid of piracy was the important factor.

Another aspect have you thought about immigration to Russia, in OTL West European settlers was a important factor in develop these regions. In OTL the settlers mainly came from Hesse because this region allowed emigration, but with royal power strengthen in Mecklenburg the local duke could free the local peasantry and allow surplus population to emigrate to weaken the nobility and Mecklenburg is placed perfect for emigration to Russia (which usually was through St. Petersburg to the Volga and down along it).

 

[TrickyApe]

Russian soldiers in these areas had been dying at such a high rate that holding them became untenable.

The South Caspian territories did indeed have a problem with disease but, from what I've been able to make out, not a bigger problem than the Sugar Islands that Europe valued so highly. Malaria was still a problem in the region in the 20th century but not in a way that seemed to preclude development or trade, certainly not more than in the Caribbean. Gilan produced the most and best quality silk in Persia, while Mazandaran had more silk, cotton, sugar, and rice. They had the potential to be Sugar Islands just across the Caspian.

The cotton could be (and had been) grown in much greater volumes in the conquered areas of the CA.

Sure it has been grown in CA, since the railways made transportation affordable. Before that very little raw cotton was exported from Central Asia. Transcaucasia had far less ultimate potential but could produce and eventually did produce far more than the 18th century or early 19th century needs of the Russian textile industry. Moving raw cotton on camel back, without even roads for wheeled vehicles, was unsurprisingly not competitive with foreign imports. The Azerbaijani cotton could move across the Caspian and up the Volga.

“Georgia” (as in 3 tsardoms and few minor entities) did not have an access to the Black Sea and definitely not from the Caspian Sea and the schema needed a war with both Ottomans and Persia.

Yes, seizing the ports of today's Georgia would involve conflict with the Ottomans. Nonetheless, there were schemes in the late 18th and turn of the 19th century to export grain from Ukraine to the area in return for local products. Wine, fruit, and tobacco were potentially lucrative cash crops and, since this is alt-history, imagine the potential if tea cultivation were introduced on the Black Sea coast a century before it was OTL.

Except for the fact that it was. 😂

Yes, on the backs of animals moving on unpaved tracks.

 

[CaedmonCousland]

Well, interested to see how things develop in terms of Prussia. Checked out a bit with the CA conquests as its an area I have effectively zero knowledge of, but it will be interesting to see how the Diplomatic Revolution plays out with he Baltic League. Interesting to think on how Frederick will view it, covering basically his north and east flanks or as a risk in surrounding Prussia if it teams with Austria. I think you already stated that Sweden probably has little interest in getting involved at the beginning of any conflict, and Russia is unlikely to turn with Grand Duchess Sophia.

 

[TrickyApe]

Yes, but they’re secondary, you’re far better off growing cereal with farmers loyal to the state than growing cash crops in regions with potential rebels. The real value of conquering Central Asia has always been it enable to enforce stability, it was in the same way with the European conquest of a North Africa, the land itself was not important, the fact that it got rid of piracy was the important factor.

What you say is true to a point and certainly the slave raiding was taken seriously by Russia but I don't think it's a coincidence that the Russians finally invested the resources to succeed at taking over Central Asia at a point in time when transportation developments made the region economically valuable to them.

 

[St. Just]

Itd be interesting if, instead of a big German presence on thw Volga, they were encouraged to go farther afield to Central Asia instead (like the progenitors of Rot-Front in Kyrgyzstan)

 

[alexmilman]

It would still be in Russia's interest to secure the North Caucasus. A couple of forts along the Kuban river is hardly a longterm secure border.

There were more than “a couple of forts” (how about the whole Kuban Cossacks host with the obvious question which side of the border was going to be defended from whom) and the North Caucasus had been populated, among others, by the Circassians and Chechens. You can easily find out how long it took to subdue them and what was the cost on both sides. In the case of the Circassians it took a wholesale genocide to “secure” their area. Anyway, so-called “Kabarda” was formally a part of the Ottoman Empire and could not be simply “secured” without one more war with the Ottomans. Dagestan and Chechya belonged to Persia, which also means a war.

Besides, why would any reasonable Russian ruler IITL (unlike OTL where it did cost dearly) jump from one war to another?

 

[Hastings]

It would still be in Russia's interest to secure the North Caucasus. A couple of forts along the Kuban river is hardly a longterm secure border.

