I'm always for any region in Africa successfully resisting colonization.
No GNW (or “Peter goes South”)
- Thread starter alexmilman
- Start date
Oh in that case the glows are off and Italy even if it will cost money will come back; better remember that even with the defeat at Adua it was more Italy deciding to cut the waste of money and men on an unpopular war than she don't really be able to come back and finish the Ethiopian (even because many realized the nightmare any serious pacification will have been). Still being chased off by Eritrea is a too big humiliation to simply accepting it and stay home.
Not considering that the war on Ethiopia was not only something wanted by the presidente del consiglio of the time Crispi to have his own short victorious war but was an expasion of a local conflict in Tigrai between Italy and a local noble that was a rival of Menelik that launched a series of raid in italian territory.
As far as this specific region is involved what is surprising to me is that it caused a significant interest of pretty much everyone possible. For what? There were very bellicose natives, terrible (for a white person) climate, a lot of sand and very few things worth stealing taking into an account that Sudan’s oil was not, yet, discovered. One can easily find out the natural resources of Sudan, Eritrea and Somali on wiki.
So what was it? Just the attempts to get anything you can claim as your colony, no matter at which cost and how useless? “Map-based strategy” favored by the foreign ministries? An idle hope to find out something valuable under the sand?
Strategic point if you want to expand commerce in Asia, as you need a coal station to supply your ships or the arabic penisula and it's always a good thing having a base near the Suez canal. Not considering that while you find that not smart, at the time if you want to be considered a great power you need to have colonies and unfortunely there was not much left when italy entered the game and yes a little inflated hope regarding what can be found in the horn of Africa.
Absence of British domination is quite interesting actually , I wonder will we actually see a different form of European colonialism in Africa (Berlin Conference was there to regulate European colonialism in Africa after all ) , given somewhat greater balance of power on the continent and French dominance in the continent i could see this taking different form .
Given that it was mentioned that France possibly wouldn't be to enthusiastic about conquering African inland territories and its existing indirect influence in countries like Egypt would it be possible to see principle of effective control largely exercised on the coastal areas and strategically important places while further inland is defined within primacy of spheres of influence, not requiring European military intervention and generally relying more on concessions, diplomatic primacy and seizure of important resources, plus trade primacy (but not exclusion of other powers in this particular case).
If this view is implemented I could see Russia being included with its primacy in Ethiopia.
I could even see countries like Russia, Sweden -Denmark/Norway , Austria that don't have direct interest in Africa (due to the lack of political will, or simply lack of power ) advocating for this. Benefit of this model would be that just like with Egypt Russia and other countries would have access to African market ( thus solving future market problem for Russia once its domestic market is satiated), this would also offset potential colonial rivalry for latecomers like Germany as they could still trade within other spheres of influence, maybe even temper Italian colonial adventures, while France and British wouldn't need to conquer large pieces of unimportant lands while still getting their hands on the resources.
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This would be very interesting as outside of some major areas like the Congo, southern Africa (and even then, most of the coast) and Somalia, Africa would develop far more naturally in terms of political expansion and country creation without any European powers drawing up artificial borders(mostly), since in what you're suggesting, a country like Britain would make much better profit from selling guns to two African kingdoms facing off against one another or selling it's products to a certain African country who's forced to produce something like tea or coffee because there's a demand for those in Britain that leaves them somewhat dependent on outside trade and easier to influence instead of having to just military occupy the territory, having to pacify tribes, explore the region and map everything, build the necessary infrastructure (especially for settler colonies like South Africa, Rhodesia and Kenya). Getting better money without having to actually settle so much boots in the continent
Ah that old painful neglect of regions once it's apart of the nation, pretty common across the world.
Though who knows maybe Italy could avoid losing a disturbing amount of it's human capital in this timeline.
This part is understandable but: (a) there is a big difference between getting a coaling port and getting a long stretch of a desert coast and (b) absolutely irrelevant when it comes to conquest of a landlocked territory like Sudan or Ethiopia.
I know about this “consideration”, just surprised how so many not stupid people got themselves sucked into this costly idiocy.
Yes, I was planning something along these lines on a somewhat optimistic assumption that after all capitalism is primary about profits and not a costly “prestige”. The obvious advantage for the “third parties” would be an absence of expenses related to the conquest and administration and the “owner” may be compensated by the reasonable import/export tariffs on a foreign trade and arrangements minimizing competition with “owner’s” own businesses.
But, OTOH, there were plenty of people of all kinds from politicians to the simple adventurers (with the military, writers, publishers, etc. in between) who had their own ideas and interests. And don’t forget that the “masses” like “glory”. Then we have the local “issues”. IIRC, Khediv Ismail was itching to make Egypt into a Great Power by conquering all the Nile territory, Ethiopia had claims to Eritrea, etc.
Well, I still wonder what the Brits lost in Khartum and why didn’t they left the Sudan adventure to be 100% Egyptian enterprise leaving to Ismail a complete freedom of getting a bloody nose. The colonial powers were, of course, interested in containment of the Mahdists but why to waste time and effort on the conquest? After all, for a colonial “master” it would be much more important to keep the local ruler financially solvent and capable of paying percentages on a debt which he would inevitably accumulate in a process of trying to be “civilized”.
ITTL South Africa is Dutch and perhaps the Dutch are going to expand to Rhodesia. But their pattern is different from most of the colonial expansions (except for Algeria?): it was mostly the farmers looking for more lands; no plantations and even a minimal exploitation of the natural resources.
But for the rest what you described would be mostly a continuation of the existing trade patterns with the slaves being replaced by other items. The difference would be in a need of a direct involvement to produce many of these “other items” because chances are that on their own the local tribes would not turn overnight into more or less centralized native states and in any case there would be a need in modern technology and infrastructure in one form or another. Meaningful concessions would be possible only within the reasonably stable kingdoms, which did not exist on a big part of the continent. OTOH, was there a real economic need (profit) in conquering the whole continent? As I understand, some of the British, French and German colonies were not profitable and even required subsidies. Again, it is my impression (and I may be wrong) that in more than one case the “explorers” (or whoever) were just hastily declaring territories for their states without bothering to stop and think about economic aspect of such an acquisition and the same goes for the high-level diplomatic arrangements like Berlin Conference (probably some meaningful thoughts were behind the claims but were there dominating?).
Honestly the idea of Egypt essentially fighting a even worst version of Vietnam in Sudan given the swamps, deserts and hills is interesting, because they either break their backs by conquering the place or wasting men and money but still giving up simply because it got too expensive, not to mention something like that might spook the Ethiopians in bringing Eritrea into the fold, especially as they are not so different and it was decades of Italian rule that set them apart enough, so without a strong Italian presence and much less British presence backing them up, a Eritrea who falls into Ethiopian control and gives them a much desired access to the sea is ideal
The loose ends #2
281. The loose ends #2
Sultan Abdülaziz spent most of his reign sincerely trying to “civilize” the Ottoman Empire. And he was showing an example. In 1867 he went on the European trip visiting the International Exhibition in Paris. Apart from France, he also visited Italy, Austria, Germany, Belgium and England and met with the rulers of these countries, who presented him with badges. This trip made quite a splash and the sultan gained attention with his character. In Britain he was made a Knight of the Garter by Queen Victoria and reviewed the Royal Navy, which quite impressed him.
One of the “stars” of that review was HMS Minotaur, a five masts armored broadside frigate with a single screw which was considered "an excellent sea-boat and a steady gun platform, but unhandy under steam and practically unmanageable under sail". The ships of her class were described as "the dullest performers under canvas of the whole masted fleet of their day, and no ships ever carried so much dress to so little purpose." It was supposed to be armed with the brand new Armstrong breechloading rifled guns but they proved to be a failure and the ship ended up with a mix of various muzzle-loading guns. Nonetheless, its …er… “battle score” was higher than ordinary:
Back in his empire Abdülaziz worked hard to make it modern while preserving a traditional culture.
The army was built based upon the Prussian model and trained by the Prussian instructors. The reorganized Turkish army consisted of the nizam, redif, mustakhfiz, irregular and Egyptian troops.
Nizam was a real-service troops. According to the staffing table, it numbered 210,000 people, of whom 60,000 after 4-5 years, 1-2 years before the expiration of their full service term, were retired on leave; these contingents of vacation in case of war were intended to replenish the nizam. The total service term in nizam was six years old. Nizam contained a certain number of infantry tabors (battalions), cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries.
Redif was intended to be trained reserve troops. By state, there were 190,000 people in it by the beginning of the war. The redif was divided into two (later into three) classes; the first for three years consisted of persons who had served 6 years of service in Nizam as well as persons aged 20 to 29 years who for any reason did not serve in the lower class; persons who had served 3 years in the first grade were transferred to the second class. In peacetime, the redife maintained only minimal personnel, but stockpiles of small arms and uniforms (but no artillery or horses) by law had to be available at full strength during the deployment period. In wartime, it was envisaged to form a certain number of tabors, squadrons and batteries from a redif, separately from nizam.
Mustahfiz was a militia. According to the state, it numbered 300,000 people; the mustakhphysis was formed from among the persons enrolled there for eight years after the end of their stay in the redif. It did not have any assigned uniforms or weapons but in the case of war was expected to somehow form all classes of the military units.
