317. How to spend money #1
“Где деньги, Зин?” [1]
V.Vysotsky, ‘ Dialog while watching TV’
“- Your Equality, we have no money.
- And what our Finance Ministry is busy with?
- They are counting the state debt: this is a full-time occupation.”
V. Bakhnov, ‘History of Ohohondia’
«Достойно, право, смеху! Свои же люди своему владыке Да денег не дают!» [2]
A.K. Tolstoy, ‘Death of Ivan the Terrible’
The Sino-Japanese War was over but there was a domino effect, which proved to be quite expensive for most of the major
non-participants. This was the first
truly modern naval war and most of the existing wisdom dated to the battle of Lissa went down the tubes:
- It was demonstrated that the main idea of Jeune École, fast unprotected ships with a powerful artillery is not effective: unarmored cruisers on both sides proved to be quite vulnerable and the huge guns on the Japanese cruisers were simply unusable in a battle.
- It was demonstrated that, while the properly armored battleships are almost invulnerable to the medium caliber artillery, their own main caliber artillery is effective only if the guns are having a long range and proper shells.
- It was demonstrated that the ships with the numerous exposed wooden parts are extremely vulnerable: two Chinese cruisers with this problem burned and there was a serious fire on the Japanese flagship, while the battleships, on which most of the wooden things had been removed, there were no fires.
- It was demonstrated that while formation “line ahead” (Japanese order of battle at Yalu) is tactically superior to the “line ahead”, putting unarmored or protected cruisers against the battleships is a bad idea.
- It was demonstrated that while the small mine boats can be useful, it is preferable to have bigger, “destroyer” class ships with at least 3” artillery.
- It was demonstrated that casemate placement of the medium- and small-caliber artillery is not very efficient and that general tendency to put on a ship as many of these guns as physically possible does not result in the obvious advantages, especially on the battleships.
- It became clear that a speed, as one of the important factors, can’t be neglected on the battleships.
Which meant that the countries with a big reliance upon a naval power have to reassess their naval doctrines and start building the brand new fleets: the cruisers lacking armor will be useful mostly for the “colonial” assignments where confrontation with the modern opponent is very unlikely. And because, with the growing number of the potential “contention” points over the globe, probability of the confrontation (with or without shooting) between the modern powers becomes quite significant, availability of the armored cruisers even in the remote colonial posts becomes important geopolitical factor. Even the countries with the modest naval & colonial ambitions will have to make serious changes because, as was just demonstrated, the obsolete navies can’t even guarantee a descent coastal defense.
So the brand new naval programs had been started all over the world, which meant that besides figuring out how these programs will look like, one had to figure out how to pay for them and where, when and how to implement them.
Britain. Out of the major European players, at least for a moment, Britain with its huge ship-building industry and a very big budget seemingly was in the best position but a proposal to spend annually £8,460,000 on the naval buildup caused cries of alarm and The First Lord of Admiralty had to assure the alarmists that a shortage of the available materials and labor makes it impossible to built at a faster rate than present operations and, anyway, it is unnecessary because “
Europe knows our strength.” [3]
To address the main caliber guns issue, the Armstrong Whitworth developed 12-inch naval gun of 40
calibres with the effective firing range of 14 km. Due to the budgetary considerations, the first guns of that type had been purchased by Japanese navy. On the
Majestic class battleships the RN had BL 12-inch Mark VIII naval guns of 35.43 calibers with the effective range 9.1 km.
The Royal Navy built a series of the battleships, which were characterised by a
main battery of four heavy guns—typically 12-inch (305 mm) guns—in two twin mounts, a
secondary armament that usually comprised 4.7-to-6-inch (120 to 150 mm) guns, and a high
freeboard allowing to operate on the high seas. One of the significant features was switch from the barbettes to the modern rotating turrets. The downsize was that, at least for a while the British Navy was using Harvey armor instead of a harder Krupp armor.
Germany.
In Germany
Kapitän zur See (captain at sea) Tirpitz became chief of the naval staff in 1892 and was made a
Konteradmiral (rear admiral) in 1895 and then was placed in charge of the
German East Asia Squadron in the
Far East with a promise of appointment as naval secretary at a suitable moment. The cruiser squadron operated from British facilities in
Hong Kong which were far from satisfactory as the German ships always took second place for available docks. He favored bay at
Kiautschou/Tsingtao and in 1896 murder of two German missionaries in China had been used as an excuse for getting into the bay, landing a force of 717 and occupying the fortification with no resistance from the Chinese garrison.