The Kuban works fine, better than trying to conquer Circassia or the Chechens and Avars. It took nearly 50 years with an army peaking at 250,000 to pacify/genocide the North Caucasian peoples. It did not make much sense even OTL and makes no sense if Russia doesn't have a presence in the South Caucuses. Basically what happened was Russia gained allegiance of Georgian states, but only had an insecure route to them. There are only three land routes into the region, along the Circassian coast, the military road through Ossetia and the coastal road in Dagestan, all of which were periodically raided. Between 1796 and 1864 the Russians fought three wars each against the Persians and the Ottomans for territory south of the mountains, despite the shaky control to the north. It turned into a bog, which the Russian commitment to securing the North Caucuses ever growing as they got pulled deeper in. The whole thing was idiocy. Idiocy that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. It was Vietnam, but far worse.

Kuban and Terek are perfectly good natural boundaries separating Russian territory from non-Russian and most of the arable land is north of those rivers. Would the line of the Caucuses be better? Yes, but not enough to justify the cost of conquest, since it isn't like either Persia or the Ottomans could support much of an army that far north.

 

[alexmilman]

The South Caspian territories did indeed have a problem with disease but, from what I've been able to make out, not a bigger problem than the Sugar Islands that Europe valued so highly. Malaria was still a problem in the region in the 20th century but not in a way that seemed to preclude development or trade, certainly not more than in the Caribbean. Gilan produced the most and best quality silk in Persia, while Mazandaran had more silk, cotton, sugar, and rice. They had the potential to be Sugar Islands just across the Caspian.

This is all a theory. In a reality, by the early 1730s the Russian government was so worried by the losses to the diseases and a cost of maintaining the occupation that it gladly returned practically all territories conquered by Peter as soon as there was a stable government in Persia. Of course, later Azerbaijan was conquered again but never the Southern coast of the Caspian. It was seemingly cheaper to buy silk and other goods in Persia than to rule these territories.

Sugar, until much later, was something of a luxury item with a very limited consumer base and not something worthy of two serious and many minor wars.

Sure it has been grown in CA, since the railways made transportation affordable. Before that very little raw cotton was exported from Central Asia. Transcaucasia had far less ultimate potential but could produce and eventually did produce far more than the 18th century or early 19th century needs of the Russian textile industry. Moving raw cotton on camel back, without even roads for wheeled vehicles, was unsurprisingly not competitive with foreign imports. The Azerbaijani cotton could move across the Caspian and up the Volga.

Conquest of Transcaucasia required a number of wars, with the Ottomans, Persia and the natives. It took many decades and was very costly in OTL where it happened later with a greater Russian technological advantage than existed in the mid-XVIII.

For the Russian textile industry of the XVIII cotton was not the main material so even the OTL limited imports were adequate until cotton became a military material.

Yes, seizing the ports of today's Georgia would involve conflict with the Ottomans. Nonetheless, there were schemes in the late 18th and turn of the 19th century to export grain from Ukraine to the area in return for local products. Wine, fruit, and tobacco were potentially lucrative cash crops and, since this is alt-history, imagine the potential if tea cultivation were introduced on the Black Sea coast a century before it was OTL.

Russian main goal IITL (as far as I have some say on the subject) is to get gold for its agricultural products, not to exchange them to the fruits. The Georgian wines were not popular in Russia until early XX and actually not until the Soviet times.

Yes, on the backs of animals moving on unpaved tracks.

Not a major consideration. Most of the Russian tracks were unpaved and all Russia-China trade was going across the Gobi desert and, besides the camels, the carts also had been used. The “natives” in Bukhara, Kokand and even Khiva had been using wagons (arbas) and the Kazakh steppes were not exactly a desert.

Anyway, there will be no conquest of the Caucasus for a long while.

 

[alexmilman]

What you say is true to a point and certainly the slave raiding was taken seriously by Russia but I don't think it's a coincidence that the Russians finally invested the resources to succeed at taking over Central Asia at a point in time when transportation developments made the region economically valuable to them.

Check how many wars Russia was fighting between 1700 and conquest of the CA. There were no resources and not enough Russian presence in the region to start conquest earlier. Following your logic, conquest of the territory all the way to the Pacific would not happen until TransSib was built.

