Friends of Corsica
Take care how you call them rebels, for that name is proper only for our enemies.
- Horace Walpole to Ambassador Horace Mann
On December 7th, delegates of the Worms allies met once more in Turin to discuss the strategic situation. The Sardinians were once more represented by King
Carlo Emanuele and his chief minister
Carlo Vincenzo, Marchese d’Ormea. Austria’s man was their overall commander in Italy FZM
Ludwig Ferdinand, Graf von Schulenburg-Oeynhausen,
[1] who had already been Vienna’s military ambassador to Turin before being appointed as Lobkowitz’s replacement. Finally, Britain was represented by their resident minister
Arthur Villettes, Genoa’s belligerence making the personal presence of Vice Admiral
William Rowley impossible even if he had been free to attend.
The past year had been a sobering reminder of Bourbon strength and the limitations of the Worms allies. Austria’s diversion to Naples had (as the Sardinians had warned) been a serious mistake which had almost doomed the Italian war; only the dogged Sardinian defense of Piedmont and the audacious victory of
Maximilian Ulysses, Graf von Browne at Monterosi had averted disaster, along with a generous helping of enemy disunion and incompetence. But the danger was not yet over, for French manpower was by no means exhausted and enemy forces still held Savoy, Nice, and the fortress of Cuneo, which were all useful points from which to launch a new invasion of PIedmont. Preoccupied with their own war against France, Prussia, and Bavaria in the German theater, Austria could not offer much in the way of reinforcements for the Italian theater.
Although their forces were limited, a policy of active defense seemed wisest. The discussion of the representatives at Turin focused primarily on Genoa. Liguria left much to be desired as a thoroughfare, but Genoa’s adherence to the Bourbon alliance and the supplies, artillery, and men it had provided to their cause had made the 1744 campaign possible. Neutralizing the Republic seemed not only necessary but even plausible, as the timorous Senate had
already reached out to Vienna to try and sound out the prospect of favorable terms if the Bourbons should be driven from Italy entirely. Aside from its own meager army, only 7,000 embattled Spanish troops defended the Republic, and their commander General
Jaime de Guzmán-Dávalos, Marqués de la Mina was already making noise about withdrawing them to the French position at Nice notwithstanding Spain’s pledge in the Treaty of Aranjuez to defend Genoese territory. The Genoese were not eager to betray the Bourbon alliance they had only recently joined, especially since Madrid was currently bankrolling a good part of their military budget, but if Bourbon arms were to fail utterly the Republic’s leaders hoped that Austria could be induced to shield them from Sardinian rapacity. This was an utterly vain and fatuous hope. In fact Queen
Maria Theresa, whose protection and forbearance the Genoese were counting on, was positively livid at the faithlessness and treachery of the republic which had
twice received her father’s assistance with their Corsican troubles and had repaid him by siding with those who sought to shatter his house.
Maria Theresa, Queen of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia, Archduchess of Austria, c. 1743
Although the allies agreed generally on their goal, their proposed means were not fully in concert. Rowley had proposed an attack on Spezia in eastern Liguria, but his reasoning was chiefly naval as Spezia would make a good port, and this suggestion was opposed by both his allies and his own captains who believed an assault on that heavily-defended position was impractical. The Sardinians preferred an attack on Ceva and
western Liguria, where the French army would have to march to re-enter Italy. With luck they might push all the way to the sea, which would effectively cut off Genoa (and la Mina’s army, if they still lingered in Genoa) from her allies, reestablish direct contact between Sardinia and the British fleet, and also place coveted Finale in Sardinian hands. This accomplished many Sardinian objectives simultaneously, but did entail some risk as it would put this Piedmontese salient between the French to the west and the Spanish and Genoese to the east. Schulenburg, speaking for Austria, advocated instead a direct attack on Genoa proper, which would knock the Republic out of the war in one fell swoop. For Vienna this would also have the desirable effect of keeping Sardinia committed to the war, for Maria Theresa privately doubted whether the Sardinians, once they had Finale in hand, would exhibit much energy in the allies’ mutual cause other than to shield their own territories. Her preference was for Sardinia to be awarded her prizes at the
end of the war as rewards for loyalty rather than given them prematurely while the contest was not yet decided.
