I'm not the biggest fan of the haemoclysm categorization.
King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
- Start date
Will Theodore and Corsica have international relations/sway/interactions post WoAS? I'm thinking in terms of SYW and the American Revolution... Theodore being pen pals with some of the Founding Fathers seems amazing
I don’t think Theodore’s debt to the British will allow him to have friendly relations with the fledgling United States.
The PoD is far enough back that the American Revolution, if it occurs at all, will run a different course, with different people possibly having different allegiances and different people's ideals shaping the newborn nation if the revolution is successful. It might happen much later, or possibly a little sooner. Fewer colonies might rebel, or perhaps even more than OTL.
I am thinking that Theodore will influence revolutions in various peoples' colonies, but indirectly, as a role model of sorts. Perhaps there will be independent kingdoms of Virginia, Carolina, Maryland and New England, which will be allied against the British empire at first, but will start fighting amongst each other in their drive to the west.
I am thinking that Theodore will influence revolutions in various peoples' colonies, but indirectly, as a role model of sorts. Perhaps there will be independent kingdoms of Virginia, Carolina, Maryland and New England, which will be allied against the British empire at first, but will start fighting amongst each other in their drive to the west.
I definitely agree is rebellion will have reprocussions among other rebellions; but I don't know if he will aspire other "Kings" in the New World.
It's one thing to liberate Corsica which already technically had a Royal title just not in use; than to go ahead and make a royal title in the New World where there aren't any fuedalistic divisions and naming constructs.
Too add it's also far enough away that I could at least see Corsica being friendly to the colonials; alliegances due change.
But well the corsican republic was often used as an example by enlightment figures. In this time line there isn't going to be a corsican republic. That's going to have some effect on republicianism.
The American Revolution, like a great many events of world significance, had a great deal of convoluted circumstances leading into it. Now if (or rather when) Britain tries to tax them then some sort of unrest will occur, as the initial cause of unrest/justification was that the colonists were being denied their rights as British subjects, ie no taxation without representation.
True enough. One can claim some of the more advanced Native American nations to be proper royalty though - certainly the Aztecs and the Inca, whom Europeans encountered.
To echo @Icedaemon , a 1736 POD changes the AWI as we know it, and even if the Revolution still occurs in some form the “Founding Fathers” will be different. This is a timeline in which Washington, Franklin, and Adams exist, but Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton don’t.
Keep in mind, too, that Theodore is already 48 years old. Historically, he died in 1756, and while I would argue that his was a premature death - he had been in prison, and suddenly fell ill after his release - his survival until 1775 would require him to live to the age of 81. That’s certainly not impossible, but it’s pretty damn old for a 18th century monarch, and he’d have to live to nearly 90 to see the (historical) end of the AWI. Paoli was lionized by the revolutionaries, but he was in his 50s at the time, while Theodore is more likely to be in his grave.
Moreover, Paoli didn’t really gain celebrity in Britain and the Colonies until the late 1760s and 1770s, prompted by Boswell’s book, the heroic last stand against the French, and Paoli’s exile in England. For the American revolutionaries, Paoli’s struggle was a very recent memory; Corsica had fallen only six years before the first shots of the AWI. Theodore’s revolution, on the other hand, is likely to wrap up by 1748 or so. It won’t be forgotten, but it also won’t have the current relevance that Paoli did to the Americans in the 1770s. John Adams was an infant when Theodore was crowned and will only be thirteen years old at the time the WoAS ends, assuming the butterflies of infant mortality haven’t already claimed him; Washington will be sixteen. IOTL, Franklin was the only “Founding Father” who would have read about Theodore’s coronation when it happened, which we know because he published the occasional mention of the Corsican struggle in his Philadelphia newspaper.
As far as Theodore’s inspirational effect, I think the circumstances of his rise are more important than the man himself or the structure of the government he makes. Theodore is a king, but more specifically Theodore is an elected king, and not elected by a venerable congress of nobles as in Poland but by deputations from little Corsican villages. His formal title is “Theodore I, by the Grace of God and Unanimous Consent Elected King of Corsica.” His legitimacy rests on the principle that the people of a nation can, if they so choose, overthrow their existing monarch by force of arms and replace him with a new monarch who has no claim to the throne whatsoever except the favor of the people. That’s not a precedent that makes other continental monarchs particularly comfortable. A successful nationalist overthrow of a sovereign in Europe in the 1740s is a pretty big deal, even if the “sovereign” is pitiful little Genoa, and might have effects much closer to home than the American colonies.