 

[alexmilman]

Yes, but they’re secondary, you’re far better off growing cereal with farmers loyal to the state than growing cash crops in regions with potential rebels.

Actually, the sedentary population of these regions was quite loyal to the new power (this was mentioned in the previous chapters), especially in the areas that ended up under the direct Russian rule because this rule was much easier on them than a traditional one. The problems usually were coming from the nomadic tribes but even then it would depend upon the specific circumstances. Plus, the areas which went directly to Russia saw almost immediate influx of the Russians, the Cossacks and/or peasants (plus merchants, artisans, etc.). In OTL most of the region remained reasonably quiet all the way to 1917.

The real value of conquering Central Asia has always been it enable to enforce stability, it was in the same way with the European conquest of a North Africa, the land itself was not important, the fact that it got rid of piracy was the important factor.

There was definitely a similarity in the motivation, in the case of Khiva it was the driving reason and I had been quite clear on that (hopefully 😉). But the region as a total had clear economic value in the terms of (a) being a potential consumer of the Russian goods, (b) producing some valuable items and (c) supporting trade deeper into the CA.

Another aspect have you thought about immigration to Russia, in OTL West European settlers was a important factor in develop these regions. In OTL the settlers mainly came from Hesse because this region allowed emigration, but with royal power strengthen in Mecklenburg the local duke could free the local peasantry and allow surplus population to emigrate to weaken the nobility and Mecklenburg is placed perfect for emigration to Russia (which usually was through St. Petersburg to the Volga and down along it).

The immigrants could come from many places by a wide variety of reasons: in OTL they were Germans, Greeks, Italians, Serbs, Scots, Brits and even Spaniards. IITL the government is going to put a greater stress on inviting the specialists by offering the good salaries and other benefits. Specialists in a wide range of professions from metallurgy to the banking business. Peter I tried this with a limited success both because he and the people in charge of these activities did not have a clear idea what are they looking for (and hardly were competent enough to make a valid judgement) and because, Russia being a “wild place” with an ambiguous reputation, the high-class specialists were reluctant to take risks. IITL Russia is a recognized reputable European power and if the good conditions are offered the attitudes could be different.

 

[X Oristos]

Exactly. And if in OTL the Ottomans were predominantly “just an enemy”, IITL they are a valuable trade partner allowing to expand trade further to the Med and beyond. Persia is going to become a growing market for the Russian goods.

IITL Russia is penetrating the Asiatic markets well ahead of the schedule and ahead of the Brits. India is only marginally accessible by the caravans (from Bukhara) and eventually the Brits are going to kill this trade but, with Kashgar in the Russian hands, the regional situation is different from one of OTL in the terms of access to the “inner Asia”.

May I briefly play the role of the devil's advocate?

The British do not need to kill the russo-indian trade by sheer force. I sincerely doubt that any trade in reasonable quantities may develop at all. Importing indian textiles to Europe will be incredibly cheaper by ship than by caravans. The technology of the time dictates it and not geopolitics. Well, to be honest geopolitics as well: what are the chances of Russians pacifying the tribes of northern Pakistan and Afganistan? So, overall, I doubt there can be any profit from sending caravans to India.

Even in OTL with multiple russo-ottoman wars, the Straits were closed only in times of war despite the inter-state hostility. So, even with multiple wars, the wheat trade flourished. I would also like to make a thesis that the Ottoman Empire would be a more valuable trade partner in 1720 than e.g. 1770. It serves as a trade partner to kickstart the wheat trade, but it won't be a major wheat importer compared to (as in OTL) the urbanized West. Feeding Constantinople partially with russian grains will be profitable, but the more Ukraine develops as a wheat exporter, the less important this trade becomes.

The other major russian exports (naval supplies, iron and iron products) would be more in demand to the more developed Western European markets rather than the Ottoman Empire. And when it comes to textiles, any russian exports will have to compete with british and french textiles in the ottoman markets.

I would also argue that an earlier conquest of the CA khanates, increases the importance of the Caspian Sea and its security. I wonder whether John Elton was active in the Caspian Sea ITTL. A european-built persian flotilla might trigger russian expansionism in the area. The best port of the western coast is Baku.

