Theodore's New Model Army
Excerpts from Merganser Publishing's "Rebellion!" Series #24: The Corsican Revolution
Illustration of a Corsican regular in the 1740s
Anatomy of a Failure
By the end of the 1739 campaign it was abundantly clear that King Theodore's original scheme for the Corsican military was a failure. The king's edict on militia service, issued not long after his coronation, had mandated that the militia of the entire nation would serve in
terzi ("thirds"), four-month terms such that a third of the rebels' manpower would be active at any one time. This had proved to be impossible to enforce and was widely ignored. There existed no system of administration by which rolls of eligible militiamen could be created and maintained, and the national government possessed no power to compel pieves and villages to cough up the required men.
More than administrative failure, however, the system failed because it could not overcome the localism and self-interest of the Corsicans. Most Corsican militiamen, while willing and even eager to fight the hated Genoese, had no motivation to stray far from their village. The educated and urbane leaders of the rebellion like Costa, Giafferi, and Gaffori spoke of a Corsican "nation," but the sort of society which most Corsicans lived in was insular, centered on the village and the clan, and dominated by strictly local concerns. Hatred of their colonial taskmasters united them more than a real sense of national unity. The captains, colonels, and generals which Theodore had appointed were frequently no better; as local lords and
caporali, they too had predominantly local concerns, and usually preferred to keep their men (who, in the case of militia captains, were often their own relations) at home rather than heeding Theodore's plaintive cries for soldiers.
As a consequence, the rebellion had never really possessed an army that was truly "Corsican." The kingdom's battles since 1736 had been fought predominantly with forces available in the immediate vicinity. Fabiani's Balagnese campaign had been mainly fought with Balagnese militia, supported by the men of a few neighboring pieves and others who could be pulled to the field by clan relationships. (Fabiani, for instance, was reinforced by militia from Orezza because his wife was from that pieve and he could count on support from his in-laws.) Ceccaldi's eastern campaign had been waged almost entirely with men of Castagniccia and the eastern plain, with some help from Gaffori, who had brought his own followers and clients from Corti. These local militias also had a tendency to disperse as soon as victory was gained or defeat was suffered. Without any prompting by their own government, the Corsicans had raised a force of thousands to attack Borgo, but as soon as this engagement was over most of the army simply went home. Only the
Guardia Corsa, the sole "professional" unit of Corsican royalists, was really a national unit, and it did not even reach the strength of a single French battalion.
Even if the system had functioned as intended, it would still have been crippled by flaws that were now quite evident. The four-month system meant that three times a year, the entire militia force would essentially disband and have to be reformed, which would be disastrous if it were to happen in the middle of a campaign. This also made the provisioning of soldiers difficult, as the Corsicans fiercely resisted disarmament and were unlikely to accept being stripped of their syndicate-provided musket and powder so it could be given to their replacement. Needless to say, such quick turnover also made quality training next to impossible.
The military reorganization of the winter of 1739-40 had its origins in the "refugee army" of the Castagniccia: men who had fled Villemur's incursion, come over the mountains to Rostino, and agreed to fight with Theodore's regulars and the Rostino militia against the men who had turned them out of their houses and destroyed their livelihoods. They had fought decently at the Battle of Ponte Novu, but Fabiani feared that as soon as the battle was over they would once again disband, leaving the interior open to another attack (perhaps from Brigadier Montmorency, who came only a few miles from the Golo days after the battle). He had convinced Theodore and Gaffori to put these men on the government's payroll to induce them to remain over the winter, and it was this militia force which had remained with him through the freezing nights in Ponte Leccia. At the time, this was only seen as a temporary expedient to keep Corti from being completely exposed, but as winter drew to an end Fabiani was loathe to send the men home, particularly after the months of training they had received.
Except for the
Guardia, the government was not in the habit of paying soldiers directly. The usual procedure was to give money and arms to prominent locals, appoint them as colonels or captains, and instruct them to raise and provide for a certain number of men who would be called up on a rotating basis or as needed. The localized nature of authority on Corsica virtually required such a system; without the cooperation of local elites, the revolution could not succeed. As one might expect, however, it was enormously wasteful and corrupt, as there were few checks on the ability of a militia officer to simply pocket part of all of the money, or to raise forces to protect his own pieve but refuse any requests for support elsewhere.