Regardless, there was no doubt that Genoa was the common enemy of the Pragmatic Allies, an understanding which had direct consequences for the fate of Corsica. The great argument against aiding the Corsicans, that it would induce Genoa to belligerence, was now moot. Moreover, the landing of a battalion of French soldiers (actually only 300 men) at Calvi in late November suggested to some that the Bourbons were actively trying to take control of the island for their own purposes. Actually, although Paris declared it was fulfilling its treaty obligations, the French had no intention of launching a military campaign on Corsica. They were more interested in preventing Calvi from falling into the hands of the British-backed rebels and being used by the British navy (and its associated privateers) against them, and the fall of Bastia suggested that this might well transpire without foreign assistance.
It was agreed at Turin that while the conquest of Corsica from Genoese and Bourbon control was not a high priority of the allies, it was nonetheless desirable, and that appropriate measures should be taken to effect it. Since no allied troops could be spared to intervene there, any progress would necessarily be made by proxy, and the only proxy worth considering was the “faction” of the Baron von Neuhoff. He was unquestionably the most powerful leader on Corsica, he was already on the Sardinian payroll, he was indebted to British aid, and he had the right enemies (having fought the Genoese and the French for years). Villettes suggested that the Sardinians continue to fund Theodore (who had recently asked Turin for yet more money) so as to raise Corsicans for the continental war while also supporting the native insurgency. Carlo Emanuele agreed.
The conference did not, however, made any determinations as to the final status of Corsica. The allies did not necessarily share a vision for the island’s future. The Sardinians and Austrians (in the form of a lingering interest by Grand Duke
Franz Stefan) held private hopes that the war would ultimately deliver Corsica to them, notwithstanding the claims of the Baron von Neuhoff, while the British favored a resolution that would leave at least one choice naval base in their hands, a result which was not necessarily compatible with Sardinian or Austrian sovereignty. Nor were the allies necessarily committed to the island’s emancipation from Genoa, for they were fully prepared to sacrifice Corsica as a bargaining chip if something of greater value could be obtained. The resulting agreement was thus purposefully vague so as to avoid any rivalry or commit the allies to a course they might later have reason to recant. The representatives agreed broadly that Corsica should not be subjected to “annexation,” by which they meant a forcible takeover, but that the allies should act to “help [Corsica] regain her freedom so as to obtain for the allied powers the use of her ports.”
This was echoed by a public statement from Turin, promulgated by Carlo Emanuele but notionally in the name of the whole alliance, in which the king proclaimed himself for the “liberty” of the Corsicans and promised “aid and succor” for their struggle against the Genoese Republic. Aware that he was likely to be accused of supporting an insurgency, Carlo Emanuele argued that he was innocent of “the odious offense of exciting subjects to rebel against their lawful sovereign” because the Corsicans were already in revolt. Although the word “independence” was never used, Carlo Emanuele proclaimed his desire to see the islanders enjoy both “tranquility” and “full freedom,” further claiming that he was motivated solely for the good of the Corsican people and had no desire to seize the island for his own. Such a proclamation did not seriously discomfit the Genoese; it was practically expected of their enemy Carlo Emanuele, who as they well knew was already directly bankrolling the rebels. More alarming was when it was followed less than a month later by a similar declaration from the Queen of Hungary, who offered the Corsicans neither treasure nor military support but was perfectly willing to terrorize the Genoese.
Britain made no formal statement, allowing Turin to speak for them on the matter, but their government too was growing more congenial to the Corsican cause. In November of 1744, minister
John Carteret was forced out of office, a casualty of both Prussia’s sudden and unexpected reentry into the war against Austria and Carteret’s own inability to manage the House of Commons. Carteret had been a supporter of Theodore and his fall was initially lamented by the king, but it soon became clear that the succeeding ministry would be no less favorable. It was to be led by the Pelham brothers: Prime Minister
Henry Pelham, Chancellor of the Exchequer (and technically already Prime Minister since 1743), and his brother
Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Southern Department since 1724. Not only was Newcastle supportive of Corsican intervention, but he was also the man who gave Rowley his orders.