The total period of stay in Nizam, Redif and Mustakhphysis was 20 years. In 1878, all three categories were to give 700,000 troops to Turkey. Of course, these were just the paper numbers. From the annual conscription of 37,500 people into nizam, a significant part of peoplev did not go there due to financial difficulties and were listed directly in the redif. Because of this, nizam had significantly fewer people in its ranks than it was expected, and the redif and mustakhiz were filled with people who did not have a military training at all. Additional problems were with redif’s cavalry and artillery because neither had the stored reserves.
Only 5-10 percent of Turkish infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among those who graduated from military schools (military, artillery, engineering, military medical), as schools produced very few officers. The rest of the infantry and cavalry officers were promoted from among non-commissioned officers, that is, who graduated only from the training school, in which even elementary literacy was optional.
The Turkish General Staff consisted of 130 officers who graduated from the Higher Military School. These officers were mostly impractical, as there were no headquarters in the Turkish army in the full sense of the word. Instead of systematic staff work, officers of the General Staff often acted as personal advisers to Pashas and carried out their separate assignments. Turkish pashas were mainly either foreign adventurers and crooks of all kinds, or court intriguers with minimal combat experience and military knowledge. There were very few persons with higher military education or even experienced front-line practitioners. However, there were some very talented generals among them.
The irregulars (bashibuzuks) had been formed from various tribes to be attached to the regular army. Their numbers were unknown and their “fame” was mostly related to the cruelty toward the civilians.
Egyptian army had 65,000 with 150 guns.
Regular infantry had been armed with 3 systems of the modern breechloading rifles:
Mustahfiz, part of the redif and irregular troops were armed mainly by muzzle-loading rifles and muskets of different systems. Egyptian troops were armed with a rifle of the breechloading American Remington system.
Field artillery had the early models of the breechloading 4- and 6-pounders and bronze 3-pounder mountain guns. Total 825 guns.
While the infantry, except for the Sultan’s Guards drilled by the Germans, was not very good in attack, it was very good in building the field fortifications and defending them.
The Navy was something of Sultan’s obsession and by the 1870’s he managed to assemble one of the biggest navies in the world. By 1875 it had 21 battleships and 173 other types of warships. They were built at the Istanbul, Izmit, Gemlik and Mudanya Shipyards as well as at shipyards abroad. In 1864, the Naval War College was founded in Kasimpasa, Istanbul, for the purpose of educating officers to deal with command and staff duties.
Below are some of its ironclads by the mid-1870s.
4 Britain-built Osmaniye class ironclads - they were broadside ironclads, carrying a battery of fourteen 203 mm (8 in) Armstrong guns and ten 36-pounder Armstrong guns in a bank of guns on each broadside
Asar-i Şevket (Ottoman Turkish: Work of God) was a central battery ship with a ram built by the French. It was armed with a battery of one 229 mm (9 in) muzzle loading Armstrong gun and four 178 mm (7 in) Armstrong guns. The 178 mm guns were mounted in a central, armored battery, with the 229 mm gun on top in an open barbette mount.
2 Feth-i Bülend class (1st one built in Britain ad 2nd built in OE in 1) armed with a battery of four 222 mm (8.7 in) muzzle-loading Armstrong guns mounted in a central, armored casemate, two guns per side. The guns were positioned so as to allow any two to fire directly ahead, astern, or to either broadside.
Iclaliye ("Glorious") - an ironclad built by the Austrian shipyard Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino. Its armament consisted of two 228 mm (9 in) Armstrong guns and three 178 mm (7 in) Armstrong guns.
2 Avnillah-class Btish-built casemate ships armed with a battery of four 228 mm (9 in) guns in a central casemate.
Asar-i Tevfik (Ottoman Turkish: God's Favor) - a barbette ship armed with a main battery of eight 220-millimeter (8.7 in) guns in a central battery.
Mesudiye (Ottoman Turkish: Happiness) was a central-battery ironclad built in Britain - her primary armament consisted of twelve 10-inch (250 mm) guns in a central armored battery.
Most of these ships had been built in the 1860s and by mid-1870s they were definitely not the most modern ones and in a need of the repairs but they already cost a lot and the Ottoman finances were not very good shape to put it mildly. There were also 2 sea-going turreted monitors built in France in 1870 and few smaller modern ships (like turreted armored corvette). In December 1874, the 6,600-ton battleship Gamidiye was laid in Constantinople. But then it turned out that the Turkish industry could not cope with the construction of large modern ships. For almost ten years, the battleship stood on the slipway and was launched only in February 1885.
Back to main subject…
The ongoing problems had been routinely handled by the Sultan’s capable viziers but after the death of the last of them, Ali Pasha, in 1871, Abdulaziz thought of personally governing the state (a serious case of confident misconception because this task was clearly well above and beyond his abilities) , wanted to change the law on succession to the throne in favor of his son Yusuf Izzeddin and increase his own treasury to a huge amount at the expense of the state. He tried to appropriate all the state revenues. In 1873, ceding almost all the rights of an independent sovereign to the hediva of Egypt for 21 million francs, he still left soldiers and officials without pay. When everything began to decline and Herzegovina rebelled (August 1875), he ordered to reduce the payment of interest on public debts by half, thereby undermining confidence in the state. The second stage of Tanzimat's reforms carried out during the reign of Abdulaziz did not bring the Ottoman Empire out of the social and political crisis. Rising prices, privileges of foreign entrepreneurs, increased foreign policy dependence of the Porte increased dissatisfaction with the Abdulaziz government. By the end of his rule, a significant part of the liberal bureaucracy had defected to the opposition side.
Drought in 1873 and floods in 1874 had produced widespread discontent and even famine among the Ottoman peasantry, who already were disturbed by the increased burdens of a landholding system that had spread in the Balkans in the 19th century and by increased taxation and greater liability to conscription resulting from the 1869 military reorganization. A naval buildup, which was seemingly going well beyond country’s real need, cost huge money and resulted in most of these ships staying in the ports and visibly deteriorating without ever been used contributed to the general situation and so were the lavish palaces the Sultan was fond of building.
The burden of taxation had been aggravated by the Ottoman debt burden. The first Ottoman foreign loan was in 1854; by 1875 the nominal public debt was £200 million, with annual interest and amortization payments of £12 million, more than half of the national revenue. The Ottomans could meet only about half of their annual obligation, however, because a world financial crisis in 1873 had made new credit difficult to obtain.
One thing led to another and Abdulaziz was deposed by his ministers on 30 May 1876 and few days later committed suicide (or was killed). He was replaced by Murad V who within few months went mad (which rather easy to understand taking into an account the ongoing mess) and was replaced by Abdul Hamid II.
Even before Abdulaziz’ deposition, the Balkan discontent was fanned by nationalist agitation supported by Serbia (Ottoman vassal state) and by émigré Slav organizations. It culminated in uprisings largely of Christian peasants against Muslim lords in Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 1875) and in Bulgaria (August 1876). Abdulaziz agreed to reforms proposed by Hungarian government but the rebels, suspecting they might win their independence, continued their uprising, joined by militants in Serbia and Bulgaria. Ottoman efforts to suppress the uprisings led to war with Serbia and Montenegro (July 1876).
The cruelty with which these uprisings had been suppressed became known outside the OE and produced “mass protests” in Europe and even the US. Of course, with the exception of Hungary and Austria, majority of a population in each of these countries would be hard pressed to point the Balkans on a map and, even under the fear of execution, would not be able to explain the meaning of “vilayet” and actually did not give a damn about the whole issue so the loudest voices had been coming from the “educated mass”. Needless to say that majority that “mass” also did not know enough of the situation to maintain 5 minutes worth of a meaningful talk but this was not necessary: the “spiritual leaders” in each specific country were smart enough to provide them with the sets of easy to memorize cliches in which they could communicate with each other and which they could use against the unlikely (nobody could seriously justify the atrocities) ideological opposition.
At that point the leading European governments were expected to do something on behalf of the fellow Christians but, surprisingly or not, their reaction was far from being uniform or even encouraging.
The Great and not too Great Powers took their time to prepare an explicit document containing a number of the great ideas of how the OE must function. The Ottoman representative pointed out that OE just adopted a new constitution, which already addressed some of the concerns. This remark had been ignored and in the subsequent conference's plenary sessions, the Ottoman Empire submitted objections and alternative reform proposals that were rejected by the Great Powers, and attempts to bridge the gap did not succeed. Eventually, on 18 January 1877 Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha announced the definitive refusal of the Ottoman Empire to accept the conference decisions. After which everybody decided that their mission was accomplished and left ( except for the consuls and ambassadors stationed in Constantinople) with a feeling of time well-spent.
_______
[1] Just as my own addition to this theory. How about them just forming a “mass” (or “crowd”) of their own that is also easy to manipulate? Of course, this “mass” may manipulate the bigger “mass” or at least have illusions on that account. Or, in the case of a “charismatic leader” (like Atilla, Genghis Khan, Peter I, Nappy or Shaka Zulu), both “masses” are being manipulated. Anyway, an idea that the upper classes possess mental superiority making them immune from the herd mentality seems to be too “elitist” to me. It is just that their herds are smaller.