Last but not least, I think it is difficult to butterfly away imperial competition in the Caucasus. The very nature of the caucasian polities, being small statelets and tribes at the fridge of empires make the system very unstable. It would have been much more stable if there a few well organized states that could act as buffers between the three empires (Russia, OE, Persia). Such an example would be the security of the rich chernozem agricultural zone by tribal raiders. The raids of poor mountaineers against rich agricultural plains and valleys are as old as agriculture itself and won't easily go away. There are few chances for a reasonably well-organized state to encompass Transcaucasia or the Ottomans to completely control the mountain tribes. The security concerns are similar to those that led to the destruction of the Crimean Khanate.

 

[alexmilman]

May I briefly play the role of the devil's advocate?

You are more than welcomed. 😉

The British do not need to kill the russo-indian trade by sheer force. I sincerely doubt that any trade in reasonable quantities may develop at all.

“At all” is too strong but I don’t remember saying anything about it growing into something significant. In OTL in Bukhara there were 20 - 40 Indian merchants (or families?) living permanently which gives some idea about the volume of trade and strongly hints to its nomenclature: “luxury items” as opposite to the big volume commodities. This would not go to change. AFAIK, before the British conquest the European trade with India was mostly European import of these “luxury items” because the Indian state had a very limited interest to the European goods.

Importing indian textiles to Europe will be incredibly cheaper by ship than by caravans.

Here we are getting to the point. In its Asiatic trade Russia was interested in exporting its goods and, with the exception of the small volume “luxury” fabrics (like silk), was importing the wool-based cloth while exporting its own flax-based textiles. In other words, India as a supplier of the commonly used fabrics would be of no interest (IIRC, the Brits killed the Indian textile production forcing purchase of their own textiles).

So India is of interest mostly as a source of the spices and some luxury items and consumer of the same stuff which Bukhara was selling in OTL, not a major perspective trade partner. The potential consumers of the Russian production can be an Inner Asia but I’m not sure that the Afghan tribes could become a major and reliable consumer of anything.

The technology of the time dictates it and not geopolitics. Well, to be honest geopolitics as well: what are the chances of Russians pacifying the tribes of northern Pakistan and Afganistan? So, overall, I doubt there can be any profit from sending caravans to India.

The caravans had been going in OTL so the trade was profitable. Which is not the same as saying that it could be turned into something profitable on the state level, aka big enough in its volume to make a noticeable percentage of the Russian exports. OTOH, an idea that the trade is possible only after the “pacification” of the area sounds a little bit too “British”: the trade between the CA, Inner Asia and India did exist before the Russians got into the picture, which means that everybody involved had certain interest in it. This would not going to change until and unless the Brits will stop it on the territories which they conquer.

Even in OTL with multiple russo-ottoman wars, the Straits were closed only in times of war despite the inter-state hostility. So, even with multiple wars, the wheat trade flourished. I would also like to make a thesis that the Ottoman Empire would be a more valuable trade partner in 1720 than e.g. 1770. It serves as a trade partner to kickstart the wheat trade, but it won't be a major wheat importer compared to (as in OTL) the urbanized West. Feeding Constantinople partially with russian grains will be profitable, but the more Ukraine develops as a wheat exporter, the less important this trade becomes.

As far as I can tell, a big volume Russian grain trade through the Med is the late XIX century phenomena. In the XVIII it was going through the Baltics to the Netherlands and Britain.

Grain exports to France were rather sporadic and the same goes for Spain.

Constantinople was not the only place in the Ottoman Empire which needed grain so I assume that at least Levant also could be a market. What about Greece and Northern Africa, except Egypt?

But the Ottoman Empire as a partner could be a valuable source of the “Eastern goods”.

The other major russian exports (naval supplies, iron and iron products) would be more in demand to the more developed Western European markets rather than the Ottoman Empire.

They always were. Which does not mean that the Ottomans would not be buying a considerable amount of the manufactured products. In OTL, for example, they were buying the knives from Austria and, while we are on the subject, the knives made in the Crimean Khanate had been in a high demand.

Iron is tricky. In OTL after the GNW the iron exports (peg and sheet iron and cast iron) constituted a large percentage of the Russian iron production at the expense of the domestic manufacturing of the finished goods and development of the domestic manufacturing of the high quality steel (which by the late XIX resulted in a big “Oops!” ). This is going to change IITL. The same goes for the naval supplies: Russia was selling predominantly the raw materials instead of the finished products (hemp instead of the cables, etc.).

