License built copy?

Squadron service, or powering prototypes?
Service. It was used in:

Most were prototype but with the Warwick and Hawker Tempest and Sea Fury were the main types to see service.
 
Japan had superior subs


No, they did not. The proof is that they died relatively easily.

Rather, submarines were used increasingly towards the end of the war as supply carriers, transporting food, spare parts, ammunitions to isolated garrisons which had been left behind by the fast allied progression called the “Island-hopping campaign”. No surface convoys could have slipped through the local mastery of the USN in the air and on the surface. Another critical issue of IJN submarines was their lack of agility, limited operational depth and above all, their lack of radar.

Why is that important?

This discrepancy was more acute as USN Submarines did had a radar and this helped for example the USS Batfish to sink three IJN submarines near Japan in four days. This technological gap was partly crossed by the arrival in Japan of long missions to Germany (made by IJN submarines), carrying back plans and systems, the latest technologies from Nazi Germany scientists, allowing them to carry out their own “V” weapons program (see below). On the submarine side, plans of the Type XXI and XVII and Walter propulsion systems helped Japan to built their own superfast submarine in the last months, the I-201 class. After the war, both the USN and USSR will obtain these for study.

The I-201 class was actually in some ways superior to the Type XXI to which it was compared. Better battery layout and better weapons. Quieter.
 
Japanese submarines were misused throughout WWII. They were employed, initially as "fleet boats" rather like the way nuclear subs are today - protecting the fleet, rather than as commerce raiders. They occasionally engaged in commerce raids but it was quite infrequent. The submarines were quite good boats, limited more by their supply of drinking water than by how far they could sail. If they had been used as commerce raiders the Allies would have been a little bit hard pressed and would have had to engage in some creative routing for their convoys. However they weren't. They spent most of their time on resupply runs to the various garrisons which it was difficult to resupply, otherwise.
 
Japanese submarines were misused throughout WWII. They were employed, initially as "fleet boats" rather like the way nuclear subs are today - protecting the fleet, rather than as commerce raiders. They occasionally engaged in commerce raids but it was quite infrequent. The submarines were quite good boats, limited more by their supply of drinking water than by how far they could sail. If they had been used as commerce raiders the Allies would have been a little bit hard pressed and would have had to engage in some creative routing for their convoys. However they weren't. They spent most of their time on resupply runs to the various garrisons which it was difficult to resupply, otherwise.

I have demonstrated from the record that the boats were shallow clumsy noisy underwater performers and that they were easy prey. What is about "easy kill" that is difficult to understand or why they were easy once the proper ASW tactics were employed in the environment?
 
I have demonstrated from the record that the boats were shallow clumsy noisy underwater performers and that they were easy prey. What is about "easy kill" that is difficult to understand or why they were easy once the proper ASW tactics were employed in the environment?

I don't disagree, but Japan built the boats they wanted to the industrial standards they were capable of.

Would Japan license building the Type IX uboat lead to better results? In German service it was likely much less sinkable, and is the German 'long range' uboat but would the Japanese be able to build their copy as tough? How may changes would a Type IX require to be built in Japanese yard, and to accommodate Japanese torpedos and other gear? How would the bastardised Type IX go being misused by the IJN, would the extra toughness overcome the misuse?
 
I don't disagree, but Japan built the boats they wanted to the industrial standards they were capable of.

Would Japan license building the Type IX uboat lead to better results? In German service it was likely much less sinkable, and is the German 'long range' uboat but would the Japanese be able to build their copy as tough? How may changes would a Type IX require to be built in Japanese yard, and to accommodate Japanese torpedos and other gear? How would the bastardised Type IX go being misused by the IJN, would the extra toughness overcome the misuse?

Those are actually good questions.

a. As to toughness, that is as much a function of adopting welding in the pressure hull and gasket and seal technology as anything else. The Japanese were better shipbuilders overall than the Germans. It was their electronics and mechanicals which was inferior. If they adopt best design practices from their commercial yards circa 1943 to their pre-war construction and accepted about 10% less range and 5% less speed, they could build a comparator to a Type IX. it would be more like a GATO than a Type IX in practice or what they called a Kaidai.

b. Can the Japanese use German torpedoes?

Type 95. from Navweaps

53.3 cm (21") Type 95 (1935) Model 1

Ship Class Used OnSubmarines
Date Of Design1935
Date In Service1938
Weight3,671 lbs. (1,665 kg)
Overall Length281.5 in (7.150 m)
Negative Buoyancy705 lbs. (320 kg)
Explosive Charge893 lbs. (405 kg) Type 97
Power / Range / Speed330 HP / 13,100 yards (12,000 m) / 45-47 knots
430 HP / 9,850 yards (9,000 m) / 49-51 knots
PropulsionKerosene-oxygen wet-heater
Wander Left or Right (max)185 yards @ 9,850 yards (170 m @ 9,000 m)
270 yards @ 13,100 yards (250 m @ 12,000 m)

German G7 (wetheater) series from Navweaps.

Ship Class Used OnSurface ships and Submarines
Date Of Designabout 1930
Date In Serviceabout 1938
Weight3,369 lbs. (1,528 kg)
Overall Length23 ft. 7 in. (7.186 m)
Negative Buoyancy605 lbs. (274 kg)
Explosive Charge
(see text)
617 lbs. (280 kg) Hexanite
Range / Speed6,560 yards (6,000 m) / 44 knots
8,750 yards (8,000 m) / 40 knots
15,300 yards (14,000 m) / 30 knots
PowerDecahydronaphthalene (Decalin) Wet-Heater

The Japanese could have used German fish, but why would they?