[2] Professor at the Institute of Psychology at Budapest University. Studied various forms of what passes for “foolish behavior”.
[3] In a retrospect and as far as preservation of the regime goes this was not necessarily a very good idea.
[4] Now, this was clearly not a very good idea.
[5] Just quoting from https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/portrait/mighty-sovereigns-of-ottoman-throne-sultan-abdulaziz
[6] He and his Chief of Security had the flat flasks with cognac which could be easily hidden in their high boots so when the Empress was not around….
“Only the accumulation of stupidity, not intelligence, can occur in the crowd”
G. Lebon
“The masses are formed mainly from representatives of the lower and part of the middle strata of the population close to the lower ones. Representatives of the higher and close middle layers prefer to be outside the masses.” [1]
A.Zinoviev
“When an innovation is too difficult to implement, it is a sign that it is not necessary.”
Luc de Clapier de Vauvenargue
“Any reform is already harmful in its essence. What does the reform mean? The reform includes two actions: 1) the abolition of the old one and 2) a decision in place of something new. Which of these actions is harmful? Both are the same.”
A.Ostrovsky
“Confident misconception, the highest level of stupidity: a person's assessment of his ability to do something greatly exceeds his real abilities….Inability to resist: a person acts stupidly because at some point he loses the ability to behave differently… Dispersion or lack of experience. A person commits a clearly unreasonable act for one of two reasons: he is either inattentive or simply does not understand what he is doing.
Balazs Aczel [2]
“Colonies do not cease to be colonies because they are independent.”
“In politics nothing is contemptible.”
“The very phrase 'foreign affairs' makes an Englishman convinced that I am about to treat of subjects with which he has no concern.”
Benjamin Disraeli
The Ottoman Empire.G. Lebon
“The masses are formed mainly from representatives of the lower and part of the middle strata of the population close to the lower ones. Representatives of the higher and close middle layers prefer to be outside the masses.” [1]
A.Zinoviev
“When an innovation is too difficult to implement, it is a sign that it is not necessary.”
Luc de Clapier de Vauvenargue
“Any reform is already harmful in its essence. What does the reform mean? The reform includes two actions: 1) the abolition of the old one and 2) a decision in place of something new. Which of these actions is harmful? Both are the same.”
A.Ostrovsky
“Confident misconception, the highest level of stupidity: a person's assessment of his ability to do something greatly exceeds his real abilities….Inability to resist: a person acts stupidly because at some point he loses the ability to behave differently… Dispersion or lack of experience. A person commits a clearly unreasonable act for one of two reasons: he is either inattentive or simply does not understand what he is doing.
Balazs Aczel [2]
“Colonies do not cease to be colonies because they are independent.”
“In politics nothing is contemptible.”
“The very phrase 'foreign affairs' makes an Englishman convinced that I am about to treat of subjects with which he has no concern.”
Benjamin Disraeli
Sultan Abdülaziz spent most of his reign sincerely trying to “civilize” the Ottoman Empire. And he was showing an example. In 1867 he went on the European trip visiting the International Exhibition in Paris. Apart from France, he also visited Italy, Austria, Germany, Belgium and England and met with the rulers of these countries, who presented him with badges. This trip made quite a splash and the sultan gained attention with his character. In Britain he was made a Knight of the Garter by Queen Victoria and reviewed the Royal Navy, which quite impressed him.
One of the “stars” of that review was HMS Minotaur, a five masts armored broadside frigate with a single screw which was considered "an excellent sea-boat and a steady gun platform, but unhandy under steam and practically unmanageable under sail". The ships of her class were described as "the dullest performers under canvas of the whole masted fleet of their day, and no ships ever carried so much dress to so little purpose." It was supposed to be armed with the brand new Armstrong breechloading rifled guns but they proved to be a failure and the ship ended up with a mix of various muzzle-loading guns. Nonetheless, its …er… “battle score” was higher than ordinary:
- In 1872 the ship rammed the ironclad HMS Bellerophon as they were leaving Belfast Lough. Minotaur lost her bowsprit and fore topgallant mast, but Bellerophon only suffered some minor flooding. A relatively minor damage to the rammed ship can be excused by a lack of experience: next time Minotaur did noticeably better.
- On 24 December 1886, she collided with HMS Monarch in the Tagus, severely damaging HMS Monarch.
Back in his empire Abdülaziz worked hard to make it modern while preserving a traditional culture.
- The vilayet and the court organization were arranged according to the example of France.
- The administration and the courthouse were separated from each other, and two high councils were established according to the Conseil d'Etat (the Council of State) and Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) model in 1868.
- The first act of codification of the provisions of Shariah law in the history of Islam took place in the time of Sultan Abdülaziz. In response to those who wanted to apply French civil law, a legislative committee under the leadership of Cevdet Pasha prepared a civil code called “Mecelle-i Ahkam-ı Adliyye” in 1869.
- Schools were established to train civil servants in 1862. Galatasaray High School was opened in 1868 according to the French model to train high-level bureaucrats. A modern university started its activities in 1870.
- The number of newspapers increased. Literature was revived. Ideas such as Turkism, Islamism and democracy began to be discussed in this period. [3]
- During his reign, the length of the railway, which was 452 kilometers (281 miles) until then, tripled. One of the new railways was even passing through the Sultan’s own palace garden.
- New roads were built in Nis, Bosnia, Vidin, Samsun, Amasya and Kastamonu. The iron bridge between Karaköy and Eminönü was put into service. Horse trams were put into service.
- In 1863, The Ottoman Imperial Bank was established in partnership with the French and British. [4]
- The Bulgarians were given the right to leave the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and establish their own autocephalous churches in 1870.
- Non-Muslims started to develop economically and socially, forming the upper classes of the country and living by European standards. This was the beginning of some social problems in the future.[5]
The army was built based upon the Prussian model and trained by the Prussian instructors. The reorganized Turkish army consisted of the nizam, redif, mustakhfiz, irregular and Egyptian troops.
Nizam was a real-service troops. According to the staffing table, it numbered 210,000 people, of whom 60,000 after 4-5 years, 1-2 years before the expiration of their full service term, were retired on leave; these contingents of vacation in case of war were intended to replenish the nizam. The total service term in nizam was six years old. Nizam contained a certain number of infantry tabors (battalions), cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries.
Redif was intended to be trained reserve troops. By state, there were 190,000 people in it by the beginning of the war. The redif was divided into two (later into three) classes; the first for three years consisted of persons who had served 6 years of service in Nizam as well as persons aged 20 to 29 years who for any reason did not serve in the lower class; persons who had served 3 years in the first grade were transferred to the second class. In peacetime, the redife maintained only minimal personnel, but stockpiles of small arms and uniforms (but no artillery or horses) by law had to be available at full strength during the deployment period. In wartime, it was envisaged to form a certain number of tabors, squadrons and batteries from a redif, separately from nizam.
Mustahfiz was a militia. According to the state, it numbered 300,000 people; the mustakhphysis was formed from among the persons enrolled there for eight years after the end of their stay in the redif. It did not have any assigned uniforms or weapons but in the case of war was expected to somehow form all classes of the military units.
The total period of stay in Nizam, Redif and Mustakhphysis was 20 years. In 1878, all three categories were to give 700,000 troops to Turkey. Of course, these were just the paper numbers. From the annual conscription of 37,500 people into nizam, a significant part of peoplev did not go there due to financial difficulties and were listed directly in the redif. Because of this, nizam had significantly fewer people in its ranks than it was expected, and the redif and mustakhiz were filled with people who did not have a military training at all. Additional problems were with redif’s cavalry and artillery because neither had the stored reserves.
Only 5-10 percent of Turkish infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among those who graduated from military schools (military, artillery, engineering, military medical), as schools produced very few officers. The rest of the infantry and cavalry officers were promoted from among non-commissioned officers, that is, who graduated only from the training school, in which even elementary literacy was optional.
The Turkish General Staff consisted of 130 officers who graduated from the Higher Military School. These officers were mostly impractical, as there were no headquarters in the Turkish army in the full sense of the word. Instead of systematic staff work, officers of the General Staff often acted as personal advisers to Pashas and carried out their separate assignments. Turkish pashas were mainly either foreign adventurers and crooks of all kinds, or court intriguers with minimal combat experience and military knowledge. There were very few persons with higher military education or even experienced front-line practitioners. However, there were some very talented generals among them.
The irregulars (bashibuzuks) had been formed from various tribes to be attached to the regular army. Their numbers were unknown and their “fame” was mostly related to the cruelty toward the civilians.
Egyptian army had 65,000 with 150 guns.
Regular infantry had been armed with 3 systems of the modern breechloading rifles:
- Peabody Martini
- Snyder
- Winchester with 13-round magazine. Mostly used by the cavalry and bashibuzuks.
Mustahfiz, part of the redif and irregular troops were armed mainly by muzzle-loading rifles and muskets of different systems. Egyptian troops were armed with a rifle of the breechloading American Remington system.
Field artillery had the early models of the breechloading 4- and 6-pounders and bronze 3-pounder mountain guns. Total 825 guns.
While the infantry, except for the Sultan’s Guards drilled by the Germans, was not very good in attack, it was very good in building the field fortifications and defending them.