As for monarchies in the colonies, my read on the American Revolution is the form of government adopted by the new nation was based primarily on the form of government they already had - the colonies already possessed republican governments with elected legislative bodies and non-royal executives (governors). I can’t imagine the citizens of the newly-independent states would support transforming these governments into petty monarchies because Corsica elected a king ~30 years before. Perhaps the idea of having the USA (or its TTL equivalent, if it emerges) become a “crowned republic” might get a little more traction, but I’m still skeptical that it would win out in the end.
Technically, the royal title was in use - by Genoa. Although they had ruled the island for centuries without it, the Genoese government had decided to crown the doge as King of Corsica back in 1637 and every doge since then had taken the title.
I suspect this is going to cause some consternation in diplomatic circles. One can imagine a Corsican minister insisting upon being treated as superior to his Genoese counterpart in the ceremonial order of precedence because he represents a kingdom while the Genoese minister “merely” represents a duchy. I doubt the venerable republic will be pleased with the prospect of being treated as though they were below the dignity of their rebellious former colony.
Keep in mind, too, that Theodore is already 48 years old. Historically, he died in 1756, and while I would argue that his was a premature death - he had been in prison, and suddenly fell ill after his release - his survival until 1775 would require him to live to the age of 81. That’s certainly not impossible, but it’s pretty damn old for a 18th century monarch, and he’d have to live to nearly 90 to see the (historical) end of the AWI. Paoli was lionized by the revolutionaries, but he was in his 50s at the time, while Theodore is more likely to be in his grave.
Moreover, Paoli didn’t really gain celebrity in Britain and the Colonies until the late 1760s and 1770s, prompted by Boswell’s book, the heroic last stand against the French, and Paoli’s exile in England. For the American revolutionaries, Paoli’s struggle was a very recent memory; Corsica had fallen only six years before the first shots of the AWI. Theodore’s revolution, on the other hand, is likely to wrap up by 1748 or so. It won’t be forgotten, but it also won’t have the current relevance that Paoli did to the Americans in the 1770s. John Adams was an infant when Theodore was crowned and will only be thirteen years old at the time the WoAS ends, assuming the butterflies of infant mortality haven’t already claimed him; Washington will be sixteen. IOTL, Franklin was the only “Founding Father” who would have read about Theodore’s coronation when it happened, which we know because he published the occasional mention of the Corsican struggle in his Philadelphia newspaper.
As far as Theodore’s inspirational effect, I think the circumstances of his rise are more important than the man himself or the structure of the government he makes. Theodore is a king, but more specifically Theodore is an elected king, and not elected by a venerable congress of nobles as in Poland but by deputations from little Corsican villages. His formal title is “Theodore I, by the Grace of God and Unanimous Consent Elected King of Corsica.” His legitimacy rests on the principle that the people of a nation can, if they so choose, overthrow their existing monarch by force of arms and replace him with a new monarch who has no claim to the throne whatsoever except the favor of the people. That’s not a precedent that makes other continental monarchs particularly comfortable. A successful nationalist overthrow of a sovereign in Europe in the 1740s is a pretty big deal, even if the “sovereign” is pitiful little Genoa, and might have effects much closer to home than the American colonies.
As for monarchies in the colonies, my read on the American Revolution is the form of government adopted by the new nation was based primarily on the form of government they already had - the colonies already possessed republican governments with elected legislative bodies and non-royal executives (governors). I can’t imagine the citizens of the newly-independent states would support transforming these governments into petty monarchies because Corsica elected a king ~30 years before. Perhaps the idea of having the USA (or its TTL equivalent, if it emerges) become a “crowned republic” might get a little more traction, but I’m still skeptical that it would win out in the end.
Technically, the royal title was in use - by Genoa. Although they had ruled the island for centuries without it, the Genoese government had decided to crown the doge as King of Corsica back in 1637 and every doge since then had taken the title.
I suspect this is going to cause some consternation in diplomatic circles. One can imagine a Corsican minister insisting upon being treated as superior to his Genoese counterpart in the ceremonial order of precedence because he represents a kingdom while the Genoese minister “merely” represents a duchy. I doubt the venerable republic will be pleased with the prospect of being treated as though they were below the dignity of their rebellious former colony.
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Very true hadn't thought of that.
And in my excitement sort of wrapped this whole century into a lot shorter of a time period than it really is generationally wise.