The arrival of the syndicate armada and its chests full of florins had restored the king's finances, but events moved swiftly thereafter and it is difficult to trace Theodore's expenditures. Clearly the reformed
Guardia Corsa was sustained and expanded with this new money, and militia officers were encouraged to come fight in the Balagna with promises of weapons and funds. During the rapid collapse of royalist positions after the fall of the Balagna, however, the king was more concerned with keeping his money from the French than figuring out how best to spend it. Through most of the 1739 summer and autumn campaign, the rebels' forces had been largely unpaid volunteers motivated to defend their own homelands, and even the Guard's pay was spotty and several months in arrears owing less to a shortage of money than to administrative and logistical confusion. General d'Ornano received funds and armaments to further his war effort in the south, but he was something of a special case, not only because of his ongoing struggle with Marshal Châtel but because his loyalty was thought to be precarious.
Fabiani's Reform
The winter of 1739-40 gave the royalist government a chance to pause and straighten out its affairs. Some reform was administrative; Secretary Gaffori made an attempt to regulate the government's spending. He appointed Decio Ciavaldini, a wealthy member of the national Diet whose family owned an ironworks in Alesani, as Controller-General, and assigned adjutants to regular regiments who were responsible for keeping the rolls of the unit and overseeing pay. The most substantial reforms, however, were proposed by Fabiani, and they concerned the structure of the army itself.
Fabiani's proposal involved scrapping the four-month system entirely and cutting back on (but not eliminating) payments to militia officers. Instead, he proposed a standing army organized in the continental fashion and based on annual enlistments. These troops would be paid (albeit not much) and armed from government arsenals. The fact that the army he suggested already existed was a major selling point in his favor, as his proposed force was not merely an idea—he could point to his already-organized companies of militia and say that unless the government saw fit to adopt them, they would return to their homes and the effort spent training and providing for them over the winter would be for naught. Unsurprisingly, Theodore and his council accepted Fabiani's proposal. Two regiments of 600 men each were authorized, and Giappiconi, the Minister of War, was instructed to cooperate with Fabiani in the recruitment and establishment of this force. Fabiani, however, took the opportunity to enact a thorough reorganization, not just of the militia but of the regular troops.
Over the course of the winter at Ponte Leccia, Fabiani and Kilmallock had made use of the regulars, both foreign and native, to train and lead the militia. Most of the Guard’s officers had at least some experience in a continental army, and even its ordinary soldiers had by now been drilling and marching under the instruction of Kilmallock and their own captains for more than a year. Likewise, while some of the foreigners were freed galley slaves or new recruits who had defected, there also many among them who had served a decent stretch in a proper army (like the
Colonesi, the two dozen or so veterans of the army of Electoral Cologne, including Lieutenant-Colonel Drevitz himself). At first, the Guard was utilized as a separate demonstration unit, but soon Fabiani found it useful to integrate Guard soldiers into the militia companies as officers and NCOs in order to spread their experience through the group.
The "new" royal army of March 1740 consisted of three regiments, two of infantry and one of guards. Battalions were of equal size (save for variations in the staff), but the guards regiment had only a single battalion while the infantry regiments had two. This represented a major decline in the nominal strength of the Guards, who saw their number of companies drop by half, but this was a product of their personnel being assigned to the new regiments as officers and trainers. All battalions, guard and regular, were standardized at 5 companies of 60 men each. The foreign regiment also had 60-man companies, but only two of these in the regiment's single battalion, plus the half-sized
Leibgarde company which was now administratively merged with the foreigners.
The new army was intended to be truly "national," although in practice it was a strictly northern army. The vast majority of its soldiers in 1740 were from the Castagniccia, with much smaller but notable contingents from Caccia, Talcini, and Niolo. The advantages offered by such a force were plain: because it was national, it could be deployed anywhere instead of being tied to one region or another, and because it was enlisted and salaried, it could be retained for as long as needed without disbanding after every battle. Although small, Fabiani believed it would work hand-in-glove with local militia forces wherever it campaigned, forming a semi-professional core around which irregulars could adhere. The cost, however, was not insignificant, and the syndicate's chests were not endless. As the spring of 1740 approached, it remained to be seen whether it would prove worthy of the considerable resources Fabiani had devoted to it.