And when it comes to textiles, any russian exports will have to compete with british and french textiles in the ottoman markets.

Actually, not too much because the French were importing silk and the woolens and Russians the flax-based fabrics (not sure what the Brits were selling in the XVIII, probably woolens).

I would also argue that an earlier conquest of the CA khanates, increases the importance of the Caspian Sea and its security. I wonder whether John Elton was active in the Caspian Sea ITTL. A european-built persian flotilla might trigger russian expansionism in the area. The best port of the western coast is Baku.

In the XVIII the trade was mostly going through Derbent but a greater naval trade was a clear possibility.

Last but not least, I think it is difficult to butterfly away imperial competition in the Caucasus. The very nature of the caucasian polities, being small statelets and tribes at the fridge of empires make the system very unstable.

Yes, it does. But it also limits instability to the small-scale raids across the border done by both sides (the Kuban Cossacks on the Russian side were a match to the opponents on other side). Between the raids the same people had been trading with each other.

It would have been much more stable if there a few well organized states that could act as buffers between the three empires (Russia, OE, Persia).

Well-organized states in the XVIII-XIX century Caucasus is a pure ASB. Anyway, taking into an account that the Caucasus was split between Persia and the Ottomans why would any of them voluntarily give away its territory to create a meaningful state which it would not be able to loot at will?

Such an example would be the security of the rich chernozem agricultural zone by tribal raiders. The raids of poor mountaineers against rich agricultural plains and valleys are as old as agriculture itself and won't easily go away.

Errrr… Actually, a big chunk of these good agricultural lands was/is to the South of the Kuban river so there is no need to feel too sorry about the “poor mountaineers” who lived well to the South and did not have any contact with the Russians until they started conquest of the Caucasus. 😂

There are few chances for a reasonably well-organized state to encompass Transcaucasia or the Ottomans to completely control the mountain tribes.

Many of which were Persian subjects…

The security concerns are similar to those that led to the destruction of the Crimean Khanate.

Not at all because the Circassians, Chechens, etc. rarely got far beyond the “natural borders”. Unlike the Crimean Khanate, they were not unified and could not cause any noticeable harm. The whole charade, as was very well explained by @Hastings was about the initial idiotic decision to get into the Southern Caucasus (treaty with Karli-Kahetia) with a resulting need to subdue the whole space in between to secure a reliable communication. Well, and getting a better trade arrangement with Persia by conquering a big chunk
of it.

 

[Kriss]

Regarding expansion in Caucasus , i agree that it's more trouble than it's worth just from the costs of occupation. Thought it's not like it won't happen, once oil is discovered in Baku i see Russia moving in to claim the area, by that time Ottoman/Persian empire will decline enough and Russia will have technological edge to be able to subdue the area.

Now regarding future Russian expansion, well besides future Polish Partition there is still expansion in America's, though i don't see it moving past Alaska.

 

[alexmilman]

Regarding expansion in Caucasus , i agree that it's more trouble than it's worth just from the costs of occupation. Thought it's not like it won't happen, once oil is discovered in Baku i see Russia moving in to claim the area, by that time Ottoman/Persian empire will decline enough and Russia will have technological edge to be able to subdue the area.

There was no need to discover Baku oil: this was a known fact for centuries and it was even used for various purposes. The whole thing started making economic sense when a process of converting oil to the kerosine was discovered. It’s worth noticing that all the way to the Soviet times ot was almost exclusively about the kerosine: the Nobel company had been just dumping all other “byproducts” to the Caspian Sea. However, in the XVIII this is a remote and unknown future which can’t be a driving reason behind the conquest.

Not sure if there was a serious underlying economic reason behind the Russian conquest of the Northern Azerbaijan. In 1807 Baku had 500 houses and 3,000 of a total population and it became a capital of the gubernia only in 1859. The main purpose of the whole conquest was creation of a convenient base for a complete conquest of the Caucasus.

Now regarding future Russian expansion, well besides future Polish Partition there is still expansion in America's, though i don't see it moving past Alaska.

How about the intensive vs. extensive model of a development? 😉 Paul I and AIII were seemingly the only monarchs who figured out that Russia is already too big and that the attention had to be paid to the domestic issues rather than expansion.