The timeline still has a long way to go before we see rumblings in the colonies but I can always hold hope Theodore's successor might get to comment on the affair.
Elusive Peace
Elusive Peace
A typical macchiaro wearing a pilone, a Corsican hooded cloak
A typical macchiaro wearing a pilone, a Corsican hooded cloak
Although the raids on Corti and Morosaglia in late 1741 had not succeeded in raising a general rebellion, the situation for the Genoese in Corsica remained grave. Commissioner-General Domenico Maria Spinola had responded to these serious attacks by relocating forces to Corti and his garrisons in the Castagniccia, and by increasing the protection of the all-important supply convoys which carried food, money, and other supplies up the Golo valley to Corti. For the most part, this protection was adequate - most rebel bands comprised only 20-30 men and only briefly attained larger numbers by cooperating, while Spinola insisted on at least a hundred guards for each convoy, with some having as many as 200. This allocation of men, however, badly strained Spinola’s limited men and resources.
Had Spinola’s supplies of flour and cash been plentiful, he could have cut down the number of convoys considerably, and thus the number of troops needed for this duty - one large convoy protected by hundreds of soldiers would be impossible for the rebels to stop, and it might carry sufficient food, wages, clothing, munitions, and so on to sustain Corti or other inland outposts for months. Yet Spinola’s flour warehouses were always near-empty, and the Senate’s remittances were both insufficient in size and intermittent in schedule. This required him to send small and frequent convoys up the Golo road just to keep the Corti garrison from starvation or mutiny, which in turn required him to guard these convoys with hundreds of troops that were almost continually occupied in this duty. Such demands, along with his fears of another major rebel assault on his garrisons, meant that most soldiers were devoted to either protecting or supplying the garrisons and were unavailable for expeditionary service to hunt down rebels and deliver justice.
These expeditions were mired in problems of their own. They were often called off entirely because of lack of supplies; Spinola sometimes simply did not have the food to supply roving forces for the time they were expected to be in the backcountry. Genoese commanders reported threadbare uniforms and a lack of winter equipment which made expeditions into the mountains over the winter of 1741-42 nearly impossible. When these “judicial” expeditions did occur, they provided excellent opportunities for desertion. Major Domenico de Franceschi, a capable and resourceful officer who led a “flying column” of Genoese troops and filogenovesi militia, nevertheless reported that he lost fully a third of his strength to desertion in a four month period in early 1742. For such a cost, the did not reap a large reward; when a rebel attack prompted an expedition, the most common result was that by the time the Genoese had responded the rebels had moved elsewhere. Yet even given the dire situation he found himself in, Spinola could not simply ignore these affronts, as this would be taken as a gesture of the complete powerlessness of the republic and would undoubtedly embolden the rebels.
Desertion threatened even the most loyal of Genoa’s troops. In February, fed up with the harsh conditions and the lack of pay, Major Micaglia Stefanopoli, the most senior leader of the Greek militia, went personally to Bastia to present Spinola with a list of grievances. The outcome of this meeting is unclear, but conditions clearly did not improve much, as subsequently several dozen Greeks deserted and returned back over the mountains to Ajaccio. They were swiftly caught, but the Genoese feared to punish them lest they lose the support of the Greeks in general, and as a result the deserters were merely required to rejoin their unit at Corti. Such light treatment did little to discourage other deserters, Greek or otherwise, from either defecting to the nationals or seeking the protection of Georges Ozero, French vice-consul at Calvi, who gladly helped defectors from the Genoese army find new positions in the army of France.
By early 1742 the center of gravity of the armed resistance had shifted northwards. The troops which Spinola had moved to the interior had come principally from Ajaccio and Calvi, which meant that the rich province of the Balagna was effectively unoccupied aside from the principal garrisons at Calvi, Algajola, and Calenzana. Giuseppe Maria Mambilla, the commissioner of Calvi, complained that a group of Balagnese exiles, chief among them Giovanni Tommaso Giuliani di Muro and Nicolò Poletti di Palasca, were not only fanning the flames of sedition but supporting rebel bands that struck at the Genoese in the interior and then retreated to the upper Balagna as a safe haven. This had already been a source of concern prior to the assault on Corti, such that Spinola had assigned Colonel Pietro Paolo Crettler, one of his best and most experienced officers, to make a large expedition into the northern pieves of Canale, Caccia, and Pietralba by which the exiles moved between the Balagna and the interior. The assault on Corti and the assassination of Andergossen, however, quashed this expedition before it could be started, and Crettler was assigned to be Andergossen’s replacement at Corti. His “successor,” eventually, was Colonel Rodolfo Antonio de Jost, who was substantially less capable and had fewer troops. Jost refused to move anywhere unless his forces were given a month’s pay in advance, and while his men no doubt appreciated their commander’s stand on their behalf, this along with continuing difficulties of manpower and logistics meant that the expedition into the northern corridor was not even attempted until the summer of 1742. When it finally occurred, Jost came up empty-handed; he was a conventional officer who had no talent for sniffing out rebels in the mountains and the machja, and whenever he reached a parish which had been rumored to be a place of rebel activity, the rebels had already gone.