The Navy was something of Sultan’s obsession and by the 1870’s he managed to assemble one of the biggest navies in the world. By 1875 it had 21 battleships and 173 other types of warships. They were built at the Istanbul, Izmit, Gemlik and Mudanya Shipyards as well as at shipyards abroad. In 1864, the Naval War College was founded in Kasimpasa, Istanbul, for the purpose of educating officers to deal with command and staff duties.
Below are some of its ironclads by the mid-1870s.
4 Britain-built Osmaniye class ironclads - they were broadside ironclads, carrying a battery of fourteen 203 mm (8 in) Armstrong guns and ten 36-pounder Armstrong guns in a bank of guns on each broadside
Asar-i Şevket (Ottoman Turkish: Work of God) was a central battery ship with a ram built by the French. It was armed with a battery of one 229 mm (9 in) muzzle loading Armstrong gun and four 178 mm (7 in) Armstrong guns. The 178 mm guns were mounted in a central, armored battery, with the 229 mm gun on top in an open barbette mount.
2 Feth-i Bülend class (1st one built in Britain ad 2nd built in OE in 1) armed with a battery of four 222 mm (8.7 in) muzzle-loading Armstrong guns mounted in a central, armored casemate, two guns per side. The guns were positioned so as to allow any two to fire directly ahead, astern, or to either broadside.
Iclaliye ("Glorious") - an ironclad built by the Austrian shipyard Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino. Its armament consisted of two 228 mm (9 in) Armstrong guns and three 178 mm (7 in) Armstrong guns.
2 Avnillah-class Btish-built casemate ships armed with a battery of four 228 mm (9 in) guns in a central casemate.
Asar-i Tevfik (Ottoman Turkish: God's Favor) - a barbette ship armed with a main battery of eight 220-millimeter (8.7 in) guns in a central battery.
Mesudiye (Ottoman Turkish: Happiness) was a central-battery ironclad built in Britain - her primary armament consisted of twelve 10-inch (250 mm) guns in a central armored battery.
Most of these ships had been built in the 1860s and by mid-1870s they were definitely not the most modern ones and in a need of the repairs but they already cost a lot and the Ottoman finances were not very good shape to put it mildly. There were also 2 sea-going turreted monitors built in France in 1870 and few smaller modern ships (like turreted armored corvette). In December 1874, the 6,600-ton battleship Gamidiye was laid in Constantinople. But then it turned out that the Turkish industry could not cope with the construction of large modern ships. For almost ten years, the battleship stood on the slipway and was launched only in February 1885.
Back to main subject…
The ongoing problems had been routinely handled by the Sultan’s capable viziers but after the death of the last of them, Ali Pasha, in 1871, Abdulaziz thought of personally governing the state (a serious case of confident misconception because this task was clearly well above and beyond his abilities) , wanted to change the law on succession to the throne in favor of his son Yusuf Izzeddin and increase his own treasury to a huge amount at the expense of the state. He tried to appropriate all the state revenues. In 1873, ceding almost all the rights of an independent sovereign to the hediva of Egypt for 21 million francs, he still left soldiers and officials without pay. When everything began to decline and Herzegovina rebelled (August 1875), he ordered to reduce the payment of interest on public debts by half, thereby undermining confidence in the state. The second stage of Tanzimat's reforms carried out during the reign of Abdulaziz did not bring the Ottoman Empire out of the social and political crisis. Rising prices, privileges of foreign entrepreneurs, increased foreign policy dependence of the Porte increased dissatisfaction with the Abdulaziz government. By the end of his rule, a significant part of the liberal bureaucracy had defected to the opposition side.
Drought in 1873 and floods in 1874 had produced widespread discontent and even famine among the Ottoman peasantry, who already were disturbed by the increased burdens of a landholding system that had spread in the Balkans in the 19th century and by increased taxation and greater liability to conscription resulting from the 1869 military reorganization. A naval buildup, which was seemingly going well beyond country’s real need, cost huge money and resulted in most of these ships staying in the ports and visibly deteriorating without ever been used contributed to the general situation and so were the lavish palaces the Sultan was fond of building.
The burden of taxation had been aggravated by the Ottoman debt burden. The first Ottoman foreign loan was in 1854; by 1875 the nominal public debt was £200 million, with annual interest and amortization payments of £12 million, more than half of the national revenue. The Ottomans could meet only about half of their annual obligation, however, because a world financial crisis in 1873 had made new credit difficult to obtain.
One thing led to another and Abdulaziz was deposed by his ministers on 30 May 1876 and few days later committed suicide (or was killed). He was replaced by Murad V who within few months went mad (which rather easy to understand taking into an account the ongoing mess) and was replaced by Abdul Hamid II.
Even before Abdulaziz’ deposition, the Balkan discontent was fanned by nationalist agitation supported by Serbia (Ottoman vassal state) and by émigré Slav organizations. It culminated in uprisings largely of Christian peasants against Muslim lords in Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 1875) and in Bulgaria (August 1876). Abdulaziz agreed to reforms proposed by Hungarian government but the rebels, suspecting they might win their independence, continued their uprising, joined by militants in Serbia and Bulgaria. Ottoman efforts to suppress the uprisings led to war with Serbia and Montenegro (July 1876).
The cruelty with which these uprisings had been suppressed became known outside the OE and produced “mass protests” in Europe and even the US. Of course, with the exception of Hungary and Austria, majority of a population in each of these countries would be hard pressed to point the Balkans on a map and, even under the fear of execution, would not be able to explain the meaning of “vilayet” and actually did not give a damn about the whole issue so the loudest voices had been coming from the “educated mass”. Needless to say that majority that “mass” also did not know enough of the situation to maintain 5 minutes worth of a meaningful talk but this was not necessary: the “spiritual leaders” in each specific country were smart enough to provide them with the sets of easy to memorize cliches in which they could communicate with each other and which they could use against the unlikely (nobody could seriously justify the atrocities) ideological opposition.
At that point the leading European governments were expected to do something on behalf of the fellow Christians but, surprisingly or not, their reaction was far from being uniform or even encouraging.
- Britain Disraeli and Derby stated in Parliament that the rumors about the Turkish atrocities are “coffee-house babble”. Of course, Gladstone wrote a pamphlet arguing that the Turks should be deprived of Bulgaria because of what they had done there but he was a political had been and Disraeli did not have any intention to get Britain involved in a war against the Ottomans. Of course, something had to be done and he wrote to Lord Salisbury: “Had it not been for these unhappy 'atrocities', we should have settled a peace very honourable to England and satisfactory to Europe. Now we are obliged to work from a new point of departure, and dictate to Turkey, who has forfeited all sympathy.” In translation to the human language this meant “arrange to some meaningless conference which would allow us a little bit of a moral grandstanding.”
- Austria FJI would like to get Bosnia and Herzegovina but he was in a situation “of course, he would grab it but who would let him?”.
- Germany Bismarck could not simply ignore the situation but did not have any intention to get Germany involved in any meaningful way.
- Russia The Slavophiles of all shapes had been bemoaning about sufferings of the Slavic Brethren and demanding liberation of all Slavs and march on Constantinople (with the goal of putting the cross back on a dome of St. Sophia) but AIII intensively disliked to be told what he has to do (the only exception was for his wife telling him to stop drinking; he did not like this either but pretended to obey [6]), especially when it was leading to breaking his proclaimed policy of peace and non-intervention and, on the top of it, being against Russian traditional and close ally. Not to mention that the whole pan-Slavic agenda looked as a dangerous stupidity (if not something worse) leading to the destruction of the European balance. The state-controlled part of the press began publishing mocking articles offering to open fundraising to buy one way railroad tickets to the most prominent figures in Slavophilic camp so that they can travel to the Balkans and fight for their proclaimed ideals. Officially, Russian Foreign Ministry expressed willingness to participate in the international conference but without any commitment to anything else. Count Ignatiev, Ambassador in Constantinople, will attend.
- France Emperor Charles also had no intention to go into a war that had nothing to do with the French national interests but a conference looked as a good PR.
- Hungary King Szilard I put troops on the border to prevent any communication between his and Ottoman Serbs and, just in case, the same was going for Wallachian-Transylvanian border. The last thing he wanted was stronger Ottoman Serbia because his Serbs could start getting the wrong ideas. So far, Walachia was quiet but you never know. So let’s talk and in a meantime the Ottomans will handle the situation.
- Italy We want to be relevant!
- US - conference is fine: our Consul General in Constantinople will participate and it’ll not cost us a dime.
The Great and not too Great Powers took their time to prepare an explicit document containing a number of the great ideas of how the OE must function. The Ottoman representative pointed out that OE just adopted a new constitution, which already addressed some of the concerns. This remark had been ignored and in the subsequent conference's plenary sessions, the Ottoman Empire submitted objections and alternative reform proposals that were rejected by the Great Powers, and attempts to bridge the gap did not succeed. Eventually, on 18 January 1877 Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha announced the definitive refusal of the Ottoman Empire to accept the conference decisions. After which everybody decided that their mission was accomplished and left ( except for the consuls and ambassadors stationed in Constantinople) with a feeling of time well-spent.