 

[Chernabog90]

Regarding expansion in Caucasus , i agree that it's more trouble than it's worth just from the costs of occupation. Thought it's not like it won't happen, once oil is discovered in Baku i see Russia moving in to claim the area, by that time Ottoman/Persian empire will decline enough and Russia will have technological edge to be able to subdue the area.

Now regarding future Russian expansion, well besides future Polish Partition there is still expansion in America's, though i don't see it moving past Alaska.

Russia already has a massive amount of oil in its own territory, there is no need to try to expand to the Caucasus and be dragged into the problem that the region has, I think it's better if the time is possible that instead of directly annexing it, Russia prop up a client state in the region like Georgia for example

also as interesting as the Russian presence in the American, I don't think they really needed a new Siberia except if maybe you could expand the region all the way down

 

[Jürgen]

Regarding expansion in Caucasus , i agree that it's more trouble than it's worth just from the costs of occupation. Thought it's not like it won't happen, once oil is discovered in Baku i see Russia moving in to claim the area, by that time Ottoman/Persian empire will decline enough and Russia will have technological edge to be able to subdue the area.

Now regarding future Russian expansion, well besides future Polish Partition there is still expansion in America's, though i don't see it moving past Alaska.

While I think a Russian conquest of the Caucasus will happen at some point, it’s better it’s the folly of a 19th century Czar and the 18th century Czars instead spend their time on smarter things like developing Russia.

 

[Valena]

While I think a Russian conquest of the Caucasus will happen at some point, it’s better it’s the folly of a 19th century Czar and the 18th century Czars instead spend their time on smarter things like developing Russia.

Agree.

 

[Kriss]

While I think a Russian conquest of the Caucasus will happen at some point, it’s better it’s the folly of a 19th century Czar and the 18th century Czars instead spend their time on smarter things like developing Russia.

That's my line of though when i said about discovering oil. Otherwise yea Russian priority is pretty much keeping up parity with rest of Europe lest they get caught with their pants down like in otl.

How about the intensive vs. extensive model of a development? 😉 Paul I and AIII were seemingly the only monarchs who figured out that Russia is already too big and that the attention had to be paid to the domestic issues rather than expansion.

Nothing against that, but ultimately if some Russian emperor feels the need to expand further it's far better and cheaper to do it in Alaska, than in Caucasus.

Colony was even profitable at first, though those declined down the line.

 

[alexmilman]

Russia already has a massive amount of oil in its own territory, there is no need to try to expand to the Caucasus and be dragged into the problem that the region has, I think it's better if the time is possible that instead of directly annexing it, Russia prop up a client state in the region like Georgia for example

The oil was pretty much useless until process of its conversion into kerosine was invented, in other words until mid-XIX so under no circumstances it could be a serious motivation for the conquest in mid-XVIII. As for your proposal regarding the client state, this is exactly what did happened and we know the results.

To start with, “Georgia” at that time was not a single state and there was no chance for its unification. There were 3 kingdoms, each of which did not fully control even its own territory, and there were smaller de facto independent Georgian entities and various non-Georgian (in a narrow meaning of the term) tribes/nations. All of them had been on pretty much the same territory and permanently at war with each other. The initial idea to establish one of these kingdoms as a vassal state did not work out because even within that state a pro-Russian party was more than balanced by the pro-Persian one.

AFAIK, all 3 kingdoms were vassals of Persia and if not, then of the Ottomans so any move toward the independence was causing counter-reaction from their sovereign.

The whole region was only marginally accessible from Russia by a couple of the very precarious mountain routes. In OTL a part of the colonization was construction of the Military Georgian Road. Its construction started in 1783, it was open it 1799 and it was the only more or less reliable connection between Russia and Kartly-Kahetia. Even then, travel by it was not easy: with a length of approximately 200 km travel was taking almost 40 days. Improvement of the road was done in 1801 - 1814.

Obviously, part of the schema was a need to protect the road itself with a resulting need of a Russian conquest of pretty much everything in between. More or less the same goes for the Northern Azerbaijan: its conquest was not a big deal but it left Chechnya and Dagestan in the rear with a resulting need to subdue them, etc.