The only serious foe the bands of exiles and bandits had was Major Franceschi’s unit, which despite desertion and privation gained victory in several skirmishes against armed Corsican bands. He was rarely available for expeditions into the mountains, however, as Spinola needed him and his men in the Castagniccia, which he perpetually feared was on the brink of revolt. Whenever there were rumors of militiamen gathering, a consulta being declared, or munitions being stockpiled, Franceschi had to be sent to put a lid on such activities. Franceschi, however, was dependent on the filogenovesi, who were sometimes unreliable and had their own difficulties. Unable to directly threaten the Genoese in their garrisons, the rebels had shifted their focus to concentrate on “internal” foes, by which they meant the filogenovesi. Anyone who cooperated with the Genoese was denounced as a vittolu - a traitor to the nation - and threatened with arson or death. Captain Filippo Grimaldi of Moriani, the most prominent filogenovesi commander and a longtime adversary of the national movement, came very close to assassination in May. Even those who still resolutely supported the republic, however, were frequently left untapped by the government, as Spinola lacked the money and weapons to arm such men and put them on the payroll in large numbers. He reported to the Senate in the spring that a large quantity of the muskets in storage in Bastia, which he had hoped might be disseminated to loyal communities, were so old and poorly maintained as to no longer be suitable for combat.
Rebels who were caught rarely met with harsh punishment. Spinola had initially acted with great leniency towards any opposition, offering amnesty to any who surrendered themselves, but this led only to a “revolving door” effect where rebels continually surrendered when things got hot and then returned to banditry later. Exiling offenders was not much better; they were typically on a boat back to Corsica within days. Finally, Spinola demanded that those seeking amnesty surrender hostages, generally their close kin and preferably their parents or children, but often this was no more successful - one rebel from Ampugnani surrendered his father to the Genoese and went back to raiding within weeks, perhaps knowing that Spinola was not actually going to slaughter hostages (or perhaps just not very fond of his father).
In the summer of 1742, rebel attacks began to intensify. Their numbers, while still small compared to the Genoese garrisons, had steadily increased thanks to recruitment driven by a successful campaign of propaganda. For months, the rebels had been spreading rumors of Genoese abuses and plans to crack down on the Corsicans with heavy taxes and confiscations of weapons. Now, however, they were growing more sophisticated. They began to disseminate “circulars,” open letters inviting the people to revolt, as well as declarations by King Theodore, who had arrived at Villefranche at the end of May and was in Livorno by early July. It is known that the British, specifically Ambassador Arthur Villettes and Consul Burrington Goldsworthy, assisted Theodore with drafting declarations to the Corsicans and helped cover his printing costs. The letters, both the circulars of the rebel bands and those smuggled in from Theodore, claimed that the king would return with soldiers, guns, and money, and alleged that the Great Powers had determined to support the Corsicans against the republic. In July, a rebel band managed to take a Genoese supply convoy for the first time since November, and while the attackers were not able to make off with most of the cargo it was a demonstration of their growing power and the growing fragility of the Genoese position in the interior. Yet not even the coast was safe; in August, a small patrol of Genoese soldiers was ambushed near Biguglia, just a scant few miles south of Bastia.
All of Spinola’s hopes were now pinned upon a good reception of the Regolamento - the “Regulation,” or the body of law by which the Genoese Republic was to rule Corsica. In his view, the numbers of true “irreconcilables” among the Corsicans were few, and by gentle and reasonable laws the rest could be brought to reject their extremism. The regulation had been delayed by the need to elect a new Council of Twelve, representatives of the Corsican “nobility” who would nominally advise the Genoese government. Despite threats from the exiles, this was accomplished in April, although since many feared retribution from the nationals the Genoese had some trouble finding men who were willing to serve as one of the Twelve Nobles of the Diqua. A number of men nominated by the procuratori (“procurators,” representatives of the parishes who elected the Twelve) simply declined to serve, citing “illness” or incapacity. Nor were the procurators themselves always helpful - a group of procuratori in the Balagna jointly declared, ahead of the Regulation’s publication, that they would not accept any new taxation regardless of whether the Twelve Nobles approved it or not.