_______
[1] Just as my own addition to this theory. How about them just forming a “mass” (or “crowd”) of their own that is also easy to manipulate? Of course, this “mass” may manipulate the bigger “mass” or at least have illusions on that account. Or, in the case of a “charismatic leader” (like Atilla, Genghis Khan, Peter I, Nappy or Shaka Zulu), both “masses” are being manipulated. Anyway, an idea that the upper classes possess mental superiority making them immune from the herd mentality seems to be too “elitist” to me. It is just that their herds are smaller.
[2] Professor at the Institute of Psychology at Budapest University. Studied various forms of what passes for “foolish behavior”.
[3] In a retrospect and as far as preservation of the regime goes this was not necessarily a very good idea.
[4] Now, this was clearly not a very good idea.
[5] Just quoting from https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/portrait/mighty-sovereigns-of-ottoman-throne-sultan-abdulaziz
[6] He and his Chief of Security had the flat flasks with cognac which could be easily hidden in their high boots so when the Empress was not around….
Loose ends #3
282. Loose ends #3
By the late 1870s, France owned 50.3% of the funds of various commercial enterprises, as well as 53.1% of the external Egyptian debt (1,250 thousand francs of the total value of 2,352,500 fr. ). In fact, it controlled 53.6% of the entire Egyptian economy.[1]
Ismāʿīl, the second son of Ibrahim Pasha, was born in 1830. He studied in Paris and undertook various diplomatic missions in Europe before becoming viceroy in 1863. Quite understandably, he wanted to be considered “civilized” and, by extension, this applied to Egypt. Within the reasonable limits. In 1867 he obtained from the Ottoman sultan the hereditary title of khedive. In 1869 he turned the celebration of the Suez Canal opening into a magnificent display of khedival splendour. One of the most significant of Ismāʿīl’s innovations was the establishment of an assembly of delegates in November 1866. Although this body served only in an advisory capacity, its members eventually came to have an important influence on the course of governmental affairs. Village headmen dominated the assembly and came to exert increasing political and economic influence over the countryside and the central government. Of course, being a “reformer” did not automatically mean that he had a clue how to manage finances and economy in general.
A short period of the cotton bonanza was over and after the dust on the other side of the Atlantic settled, price of the cotton went down and so did the influx of mooney. The manufactures created by Muhammed Ali were seriously handicapped by an absence of the domestic deposits of coal and mostly relied on the water power or horse-driven systems. An alternative was to buy coal abroad, which required money. Of course, maintaining strong protectionist policies of his grandfather would help to preserve at least some of the local manufacturing base but this would not be progressive and he sucked up to the free trade mantra which, to his surprise, put most of Egypt’s manufacturing base (predominantly state-owned) out of business with the resulting loss of his income.
However, he managed, with the French help, to create Egypt’s sugar industry.
“The Khedive, being the owner of vast estates comprising almost one fifth of the cultivable area of Egypt, and wishing to increase the cultivation of sugar cane while avoiding the risks that always arise with monoculture, wanted to establish on part of his vast properties a gigantic sugar production encompassing 487,467 feddans, of which 315,548 feddans in Middle and Upper Egypt were more or less suitable for this kind of plantation. Sixteen factories, placed at regular intervals along the Nile from south of Asyut down to the Delta, complemented the agricultural exploitation proper. Set up by the two companies Cail and Fives-Lille in an admirable manner, each cost several million francs; they would become the best support of a rich agriculture. Some, unfortunately, could not function and were abandoned shortly after their inauguration.”
Khedive Ismail’s scheme to develop the cultivation and processing of sugar cane in Egypt can be briefly outlined as follows: the end of the American Civil War in 1865 spelled the end of the cotton boom for Egypt. In order to diversify the country’s cotton-based cash crop economy and to develop alternative sources of income, Ismail Pasha decided to devote vast tracts of agricultural land he owned personally in Middle and Upper Egypt to the cultivation of sugar cane. This respective land, administered by the Daira Saniyya (the central administration of the khedivial properties and estates), covered an impressive area of 315,548 feddans (132,556.35 hectares) according to Mazuel.17 As sugar cane requires crushing and processing within hours of the harvest, it was recommended to have processing facilities available in the vicinity of the fields. One essential component of the project, therefore, was the construction of a sufficient number of sugar factories for cane crushing, raw-sugar production, and refinement in the vicinity of the respective Daira Saniyya lands along the Nile between Biba and Armant, and further west in the Fayyum Oasis.
Simultaneously, between 1867 and 1873, the Ibrahimiyya Canal was dug: an irrigation canal running 256 kilometres along the western bank of the Nile, starting at Asyut in Middle Egypt and ending at Ashmant south of Cairo. The canal was complemented by networks of smaller canals for the irrigation of the fields. Besides irrigation, transport facilities were vital for Ismail’s sugar project. With the main purpose of serving the sugar factories, a railway line was built from Cairo (more exactly, Bulaq al-Dakrur on the Giza side of the Nile) southward along the Nile to Asyut, running for the most part on the eastern bank of the Ibrahimiyya Canal, and complemented by a westbound branch-line into the Fayyum, branching off at Wasita. As a result, Egypt’s railway network was extended into the regions south of Cairo for the first time; so far, since the construction of the first railway line from Alexandria to Cairo in 1854–1856, railway construction had focussed on the Delta regions.19 To complete the transport infrastructure, an extensive network of agricultural light railway including wagons and steam engines was set up, in order to transport the cane directly from the fields to the nearby factories. Eventually, by 1878, the Daira Saniyya was described as having about 340,000 acres of land, 15 sugar factories, 250 kilometres of railway, 50 locomotives and 1,500 wagons.
The cotton proved to be a mixed blessing: Muhammed Ali enforced its cultivation in the Northern Egypt to provide a convenient transportation. Unfortunately, this was a traditional wheat-growing area and Egypt turned from being the food exporter to food consumer. Egypt was increasingly relying upon the grain imports from the OE and Russia.
Ismāʿīl created was stimulating commercial progress, inviting huge numbers of foreigners (over one hundred thousand Europeans came to work in Cairo alone) and built a railroad which made Egypt having most railways per habitable kilometer than any nation in the world. He was planning a railroad all the way to Sudan and further.
His personal train was rather fancy.
It is an open question how much profit he was getting out of all these activities.
Hereditary Khedive title came at a cost of increased tribute, giving Sultan a part of the Egyptian navy and participation in subduing uprising on the Crete. Ismail spent heavily—some went to bribes to Constantinople to facilitate his reform projects. Much of the money went for the construction of the Suez Canal. About £46 million went to construct 8,000 miles (13,000 km) of irrigation canals to help modernize agriculture. He built over 900 miles (1,400 km) railroads, 5,000 miles (8,000 km) of telegraph lines, 400 bridges, harbor works in Alexandria, and 4,500 schools. Education reform increased the education budget more than tenfold.
He kept building palaces, lavishly entertained all types of the visiting celebrities, founded national library and maintained opera and theater.
On the top of all of the above, he decided to make Egypt a true Great Power by expanding his possessions all the way up to the sources of the Nile [2]. He started with annexing Darfur but after this got into big trouble in Ethiopia. It seems that he got there as a result of rather fantastic rumors about the rich soil and a lot of easily available valuable natural resources. In 1865 the Ottoman Sublime Porte ceded the Ottoman Province of Habesh (with Massawa and Suakin at the Red Sea as the main cities of that province) to Ismail. This province, which neighboured Ethiopia, first consisted of a coastal strip only but expanded subsequently inland into territory controlled by the Ethiopian ruler. New economically promising projects, like huge cotton plantations in the Barka delta, were started. In 1872 Bogos (with the city of Keren) was annexed by the governor of the new "Province of Eastern Sudan and the Red Sea Coast", Werner Munzinger Pasha [3].
Yohannes IV became the emperor of Ethiopia in 1872 after defeating Tekle Giyorgis II in battle. He worked on modernizing his army, some of whom were trained by the British adventurer John Kirkham.
The Egyptians invaded from their coastal possessions in what is now Eritrea. The armies of Yohannes and Isma'il met at Gundat on the morning of 16 November 1875. The Egyptians were vastly outnumbered and their forces were completely destroyed.
“On 14 November, Alula crossed the Mereb river and immediately engaged forward Egyptian posts. The main Ethiopian army under the emperor (Yohannis IV) crossed the river on the night of 15-16 November. Meanwhile, Shalaqa Alula had disengaged his forces; he had completed a flanking action from the west against troops advancing from Addi Quala; and had appeared in the Egyptian rear, blocking their line of retreat.
On the morning of 16 November 1875, the Egyptians found themselves surrounded in a steep valley, and the battle soon turned into a massacre from which only a few of the 3,000 Egyptians managed to escape. Two thousand two hundred Remington rifles and sixteen cannons were captured by the Ethiopians, who lost some 550 dead and 400 wounded. Among the latter of whom was Alula’s brother Basha Tessema, whose wound remained unhealed for a long period.”
The Egyptians tried again to invade from the north, but were again defeated at the battle of Gura in March 1876.