Taking into an account a very limited economic value of the whole area, it is an open question if the achieved goal justified the expenses.

also as interesting as the Russian presence in the American, I don't think they really needed a new Siberia except if maybe you could expand the region all the way down

For this schema to be even marginally sustainable, Russia had to seriously get into the circumnavigation travels well ahead of the schedule (the 1st happened in 1803-06) and on a much greater scale than in OTL. Even then, a potential number of the settlers would be extremely limited. An alternative land route to the Pacific coast and then across the ocean would require a much better communication between European Russia and the Pacific coast: better roads, much earlier and much bigger Russian settlements in the Eastern Siberia and on the Pacific coast. Well, and some valid reason for the people who are neither merchants nor hunters to sail across the ocean to nowhere.

 

[alexmilman]

113. Inside and outside the capital

“King Solomon is called wise because having three hundred wives, he ignored all their advice.”
“After a week of hunger strike, the lion finally admitted that the zookeeper was the king of animals.”
“How is your self-esteem? - So-so. We are kings, a modest people.”
“Vanya, didn’t the king order to impale you!?! - Well, yes... I've already served the sentence.”
Jokes about the kings
​

Besides the annoying issue related to his own family, Alexey had to deal with a big problem inherited from his father.

Peter I issued a ukase (decree) on 10 December, 1719, known as Berg-privilege. Following German and Swedish models, he legalised the principles of free mining and of ius regale, i.e. royal prerogative to the entrails of the earth. Undertakers received the right to prospect ores and to mine in any territory on the condition that 1/32 of the returns was set aside for the landowner. According to Berg-privilege, one- tenth of the returns had to be sent to the state treasury as a mining tax. However, administration was never adjusted accordingly and no prin- ciples were laid down concerning how to measure the returns. But the government soon clarified the tax system. The Senate ukase of 1724 ordered that the treasury should have "from every hand-blast furnace first one kopeck and then another den'ga per pood pig iron". Ore prospectors, who had intensified their search since free mining was put into operation, met opposition from the landowners. Already in 1722 the government had to issue a ukase directed against such practices, but this also seemed to be ineffective. The principle of free mining was then abolished for the Siberian territories by the ukase of 26 September, 1727. Those who wanted to found mines and metallur- gical works in Siberia on territories belonging to private landowners had to reach agreements with them. The principle of free mining for all Russian territories was taken up again by the Bergregulation of 1735 and proved to be just as problematic as before.
A new manifesto of 1740 proclaimed the right of the landowner not only to the earth sur- face but also to its entrails. With free mining abolished, the manifesto guaranteed manufacturers freedom from a mining administration that meddled in their affairs. It was declared that anyone was free to set up a mining industiy on his own land, to cede his rights to any other person or jointly build works on his own land. As a landowner, the state held the same rights. The right for anyone to exploit ore deposits found on state lands was abolished. Henceforward, the state could work such depos its under its own management or lease them on conditions which were not codified by law but were elaborated specifically for each case. Finally, the state acquired the possibility to establish rules according to which exploitation of entrails of state land could be given to entrepreneurs under conditions advantageous to the state treasury.

The abandoned principle of Peter I, i.e. that mining should be free, was, in fact, a logical outcome of his policy to encourage the mining industry, namely to favour big capital instead of capital in general. Already in the first quarter of the 18th century the small metallurgical industry in the Urals was attacked. In 1717, a ukase of the Siberian governor was issued which prohibited (punishable by death) "foreign people" from melting ore. In 1723, this ban was confirmed by the mining authorities. Small hand-blast furnaces and primitive copper furnaces were demolished in the Urals or subordinated to the administration of the mining districts.

As a result of the manifesto of 1740 [1], the main question of the new mining policy of the Russian empire where nine-tenths of the territories belonged to the state treasury was not the problem of abuse by landowners but how to reläte the rights of the government to the rights of the owners of works built on state land.