Immediately after this had been done and telegraph line restored, the German commanding officer, rear admiral Diederichs, was stunned to learn that his orders had been canceled, and that he was to suspend operations at Kiautschou pending negotiations with the Chinese government. If he had already occupied the village of Tsingtau, he was to consider his presence temporary. He responded, thinking the politicians in Berlin had lost their nerve to political or diplomatic complications: "Proclamation already published. ... Revocation not possible." After considerable time and uncertainty, the admiralty finally cabled congratulations and the proclamation to remain in effect; Wilhelm II promoted him to vice admiral. After negotiation with the Chinese government the German Empire retreated from outright cession of the area and accepted a leasehold of the bay for 99 years.
Wilhelm’s colonial dreams were coming true causing certain uneasiness in Britain. Tirpitz, who already became Naval Secretary, started preparing a series of the Naval Laws which were intended to strengthen the German Navy to such a degree that Britain could not destroy without imperiling itself and will be forced to negotiate on the equal terms.
Both Wilhelm and Tirpitz had been heavily influenced by Mahan’s ideas regarding controlling of the seas and neither of them bothered to question applicability of these ideas to the land-based countries. Well, if a land-based country considers colonial empire as its priority, then of course the whole theory may make
some sense. But how to combine ideology of the cruisers controlling the trade lines with ideology of the mighty fleets of the battleships deciding fate of the nations by confronting each other in a major battle? And how example of the Anglo-Dutch wars was applicable for Germany? Well,
everybody, was saying that the theory is cool so one just have to follow to be a Great Power. 😉 So, following “The Teaching”, Tirpitz was dismissing commerce raiding and coastal defense, and arguing that Germany must prepare for offensive sea battle to ensure its place in the world. The aim was to build a fleet that would be two thirds the size of the British navy: taking into an account that the British Navy was stretched all over the world, this would provide Germany with a relative parity in the Northern Sea and, if Russia and France are added to the equation (on German side), then the allies may have a numeric advantage.
However, there was a tiny problem: Reichstag funded four of the thirty-six cruisers that Wilhelm requested in 1895, and none at all the following two years. Only in 1898, after three years of an extensive lobbying and public relations campaign Reichstag funded the building of 19 battleships, 8 armoured cruisers, 12 large and 30 light cruisers to be completed by 1904.. This did not worry Britain too much because implementation of the plan still will keep Germany well behind. But this was only the first part of a plan: the idea was to have forty-five battleships and
armored cruisers but for this Wilhelm and Tirpitz will have to wait for the proper political situation.
France. Battleship development programs of other countries and experience of the last war finally brought defeat of the
Jeune École: France obviously needed something more formidable that the protected cruisers. The traditionalists won and pushed through the Statut Naval (Naval Law) of 1890 that projected a total force of twenty-eight battleships. Choosing, as usual, their own approach to addressing a problem. Instead of building a series, they were building unique experimental ships, all characterized by pronounced
tumblehome and a
lozenge arrangement of a mixed-caliber
main battery. All of them ended up being extremely tall, thanks to the tumblehome, and as a result not too stable.
Similarity to the medieval castles was not lost. 😉
Add to this a permanent bitching about the funds in the National Assembly, naval bureaucracy which (presumably as a matter of principle) makes everything as complicated as possible, and the unions which have both “attitude” and political clout and you got a picture. French Empire was slowly building a collection of the ships. On a positive side, the artillery was second to none and the Cane guns had been extremely popular.
Japan. After what was considered a humiliation by the foreign powers, Japan began to build up its military strength in preparation for future confrontations. Yamamoto Gonbe was assigned to compose a study of Japan's future naval needs. He believed that Japan should have sufficient naval strength to not only to deal with a single hypothetical enemy separately, but to also confront any fleet from two combined powers that might be dispatched against Japan from overseas waters. Most probably this would be one major power and one “secondary” power. Which ones, did not really matter (why to complicate the clear idea with the secondary details).
He therefore calculated that four battleships would be the main battle force that a major power could divert from their other naval commitments to use against Japan and he also added two more battleships that might be contributed to such a naval expedition by a lesser hostile power. In order to achieve victory Japan should have a force of six of the largest battleships supplemented by four armored cruisers of at least 7,000 tons. The centerpiece of this expansion was to be the acquisition of four new battleships in addition to the two which were already being completed in Britain being part of an earlier construction program. Battleships would be supplemented by lesser warships of various types, including cruisers that could seek out and pursue the enemy and a sufficient number of destroyers and torpedo boats capable of striking the enemy in home ports. As a result, the program also included the construction of twenty-three destroyers, sixty-three torpedo boats, and an expansion of Japanese shipyards and repair and training facilities.