After the defeat at Gundet, the Egyptians sent a much larger, well-armed force to attempt a second invasion. This army moved to Gura plain, and made two forts there: "Gura" fort and "Khaya Khor" fort. Gura fort was garrisoned by 7,500 men led by Rateb Pasha and ex Confederate general William Wing Loring and Khaya Khor fort was garrisoned by 5,500 men led by Uthman Rifqi. Yohannes soon arrived in the area with a huge army of over 50,000 men mobilized from the provinces of Tigray, Gondar and Hamasien. Taking advantage of the lack of Egyptian reconnaissance, the Ethiopians positioned themselves on the Godolfelassie road, Yohannes could now strike Gura, Khaya Khor or Keren. Fearing an attack on the supply depots, Rateb Pasha decided to send 5,000 out of his 7,500 strong force to attack the Ethiopian army, believing that dug-in Egyptian forces were unbeatable by enemies who did not posses artillery, such as the Abyssinians. The 5,000 strong Egyptian infantry of Gura fort sortied out early on March 7th. On March 7th, the Egyptians that left the fort were attacked by the Ethiopians and surrounded. Most of the Ethiopians were armed with firearms, and although they had only one field-gun, it is said to have had no effect in deciding the action.
Rateb Pasha allowed his views to be overruled by Loring Pasha, who insisted on the ramps of the trenches which had been erected being razed, so that the artillery could have a clear zone of fire.[4] The gunners and infantry were enfiladed by the Ethiopians from higher ground, and the slaughter was so great that several regiments became completely demoralized. Out of the 5,000 Egyptians that sortied out only a few hundred managed to return to the fort.
Loring: “…Imagine 5,000 men who did not even know how to shoot, fighting over 50,000 savages who are at war all the time”
The Ethiopians followed up their success, and closely invested Fort Gura, which they attacked in force on the 8th and 9th of March. When Ratib Pasha had urged remaining with the Gura fortress, Loring had taunted him and called him a coward until he consented to meeting the Ethiopian host in the open valley. On March 10th, Rashid Pasha and Osman Bey Neghib led an attack on the Ethiopians which was repulsed with loss, and both officers were killed while leading their men. The Ethiopians then withdrew to loot the dead and collect the rifles which the panic-stricken Egyptian troops had abandoned. Most of the artillery was lost, as well as considerable quantities of rifle ammunition. After the withdrawal of the Ethiopians, the angered Egyptians left their forts and burned the wounded enemies alive. [5] The Ethiopians retaliated by a cold-blooded massacre of about 600 Egyptian prisoners whom they had taken.
Egyptians blamed the Americans for the disaster. While the rest of the Egyptian army returned home, they were ordered to remain in Massawa until further notice, where they endured the summer months, then spent the next two years enduring endless frustration and humiliation in Cairo. In 1878, partially due to finances, the American officers were dismissed.
News of this huge defeat was suppressed in Egypt for fear that it would undermine the government of the Khedive. Somebody else would probably cool down but Ismāʿīl simply shifted to a different direction, planning to keep southward expansion through Sudan, which was, at least formally, a part of his territory: Egypt controlled Khartum and some fortified places but not too much of a countryside and was almost completely dependent upon communication by the Nile with the alternative being exhausting travel through the desert to which the Egyptian soldiers were not accustomed, as was already demonstrated in Ethiopia. Actually, so far, the “western” training proved to be not too useful in fighting down South both because its level was quite low in general and because neither Egyptian nor Western commanders had any clue about specifics of fighting in these regions.
As a result of all these peaceful and military exercises the national debt rose from £3 million to about £90 million, in a country with 5 million population and an annual treasury revenue of about £8 million. Khedive's debts became so large that in 1876 he had to declare his bankruptcy. In a month The Egyptian Public Debt Fund was established, which accumulated all debt and had to control the income intended for its repayment. France, England, Austria, Italy immediately entered the fund with France being the major shareholder. The most important objects of French investments were the Egyptian Land Loan Company (Le Credit foncier egyptien) and Sugar Enterprises of Egypt (Sucreries).
Egypt was also of great strategic importance for France. Since the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1860s, the French political elite dreamed of establishing a North African colonial empire, and diplomacy has always acted with regard to the general political situation in the Maghreb. As a part of that policy France carried out active cultural expansion in Egypt. Almost all representatives of the local intelligentsia and political leaders of the country studied in privileged French schools. The result of France's cultural policy was the "gallicization" of Egyptian ruling circles. Thus, France's diplomatic activity in the Egyptian issue was determined by a whole range of interests, as well as relations with other European powers and Egypt. Expectation was that the “gallicizied” part of the Egyptian elite will be pro-French and behave accordingly. This expectation was seemingly reasonable.
On the other side of this equation were the Egyptian attitudes: by the reasons which was really hard to imagine, the ungrateful natives were seemingly unhappy with the growing role of the foreign bankers, entrepreneurs and diplomats controlling Egypt’s financial system. Rather paradoxically, in the army which Muhammed Ali created based upon the European model appeared that part of the Westernized intelligentsia, which, based on the European ideals of the national freedom and sovereignty, demanded independence from the West. Of course, besides these ideals, there was also a contributing “materialistic” factor: due to the ongoing financial problems, Khedive had been regularly delaying the troops’ salaries. And, having as their superiors the obvious nincompoops who got the command positions by the virtue of being westerners and royally screwed up two campaigns against Ethiopia also was humiliating and helped to ignore the obvious fact that the native Egyptian officers did not demonstrate any brilliant performance either and completely failed to train their own troops. Situation in Egypt was getting increasingly volatile with the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians” gaining the broad popularity. Which was a great concern for France, Britain and some other European countries:
At the same time in Sudan popularity of the Egyptian administration was going down the drain due to the efforts to squeeze more taxes and to enforce the reforms which most of the population, being conservative Muslims, did not want. It was just a matter of it being weakened for the time bomb to explode.
______________
[1] These are real OTL data. The only item that I omitted was that France also owned 70.9% (390,000 francs out of total 550,000) of the Suez Canal Company: ITTL ownership is more internationalized.
[2] At that time nobody knew for sure where they are but wouldn’t it sound great?
[3] A Swiss adventurer who served the Brits, French and then Egypt. Was killed during invasion of Ethiopia.
[4] The fact that someone participated in a war on a losing side does not guarantee that the person is not an idiot. During the ACW he had been quarreling with Robert Lee and Stonewall Jackson and, seemingly, did not distinguish himself with any victories.
[5] Who exactly were the “savages” in this episode? And where were the European and American officers?
“Interestingly, the crocodile of my Aggression never bites hippopotamus of my Laziness.”
“Fool is an international phenomenon. And - deeply political.”
“Some fools became aggressive, like wolves.”
Unknown authors
“Mamaev. ..There are no funds to live in this apartment, but you want to rent a bigger one! What's your reason?
Glumov. No reason. Out of stupidity.
Mamaev. Stupidly? What nonsense!
Glumov. What nonsense? I'm stupid.
Mamaev. Stupid! That's strange. How come, stupid?
Glumov. It's very simple, it's not smart enough. What's strange here? Doesn't that happen? Very often.
Mamaev. No, but it's interesting! A man says about himself that he's stupid.
Glumov. Well, should I wait for others to say? Doesn't that matter? After all, you can't hide it.”
Ostrovsky, ‘Enough stupidity in every wise man’
Egypt 1870s.“Fool is an international phenomenon. And - deeply political.”
“Some fools became aggressive, like wolves.”
Unknown authors
“Mamaev. ..There are no funds to live in this apartment, but you want to rent a bigger one! What's your reason?
Glumov. No reason. Out of stupidity.
Mamaev. Stupidly? What nonsense!
Glumov. What nonsense? I'm stupid.
Mamaev. Stupid! That's strange. How come, stupid?
Glumov. It's very simple, it's not smart enough. What's strange here? Doesn't that happen? Very often.
Mamaev. No, but it's interesting! A man says about himself that he's stupid.
Glumov. Well, should I wait for others to say? Doesn't that matter? After all, you can't hide it.”
Ostrovsky, ‘Enough stupidity in every wise man’
By the late 1870s, France owned 50.3% of the funds of various commercial enterprises, as well as 53.1% of the external Egyptian debt (1,250 thousand francs of the total value of 2,352,500 fr. ). In fact, it controlled 53.6% of the entire Egyptian economy.[1]
Ismāʿīl, the second son of Ibrahim Pasha, was born in 1830. He studied in Paris and undertook various diplomatic missions in Europe before becoming viceroy in 1863. Quite understandably, he wanted to be considered “civilized” and, by extension, this applied to Egypt. Within the reasonable limits. In 1867 he obtained from the Ottoman sultan the hereditary title of khedive. In 1869 he turned the celebration of the Suez Canal opening into a magnificent display of khedival splendour. One of the most significant of Ismāʿīl’s innovations was the establishment of an assembly of delegates in November 1866. Although this body served only in an advisory capacity, its members eventually came to have an important influence on the course of governmental affairs. Village headmen dominated the assembly and came to exert increasing political and economic influence over the countryside and the central government. Of course, being a “reformer” did not automatically mean that he had a clue how to manage finances and economy in general.
A short period of the cotton bonanza was over and after the dust on the other side of the Atlantic settled, price of the cotton went down and so did the influx of mooney. The manufactures created by Muhammed Ali were seriously handicapped by an absence of the domestic deposits of coal and mostly relied on the water power or horse-driven systems. An alternative was to buy coal abroad, which required money. Of course, maintaining strong protectionist policies of his grandfather would help to preserve at least some of the local manufacturing base but this would not be progressive and he sucked up to the free trade mantra which, to his surprise, put most of Egypt’s manufacturing base (predominantly state-owned) out of business with the resulting loss of his income.