The answer was to create two ownership models for the private works:

• Possessionnye - for those who had some kind of an allowance (e.g. to work power, land, mines). The owners had certain restrictions on their activities. They could not make independent decisions on extending, decreasing or shutting down the works, nor could they freely command the labour force appointed to the works or transfer it from one works to another. Further, an owner subjected to this legal form had to use land and forests attached to his works. In the case of three years of inactivity, he was liable to lose his posessionnye rights. Nor had he the right to sell or to change any part of his estate. It could only be sold as a whole. Owners of posessionnye works began to pay 6 kopecks per pood of smelted cast iron, as compared to 8 kopecks per pood payed by owners ofvladel'cheskiye works. These lands could be inherited, sold or transmitted to other persons, also on terms of posessionnye rights. However, ores of other metals found on these lands were, however, regarded to be the property of the state treasury. Neither could be state peasants transferred to these works.​
• Vladetelskie - on the patrimonial lands. Their owners had a complete freedom of the business transactions including a freedom of moving the workforce to and from their other estates.​

On the state-owned enterprises legal status of the workers was regulated: they were equal to the lowest military rank, the recruits, and after 35 years of compulsory service at an ironworks owned by the state treasury a workman could resign and had the right to a small pension.

The work-force of the private works at the beginning of the 18th century was mainly composed of "aliens"; peasants from villages under the state or private estates, with or without passports, escaping serfs, monastic peasants, traders, vagrants and people without relatives. In 1747, the private works of Ural employed more than 11,000 census souls. Among them, serfs who had belonged to the works from the start or who had been bought there låter formed, on average, no more than 27 %. The others came to the works by their own will.

Noblemen owning ironworks transported serfs from their landed estates to their works, teaching them handicrafts. Children of serf workmen also became workmen. Nobles had the right to purchase peasants for their works from other noblemen. The same right was obtained by non-noble owners through the ukase of 18 January 1721. Serfs purchased by non-noble owners were regarded by the law as an integral part of the works. In case the works was transferred to somebody else, these people could not be separated.

The system was creating two types of problems:

• The upsurge in märket conditions lured the court nobility into securing a large slice of the state-owned works. However, after a short time the major part of these works were returned to the state though in dysfunction and burdened with debts because their aristocratic owners did not have any experience and tended to just squeeze as much money as was possible as fast as possible and then return the ruined enterprise to the state which was going to pay off their debts. Figuring out this problem took some time (usually, fleecing the state was taking few years and it took time to find out that the “specific cases” actually represented a pattern) and dealing with it was not easy: after it was figured out that Alexey is going to reject the direct applications, they were channeled through the …er… “appropriate channels” with a need to establish a strong control over activities of the Berg Ministry, which was also easier said than done. Finally, a transfer of the state enterprises and mines had to be abolished altogether: they had to be auctioned. Which, of course, also was not an ideal solution but, at least, more or less excluded “getting something for nothing” applicants.
• The system of the huge mining districts (basically, latifundia) and strong government regulations was supporting the big enterprises (as Demidov’s “empire” on Ural and the big state-owned ironworks) but was killing a competition and introduction of the new technologies.

There was also a third, not quite related, problem. Iron production created by Peter was heavily export-oriented: in 1724, Peter I ordered that all state iron should be sold abroad. The largest consumer of the Russian iron exports, Britain, was interested in the bar and cast iron. As a result, the number #1 private enterprise on Ural, Demodov’s ironworks, also had been heavily oriented toward these types of production rather than on production of s high quality steel and the metal goods. Alexey way taking steps toward changing this pattern and by the mid-XVIII iron export grew approximately by a factor of three, whereas the domestic märket increased by a factor over seven. The transition from exporting to selling domestically pro- voked a necessary technical reconstruction. Since the home märket demanded more specialised iron products (for instance roofing iron) than bar iron, additional works had to be built and rolling and cutting milis and warming furnaces installed. In this area the new, smaller enterprises of the Siberia and Southern Russia proved to be much more flexible than the old mammonths.

Among other factors, metallurgy of Ural had been heavily based upon the charcoal which was making conversion of a cast iron into steel expensive and put limitations on its production (especially when the local forests had been depleted). In that sense the new enterprises of the Southern Russia had been much better off due to the huge deposits of a high quality coal found in the region. Both decline and raise were in their initial stages and for a while did not have a direct impact upon the export market: Bessemer technology was more than century away.

The coal of the Southern Russia also preserved the weapon manufactures of the Tula region from extinction: prior to its discovery it was ordered to close all metalworks in the radius of 100 versts from Moscow to avoid depletion of the forests. [2]


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[1] In OTL 1782
[2] In OTL they were closed for a while and then reopened but the damage was done.