The naval situation was in the meantime developing in Britain’s favor. At the end of September, Rowley had received word from Gibraltar that an Anglo-Dutch fleet under Sir
John Balchen had met the long-delayed victualling fleet at the mouth of the Tagus, driven away the blockading French squadron, escorted the victuallers to Gibraltar, and was now blockading the French detachment at Cadiz. This was doubly useful to Rowley; with the victuallers advanced to Gibraltar he could fetch them himself without exiting the Mediterranean, and with the French fleet trapped at Cadiz he needed only escort the English merchant ships as far as the Strait without worrying greatly about their interception. Rowley would have to wait some time for suitable wind, but he intended to make the journey to the Rock with a large force of ships of the line, leaving only a small squadron under Commodore
Robert Long to cover Liguria.
Unfortunately, Balchen’s stay at Cadiz would not last long enough for Rowley to accomplish this task. Although the British component of his fleet was prepared for an extended blockade, the Dutch ships had not brought sufficient provisions to do so. Allegedly this had been done purposefully so as to prevent the Dutch navy from being deployed too far from the Channel. As Balchen’s British ships alone were not sufficient to maintain the blockade, Balchen was forced to withdraw from Cadiz shortly after his arrival. While the victuallers had already been escorted to the Rock, the freedom of the French cruising squadron at Cadiz meant that Rowley would have to sail at least as far as Cape St. Vincent to take the English merchants then at Port Mahon past the Bourbon gauntlet and into the open sea. As this enterprise seemed best done sooner rather than later to prevent any junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the area, Rowley ordered for all possible sail to be gathered at once for this task. Long was left with only four ships of the line, which included the
Dragon and the
Newcastle under Captain
Charles Watson, then at Bastia. The
Newcastle was recalled to Vado Bay shortly after its participation in the Sack of Bastia on the 1st of October. Long, at least, was able to procure supplies for his diminished squadron, in large part thanks to beef and mutton procured in Corsican ports.
After taking his fleet through the Strait with nearly 40 merchant vessels in tow, Rowley finally had a stroke of luck off Cape Spartel. On the 21st of October Rowley and his 26 warships abruptly ran into a force of six French ships cruising the Strait. He immediately pursued, forcing the French to try and regain Cadiz. They were able to do this, but barely, and not without the loss of the 50-gun
Tigre which lost a spar in the pursuit and was overhauled and captured by Captain
Thomas Cooper of the
Stirling Castle. With the remainder of the French force shut up in Cadiz, Rowley was able to complete his escort of the merchant fleet and return to Gibraltar, from where he could escort the victuallers to Port Mahon. Once there, he took the opportunity to refit and clean his ships, sending out a few small cruising parties after specific targets. Undoubtedly his badly fouled fleet needed the respite, but he was later criticized for leaving Long’s squadron too weak to meaningfully interfere with the French evacuation to Nice or to maintain a tight blockade of Genoa. In early December Long was sent another ship of the line and two frigates, but he was still very thinly stretched.
The British fleet disposition would not change until February, when Rowley received new orders from Newcastle, directing him to split his forces between the Riviera and Cartagena.
Newcastle to Rowley said:
...that you proceed with the greatest part of your squadron off Carthagena, leaving a sufficient strength under the command of Commodore Osborn, or such other officer as you may think proper, to perform all services on the coast of Italy that may be necessary for the security and defence of the states of the King of Sardinia, the Queen of Hungary and the Great Duke of Tuscany; and you will make the proper disposition of the ships so to be left for obstructing the passage and motions of the French and Spaniards as far as may be practicable, and for preventing the landing of any fresh troops from Spain into Italy; and, insofar as it does not prevent the execution of these former tasks, you will render such assistance to the Malcontents of Corsica as may be useful for the conveyance of the auxiliaries of the King of Sardinia and the capture of the town of Calvi for the use of the fleet; for which purpose a few ships of the line with the smaller ships of your squadron may be sufficient.