Spinola urged the Senate to publish the draft Regulation as soon as possible, despite warnings from his fellow commissioners that since the Regulation was also a tax document it might inflame as much as it pacified. Yet Spinola was also under tremendous pressure from the government to at least defray the costs of the occupation, and in the meantime the Corsicans were using the Regulation’s absence as an excuse; since arms control was one of the measures to be covered in the Regulation, the Castagniccians refused to disarm until it had been published and ratified, claiming that they had the law on their side. Finally, the Senate heeded Spinola, and they rushed the document out in September. So concerned was Spinola over the reception of the Regulation that, in a break with his usual merciful nature, he informed his captains that even one word of opposition to the laws was a capital offense.
In form, the Regulation was not far from the “return to 1715” proposal which had been drawn up by the Deputation of Corsica a year earlier. The hated due seini tax was abolished, and the ban on firearms was lifted, although limits and licenses were imposed. As fast as it could be published, however, the rebels were working to undermine it. Even among the fence-sitting majority of Corsicans, trust in the Genoese government was low, which created an opportunity for malicious rumors and conspiracy theories to spread. Some rumors that circulated were outright fabrications - that all firearms were banned, for instance. Others, however, were more creative: It was observed, for instance that the new Regulation said nothing about the sovereignty of the kingdom being assured by the King of France, which had been mentioned in a single sentence of the Regulation of 1738. There was undoubtedly nothing to this other than a recognition of the fact that French troops were no longer occupying Corsica, but the exiles spread the rumor that its absence meant that the French government had repudiated its support for the republic and would no longer oppose Corsican independence.
What provoked the greatest objection from the Corsicans, however, was the re-imposition of the taglia, the standard capitation tax of the old Genoese regime. The Senate had not thought this to be a likely source of outrage; the taglia was longstanding, and it had been its supplement by the due seini that had provoked the revolt. Since 1729, however, the Corsican attitude towards Genoese taxes in general had changed markedly. Most of the island had paid no taxes at all, or paid them only during brief and fitful interludes of peace and order, in the last thirteen years of rebellion. They were apt to view any taxes as an imposition. Moreover, since they had gained these concessions through resistance, it occured to many that the Genoese might be forced to make the deal even better through continued resistance, and thus many communities and their leaders looked at the new Regulation not as a law handed down by their masters but as Genoa’s opening bid in a negotiation.
In late September, representatives from the pieves of Caccia, Orezza, Ampugnani, Rostino and Tavagna announced their dissatisfaction with the taglia and announced their intention to hold a consulta at Morosaglia to discuss the matter. Spinola had no intention of allowing this, and sent troops to dissolve the meeting. It does not seem to have actually taken place; when the Genoese arrived there were only two dozen or so people, who fearfully proclaimed their allegiance to the republic and then dispersed, claiming either that they didn’t know what had been planned or had been misled by “malefactors.” Yet the Castagniccians continued to dispute their tax obligations, and even those who sympathized with the Genoese were reluctant to comply. Lieutenant-General Johann Friedrich von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg, the effective leader of the resistance in the Tavagna and Niolo, announced that anyone who dared pay the taglia was a traitor, and that as a matter of royal policy his men would burn down the houses of suspected taxpayers. In fact there is no evidence that Rauschenburg ever actually ordered anyone’s house to be burned, but some other rebel leaders had fewer inhibitions and put his ban into practice.
In the Balagana, Giuseppe Maria Mambilla, the commissioner of Calvi, tried a different tactic and invited the Balagnese procuratori to Calvi to discuss the Regulation. There was indeed a discussion, but it quickly became a farce. The Balagnese made exorbitant demands, insisting upon a tax rate which would have permitted them the lowest taxes on the island despite being its richest province, as well as demanding the right to possess any number of firearms without restriction. Mambilla decided to cow them with a show of force instead, but as he did not have sufficient men he resorted to answering farce with farce, ordering his soldiers to pretend to prepare an expedition. Surprisingly this met with moderate success, as some parishes which had previously refused now agreed to pay their taxes for fear of retaliation. Nevertheless, resistance in the upper Balagna remained stalwart. Mambilla informed Spinola that he could return the Balagna to complete obedience with “merely” a thousand more men, but that was so far beyond Spinola’s resources as to be laughable.