However, he managed, with the French help, to create Egypt’s sugar industry.
“The Khedive, being the owner of vast estates comprising almost one fifth of the cultivable area of Egypt, and wishing to increase the cultivation of sugar cane while avoiding the risks that always arise with monoculture, wanted to establish on part of his vast properties a gigantic sugar production encompassing 487,467 feddans, of which 315,548 feddans in Middle and Upper Egypt were more or less suitable for this kind of plantation. Sixteen factories, placed at regular intervals along the Nile from south of Asyut down to the Delta, complemented the agricultural exploitation proper. Set up by the two companies Cail and Fives-Lille in an admirable manner, each cost several million francs; they would become the best support of a rich agriculture. Some, unfortunately, could not function and were abandoned shortly after their inauguration.”
Khedive Ismail’s scheme to develop the cultivation and processing of sugar cane in Egypt can be briefly outlined as follows: the end of the American Civil War in 1865 spelled the end of the cotton boom for Egypt. In order to diversify the country’s cotton-based cash crop economy and to develop alternative sources of income, Ismail Pasha decided to devote vast tracts of agricultural land he owned personally in Middle and Upper Egypt to the cultivation of sugar cane. This respective land, administered by the Daira Saniyya (the central administration of the khedivial properties and estates), covered an impressive area of 315,548 feddans (132,556.35 hectares) according to Mazuel.17 As sugar cane requires crushing and processing within hours of the harvest, it was recommended to have processing facilities available in the vicinity of the fields. One essential component of the project, therefore, was the construction of a sufficient number of sugar factories for cane crushing, raw-sugar production, and refinement in the vicinity of the respective Daira Saniyya lands along the Nile between Biba and Armant, and further west in the Fayyum Oasis.
Simultaneously, between 1867 and 1873, the Ibrahimiyya Canal was dug: an irrigation canal running 256 kilometres along the western bank of the Nile, starting at Asyut in Middle Egypt and ending at Ashmant south of Cairo. The canal was complemented by networks of smaller canals for the irrigation of the fields. Besides irrigation, transport facilities were vital for Ismail’s sugar project. With the main purpose of serving the sugar factories, a railway line was built from Cairo (more exactly, Bulaq al-Dakrur on the Giza side of the Nile) southward along the Nile to Asyut, running for the most part on the eastern bank of the Ibrahimiyya Canal, and complemented by a westbound branch-line into the Fayyum, branching off at Wasita. As a result, Egypt’s railway network was extended into the regions south of Cairo for the first time; so far, since the construction of the first railway line from Alexandria to Cairo in 1854–1856, railway construction had focussed on the Delta regions.19 To complete the transport infrastructure, an extensive network of agricultural light railway including wagons and steam engines was set up, in order to transport the cane directly from the fields to the nearby factories. Eventually, by 1878, the Daira Saniyya was described as having about 340,000 acres of land, 15 sugar factories, 250 kilometres of railway, 50 locomotives and 1,500 wagons.
The cotton proved to be a mixed blessing: Muhammed Ali enforced its cultivation in the Northern Egypt to provide a convenient transportation. Unfortunately, this was a traditional wheat-growing area and Egypt turned from being the food exporter to food consumer. Egypt was increasingly relying upon the grain imports from the OE and Russia.
Ismāʿīl created was stimulating commercial progress, inviting huge numbers of foreigners (over one hundred thousand Europeans came to work in Cairo alone) and built a railroad which made Egypt having most railways per habitable kilometer than any nation in the world. He was planning a railroad all the way to Sudan and further.
His personal train was rather fancy.
It is an open question how much profit he was getting out of all these activities.
Hereditary Khedive title came at a cost of increased tribute, giving Sultan a part of the Egyptian navy and participation in subduing uprising on the Crete. Ismail spent heavily—some went to bribes to Constantinople to facilitate his reform projects. Much of the money went for the construction of the Suez Canal. About £46 million went to construct 8,000 miles (13,000 km) of irrigation canals to help modernize agriculture. He built over 900 miles (1,400 km) railroads, 5,000 miles (8,000 km) of telegraph lines, 400 bridges, harbor works in Alexandria, and 4,500 schools. Education reform increased the education budget more than tenfold.
He kept building palaces, lavishly entertained all types of the visiting celebrities, founded national library and maintained opera and theater.
On the top of all of the above, he decided to make Egypt a true Great Power by expanding his possessions all the way up to the sources of the Nile [2]. He started with annexing Darfur but after this got into big trouble in Ethiopia. It seems that he got there as a result of rather fantastic rumors about the rich soil and a lot of easily available valuable natural resources. In 1865 the Ottoman Sublime Porte ceded the Ottoman Province of Habesh (with Massawa and Suakin at the Red Sea as the main cities of that province) to Ismail. This province, which neighboured Ethiopia, first consisted of a coastal strip only but expanded subsequently inland into territory controlled by the Ethiopian ruler. New economically promising projects, like huge cotton plantations in the Barka delta, were started. In 1872 Bogos (with the city of Keren) was annexed by the governor of the new "Province of Eastern Sudan and the Red Sea Coast", Werner Munzinger Pasha [3].
Yohannes IV became the emperor of Ethiopia in 1872 after defeating Tekle Giyorgis II in battle. He worked on modernizing his army, some of whom were trained by the British adventurer John Kirkham.
The Egyptians invaded from their coastal possessions in what is now Eritrea. The armies of Yohannes and Isma'il met at Gundat on the morning of 16 November 1875. The Egyptians were vastly outnumbered and their forces were completely destroyed.
“On 14 November, Alula crossed the Mereb river and immediately engaged forward Egyptian posts. The main Ethiopian army under the emperor (Yohannis IV) crossed the river on the night of 15-16 November. Meanwhile, Shalaqa Alula had disengaged his forces; he had completed a flanking action from the west against troops advancing from Addi Quala; and had appeared in the Egyptian rear, blocking their line of retreat.
On the morning of 16 November 1875, the Egyptians found themselves surrounded in a steep valley, and the battle soon turned into a massacre from which only a few of the 3,000 Egyptians managed to escape. Two thousand two hundred Remington rifles and sixteen cannons were captured by the Ethiopians, who lost some 550 dead and 400 wounded. Among the latter of whom was Alula’s brother Basha Tessema, whose wound remained unhealed for a long period.”
The Egyptians tried again to invade from the north, but were again defeated at the battle of Gura in March 1876.
After the defeat at Gundet, the Egyptians sent a much larger, well-armed force to attempt a second invasion. This army moved to Gura plain, and made two forts there: "Gura" fort and "Khaya Khor" fort. Gura fort was garrisoned by 7,500 men led by Rateb Pasha and ex Confederate general William Wing Loring and Khaya Khor fort was garrisoned by 5,500 men led by Uthman Rifqi. Yohannes soon arrived in the area with a huge army of over 50,000 men mobilized from the provinces of Tigray, Gondar and Hamasien. Taking advantage of the lack of Egyptian reconnaissance, the Ethiopians positioned themselves on the Godolfelassie road, Yohannes could now strike Gura, Khaya Khor or Keren. Fearing an attack on the supply depots, Rateb Pasha decided to send 5,000 out of his 7,500 strong force to attack the Ethiopian army, believing that dug-in Egyptian forces were unbeatable by enemies who did not posses artillery, such as the Abyssinians. The 5,000 strong Egyptian infantry of Gura fort sortied out early on March 7th. On March 7th, the Egyptians that left the fort were attacked by the Ethiopians and surrounded. Most of the Ethiopians were armed with firearms, and although they had only one field-gun, it is said to have had no effect in deciding the action.
Rateb Pasha allowed his views to be overruled by Loring Pasha, who insisted on the ramps of the trenches which had been erected being razed, so that the artillery could have a clear zone of fire.[4] The gunners and infantry were enfiladed by the Ethiopians from higher ground, and the slaughter was so great that several regiments became completely demoralized. Out of the 5,000 Egyptians that sortied out only a few hundred managed to return to the fort.
Loring: “…Imagine 5,000 men who did not even know how to shoot, fighting over 50,000 savages who are at war all the time”
The Ethiopians followed up their success, and closely invested Fort Gura, which they attacked in force on the 8th and 9th of March. When Ratib Pasha had urged remaining with the Gura fortress, Loring had taunted him and called him a coward until he consented to meeting the Ethiopian host in the open valley. On March 10th, Rashid Pasha and Osman Bey Neghib led an attack on the Ethiopians which was repulsed with loss, and both officers were killed while leading their men. The Ethiopians then withdrew to loot the dead and collect the rifles which the panic-stricken Egyptian troops had abandoned. Most of the artillery was lost, as well as considerable quantities of rifle ammunition. After the withdrawal of the Ethiopians, the angered Egyptians left their forts and burned the wounded enemies alive. [5] The Ethiopians retaliated by a cold-blooded massacre of about 600 Egyptian prisoners whom they had taken.