Guards Regiment (313 men)
Regimental staff:
1 colonel
1 lieutenant-colonel
1 major
1 adjutant
1 chaplain
1 surgeon
1 armorer
1 drum-major
1 standardbearer
2 trumpeters
2 fifers
5 Guards Companies, each with:
1 captain
1 lieutenant
3 sergeants
6 corporals
48 guards
1 drummer
(620 men)
First Battalion:
1st Battalion staff:
1 colonel
1 major
1 adjutant
1 chaplain
1 surgeon
1 armorer
1 drum-major
2 trumpeters
2 fifers
5 Fusilier Companies, each with:
1 captain
1 lieutenant
3 sergeants
6 corporals
48 fusiliers
1 drummer
Second Battalion:
2nd Battalion staff:
1 lieutenant-colonel
1 adjutant
1 chaplain
1 surgeon
1 armorer
2 trumpeters
2 fifers
5 Fusilier Companies, same as 1st battalion
(158 men)
Regimental staff:
1 lieutenant-colonel
1 major
1 adjutant
1 surgeon
1 armorer
1 drum-major
2 fifers
2 Fusilier Companies, each with:
1 captain
1 lieutenant
1 sub-lieutenant
2 sergeants
6 corporals
48 fusiliers
1 drummer
1
Leibgarde Company, with:
1 captain
1 lieutenant
1 sub-lieutenant
2 sergeants
4 corporals
16 guards
2 trumpeters
2 drummers
1 kettle-drummer
No army in Europe adhered strictly to its organizational charts, and the Corsican royal army was certainly no exception. Still, it does seem to have been near its paper strength in March, with around 1,500-1,600 of its nominal 1,711 soldiers (including the foreign regiment and
Leibgarde). Some officers were scarce; the new army called for six battalion surgeons, for instance, but at that point had only managed to find two. The opposite problem was experienced regarding chaplains, causing Theodore's secretary Denis Richard to observe, perhaps with some exaggeration, that where other armies had a chaplain for each regiment, the Corsicans insisted on one in every company. Clearly the royal army did not suffer from a dearth of blessings.
Uniforms
According to the published manifest, the syndicate had sent 400 uniforms of Theodore's design to Corsica. While the Corsicans certainly had wool and the means to weave it, the green coats of Theodore's uniforms proved difficult to replicate because that color was particularly difficult and expensive to produce from natural dye. These "national" uniforms were originally given to the
Guardia Corsa, but with the reduction of that unit Fabiani decided to use some of them to denote senior officers in the new regiments. The rest wore civilian clothing, which was typically made from undyed wool, and in Corsica most sheep had dark fleece. The dominant color of the Corsican fighters, regular or irregular, was dark brown.
The army had no rank insignia as such, but types of officers were differentiated as follows:
Sub-officers (Cpl, Sgt): A black tricorne hat; regular soldiers typically wore the "Phrygian cap" of the Corsican peasant.
Company officers (Lt, Cpt): A black tricorne hat and an officer's stick, hung from a coat button when not in hand.
Field officers (Maj, Lt Col, Col): Full "national" uniform and officer's stick.
All soldiers wore the green cockade of the royalist cause, which was hardly unique to the regular troops.
A Corsican soldier sounding a conch
Musicians
Of special note was the army's band corps. Typical practice on the continent involved drummers at the company level and fifers at the battalion level, which together would be used to coordinate the movements of infantry. Cavalry, in turn, generally used trumpets and kettle drums. The syndicate had in fact sent all of these instruments to Corsica—even a set of kettle drums
—but the Corsicans were unfamiliar with most of them. Fifes did not prove too difficult; Corsican shepherds had long used the
pirula (a reed flute) and the
pifana (a gemshorn). Drums, however, seem to have caught on slowly, despite Fabiani assigning regimental drum-majors to the infantry from among the foreign soldiers to instruct the company drummers in their use.
Of particular note were the two trumpeters in every regiment. With the exception of the
Leibgarde trumpeters, who used brass instruments, the army's trumpeters appear to have usually used the conch horn. The French had encountered the rebel conch-players before, at Borgo and Alesani, and described the sound as "unnerving." They assumed that this psychological effect was its sole intention, but in fact Corsican shepherds and cattle-drivers had long used conch horns for signaling, and such signals were readily adapted to military use. The Corsican royal army was, as far as this author is aware, the only European army of the period to use the conch as a military instrument.
Selected officers as of March 1740
Colonel, Guard Regt: Count
Gio-Giacomo Ambrosi di Castinetta, of Rostino
Lieutenant-Colonel, Guard Regt:
Antonio Buttafuoco, of Vescovato
Colonel, 1st Infantry Regt:
Paolo Francesco Giannoni, of Rostino
Lieutenant-Colonel, 1st Infantry Regt:
Silvestre Colombani, of Talasani
Colonel, 2nd Infantry Regt:
Carlo Felice Giuseppe, of Pietralba
Lieutenant-Colonel, 2nd Infantry Regt:
Gio Paolo Giudicelli, of Speloncato
Lieutenant-Colonel, Foreign Regt:
Karl Christian Drevitz, of Cologne
Captain,
Leibgarde:
Johann-Gottfried Vater, of Saxony
Also, great story, fantabulous really, lovin' it.