In the Dila, the Genoese did not even make an attempt. The southern half of Corsica had remained relatively quiet over the previous year, but it was the peace of autonomy rather than subjection. After the strengthening of the garrisons in the interior Diqua, so few troops remained in the south that any “judicial” expedition against intransigent Corsicans was quite out of the question. The only Genoese post in the south which did not lay directly on the coast was Sartena, but that was only a short distance from the little port of Propriano, and the area's security derived less from its small regular garrison than the unexpected but welcome services of Giacomo Peretti, a powerful clan leader in the Sartena area who had decided to join the Genoese and announced his acceptance of the new Regulation. As usual, there was more ambiguity from Luca d’Ornano, who was not exactly a filogenovese but had permitted the Genoese to reinforce their garrison at Corti through the valley of the Gravona. He appears to have initially accepted the Regulation, but then rejected it, and then clarified that he accepted the Regulation in principle but was not yet prepared to implement it given the pending “talks” between the Genoese and the procuratori in the Diqua. He knew very well that with the Ajaccio garrison stripped to the bone, there was absolutely nothing the local commissioner could do to force his obedience. The “free” Corsians in the Dila elsewhere, in Zicavo, Istria, and the Alta Rocca, announced that they did not accept the Regulation and thus had no intention of paying any taxes at all. Matthias von Drost had assured them that deliverance would soon be at hand.
Spinola suspected that the Corsicans of the Diqua were stalling for time, attempting to draw out the process of acceptance as long as possible so as to prepare themselves for a new insurrection. Given the military situation, however, talking was all he could reasonably afford to do. Although he had nipped the consulta of Morosaglia in the bud, Spinola decided to give the Corsicans the talks they wanted, albeit under Genoese auspices as Mambilla had done at Calvi. One doubts whether he actually anticipated any more success than Mambilla, but the best he could hope for was that in the interim the Senate would finally give him the men, money, and supplies he needed. In a pitiful note to the Senate, he wrote that his heart leapt whenever he saw a sail from the governor’s palace in Bastia, as he could not help but hope that it was a ship full of coins and flour, yet he was inevitably disappointed.
Then, as Spinola was trying to negotiate a round of talks with the delegates of the Castagniccia that neither side believed would amount to anything, Colonel Antonio Colonna-Bozzi and 340 expatriate soldiers of the “Free Battalion” landed on Corsica and laid siege to Porto Vecchio. A letter from Colonna soon spread to the north, the contents of which amounted to a declaration of war against the republic. He came in the name of the King of Corsica, he wrote, whose arrival was immanent; and in his capacity as colonel of the king’s armies and his representative, he called upon the Corsican people to join in the righteous struggle.[A]
Timeline Notes
[A] Perhaps not the most exciting update ever, but I felt it wasn't necessary to get too deeply into the small-scale skirmishes in our march towards catching up on Corsica up to the time of Colonna's landing. The situation described above is fairly similar to, and only slightly more dire than, the situation around this time IOTL in the wake of the French withdrawal. I suspect if Spinola had known what was involved with the job he was taking, he wouldn't have taken it.
So the corsicans are of the opinion that any taxes are an unfair imposition, I'm beginning to suspect freeing corsica is going to be the easy bit compared to ruling it.
(Having said that traditionally native governments can get away with more taxes than foreign ones)
(Having said that traditionally native governments can get away with more taxes than foreign ones)
Md139115
Banned
It will significantly help Theodore’s tax collections if he is able to turn around and use it to provide a tangible benefit to the various areas, say better roads or trade connections with the rest of Europe being sponsored by the diplomatic service.
This fundamentally is why native governments can get away with more taxes; people can see their tax dollars at work, unlike a colony or distant territory that pays money to a distant land but sees nothing in return (even if they actually are getting a net benefit from the deal). In the Genoa/Corsica case, I wouldn’t be surprised if Corsica was keeping only about a third of the tax money it was paying to the Genoese (I’m not Carp! Don’t quote me on this!), meaning that even relatively modest taxes by Theodore are probably going to see a significant improvement for the Corsicans.
Md139115
Banned
Actually, Corsica being a predominately agricultural country with not much opportunity for industry, I suspect that Theodore is going to attempt to keep tariffs low and raise the bulk of the revenue on taxes in kind on agricultural products.