In 1897 it was decided that expansion is needed but budgetary considerations would not allow to purchase more battleships and it was decided that purchasing of the armored cruisers with the new Harvey and KC armor, which could resist all but the largest
AP shells, and new fast-firing guns will allow to put them into a battle line. Subsequently, the revisions to the ten-year plan led to the four protected cruisers were replaced by additional two armored cruisers. As a consequence the "Six-Six Fleet" was born, with six battleships and six armored cruisers.
The program with the total cost being ¥280 million, was approved by the cabinet in late 1895 and funded by the Diet in early 1896. The funding would be partially covered by the war indemnity but most of the money were coming from public loans and existing government revenue. Most of the ships were to be built in British shipyards.
But, as often happens with the great plans, something important had been forgotten, namely the main prize of the last war, Port Arthur. The naval program was designed in anticipation of a war with at least one major power including a
possibility that such a power can be Russia. Of course, so far Russia was the only friendly western power but if one is trying to cover all possibility, confrontation can’t be excluded. And if it is brought into the picture, a need to defend Port Arthur from a land attack will become a top priority. Which meant that the existing fortifications are to be examined and, if necessary, upgraded. It was easily found (surprise, surprise) that while the coastal fortifications are in a reasonably good shape (except that their artillery was mostly outdated), the land side forts were either turned to rabble during the siege or were absolutely inadequate by their construction and placement leaving plenty of the dead zones and bringing the port within range of a modern heavy artillery. There was a need to build a new system of the forward-placed forts defending the peninsula.
The 1st proposal was placing the forts
within 4.5 km from the town’s outskirts. This would protect town from the bombardment but perimeter of the land defenses was going to be 70 km requiring up to 70,000 garrison and over 500 guns on the land side only. Understandably, this plan was not approved and more modest one was designed. Now the length of the perimeter was only 19 km. In addition to the main defensive line, consisting of forts and intermediate fortifications, batteries and redoubts, the project also provided for the encirclement of the old city and the eastern basin with a continuous central fence of temporary strongholds at the command posts and the broken lines linking them - cremallera, bastion and polygonal curtains. This project was required something like 11,000 troops to defend and it was approved. However, it was actually inadequate for defense because now some of the forts were within 2.5 and even 1.5km from the outskirts making town and the
port vulnerable to the bombardment. Even worse, due to the fact that most of the inner harbor was too shallow for anything bigger than destroyer, the battleships and cruisers would have to be crowded in the eastern part of the harbor within range of a siege artillery.
The reduction in the length of the defensive line of the fortress led to the fact that the mountain range and the Lyaoteshan Peninsula were not included in it on the seaside front, which would allow the enemy to sail to the western coast of this peninsula and bombard the port from a distance of 12 - 13 km. Besides these expenses, money have to be spend on infrastructures of Port-Arthur and Dalian and probably Dalian has to be (re-)fortified as well. Even this reduced project was going to require a lot of work and money and resources had been already stretched by the attempts to implement the naval program.
All these considerations should be bringing the obvious question: why to consider war with Russia? After all, it demonstrated a friendly attitude backing up Japan on Liaodong issue. But when the military planning is trusted to the professionals, the question “why does it make sense to condider?” rarely comes to a mind dedicated to a purely professional aspect of the issue, which looked a little bit bizarre: in a
theoretically possible conflict JIN was going to be pretty much irrelevant unless a considered opponent decides to stick out his neck for no obvious reason (unless the odds are too favorable to miss an opportunity). Breaking through Vladivostok’s coastal defenses is going to be a very expensive task for JIN and nothing would prevent the Russian Pacific squadron to sail North to its base on Alaska or Petropavlovsk while the cruisers will be operating on the Japanese supply lines having secure ports in too few locations to catch them. The main conflict is going to be on land, which means that priority of the expenses must be Liaodong fortifications or general army expenses not to allow the enemy to get to Liaodong.
OTOH, if this specific conflict is off the table, then the whole idea of the program ceases to make sense. The warships are going to be ordered in Britain …. to fight the RN? Germany and France have a relatively token presence in the region an so does the US. So Japan is building navy to fight against whom? Better not to ask yourself that type of the questions and hope that nobody else to ask them either. The honest answer would be: Japan needs a powerful navy by a single important reason: to be taken seriously by the outside world.
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[1] “Where I’m going to get money?” (husband to his wife)
[2] “It’s truly laughable: the subjects are not giving money to their sovereign!”
[3] In OTL - in 1900.