Comparison...

US Mark 14 from Navweaps.

21" (53.3 cm) Mark 14

Ship Class Used OnSubmarines
Date Of Design1930
Date In Service1931
WeightMod 0: 3,000 lbs. (1,361 kg)
Mod 3: 3,061 lbs. (1,388 kg)
Overall Length20 ft 6 in (6.248 m)
Explosive ChargeMod 0: 507 lbs. (230 kg) TNT
Mod 3: 668 lbs. (303 kg) TPX
Range / SpeedAll Mods: 4,500 yards (4,100 m) / 46 knots
Mod 0: 9,000 yards (8,200 m) / 31 knots
Mod 3: 9,000 yards (8,200 m) / 30.5 knots
PowerWet-heater steam turbine
GuidanceMark 12 Mod 3 gyro

and...

Mark 36 from NavWeaps.

21" (53.3 cm) Mark 36

Ship Class Used OnSubmarine
Date Of Design1944
Date In Service1948
Weight4,000 lbs. (1,814 kg)
Overall Length20 ft 6 in (6.248 m)
Explosive Charge800 lbs. (363 kg) HBX-1
Range / Speed7,000 yards (3,300 m) / 47 knots
PowerElectric-Battery, seawater
GuidanceGyro, pattern running

That (^^^) is what the USN wanted pre-WWII and forms the basis of my fictional NiCad Mark 20.
 
I have demonstrated from the record that the boats were shallow clumsy noisy underwater performers and that they were easy prey. What is about "easy kill" that is difficult to understand or why they were easy once the proper ASW tactics were employed in the environment?

How does that deny the points I made?
 
How many US boats died by main induction valve failure in WW II? 0. How many British boats? 10.

Crap is a matter of perspective.
 
Mines, edgeworthy. There were NO minefields in most of those cases claimed present.^1 INS DAKAR is yet another indice. Mechanical suspected as to cause of loss? I might have been wrong about that one. See


And examine this.

I may have to revise my estimate of the mechanical.

What happened to Dakar?

After the finding of the Dakar, and about a year after the salvage of the bridge, the mystery of the INS Dakar was solved.

We will never know exactly what has happened on the night between the 24th and the 25th of January 1968, but according to what was found we can get as close to the truth as possible:

1. It happened between midnight and 3am. The boat was traveling at a speed of 8.5 knots, submerged, snorkeling and in direct drive.

2. In direct drive the diesel engines not only charge the batteries but also turn the 2 propellers.

3. For an unknown reason a minor leak of water starts at one of the forward sections. This leak of water impairs the balance of the submarine and she loses her trim.

4. Because of the speed momentum the submarine goes into a steep, fast dive. The fact that the diesels are engaged with the electrical motors prevents an "all backward" maneuver which might have avoided the tragedy that followed.

5. Within 30 seconds the Dakar reaches it's crash depth and starts to implode.

6. The implosion happens fast and rips all along the hull with a tremendous power. The death of the boat and her crew is instant, fast and violent.

7. During the implosion the stern emergency buoy breaks loose and makes its way to the surface. However, it drags along with it the 600 ft long steel cable and a heavy pulley. The weight of the cable and the pulley prevent the buoy from surfacing completely.

8. The Dakar, imploded and broken up, continues her dive to the depths of the Mediterranean. Within 10-15 minuets she reaches the bottom of the sea and crashes with a huge impact. The crash separates the hull between the engine room and the stern compartment. This causes the broken stern to fly forward and land near the conning tower. Heavy parts fly in all directions, a huge cloud of sand rises for a long time, and when it settles down the deep silence dominates again the eternal silence of the sea.

It just may have been the same thing that killed the HMS Thetis. The incompetently designed torpedo tubes and their control safety checks.

Sometimes I goof. Ever watch Ice Station Zebra? The submarine consultant was an American submariner who knew about this stuff. Now why would I mention this?
 
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Mines, edgeworthy. There were NO minefields in most of those cases claimed present.^1 INS DAKAR is yet another indice. Mechanical suspected as to cause of loss? I might have been wrong about that one. See


And examine this.

I may have to revise my estimate of the mechanical.



It just may have been the same thing that killed the HMS Thetis. The incompetently designed torpedo tubes and their control safety checks.

Sometimes I goof. Ever watch Ice Station Zebra? The submarine consultant was an American submariner who knew about this stuff. Now why would I mention this?
Yet again the sources you provided DO NOT ACTUALLY SAY THAT!

No information is provided on why the losses could not have been from mines. You have given no comparison of location of the Submarines lost or where any Minefields were, thus indicating why they could not have been mined.
(You seriously expect us to believe that The Straits of Sicily or Otranto, and the approaches to Tripoli, or Taranto, or Naples, or Malta were not mined?)

And the report on INS Dakar does not give a specific cause, stating it as unknown, you are assuming one without evidence.
(The part you quoted clearly says that, you even highlighted it yourself!?)

And Alistair MacLean knew one or two things about Naval Warfare himself. He was a Torpedo Specialist who took part in PQ-17.
His works were written with the advice of his brother Ian. Who held an Unlimited Master Mariner's License, the highest possible grade of seafarer qualification.
(Incidentally, Ice Station Zebra was written just after the loss of USS Thresher.)
 
Examine the evidence. Draw your own conclusions. It is sufficient if you have no pre-judgement or bias. YMMV and it should but I am convinced from what I presented that the British built crappy accident-prone subs. Their Human factors was positively German awful.
 
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