It appeared to be the crowning success of Theodore’s diplomacy - after nearly nine years of war and intrigue, the British government was explicitly directing its fleet to intervene on behalf of the Corsicans. Yet while it was good news for Theodore, it is difficult to argue with Rowley’s own conclusion, which was that the “Corsican distraction” was a strategic blunder. As useful as Calvi might be to the British fleet, its value was not so great that it merited pulling ships away from vital duties elsewhere. Not that Rowley was immune to strategic blunders - his lust to capture a Spanish treasure fleet said to be returning from the West Indies would, later in 1745, cause him to make some very questionable fleet dispositions indeed. Yet even if he was chiefly motivated by avarice as some have alleged (for the prize money in such a capture would be worth a fortune), it was generally admitted by thinkers of the time that Spain’s treasure fleets were of strategic significance, while the progress of the Corsican rebellion could not possibly influence the course of the greater war.
As winter approached, the Corsican nationals made deliberate but inexorable progress up the eastern coast of Capo Corso spearheaded by several regular companies. This project was aided considerably by the rebels’ possession of the port of Bastia, where provisions, ammunition, and materiel could be loaded onto small craft and landed further up the coast to resupply the soldiers and furnish them with artillery to batter defensive towers. In the first days of November the nationals captured Sisco after placing a cannon near the town and bombarding the Torre di Balba. Towards the end of the month, the nationals attacked the village of Luri and dispersed the loyalist militia there. The forces of
Natale Giustiniani, the Lieutenant of Rogliano, were never particularly numerous, and the fall of Bastia had cut his men off from any hope of supply or reinforcement. They were running short on ammunition, Giustiniani had no money to pay his troops, and the local
filogenovesi - upon whom the defense of the
pieve of Luri depended - feared retribution from the nationals if they persisted in their resistance.
Horace Mann, the British resident in Florence, had called the Corsicans an “unruly race of brutes” after receiving news of Bastia’s sack, but a reputation for brutishness did occasionally have its utility. Winter forced a pause in this operation, but few doubted that Giustiniani’s days at Rogliano were numbered.
While this campaign proceeded apace, Theodore faced a difficult conundrum. While he was grateful for the international support which had been so long in coming, Theodore was well aware that Carlo Emanuele was not funding him out of the goodness of his heart. His representatives continued to press Theodore, through his emissary in Turin
Domenico Carlo Rivarola, to deliver the troops he had promised. Theodore was pleased with the progress of his campaign on Corsica and had no desire to weaken his forces, but he could not flatly refused since these forces were unsustainable without Turin paying the bills. Theodore asked for more money to raise an additional battalion so he would have enough to both fight the common Genoese enemy
and supply men to the Piedmontese, and succeeded in getting another 5,000 sequins for his efforts. D’Ormea made it very clear, however, that further disbursements - including the payments which constituted Theodore’s own “salary” - would be dependent on results.
To find more willing volunteers, Theodore turned his eyes abroad. In a declaration penned at Bastia, Theodore called upon all Corsicans in foreign military service to return home for the purpose of “uniting and reassembling all such as are dispersed and living exiled from their country.” Only those serving the armies of the Pragmatic Allies were excepted, while Corsicans in other states were given varying grace periods based on their proximity and the esteem in which Theodore held their governments. Corsicans in Venetian service were commanded to return within three months; those in Papal service, only one; and those in Genoese service, who had been by now given multiple ultimatums, were warned to defect immediately lest they be branded as traitors.
This demand lacked any kind of teeth and is best understood as aspirational, or an expression of Theodore’s presumption to be not merely king of Corsica, but of
the Corsicans. The Corsican units in Genoese service did not record any more desertions than normal in the months following the “Bastia Declaration,” and there were no significant defections from the Corsican regiments of the Papal and French armies. Only in Naples and Venice did Theodore’s solicitation meet with some success. The Neapolitan regiment of Corsicans, which had only been recently founded, was permeated by
naziunali; the regiment had previously been led by Marquis
Luigi Giafferi, that living avatar of the Revolution who had since resigned his commission and returned home. Many followed in his footsteps, and despite their alignment with the Bourbon cause the Neapolitan government does not appear to have done much to stop them.