Egyptians blamed the Americans for the disaster. While the rest of the Egyptian army returned home, they were ordered to remain in Massawa until further notice, where they endured the summer months, then spent the next two years enduring endless frustration and humiliation in Cairo. In 1878, partially due to finances, the American officers were dismissed.
News of this huge defeat was suppressed in Egypt for fear that it would undermine the government of the Khedive. Somebody else would probably cool down but Ismāʿīl simply shifted to a different direction, planning to keep southward expansion through Sudan, which was, at least formally, a part of his territory: Egypt controlled Khartum and some fortified places but not too much of a countryside and was almost completely dependent upon communication by the Nile with the alternative being exhausting travel through the desert to which the Egyptian soldiers were not accustomed, as was already demonstrated in Ethiopia. Actually, so far, the “western” training proved to be not too useful in fighting down South both because its level was quite low in general and because neither Egyptian nor Western commanders had any clue about specifics of fighting in these regions.
As a result of all these peaceful and military exercises the national debt rose from £3 million to about £90 million, in a country with 5 million population and an annual treasury revenue of about £8 million. Khedive's debts became so large that in 1876 he had to declare his bankruptcy. In a month The Egyptian Public Debt Fund was established, which accumulated all debt and had to control the income intended for its repayment. France, England, Austria, Italy immediately entered the fund with France being the major shareholder. The most important objects of French investments were the Egyptian Land Loan Company (Le Credit foncier egyptien) and Sugar Enterprises of Egypt (Sucreries).
Egypt was also of great strategic importance for France. Since the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1860s, the French political elite dreamed of establishing a North African colonial empire, and diplomacy has always acted with regard to the general political situation in the Maghreb. As a part of that policy France carried out active cultural expansion in Egypt. Almost all representatives of the local intelligentsia and political leaders of the country studied in privileged French schools. The result of France's cultural policy was the "gallicization" of Egyptian ruling circles. Thus, France's diplomatic activity in the Egyptian issue was determined by a whole range of interests, as well as relations with other European powers and Egypt. Expectation was that the “gallicizied” part of the Egyptian elite will be pro-French and behave accordingly. This expectation was seemingly reasonable.
On the other side of this equation were the Egyptian attitudes: by the reasons which was really hard to imagine, the ungrateful natives were seemingly unhappy with the growing role of the foreign bankers, entrepreneurs and diplomats controlling Egypt’s financial system. Rather paradoxically, in the army which Muhammed Ali created based upon the European model appeared that part of the Westernized intelligentsia, which, based on the European ideals of the national freedom and sovereignty, demanded independence from the West. Of course, besides these ideals, there was also a contributing “materialistic” factor: due to the ongoing financial problems, Khedive had been regularly delaying the troops’ salaries. And, having as their superiors the obvious nincompoops who got the command positions by the virtue of being westerners and royally screwed up two campaigns against Ethiopia also was humiliating and helped to ignore the obvious fact that the native Egyptian officers did not demonstrate any brilliant performance either and completely failed to train their own troops. Situation in Egypt was getting increasingly volatile with the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians” gaining the broad popularity. Which was a great concern for France, Britain and some other European countries:
- As French publicists wrote, "Egypt is Suez, Suez is India, and India is England." For France the Suez Canal also was an important route to its colonies in Indo-China and the same applied to the Netherlands. Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria, etc. to one degree or another also had been interested in its proper functioning and OE was receiving its share of the revenues and did not want any problems.
- France was in a process of planning annexation of Tunisia and did not want anti-Western nationalist regime in Egypt.
- It was assumed that the “patriotic party” will refuse to pay Egypt’s foreign debts and perhaps even start confiscation of the foreign properties.
At the same time in Sudan popularity of the Egyptian administration was going down the drain due to the efforts to squeeze more taxes and to enforce the reforms which most of the population, being conservative Muslims, did not want. It was just a matter of it being weakened for the time bomb to explode.
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[1] These are real OTL data. The only item that I omitted was that France also owned 70.9% (390,000 francs out of total 550,000) of the Suez Canal Company: ITTL ownership is more internationalized.
[2] At that time nobody knew for sure where they are but wouldn’t it sound great?
[3] A Swiss adventurer who served the Brits, French and then Egypt. Was killed during invasion of Ethiopia.
[4] The fact that someone participated in a war on a losing side does not guarantee that the person is not an idiot.
During the ACW he had been quarreling with Robert Lee and Stonewall Jackson and, seemingly, did not distinguish himself with any victories.[5] Who exactly were the “savages” in this episode? And where were the European and American officers?
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How humiliating for Egypt. Guess colonial/imperial powers getting their butts kicked by Ethiopia will never stop being a tired trope in history, lol.
If this is their interest, then I wouldn't be surprised if France took more direct measures in controlling the Khedive (maybe a Franco-Egyptian Condominium?). Also, this probably means all of North Africa (sans maybe Spanish Morocco) will be French colonial land. I'd be interested to see how the French decide to administer North Africa in the near future (colonists are more widely spread out, thus leading to a weaker Pied-Noir identity?).
Glad to see Ethiopia beating back the Egyptians, hopefully they can take over the territory the Egyptians had in Eritrea and prevent them from having those two daggers at their throats.
Although I feel bad for the Egyptians, debt is at all time high, country slowly getting controlled by foreigners who don't care about Egypt, they have been humiliated militarily and Sudan is about to basically explode in revolt. Hopefully they don't go down OTL route of becoming a protectorate
Although I feel bad for the Egyptians, debt is at all time high, country slowly getting controlled by foreigners who don't care about Egypt, they have been humiliated militarily and Sudan is about to basically explode in revolt. Hopefully they don't go down OTL route of becoming a protectorate
Otl Ottomans also sent their envoy to Berlin Conference so I still hope that they get to keep Tripolia.
I could weary well see Egypt retreating from Sudan without any major power supporting it there and being under pressure from other great powers to stop this costly adventure and start properly paying its debts doesn't help. Ethiopia could weary well use this chance to claim Eritrea, of course it would need the blessing from other major powers for it.
Considering how Italy has been mostly mute about colonial adventures and Ottoman empire is in a much stronger position compared to OTL, I'd wager any Ottoman Italian war would see Italy defeated and Ottoman prestige increased.
Indeed, if Egypt is any smart they'll probably pull out while it's safe but given the politicized army and nationalistic population, we could actually see a pushback to the king trying to stop it because the nation wants to recover prestige... Not realizing they're falling in deeper into a spiral.
Honestly I'd wager is more of a question of Ethiopia marching in Eritrea or not, neither Italy nor Britain have any strong presence in the region (they were the biggest against any Ethiopian expansion otl), France already holds the important Somalia and helped invest and build railroads in Ethiopia alongside the Russians while the Russians themselves are the closest thing they would have to allies in the region and would certainly be in favor of "Orthodox monarchy bringing fellow Christian brothers under their banner" and the most important threats like the Ottomans are busy with their own issues and probably won't care and the Egyptians have just been defeated and are currently in crisis, financial, political and military. So it's really up for the Ethiopians to decide if it's worth it or not (which it is)
Other important thing is that Russia would be able to conduct its trade with Ethiopia through the ports controlled by Ethiopia without other European powers acting as mediators, not to mention Ethiopia offering concessions in those ports as thanks for Russian support.
Actually when we are talking about Ottoman Empire being in stronger position, collapse of Egypt and potential French protectorate over Egypt I could see Ottomans using this to reimpose Sultans authority over Hejaz and much of Egyptian Asian possesions lost in Egyptian-Turkish war restoring Sultans prestige as a Caliph via control of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, basically restoring their otl Asian borders.
There is one problem with Prestige though: it doesn't do anything to the problems the Ottoman Empire is facing in the long run. Sure the moral boost is nice, perhaps some better trade deals or perhaps a postponed revolution or coup, but it won't modernize the country, destroy corruption or even take care of debts. Perhaps if they are really lucky they get a better interest rate.
But with my granted very limited knowledge of the Ottomans, I think the sensible thing would be to withdraw to OTL Turkish possesions and only use the rest as long as they can until their subjects realise the yoke is gone. Preferably by e.g. offering freedom to Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and some states in the Middle East in return for them taking over the Ottoman debt.
Alas the sensible thing is probably political suicide if not actual suicide.
But with my granted very limited knowledge of the Ottomans, I think the sensible thing would be to withdraw to OTL Turkish possesions and only use the rest as long as they can until their subjects realise the yoke is gone. Preferably by e.g. offering freedom to Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and some states in the Middle East in return for them taking over the Ottoman debt.
Alas the sensible thing is probably political suicide if not actual suicide.
Given the lack of wars with Russia, Europe generally somewhat interested in maintaining the Ottoman Empire for balance of powers sake, not signing off Ottoman manufacturing in the deal with British (thus making economic situation somewhat better ), earlier start of the reforms... I would say that Ottoman Empire with its territories within Asia and Europe has a good chance to survive, maybe even Libya in Africa, they even formalized their rule in Georgia with Russia. Not to mention that they don't really have otl debt, in large part once again due to absence of costly wars with Russia that Bankrupted the treasury and it's manufacturing being saved from the British competition.
Of course Balkans are problem, but I would say that rest of empire as a whole can survive.
Though by this point i think that Ottomans shouldn't be facing same problems given the lack of otl causes .
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