[2] The 20 year old
Pasquale Paoli, the younger brother of Captain
Clemente Paoli of Rostino, was just one such “exile” who intended to return, but when Theodore was informed that the young lieutenant had been recently accepted into the newly-created Royal Academy of Artillery he urged Clemente to convince his brother to stay and continue his instruction. The king needed trained artillerymen in the future more than he needed another young lieutenant in the present.
The situation in Venice was more complex. The Republic’s Corsican regiments - comprising just over a thousand of their 20,000 man army - were not newly-formed bands of exiles, but prestigious units handed down within Corsican military families for generations. There had already been some defections amongst the officers, mostly those who had a history with Count
Marcantonio Giappiconi, but the regiments were not on the verge of dissolving entirely like the Corsicans of Naples. To accomplish his aims here Theodore leaned on his old acquaintance
Neil Browne, Britain’s consul in Venice, who in the past had sheltered Theodore and forwarded his secret correspondence. With the tacit approval of his government, Browne acted as a facilitator of desertion, circulating Theodore’s declaration and granting diplomatic protection to Corsican soldiers who wished to return home. The Venetians were not pleased, but had little recourse against the British.
From his headquarters at Vescovato,
[3] the king discussed matters with his secretaries and commanders. Once Rogliano was taken, which seemed to be a foregone conclusion, only Bonifacio, Calvi, and Algajola would remain in enemy hands. Bonifacio posed too many difficulties and was of little use to the rebels; it could safely be ignored. The real prize was Calvi, but its citadel was the strongest on the island and lacked the deficiencies which had allowed the nationals to take Bastia even with their ill-trained artillerymen. Calvi would require a true siege and was probably impregnable without serious British naval support. That left only Algajola, whose conquest was quite plausible but would probably not require the full participation of Theodore’s army, particularly if Marquis
Simone Fabiani could provide sufficient Balagnese militia to support the operation.
Informed by these realities, Theodore’s obligations to Turin finally coalesced into a concrete timetable. Theodore promised to furnish one battalion to Turin around the end of February, when winter gales began to abate. When Rogliano and Algajola were in the hands of the nationals, he would dispatch a second battalion. Ultimately Theodore hoped to raise four battalions in total - around 2,400 men on paper - of which half would serve on Corsica and the other half with the Piedmontese and Austrians. It remained to be seen, however, whether the Corsicans themselves would cooperate. Many recruits had joined to fight the Genoese and win their independence and were not necessarily interested in being thrown in the path of the Gallispan juggernaut for the sake of Maria Theresa’s patrimony.
The Situation on Corsica in February 1745
Footnotes
[1]
Feldzeugmeister (abbrev. FZM, literally “field ordnance master”) was an Austrian rank above
Feldmarshall-Lieutenant (FML) but below a full
Feldmarshall (FM). Depending on the circumstances, a FZM might command a wing or line as a subordinate officer to a FM, or might have his own independent command. In the German theater, Austria’s grand armies were led by FMs (most notably Traun and Prince Karl) with FZMs commanding smaller corps, but because of the relatively lesser importance and smaller troop numbers of the Italian theater the commander-in-chief in Italy was a “mere” FZM.
[2] The status of Naples was somewhat nuanced, being neither neutral nor fully belligerent. When Lobkowitz had marched south to conquer the kingdom, Don Carlos had very sensibly repudiated his forced neutrality and marshalled his army to fight alongside the Spanish. Once the Austrians retreated, however, the Neapolitan army stood down save for 6,000 soldiers which Don Carlos agreed to loan to his father, the King of Spain. They were for all intents and purposes mercenaries in Spanish pay. Naples supplied the Spanish army with provisions and allowed its ports and ships to be used for logistical support, but aside from supplying Gages with the aforementioned “mercenaries” the Neapolitan army made no offensive moves in Italy during the war.
[3] Theodore had stayed briefly in Bastia after the city’s capture, but had no intention of making it his provisional capital. The city was considered too hostile and it was too far away from the interior. Vescovato, located near the eastern coast near the mouth of the Golo, was a far better location from which to govern.
